Holding

The compulsory exhibition of short educational/scientific/news films and the 1% rental fee are reasonable, content‑neutral restrictions that further the public purpose of information dissemination and do not violate Articles 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(g).

Summary

The Union of India and the States of West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh challenged provisions in the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and related state regulations that require cinema exhibitors to show short scientific, educational, documentary or news films and to pay a 1% rental fee to the Films Division. The exhibitors argued that these "must‑carry" requirements infringed their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and 19(1)(g) (right to carry on a profession). The Supreme Court held that the provisions serve a public purpose of disseminating information to a largely illiterate population, are content‑neutral, and are reasonable restrictions under Articles 19(2) and 19(6). The 1% rental is a fee for services rendered, not a tax, and the expense is proportionate to the cost incurred by the Films Division. Consequently, the statutory requirements were upheld and the High Court’s order striking down the rental and directing free supply of films was set aside. The writ petition was dismissed and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

The constitutionality of compulsory exhibition of short scientific, educational, documentary or news films under Article 19(1)(a).
The validity of the 1% rental fee as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(1)(g) and whether it amounts to a tax under Article 265.
Whether the statutory provisions constitute a reasonable restriction under Articles 19(2) and 19(6).

Legislation cited

Cinematograph Act, 1952s. 12(4), s. 16
Uttar Pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955

Subjects

Freedom of speechRight to professionCompulsory exhibitionMust‑carry provisionReasonable restrictionTax vs feeCinematograph Act

Judgment

...
I

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. A
v.
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

JULY 15, 1999

[SUJA TA V. MANOHAR, K. VENKA T ASWAMY B
AND R.C. LAHOTI, JJ.]

Constitution of India-Arts 19(/)(a), 19(2),-:-Freedom of speech and
expression-Scope-Requirement to show short film, educational, scientific,
documentary film or a film carrying news or current events, along with other C
films-Whether showing of compulsory films is violative ofrights ofexhibitors
under Art 19(/)(a) of the Constitution-Held, No-Cinematograph Act, 1952;
West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act. 1964, notification No. 7277-F dated
20-9-1957 issued thereunder; U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955; Delhi
Cinematograph Rules, 1981.
D
Constitution of India-Art I9(1)(g), 19(6)-Freedom to carry
profession-Exhibiting cinematograph films in cinema theatres-Lincensing
of cinema halls-Requirement to exhibit short Films, educational, scientific,
documentary film, or news film carrying current events, along with other
films-Whether violative of rights of exhibitions under Art 19(/)(g) of the E
Constitution-Held No.

Cinematograph Act, 1952-West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act,
1954-U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, I955-Delhi Cinematograph Rules,
I981-Constitutional validity to-Exhibition of cinematograph films-
Licensing-Requirement to exhibit a scientific, educational or documentary F
film or news film-Whether violates fundamental right to free speech and
expression and right to profession ofthe exhibitors-Held, No-Constitutional
validity of the provisions upheld

The respondents, Associations of organisations engaged in the business
of distribution and exhibition of motion pictures in the area of Delhi, U.P. G
and in West Bengal challenged the validity of certain provisions of the West
Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1964 and a notification No. 7277-F dated
20-9-1957 issued thereunder; the Cinematograph Act, 1952; the U.P. Cinemas
(Regulation) Act, 1955 and the Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1981. According
to the impugned provisions of these legislation, in each cinema theatre the H
875
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A e~hibitor of films is required to show a short film which may be educational
or scientific, a documentary film, or a film carrying news or current events,
along with the other films. The duration of such films is limited and only
a small proportion of this total viewing time is devoted to the showing of such
films. Each exhibitor is required to enter into an agreement with the Films
B Division for the supply of such films for exhibition and the exhibitor is
required to pay to the films Division a rental amounting to 1% of his net
weekly collection for the supply of the films. The respondents challenged
these provisions as violative of their rights under Art 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution. The exhibitors alleged that the condition in the licence

C
requiring them to show these films even for a short duration is now
economically onerous and violates their right to carry on their chosen
business under Art. 19(1)(g); that the charge of one percent on the net
-
recoveries is a compulsory exaction in the form of a tax; and that a 'must
carry' provision in a statute, rule or regulation, is equally an infringement
of the right of free speech, except to the extent permitted under Art 19(2)
D of the Constitution. The High Court upholding the statutory provisions, held
that the condition in the agreement for charging a rental for the supply is
unconstitutional, directing the Films Division to supply such films to each
exhibitor at his place of exhibition and that no charges should be levied for
the supply of these films. Condition 15 of the licence issued under the
Cinematograph Act was struck down as redundant The High Court declined
E to consider the validity of the provisions under Art 19(1)(a), there being no
averments to that effect.

These appeals had been filed by the Union oflndia and the writ petition
was filed by the exhibitors against the findings recorded by the High Court
The questions raised for consideration were whether the purpose of
F compulsory show in the impugned provisions is to promote the fundamental
freedom of speech and expression and dissemination of ideas, or whether it
is to restrain this freedom; and whether the expense incurred in showing
these films is high or unreasonable.

G Allowing the appeals while dismissing the writ petition, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The social context of any such legislation cannot be
ignored. When a substantially significant population body is illiterate or
does not have easy access to ideas or information, it is important that all
available means of communication, particularly audiovisual communication,
H are utilised not just for entertainment but also for education, information,
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION 877
propagation of scientific ideas and the like. The best way by which ideas can A
reach this large body of uneducated people is through the entertainment
channel which is watched by all illiterate and literate alike. To earmark a
small portion of time of this entertainment medium for purpose of showing
scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news films has
to be looked at in this context of promotion of dissemination of ideas,
information and knowledge to the masses so that there may be an informed B
debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions ,.
are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it. None
of these provisions require the exhibitor to show propaganda film or a film
conveying views which he objects to. In the present case, the contents of the
compulsory films are specified in legislation concerned.(888-G-H; 889-A-C] C

1.2. Undoubtedly the exhibitors, in order to fulfil the conditions of the
licence, are required to enter into an agreement with the Films Division,
Government of India. This is not because of any statutory compulsion but
because of the fact that the Films Division is the only organisation which
produces such short films in sufficient quantities for regular distribution D
to the cinema exhibitors. The requirement for approval of such films is to
ensure that the film, in fact, comply with the requirements specified in the
statute. These provisions, therefore, do not violate Article 19(l)(a) of the
Constitution. They are not in restrain of free speech and expression.
Therefore, Article 19(2) is not attracted. (889-E-F-H; 890-A] E

Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd & Ors. v. Union of India, (1986] 1 SCC
133; S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors., (1989] 2 SCC 574; Indian
Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1985] 1 SCC 641; K.A. Abbas v. Union of India & Anr., (1970) 2 SCC 780;
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof Manubhai D. Shah, (1992] 3 F
SCC 637 and Secretary, Ministry of Infromation & Broadcasting, Govt. of
India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Anr., (1995) 2 SCC 161,
relied on.

1.3. In the present case, the restrictions sought to be imposed are G
specific and tailored to fit the public purpose behind the restrictions. The
length of the film to be shown, the duration for which it is to be shown and
the nature of the films which are to be shown, are specified and are designed
to further the public purpose of disseminating information and knowledge
so that the general public can be educated on a number of issues of national
or general importance to enable them to function effectively in the democratic H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A framework of this country with adult franchise. These restrictions, therefore,
have to be upheld as reasonable. [891-D-E)

1.4. The reasonableness or otherwise of restrictions on their right to
carry on business will have to be examined in the context of the purpose
sought to be served by imposing such restrictions. The rights of the exhibitors
B under Art. 19(l)(g) are subject to reasonable restrictions under Article
19(6). There is a public purpose in requiring the exhibitors to show such
films. Requiring an entertainment medium like cinema theatre to show for
a short duration of its programme, films which educate and impart information
cannot be considered as an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry
on business. When there is adult franchise without literacy, it becomes all
C the more important that information and ideas reach the adult population.
[892-E-G)
1.5. Looking to the purpose for which films are shown, the expense
incurred also cannot be considered as unreasonable. The Films Division
incurs an expenditure of more than Rs. 12 crores per year only for taking
D out adequate prints, while their recovery in form of rental is only Rs. 7 to
8 crores per year. Therefore, the Films Division is charging a very small
amount considering the expenditure outlay in producing and distributing
these films. In these facts and circumstances, the rental of one per cent
cannot be considered as excessive. (893-H; 894-A-B)
E 1.6. The Film Division has a distribution network spread throughout
the country to serve 13000 cinema theatres. It has ten distribution branches
throughout the country. The Film Division packs the films, seals them and
sends them by train to the cities, towns, and villages wherever the cinema
theatres are located. Therefore, there is no special inconvenience caused to
the exhibitors for securing these films. The arrangements for supply and
F
distribution which have been in existence unchallenged for the last 30 years
until the present proceedings were instituted cannot be considered as
unsatisfactory or unreasonable. (894-C-D]
1.7. The charge termed in the agreement as rental for the films covers
G charges for preparing the prints of the films for distribution, and for packing
them for delivery. These are clearly services.rendered by the Film Division
for which it is paid one per cent of the net collection as a rental. The total
cost for preparing prints, packing them and distributing them is higher than
the total recovery made by the Film Division by way of rental from all the
exhibitors. There is a clear nexus between the services rendered and the
H payment to be made. The payment, therefore, is in a nature of a fee rather
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION 879
than a tax though there may not be an exact quid pro quo. This is clearly A
an agreed fee charged for rendering services. It cannot be viewed as a
compulsory exaction or a tax. There is a statutory obligation which is cast
on the exhibitors to exhibit certain films. To carry out this statutory obligation,
if the exhibitors enter into an agreement with the Films Division and agree
to pay a certain amount of rental for procuring the films from the Film
Division to comply with the statutory obligations, the levy must, since it is B
correlated with the Films Division discharging certain obligations under the
contract, be viewed, at the highest, as a fee and not as a tax. It is an agreed
payment, and is not unreasonable. [895-A-B; F-Hl
....
District Council of the Jowai Autonomous Distt., Jowai v. Dwet Singh C
Rymbai etc., AIR (1986) 1930; Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments,
Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sir Shirur Mutt, AIR (1954)
SC 282 and Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar
Jyantikumar Pasawalla & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 2083, relied on.

1.8. Conditions 15 and 22 of the licence do not overlap, but refer to D
different sizes and types of short films, shorter films or lantern slides. The
High Court was, therefore, not right in holding that Condition No. 15 is
redundant since it is covered by Condition No. 22. Both conditions, however,
must be read in the light of Section 12(4) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952
and only films and lantern slides which fall within the description of such
films under Section 12(4) can be so required to be shown. [896-F-G) E

R.M Seshadri v. The District Magistrate, Tanjore & Anr., [1955) 1 SCR
686; Chief Commissioner, Ajmer v. Brij Niwas Das, [1963] 2 SCR 145 and
Minerva Talkies, Bangalore & Ors. v. State of Karnantaka & Ors., [1988)
Suppl. sec 176, relied on. F
Neal R. Wooley, Etc_. v. George Maynard, [1977] 430 US 705 and Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, (1997)
512 US 622, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3766-67 of G
1999 Etc. Etc.

From the Judgment and order dated 31.8.95 of the Delhi High Court in
C.W.P. No. 4408 and 4703of1993.

R.N. Trivedi, Additional Solicitor General, N.N. Goswami, Dr. R.K. Dhawan, H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A V.A. Mohta, S.K. Dholakia, (A.K. Goel, Additional Advocate Genera[ for State
ofU.P.), S.K. Dwivedi, A. Subba Rao, Hemant Sharma, (S.W.A. Qadri), B.V.
Bairam Das, Ashok Jain, Umesh Kumar Bohre, pradeep Aggarwal, Sushi! K,
Jain, Pradeep Misra, Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, Vijay Kumar, H.K. Puri, Ujjawal
Banerjee and Rathin Das for the appearing parties.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MS. SUJATA V. MANO HAR, J. Delay condoned.

Leave granted in special leave petitions.

C This group of appeals is filed by the Union of India, the State of West
Bengal and the State of Uttar Pradesh against a judgment and order dated
31.8.1995 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 4408 and 4703of1993; while
the writ petition is filed by the Eastern India Motion Picture Association
against the Union of India and others. This group of appeals and the writ
petition taise a common question of law as to the validity of certain provisions
D of(l) the West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act. 1954 and a notification No.
7277-F dated 20.9.1957 issued thereunder, (2) the Cinematograph Act, 1952, (3)
the U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 and (4) the Delhi Cinematograph
Rules, 1981.

E The respondents in the appeals are Associations of organisations
engaged in the business of distribution and exhibition of motion pictures in
the area of Delhi and U.P. commonly known as the Delhi"Uttar Pradesh Circuit
and in West Bengal.

In part III of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 which applies only to the
F Union Territories including Delhi, Section 12 imposes certain restrictions on
the powers of the licensing authority to grant a licence for the exhibition of
cinematograph films. Section 12 Sub-section (4) provides as follows :-

The Cinematograph Act :

"12(4): The Central Government may, from time to.time, issue directions
G
to licenses generally and to any licensee in particular for the purpose
of regulating the exhibition of any film or class of films, so that
scientific films, films intended for educational purposes, films dealing
with news and current events, documentary films or indigenous films
secure an adequate opportunity of being exhibited, and where any
H such directions have been issued those directions shall be deemed to
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJA TA V. MANO HAR, J ) 88}

-- be additional conditions and restrictions subject to which the licence
had been granted."
A
(underlining ours)

Under Section 16 which also fonns a part of Part III of the Cinematograph
Act, 1952, the Central Government is empowered by notification in the official
gazette, to make rules, inter alia, "(a) prescribing the tenns, conditions and B
restrictions, if any, subject to which licences may be granted under this Part."
Pursuant to the rule-making power so granted, rules have been framed by the
Central Government known as the Delhi Cinematograph Rules of l 981. Under
these rules various conditions for the grant of a licence to exhibit a
cinematograph film are stipulated. Conditions 15 and 22 are as follows :
c
"Condition No. I 5 : The licensee shall, when and so often as the
Administrator may require, exhibit free of charge or on such tenns as
regards remuneration as the Administrator may detennine, films and
lantern slides provided by the Administrator;
D
Provided that the licensee shall not be required to exhibit at one
entertainment films or lantern slides the exhibition of which will take
more than fifteen minutes in all or to exhibit films or alides unless they
are delivered to him at least twenty four hours before the entertainment
at which they are to be shown is due to begin.
E
Condition No. 22 : The licensee shall cause to be exhibited at each
perfonnance given at the licensed place one or more approved films,
the total length of which may not be exceeding 600m (2000 feet) of
~
approved films of 35 m.m. size or the corresponding footage of approved
films of 16m.m. size, and shall comply with any direction which the
Administrator or the licensing authority may give by general or special F
order as to the manner in which the approved films shall be exhibited
in the course of any perfonnance.

Explanation I : "Approved film" means cinematograph film approved
by the Central Government.
G

-- Explanation 2 : For the purpose of computing the corresponding
footage of films of 16m.m. size, in relation to films of35m.m. size, 120m.
(400 feet) of films of 16m.m. size shall be deemed to be equivalent to
300 m. (1000 feet) of films of35m.m. size."
-$
Under Notification No. XXXM{l 6)/81 dated I Ith January, 1982 issued H

-i'
...

'
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 3 S.C.R.

A under Section 5(4) of the Uttar pradesh Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955,
directions have been issued to the licensees which are as follows :

Directions :
-
...,-
"1. The licensees shall so arrange the exhibition of cinematograph
films that approved films are exhibited at every performance open to
B
the public. The ratio of approved films to be exhibited at such
performances shall in relation to other films be one to five or the
nearest approximation thereto.
-
· Definition-For the purposes of these directions, an "approved"
c film means (i) a film produced in India and approved by the Central
Government after considering the recommendations of the Film
Advisory Board, Bombay, to be scientific films, films intended for
educational purposes, films dealing with news and current events or
documentary films, (ii) Indian News Reviews produced in India and
approved by the Central Government after considering the
D recommendations of the Chief Producer, Films Division, Bombay, to be
films dealing with news and current events.
I

2. Nothin8 contained in these directions shall b~ construed as requiring
licensee-

E (a) to exhibit at any performance more than (2000 feet) approximately
610 metres ofapproved films of 35m.m. size or the corresponding
length of approved films of 16 m.m. size; or ..
(b) to exhibit any approved film for more than two weeks
continuously; or
F (c) to re-exhibit any approved film which has been shown for two ...
continuous weeks; or
(d) to exhibit approved films to the full extent indicated hereinbefore
in the event of sufficient number or length of approved films not
being available for the time being.
G
3. For the purpose of computing the corresponding length of films of
16m.m. size in relation to films of 35 m.m. size, approximately 122
metres (400 feet) of 16m.m. film shall be deemed to be equivalent to
approximately 305 metres (1000 feet) of 35m.m. films."

H Under Section 5(3) of the West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1954,

'
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 883

it is provided as follows : A
"5(3): The State Government may from time to time, issue directions
to licensees generally or in the opinion of the State Government

--
\
circumstances so justify, to any licensee in particular, for the purpose
of regulating, the exhibition of any film or class of films and in
particular the exhibition of scientific films, films intended for educational B
purposes, films, dealing with news and current events, documentary
films or films produced in India, and where any such directions have
been issued, those directions shall be deemed to be additional

- conditions and _restrictions subject to which the licence has been
granted."

By a Notification No. 7277-F dated 20.9.1957 issued by the West Bengal
c
Government under Section 5(3) of the above Act. The State Government has
given certain directions for the issue of licenses for the exhibition of films.
These are as follows :
D
"Directions : A licensee shall so regulate the public exhibition of
films by .means of a cinematograph that, at every such exhibition,
there shall be exhibited notified films of such length as bears to the
length of other films exhibited approximately the ratio of one to five

E
(a) to exhibit at any such public exhibition more than 2,000 ft. of
notified films of35 m.m. size or 800 ft. ofnotified films of 16m.m. size;
or

(b) to exhibit any notified films for more than two weeks continuously;
or F
(c) to re-exhibit any notified film which has been shown for two
continuous weeks; or

(d) to exhibit notified films beyond the limit upto which notified films
are available for exhibition for the time being, or to exhibit any notified G
films when such films are not available for the time being.

Provided further that of the total time taken in the exhibition of
notified films at every such exhibition, not less than half shall be
.allotted to the exhibition of films approved by the Central Government
after considering the recommendations of the Films Advisory Board, H
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 3 S.C.R.

A Bombay, if films of the latter description are available.

Explanation : In these directions "notified film" means a film which is
produced in India in which is-
,..
l
(i) a scientific films, or

B (ii) a film intended for educational purpose, or

(iii) a film dealing with news and current events, or

(iv) a documentary film,

certified or exempted from certification, as the case may be, under Part
c II of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (XXX:VII of 1952), which is notified
by the State government in the "Calcutta Gazette" for exhibition for
the purpose of Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the West Bengal
Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1954 (West Bengal Act XXXIX of 1954);

Provided that any of the films as referred to above, which is
D approved by the Central Government after considering the
recommendations of the Film Advisory Board, Bombay, shall be deemed
to be a notified film for the purpose of this notification."

All these provisions are similar in nature, and have been in force for
E some decades. They are hereinafter referred to as the "impugned provisions".
Thus, under Section 12(4) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 the Central
Government may issue directions to the licensees that scientific films, films
intended for educational purposes, films dealing with news and current events,
documentary films- or indigenous films have to be exhibited by the licensee
along with the other films which the licensee is exhibiting. The length and the
F duration of such films is regulated by conditions 15 and 22 of the licence
which require only a film of a short length being thus shown along with the
other films. Similarly, under the West Bengal Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1954
also Section 5(3) requires an identical class of films which are required to be
shown along with the other films which· the respondents exhibit in their
G cinema theatres. The notification of 20th of September, 1957 specifies the
duration of such films and its length, making it clear that the length of such
films which are required to be exhibited will not exceed the ratio of 1:5. The
length of these films is also specified. The licence conditions refer to "approved
filll}S" or "notified films" which are defined.

H As a result, in each cinema theatre the exhibitor of films is required to
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 885
show a film which may be educational or scientific; a documentary film, or a A
film carrying news or current event, along with the other films. The duration
of such film is strictly limited and only a small proportion of the total viewing
time is devoted to the showing of such films. Since short films in these
categories are normally produce by the films division of the government of
India; each exhibitor is required to enter into an agreement with the films
division for the supply of such films for exhibition . Under the terms and B
condition of the agreement between the exhibitor and the film division; the
exhibitor is required to pay to the films division a rental amounting to l % of
his net weekly collection for the supply of the films. This rental has remained
the same for the past several decaders and is a rental which is fixed as a result
of negotiations with the Films Federation of India. C

These Impugned provisions have been in force or several decades. The
respondents however; in 1993 challenged these provisions as violative of
their rights under Articles l9(l)(a) and 19 (l) (g) of the constitution. The
Delhi High Court; by the impugned judgment has held that the condition in
the agreement between Films Division and the exhibitor, for charging a rental D
for the supply of the said films is unconstitutional. The Delhi High Court
has also held that the provision by which the exhibitor is required to collect
a film from the Film Division is also onerous and, therefore, invalid. It has
also struck down condition 15 of the licence issued under the Cinematograph
Act; 1952 as redundant. Therefore, while upholding the statutory provisions, E
the court has directed that such films should be supplied by the Films
Division to each exhibitor at his place of exhibition and that no charges
should be levied for the supply of these films. Aggrieved by these finding,
the present app~als have been filed. The writ petition which is filed by the
Eastern India Motion pictures Association, has challenged the validity of the
same provision under Article 19(1) (a) of the constitution, since the Delhi F
High Court declined to consider the validity of these provisions under Article
19 (l) (a), without any averments to that effect.

The exhibitors contend that the above provisions which compel them
to show'a scientific, educational or documentary film or a news film, even for G
a short duration of fifteen to twenty minutes per show, violate their fundamental
rights to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
They also contend that Article 19(2) which permits a reasonable restraint on
this freedom on the grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, security
of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or
morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an H
A

886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999} 3 S.C.R.

A offence, does not cover this kind of compulsion to show educational, scientific
and documentary films or other kinds of films specified in the above provisions.

Undoubtedly, free speech is the foundation of a democratic society. A
free exchange of ideas, dissemination of information without restraints,
dissemination of knowledge, airing of differing view points, debating and
B forming one shown views and expressing them, are the basic indicia of a free
society. This freedom alone makes it possible for people to formulate their
own views and opinions on a proper basis and to exercise their social,
economic and political rights in a free society in an informed manner. Restraints
on this right, therefore, have been jealously watched by the courts. Article
C 19(2) spells out the various grounds on which this right to free speech and
expression can be restrained. Thus in Express Newspapers pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
v. Union ofIndia & Ors., [1986] 1 SCC 133 (at page 195), this Court stressed
that, "Freedom of thought and expression, and the freedom of the press are
not only valuable freedoms in themselves but are basic to a democratic form
of Government which proceeds on the theory that the problems of the
D Government can be solved by the free exchange of thought and by public
discussion of the various issues facing the nation .......... This right is one of
the pillars of individual liberty freedom of speech, which our constitution has
always unfailingly guarded ........ however precious and cherished the freedom
of speech is under Article 19(l)(a), this freedom is not absolute and unlimited
E at all times and all circumstances but is subject to the restrictions contained
in Article 19(2)." In S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram and Ors., [1989] 2 SCC
574 (at page 592), this Court again observed: "The democracy is a government
by the people via open discussion. The democratic form of government itself
demands of its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of
the community ....... The democracy can neither work nor prosper unless
F people go out to share their views." The importance of freedom of speech and
expression including freedom of the press has been repeatedly stressed by
this Court in a number of decisions (See in this connection (Indian Express
Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors v. Union of India and Ors.,
tl985] 1 SCC 641, K.A. Abbas v. The Union ofIndia and Anr., [1970] 2 SCC
G 780, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Prof Manubhai D. Shah, [ 1992]
3 sec 637.

In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, Govt. of India
and Ors., v. Cricket Association of Bengal and Anr., [1995] 2 SCC 161, this
Court, after citing Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
H went on to state (at page 213), "The freedom of speech and expression
-
U.0.I. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.) 887
includes right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Freedom of speech A
and expression is necessary, for self-expression which is an important means
of free conscience and self-fulfilment. It enables people to contribute to
debates on social and moral issues. It is the best way to find a truest model
of anything, since it is only through it that the widest possible range of ideas
can circulate. It is the only vehicle of political discourse so essential to
democracy, Equally important is the role it plays in facilitating artistic and B
scholarly endeavours of all sorts. The right to communicate, therefore,
includes right to communicate through any media that is available whether
print or electronic or audio-visual such as advertisement, movie, article.
speech etc. "

It is contended that just as a restraint on free speech is a violation of
c
Article 19(1) [except as permitted under article 19(2)] compelled speech, often
known as a "must· carry" provision in a statute, rule or regulation, is equally
an infringement of the right to free speech, except to the extent permitted
under Article 19(2). However, whether compelled speech will or will not
amount to a violation of the freedom of speech and expression, will depend D
on the nature of a "must carry" provision. If a "must carry" provision furthers
informed decision-making which is the essence of the right to free speech and
expression, it will not amount to any violation of the fundamental freedom of
speech and expression. If, however, such a provision compels a person to
carry out propaganda or project a partisan or distorted point of view, contrary E
to his wish, it may amount to a restraint on his freedom of speech and
expression. To give an example, at times a statute imposes an obligation to
print certain information in public interest. Any food product must carry on
its package the list of ingredients used in its preparation, or must print its
weight. These are beneficial "must carry" provisions meant to inform the
public about the correct quantity and contents of the product it buys. It F
enables the public to decide on a correct basis whether a particular product
should or should not be used. Cigarettes cartons are required to carry a
statutory warning that cigarette smoking is harmful to health. This is
undoubtedly a "must carry" provision or compelled speech. Nevertheless, it
is meant to further the basic purpose of imparting relevant information which G
will enable a user to make a correct decision as to whether he should smoke
a cigarette or not. Such mandatory provisions although they compel speech
cannot be viewed as a restraint on the freedom of speech and expression.

In Neal R. Wooley, etc. v. George Maynard, [1977] 430 US 705, the
United States Supreme Court considered a New Hampshire state law which H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A compelled the state motto "Live Free or Die," to be embossed on car licence
plates. A follower of Jehovah's Witnesses objected to carrying the motto on
his car licence plate. The Court held that the state's requirement that non-
commercial vehicles licence plates be embossed with the state motto invaded
(
First Amendment rights and could not be justified as facilitating the
identification of passenger vehicles or as promoting an appreciation of history,
B indi_vidualism, and state pri~e. In the more recent case of Turner Broadcasting
system, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, [1997] 512 US 622, the
US Supreme Court examined Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer
protection and Competition Act of 1992 which required cable operators to
carry the signals of specified numbers based on cable system size of local
C commercial television stations and local non-commercial educational television
stations. On the basis of the material brought on record after remand, the
majority came to the conclusion that the "must carry" provisions were
consistent with the First Amendment, because the purpose of the "must
carry" provision was to preserve the benefits of free over-the-air local
broadcast television, promoting wide-spread dissemination of information
D from a multiplicity of sources and promoting fair competition in the television
programme market. Breyer J. in his partly concurring judgment balanced the
restraints which such a compulsory carriage clause would impose because it
would interfere with the protected interests of the cable operators to choose
their own programming, against an -important First Amendment interest in
E favour of the provision viz. promoting the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources to facilitate public discussion
and informed deliberation. The latter being basic democratic government
-·
purposes which the First Amendment seeks to achieve, they outweighed
objections relating to interference with the cable operators' right to choose
their own programme.
F
Although the First Amendment right under the U.S. Constitution is not
subject to reasonable restraint as in Article 19(2), the raison de'tre of a
constitutional guarantee of free speech is the same. We have to examine
whether the purpose of compulsory speech in the impugned provisions is to
G promote the fundamental freedom of speech and expression and dissemination
of ideas, or whether it is to restrain this freedom, the social context of any
such legislation cannot be ignored. When a substantially significant population
body is illiterate or does not have easy access to ideas or information, it is
important that all available means of communication, particularly audiovisual
communication, are utilised not just for entertainment but also for education,
H information, propagation of scientific ideas and the like. The best way by
U.O.l. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 889
which ideas can reach this large body of uneducated people is through the A
entertainment channel which is watched by all-literate and illiterate alike. To
earmark a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the purpose
of showing scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news
films has to be looked at in this context of promoting dissemination of ideas,
information and knowledge to the masses so that there may be an informed
debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions B
are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it. None
of these statutory provisions require the exhibitor to show a propaganda film
or a film conveying views which he objects to. In fact, the exhibitors have
not raised any objection to the contents of the films which they are required
to show. They, however, contend that one of the important requirements for C
upholding such compulsory speech in the United States is that such speech
should be content-neutral. While in the present case, the contents of the
compulsory films are specified in the legislation concerned. In the context of
Article 19( 1) what we have to examine is whether the categories of films so
required to be carried promote dissemination of information and education or
whether they are meant to be propaganda or false or biased information. The D
statute quite clearly specifies the kinds of films which promote dissemination
of knowledge and information.

Undoubtedly, the exhibitors, in order to fulfil the conditions of the
licence, are required to enter into an agreement with the Films Division, E
Government of India. This is not because of any statutory compulsion but
because of the fact that the Films Division is the only organisation which
produces such short films on sufficient quantities for regular distribution to
the cinema exhibitors. The requirement of approval of such films is to ensure
that the films, in fact, comply with the requirements specified in the statute.
None of the provisions referred to make it mandatory for the exhibitors to F
procure such films only from the Films Division. The reason why they do so
is because of a lack of adequate alternative sources.

The exhibitors contend that before their licence is renewed, it is
necessary for them to obtain a "no objection" certificate from the Films G
Division. The purpose of this is to ensure that the ~tatutory requirements
have been complied with by the licensee in the previous 'Year. If, however, any
licensee is in a position to procure such approved films from any other
source, there is nothing in the statutes which prohibits him from doing so.
These provisions, therefore, do not violate Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution.
They are not in restraint of free speech and expression. Therefore, Article H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 3 S.C.R.

A 19(2) is not attracted.

The main challenge of the exhibitors to these provisions is, however,
under Article 19( 1)(g) of the Constitution. In fact, this was the only challenge
before the Delhi High Court. The basic purpose of the impugned laws which
deal with licensing of cinema halls, and prescribing conditions subject to
B which such licences can be granted, is to regulate the business activity of -
the exhibitors of cinematograph films. Obtaining a licence for running such
cinema theatres is for the purpose of regulating this business. This purpose
has a direct nexus with Articles 19(1 )(g) and 19(6) of the Constitution. The
source oflegislation under this head can be traced to Entry 33 of List II which
C entitles the States to legislate on "theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas
subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List l, sports, entertainments and
amusements." That is why State Laws have been framed for regulating the
terms and conditions on which a licence for exhibiting films at cinema theatres
can be obtained. part III of the cinematograph Act, 1952 which applies to
Union Territories is also in the exercise of the legislative powers under Entry
D 33 of List IL Since Delhi was a Union Territory and is now National Capital
Territory since 1991 by virtue of the Constitution 69th Amendment Act, 1991,
Parliament has the power to legislate under this Entry also. [see Article 246(4)
and the relevant provisions of Article 239(AA)]. Entry 60 List I on the other
han~ deals with "sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition." Censorship
E provisions, for example, would come under Entry 60 of List I and these would
directly relate to Article 19(1) (a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The
basic purpose of these impugned provisions is, therefore, to regulate the
business of exhibiting films in cinema theatres under Entry 33 List II.

In the case of R.M Seshadri v. The District Magistrate, Tanjore and
F Anr., [1955] l SCR 686, this Court was required to examine under Article
19( l )(g) the conditions attached to a licence to exhibit cinematograph films in
cinema theatres requiring the licensee to exhibit at every performance one or
more approved films of such duration as the Provincial Government or the
Central Government may, by general or special order, direct. The Court said
G that neither the length of the films nor the duration for which the film had to
be shown were prescribed. No maximum limit was placed on the time to be
· taken in showing such films. Looking to the unguided discretion given to the
Government in this regard, the restrictions placed were unreasonable and
arbitrary and could not be considered as reasonable restrictions under Article
19(6). The Court expressly excluded from its considerations the question
H whether educational or instructional films could be thus shows.
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [J\i ~UJAT AV. MANO HAR, J.] 891
In Brij Niwas Das v. Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, ILR (1958) Raj. 1076, A
the Rajasthan High Court upheld conditions in the licence which required that
educational and instructional slides should be shown for a duration of 15
· minutes, and approved films should be shown for a duration which was 1/
5th of the total time. Looking to the specific provisions, the Court upheld
these provisions under Article 19( l )(g) read with Article 19(6). The Court also·

- upheld Section 12(4) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The Court, however, B
said that the requirement in one of the impugned conditions that films produced
in India should be shown in this fashion without specifying the categories
of such films was not valid. The Chief commissioner, Ajmer came in appeal
before this court. This Court by its judgment and order reported in Chief
Commissioner, Ajmer, Brij Niwas Das, [1963] 2 SCR 145, held the condition C
applicable to films produced in India as also valid, the purpose being to
promote indigenous films.

Time and place constraints on cinema halls have also been upheld as
regulatory provisions in Minerva Talkies, Bangalore & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka & Ors., [1988] Supp. SCC 176. In the present case, the restrictions D
sought to be imposed are specific and tailored to fit the public purpose
behind the restrictions. The length of the film to be shown, the duration for
which it is to be shown and the nature of the films which are to be shown,
.are specified and are designed to further the public purpose of disseminating
information and knowledge so that the general public can be educated on a E
number of issues of national or general importance to enable them to function
effectively in the democratic framework of this country with adult franchise.
These restrictions, therefore, have to be upheld as reasonable.

According to the exhibitors, even if the nature of the film, its duration
and length are specified, their right to carry on their business of exhibiting F
motion pictures is nevertheless adversely affected because at every show,
·they are required to exhibit for a duration of 15 to 20 minutes these educational
scientific films, etc, thus cutting into their business time. They also contend
that they are subjected to inconvenience because they are required to procure
these films expending time and money. Moreover, under the terms of their G
agreement with the Films Division, they are also required to pay one per cent
of their net weekly collection as rental for the films so procured. They contend
that when such films are shown over television, the Govemment is required
to pay for the showing time while in their case they are required to pay a rent
to the Films Division. These are all unreasonable restrictions on their right to
carry on business. H
)

892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S:C.R.

A According to the exhibitors, although these provisions have been in
force for almost three decades and they have regularly complied with these
provisions by exhibiting educational, scientific films etc. of the Films Division
for the stipulated duration in their shows, they are now seeking to challenge
these provisions because according to them, the business of exhibiting
cinematograph films is no longer as profitable as it used to be. They contend
B that with the arrival of the electronic media, popular attraction for watching
movies in cinema theatres has dwindled. People like to watch entertainment
programmes over television or with the help of a video or through internet
in their homes. They do not flock to cinema theatres as they used to. As a
-
result, the cost of showing the short films of the Films Division can no longer
C be borne by them. The condition, therefore, in the licence requiring them to
show these films even for a short duration, is now onerous and violates their
right to carry on their chosen business under Article 19( l )(g). In this context
they further submit that the restrictions imposed cannot now be considered
as reasonable because the exhibitors, in view of their reduced profit making,
cannot bear the expenses relating to the showing of these films, including the
D rental.

The reasonableness or otherwise of restrictions on their right to carry
on business will have to be examined in the context of the purpose sought
t-0 be served by imposing such restrictions. There is no dispute that the rights
E of the exhibitors under Article 19(1 )(g) are subject to reasonable restrictions
under Article I 9(6). There is a public purpose in requiring the exhibitors to
show such films. We have already stated that where a large percentage of
population is illiterate and has very limited access to knowledge, information
and ideas, it is important that such knowledge and information is disseminated
to this vast volume of population in a manner which will ensure that ideas
F and information are in fact conveyed to them and they can assimilate and
debate these ideas before accepting or rejecting them. Requiring an
entertainment medium like cinema theatre to show for a short duration of its
programme, films which educate and impart information cannot be considered
as an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business. When there
G is adult franchise without literacy, it becomes all the more important that
information and ideas reach the adult population.

Next we have to examine whether the expense incurred in showing these
films is high or unreasonable. According to the exhibitors, their machinery,
their show-time, their theatre are used for the duration of these films and,
H therefore, they have to incur a certain amount of expense for showing these
I

"'
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 893
films. This expense, in our view, cannot be considered as a high or unreasonable A
expense. There may be many conditions of a licence which may require
expense to be incurred by the licensee. For example, a condition in the licence
which requires a cinema theatre owner to provide for fire-fighting equipment
would also require them to incur expenses. But that does not mean that such
a requirement is unreasonable. Similarly, looking to the purpose for which B
such films are shown, the expense incurred also cannot be considered as
unreasonable.

The exhibitors have also not submitted any facts and figures to support
their plea that these requirements of exhibiting a Films Division and/or
educational, scientific films etc. are economically onerous. The appellants on C
the other hand, in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Films Division, have
given detailed figures showing that in ddition to the cost of production of
these films, the expenses incurred by them in taking out prints for distribution
to about 13000 cinema theatres in the country, for packing and supplying
these films to them and for maintaining distribution centres for supplying
these films, are heavy. They have submitted that as against the cost so D
incurred by them, the rental which is charged fetches them a much lower
income.

The appellants, in their affidavit in reply, have pointed out that the
recovery of one per cent of the net collections as a rental from the cinema E
owners for the supply of approved films has been in force since 1.4.1958. This
rental was decided after discussions with the Films Federation of India which
is the apex body of the various sections of the film industry, and it was so
fixed after considering various suggestions and representations that were
received from a number of cinema organisations. The Films Division of the
Union of India is incurring heavy expenditure towards production of about F
125 films every year. It takes out about 400 prints of each film for distribution
to the cinema theatres. The cost of production, negative/positive prints, raw
stock, processing, printing, laboratory charges have all increased substantially
during the last 35 years. In addition, the Films Division maintains a chain of
distribution network for supply of approved films to as many as 13000 cinema G
theatres spread over the various parts of the country. The films are dubbed
in 15 languages to serve the interest of every region. About 50000 film prints
are to be retained in circulation at any given point of time. Maintaining such
a large network of distribution of approved films throughout the year requires
heavy expense to be incurred. As against all these costs, the lowest minimum
rental of one per cent is being imposed and it cannot be considered as H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 3 S.C.R.

A unreasonable or excessive. It is also pointed out that the Films Division.incurs
an expenditure of more than Rs. 12 crores per year only for taking out
adequate prints, while their recovery in the form of rentals is only Rs. 7 to
8 crores per year. Therefore, the Films Division is charging a very small
amount consider-ing the expenditure outlay in producing and distributing
these films. In these facts and circumstances, the rental of one per cent
B cannot be considered as excessive.

The cinema theatre owners have also alleged inconvenience in procuring
the films. The Films Division in its affidavit has pointed out that it has a
distribution network spread throughout the country to serve 13000 cinema
C theatres. It has ten distribution branches throughout the country. The Films
Division packs the films, seals them and sends them by train to the cities,
towns and villages wherever the cinema theatres are located. In fact, the
owners of the theatres used fo pay the freight charges prior to the judgment
of the High Court. Therefore, there is no special inconvenience caused to the
exhibitors for securing these films. The arrangements for supply and distribution
D have to be examined from the point of view of what is practically feasible, We
do not think that the arrangements which have been in existence unchallenged
for the last 30 years until the present proceedings were instituted can be
considered as unsatisfactory or unreasonable.

E The exhibitors also contend that the charge of one per cent on the net
recoveries is a compulsory exaction in the form of a tax. Neither the Act nor
the provisions of the licence stipulate payment of any such tax. Hence
imposition of this amount is in violation of Article 265 of the Constitution.
it is true that neither the relevant Act nor the notification nor the rules nor
the terms and conditions of the licence stipulate the payment of any rental.
F This amount is required to be paid under an agreement which the exhibitors
individually enter into with the Films Division for the supply of these films.
It is a payment under the terms of a contract between the two parties. It
cannot, therefore, be viewed as a tax at all. The exhibitors contend that
because they are required to enter into these agreements, any payment under
G the agreement is a compulsory exaction and is, therefore, tax. We do not
agree, Under the terms of the agreement, the Films Division has to supply
certain prints to the theatre owners at stated intervals. The Films Division is
required to maintain a distribution network for this purpose. It is required to
pack these films and is required to allow the exhibitors to retain these films
in their possession for a certain period. The films are to be returned to the
H Films Division thereafter. The charge is termed in the agreement as rental for
U.0.1. v. MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.] 895
the films. It covers charges for preparing the prints of the films for distribution, A
and for packing them for delivery. These are clearly services rendered by the
Films Division for which it is paid one per cent of the net collection as a rental.
As stated earlier, the total cost of preparing prints, packing them and
distributing them is much higher than the total recovery made by the Films
Division by way of rental from all the exhibitors. There is a clear nexus
between the services rendered and the payment to be made. The payment, B
therefore, is in the nature of a fee rather than a tax though there may not be
an exact quid pro quo. Nevertheless the element of quid pro quo is very
much present.

The exhibitors relied upon a number of cases which distinguish a tax C
from a free. We will only refer to some of them. In the case of District Council
of the Jowai Autonomous Distt., Jowai & Ors. v. Dwet Singh Rymbai etc.,
AIR (1986) SC 1930, this Court held that a compulsory exaction for public
purposes would amount to a tax while a payment for services rendered would
amount to a fee. On the facts in that case, the Court said that there was no
element of quid pro quo which will justify the imposition of royalty as a fee. D
In Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, madras v. Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR (1954) SC 282, this Court as far as
back in 1954, laid down the distinction between a tax and a fee. This Court
has described a tax as a compulsory exaction for public purposes which does
not required the tax-payer's consent; while fee is a charge for specific service E
to some, and it must have some relation to the expenses incurred for the
service. In Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar
Jyantikumar Pasawalla & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 2038, this Court has said that
an express authorisation for the levy of a fee is necessary. In the present case,
however, the rental is charged by the Films Division by virtue of an agreement
between the Films Division and the individual exhibitor. This is in consideration F
of the Films Division supplying films to the exhibitor, packing the film and
arranging for its delivery. This is clearly an agreed fee charged for rendering
services. It cannot be viewed as a compulsory exaction or as a tax. There is
a statutory obligation which is cast on the exhibitors to exhibit certain films.
To carry out this statutory obligation, ifthe exhibitors enter into an agreement G
with the Films Division and agree to pay a certain amount of rental for
procuring the films from the Films Division to comply with the statutory
obligation, the levy must, since it is co-related with the Films Division
discharging certain obligations under the contract, be viewed, at the highest,
as a fee and not as a tax. It is an agreed payment, and is not unreasonable.
The High Court has rightly negatived the contention of the respondent H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 3 S.C.R.

A exhibitors.
The High Court has struck down Condition 15 of the licence issued
under the Delhi Cinematograph Rules as being too wide, and unnecessary in
view of Condition 22 of the licence. Under Condition 15, the licensee is
required to exhibit films or lantern slides, the exhibition of which will take not
B more than 15 minutes in all, as required by the administrator. Such exhibition
may be free of charge or on such terms as regards remuneration as the
administrator may determine. The High Court has held that the kind of films
and lantern slides required to be exhibited under Condition 15 are not specified
and hence this condition is too wide and not related to the object of placing
C such a restriction. Condition 15, however, has to be read along with Section
12(4) of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, since Delhi Cinematograph Rules, 1981
are issued under the Cinematograph Act, 1952; and any conditions imposed
on the licence cannot go beyond the purposes specified in Section 12(4)
Condition 15, therefore, has to be read in conjunction with Section 12(4) of
the Cinematograph Act under which only scientific films, films intended for
D educational purposes, films dealing with news and current events, documentary
films or indigenous films can be so required to be exhibited. The films referred
to in Section 15 must also be of this kind. Lantern slides also take colour from
the same provision and lantern slides compulsorily required to be shown must
also fall in the categories mentioned in Section 12(4). When it is so read
Condition 15 will have a direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved,
E and it can be upheld as a reasonable restriction. We accordingly so nold.
Condition No. 22 refers to exhibition of approved films the total length of
which may not exceed 600m of 35mm or a corresponding size of approved
films of 60mm. These are somewhat longer films as compared to lantern slides
and films referred to in Condition 15. Therefore, Conditions 15 and 22 do not
F overlap, but refer to different sizes and types of short films, shorter films or
lantern slides. The High Court was, therefore, not right in holding that Condition
No 15 is redundant since it is covered by Condition No. 22. Both conditions,
however, must be read in the.light of Section 12(4) of the Cinematograph Act,
1952 and only films and lantern slides which fall within the description of such
films under Section 12(4) can be so required to be shown.
G
In the premises, the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of _,--
"
the High Court in so far is it strikes down the rental and directs the Films
Division to deliver the films to the exhibitors is set aside. The writ petition
is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

H R.A. Appeals allowed and petition dismissed.