Holding

Re‑engagement of a sailor cannot be cancelled by the sailor as a matter of right; the sailor cannot withdraw consent and claim release during the period of re‑engagement, and the A.K. Dey decision does not override the provisions of the Navy Act, Regulations and the 1994 Navy Order.

Summary

The petitioners, Artificer Apprentices in the Indian Navy, were initially engaged for 15 years and exercised an option to re‑engage for a further four years before their original term expired. After the re‑engagement was approved, they sought to withdraw their consent and be released, claiming they had been misled about the pension‑qualifying service period and relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in A.K. Dey. The Delhi High Court ordered their release, but the Union appealed. The Supreme Court held that under the Navy Act, the 1994 Navy Order and the Navy Regulations, re‑engagement is a service requirement and cannot be cancelled by the sailor as a matter of right; the contract cannot be avoided on the ground of misrepresentation because the re‑engagement itself was not valid under the service rules. Consequently, the High Court’s orders were set aside and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether a sailor who has consented to re‑engagement can withdraw that consent and demand release from service as a matter of right.
Whether the decision in A.K. Dey v. Union of India, which held that training period counts towards pensionable service, affects the sailor's right to rescind re‑engagement.

Legislation cited

Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 18, s. 19, s. 20
Navy Act, 1957s. 11, s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 17, s. 18

Subjects

Naval serviceRe‑engagementContract lawMisrepresentationPension qualificationDiscipline of defence forces

Judgment

A UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
v.
R.P. VADA V ETC.

MAY 10, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS, D.P. MOHAPATRA AND RUMA PAL, JJ.]

SERVICE LAW

Navy Act, 1957-Navy (Discipline and miscellaneous Provision)
C Regulation, 1965-Regu/ations 217 and 218-Navy Order No. (Stp) 17 of
1994-Re-engagement of sailor-After obtaining his consent-Whether the
sailor can be permitted to withdraw his consenr for re-engagement and
demand release from th~ service--Held no-Sailor has no right to claim
release during subsistence of period of engagement or re-engagement <1$ of
right-To vest such a right in a member of the Naval Force will not be in
D keeping with the high standard of discipline ('xpected of members of defence
service.

The respondents were appointed as Artificer Apprentice in Indian navy.
Their initial engagement was for 15 years. The respondents exercised their
E option for re-engagement in the service for a further period-of 4 years, before
expiry of the period of their initial engagement. The options were accepted
and their re-engagement was approved. Thereafter, they made a request for
withdrawal of their option which was turned down. They filed separate writ
petitions before High court contending that they had given option under
impression that the period of 4 years of initial training was not to be counted
F for the purpose of qualifying service for pension and therefore they had to
serve for 4 more years to earn pension under the Rules, and that in view of
change in law brought about by A.K. Dey's case that initial training is l!lso
part of qualifying service for the purpose of pension, it was not necessary for
them to continue in the service and hence they should be released. The plea
of the State was that an Apprentice Artificer who was re-engaged for a certain
G period on his consenting to it, he cannot resile from the option as a matter of
right, and that A.K. Dey's case has no bearing on this case.

Single Judge allowed the writ petitions and directed release of the
respondents. Writ Appeal filed by the State was dismissed. Respondent 'Y'
was released as per the High Court's order, while respondent 'K' was still
H 196
U.0.1. v. R.P. Y ADAV 197
not released. A
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that practice prevailing in
the Navy is that the option of re-engagement is asked for much before the
completion of initial period of engagement, so that the authorities have
sufficient time for planing and maintaining the strength of the force; and that
if the case of the respondents is accepted, it will seriously erode the discipline B
and efficiency of the force. The respondent contended that the authorities
cannot stand in the way of release of the respondent on completion of 15 years
which is qualifying service for pension, because the position as laid down in
the case of A. K Dey came to the knowledge of the respondent as well as the
authorities only after judgement in the case was rendered and the law laid C
down by this Court is binding on the authorities; and that the officers of the

3
department also have understood the matter in the same way, which is evident
from the letter HQNTG/3/ADM[S]/l of the Director (ADL) dated 9.4.1997,
recommending the case of the respondent for release.

Allowing the appeal, the Court D
HELD : Per Mahapatra, J. (For himself and Thomas, J.):

1. The provisions of the Naval Str. 17 leave no manner of doubt that
re-engagement of sailor can neither be claimed by a sailor as a matter of
right nor can cancellation of re-engagement and release from the force be E
claimed by a sailor as a matter of right. It is to be decided by the competent
authority keeping in view relevant factors, the most important one being the
service requirements. [205-D)

2. From the conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act, the
Regulations and the Navy Orders the position is manifest that the Naval F
Service is to be maintained as a highly disciplined service always kept in
readiness to face any situation of emergency. [205-E]

3. To vest a right in a member of the Naval Force to walk out from the
service at any point of time according to his sweet will is a concept abhorrent G
to the high standard of discipline expected of members of defence service.
The provisions in Regulation like Regulations 217 and 218, rule out the
concept of any right in a sailor to claim as of right release during subsistence
of period of engagement or re-engagement as the case may be. Such a
measure is required in the larger interest of the country. A sailor during the
15 or 20 years of initial engagement which includes the period of training H ·
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A attains a high degree of expertis1~ and skill for which substantial amounts
are spent from the exchequer. [20i6-C-G)

4. The contention that the n:spondents agreed for re-engagement only
for the reason that they were not 1eligible to receive pension under the Navy
(Pension) Amendment Regulations, 1982, and since that position no longer
B holds good in view of the decision of this Court in A.K. Dey's case they are
entitled to withdraw the option given by them earlier, is wholly unacceptable
and has to be rejected. Reasons for which a sailor may exercise option for
re-engagement may be very many. Such reason will vary from person: to
person. There is no provision in the Act or Regulation which shows that the
C sailor is required to state the reason in support of the option given by him for
re-engagement. Therefore the reason which played in the mind of the sailor
concerned to exercise option in favour of re-engagement is not relevant for
determination of the question raised in the case. [207-C-El

Anuj Kumar Dey and Another v. Union of India and Others, (1997) 1
D sec 366, referred to.
Per Ruma Pal, J. (dissentin11,~:

I. The appointment ofa government servant (or re-engagement as in
this case) is based initially on contract although after appointment it is a
E question of status. The re-appointment of the respondent is thus subject to
the provisions of the Contract Act. This is also how the appellants understood
it. (215-F-G)

Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1967) SC 1889, referred to.
2. The appellants by sending respondent 'K' on the "Expiry of
F Engagement Serial" expressly represented to him that he had put in only 11
years of pensionable service and that he should apply for extension for four
years to qualify for pension. It is on record that respondent agreed to be
re-engaged to complete the period of pensionable service. The representation
by the appellants was in fact wrong. It may be that the representation was
G bonaftde, but it would be a misrepn:sentation nevertheless, and the agreement
for re-engagement entered into on the basis of such a misrepresentation is
avoidable at the instance of respondent. 1218-E-Gl

Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State ofBihar, AIR (1954) SC 165, referred to.

H K.R. Raghava v. Union ofIndia, (1979) Lab. I.C. 1294, approved.
U.0.1. v. R.P. Y ADAV 199
3. High Court rightly held that respondent was entitled to avoid the A
contract of re-engagement under Section 19 of the Contract Act, his consent
to the re-engagement having been obtained by a misrepresentation within the
meaning of Section 18 of that Act. Respondent having validly exercised the
right, the appellants were bound to treat the re-engagement at an end and
release him. (218-H; 2_19-A)
B
4. The re-engagement is contrary to the Navy Act and Regulations. Since
the respondent had completed the necessary qualifying service for minimum
pension, he was entitled to ask for his discharge under Section 16(a) unless
he were re-enrolled in accordance with Regulation 268 (3) (b). (219-B)
S. In terms of Section 16(a) of the Act, respondent was entitled to be C
released. In the absence of any of the preconditions registered for
re-engagement after a sailor had served for pension, the re-engagement of
respondent was not in accordance with the regulations. It is also not the case
of the appellants that prior approval of the Chief of Naval Staff was obtained.
!fit is assumed that para 9 of(Str) Navy Order 17194 was, as it were, a blanket D
prior approval for re-engagement for a period of 3 years, even so, the
re-engagement for a period of 4 years was not in accordance with the Navy
Order and therefore not in accordance with Regulation 268 (3) (b) or Section
16(b) of Navy Act (219-B-E)

6. Refusal to release was bad as it ignored the fact that the appellants E
had a discretion in the matter which they could have exercised. By proceeding
on the basis that paragraph 18 of Navy Order (Str) 17/94 was imperative and
unconditional, the appellants failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them
under Regulation 280(2) read with paragraph 18. (220-E)

7. The refusal of the appellants was arbitrary and violative of Article F
14 of the Constitution because the appellants have released others whose cases
were similar to respondent 'K'. (220-F-G) ·

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3345 of
2000.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.1.99 of the Delhi High Court in
L. P.A. No. 579of1998.

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 3346 of 2000
H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Altaf Ahmed, Additional Solicitor General, A.K. Goel, Ms. A. Subhashini,
Arvind Kumar Sharma and S.N. Terdol for the Appellants.

K.G. Bhagat, Vineet Bhagat and R.K. Agnihotri for the Respondents.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
B
D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

The question that arises for determination in these appeals is whether
an Artificer Apprentice of Indian Navy who has been given a re-engagement
for a certain period after obtaining his consent for it is entitled to withdraw
C the consent and demand his rel!:~e from the force as of right? Another
question which also arises is what bearing the decision of this Court in Anuj
Kumar Dey and Another v. Union of India and Ors., [1997] I SCC 366 on the
above question.

In the appeal arising from SLP (C) No. 9839 of 1999, the respondent R.P.
D Yadav has already been released from the force in compliance with the direction
of the Delhi High Court in the impugned judgment. Indeed in the Order dated
14-2-2000, this Court recorded the submission of Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee, learned
Attorney General for India, that so far as the respondent R.P. Yadav is
concerned, the Union of India is only interested in having the question of law
E decided and even if it is decided in favour of the Union of India, they will
not deny the benefit which R.P. Yadav has claimed in this petition. The period
of re-engagement granted in the case of R.P. Yadav has also expired. But in
the case of Raj Kumar, the respondent in the appeal arising from SLP (C) No.
16848 of 1999, the period of re-engagement granted to the said respondent
is due to expire on 31st January, 2002. Therefore, it will be convenient to refer
F to the relevant facts in the case of Raj Kumar that is the civil appeal arising
from SLP (C) No. 16848of1999.

Raj Kumar was appointed as an Artificer Apprentice in the Indian Navy
on 14-1-1983. The period of initial engagement of 15 years expired on 31-1-
1998. Before expiry of the said period he exercised option for re-engagement
G for a further period of four years and signed the requisite papers on 26-4-1996.
The option was accepted and re-engagement till 31-1-2002 was approved by
the competent authority. On 9-4-1997, the respondent made a request for
withdrawal of his option for re-engagement and cancellation of the order. The
request was turned down by the authority vide the rejection order dated 11-
H 6-1997. He filed the writ petition, CW No. 3833 e>f 1997, before the Delhi High
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 201
Court seeking the following reliefs: A
"(i) issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction quashing the impugned order dated 11- 06-97.
(rl) issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction directing the respondents to release the petitioner on B
the scheduled date of 31- 01-98 and grant him the pension and
other retiremental benefits as applicable to on the expiry of 15
years including 4 years training period".
The main contention raised by the respondent in support of his case
was that he had given his option for re-engagement under the impression that C
the period of 4 years of initial training after appointment was not to be
counted for the purpose of qualifying service for pension and therefore he
has to serve for four years more to earn pension under the rules. This Court
in A.K. Dey and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) ruled that the period
of initial training is also a pa.t of qualifying service for the purpose of
pension. The contention by the respondent Nas that in view of the change D
in the legal position brought about tht: decision of this Court, it is no more
necessary for him to continue in service and he should be released from the
force with all retiral benefits with immediate effect. A learned single Judge of
the High Court of Delhi by the Judgment dated 4th May, 1999, accepted the
case of the respondent, allowed the writ petition and issued the direction,
"the respondents shall release the petitioners and send them to Commodore, E
Bureau of Sailors Chhetah Camp, Mankhurd, Mumbai-400 088, within 3 months
for this purpose''. The learned Judge further ordered that the respondents
shall pass appropriate orders releasing the petitioner granting him all retiral
benefits. The respondents in the writ petition filed letters patent appeal, LPA
No. 327 of 1999, challenging the above judgment/order of the learned Single p
Judge ..The appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by
the Judgment dated 3-8-1999, which is under challenge in the present appeal
filed by the respondents of the writ petition.

The factual position in the case of R.P. Yadav is similar on all material
aspects excepting the difference as noted above. G
The case of the respondents in the writ petition, shortly stated, was that
an Artificer Apprentice who is granted re- engagement for a certain period
after obtaining his consent cannot subsequently resile from it and cannot
claim release from the force as a matter of right. It was the further case of the
respondents that the decision of this Court in A.K. Dey (supra) has no bearing H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A on the controversy raised in the case.
On the case of the parties gist of which has been stated abQw, the
points formulated earlier arise for determination. The thrust of the contentions
of Shri Altaf Ahmed, learned Additional Solicitor General was that the practice
prevailing in the Navy is to ask for option of the Artificer Apprentice concerned,
B his option for re-engagement much before (one year) completion of the initial
period of engagement (fifteen years then) so that the authorities may Jiave
sufficient time to collect informations about the vacancy position and proper
planning for maintaining the strength of the Naval Force can be made well
in time. This, according to the learned counsel is necessary to keep the force
C in readiness for any eventuality. Elucidating the paint, the learned counsel
submitted that if the case of the respondent is accepted then an Artificer
Apprentice who is a 'Sailor' as held by this Court in A.K. Dey (supra), can
just walk out of the force at any time according to his sweet will and such
a situation will seriously erode the discipline and efficiency of the Navy.

D Shri K.G. Bhagat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
other hand, contended that in A.K. Dey (supra), this Court has held that the
period of initial training of four yc:ars as an Artificer Apprentice is to be taken
into account for the purpose of determining the qualifying service for pension
which under the service rules/regulations is 15 years. This position came to
E the knowledge of the respondent and the authorities concerned only after the
Judgment in A.K. Dey's case was rendered. The position of law laid down
by this Court is binding on the authorities concerned and therefore they
cannot stand on the way of release of the respondent from the force on
completion of 15 years which is also the qualifying service for pension. The
learned counsel further contended that it is how the matter has been
F understood by officers of the di:partment which is evident from the letter
HQNTG/3/ADM[S]/I of the Director (AOL) dated 9-4-1997, recommending the
case of the respondent for release.

In our view the answer to !the first question rests on the interpretation
G of relevant provisions of the Navy Act, 1957, The Navy (Discipline and Misc.
Provision) Regulation 1965 and Navy Order No. Stp 17 of 1994 regarding re-
engagement of 'Sailors' (RP/0805/93). In Section 3 (20) "sailor" is defined as
a person in the naval service other than an officer. In Section 11, it is laid
down inter alia, that no person shall be enrolled as a sailor in the Indian
Navy for a period exceeding 15 years (subsequently amended as 20 years) in
H the first instance. In Section 14(1) it is provided that subject to the provisions
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 203
of sub-section (4), officers and sailors shall be liable to serve in the Indian A
Navy or the Indian Naval Reserve Forces, as the case may be, until they are
duly discharged, dismissed, dismissed with disgrace, retired, permitted to
resign, or released. In sub-section (2), it is laid down inter alia that no sailor
shall be at liberty to resign his post except with the permission of the
prescribed officer.
B
Chapter V contains the provisions regarding conditions of service. In
Section 15, which deals with tenure of service of officers and sailors it is
declared in sub-section ( 1) that every officer and sailor shall hold office
during the pleasure of the President. In sub-section (2), it is laid down that
subject to the provisions of this Act and the regulations made thereunder,- C
(a) the Central Government may discharge or retire from the naval service any
officer; (b) the Chief of the Naval Staff or any prescribed officer may dismiss
or discharge from the naval service any sailor. In Section 16, it is provided
inter alia that a sailor shall be entitled to be discharged at the expiration of
the term of service for which he is engaged unless - (a) such expiration occurs
during active service in which case he shall be liable to continue to serve for D
such further period as may be required by the Chief of the Naval Staff; (b)
he is re-enrolled in accordance with the regulations made under this Act.
Section 17 which makes provision as to discharge provides in sub-section ( 1)
that a sailor entitled to be discharged under Section 16 shall be discharged
with all convenient speed and in an case within one month of becoming so E
entitled. In sub-section (3) of the said section it is laid down that
notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-sections, an
enrolled person shall remain liable to serve until he is duly discharged. This
provision is made subject to Section 18 which makes provision regarding
savings of powers of dismissal by Naval tribunals.
F
Chapter VI contains the provisions regarding service privileges.

In Chapter VII are included the provisions regarding pay, pension, etc.
and maintenance of families.

Chapter VIII contains the provisions regarding articles of war. In Section G
41, it is provided inter alia that every person subject to naval law, who (a)
deserts his post shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to two years or such other punishment as is hereinafter mentioned.

Chapter XX which deals with provisions regarding regulations provides
in Section 184 (I) that the Central Government may, by notification in the H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A official Gazette, make regulations for the governance, command, discipline,
recruitment, conditions of service and regulation of the naval forCllS and
generally for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.

Reliance has been placed on the Navy Order No. (Str.)17 of 1994 by
learned Additional Solicitor General in which are contained the provisions
B regarding re-engagement of sailors. In introduction to this Navy Order it is
stated inter alia that the period of enrolment in respect of non Artificer/
Artificer sailor and terms and conditions governing their further re-engagement
of service have been laid down in this Navy Order. In clause (4) it is declared
grant of re-engagement is subject to service requirement, and is not to be
C construed as a matter of right. Depending upon the requirement of service a
sailor can be re- engaged only if he fulfills the conditions set out in clause
(4). The criteria for re-engagement are provided in clause (5) of the Order.

In clause (6) it is laid down that a sailor is required to exercise his option
for re-engagement for further service on the following occasions :
D
(a) On receipt of Expiry of Engagement Serial from CABS.

(b) On selection for higher rank professional courses/specialist
courses/non-profossional pre-promotion courses in India

E (c) On selection for Deputation for new acquisitions/ courses
postings abroad.

In clause (13) provision is made, inter alia, that on publication of!Expiry
of Engagement Serial if a sailor does not wish to re-engage for further service
a certificate of unwillingness as per Appendix 'D' to this order is obtained
F from him. A copy of this certificate is to be retained with sailors service
documents and another forwarded to the Bureau of Sailors, Bombay. Under
sub- clause (c) of this Regulation it is provided that sailors who have once
expressed their unwillingness to sign an undertaking for further service and
subsequently wish to be re-engaged on promotion, will be considered for re-
G engagement only if they are willing to sign for a minimum period of two years,
provided the request is put up at least nine months prior to the date of
release. In the said provision it is expressly declared that "short term re-
engagements of one to nine months in order to earn pension of the rank will
not be granted". (emphasis supplied).

H In clause ( 16) of the order it is made explicit that re- engagement is a
U.0.1. v. R.P. Y ADAV (D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.] 205
service requirement, therefore, there is no provision to give re-engagement to A
sailors only on compassionate grounds; however, while reviewing the re-
engagement cases of deserving cases, the welfare of sailors is also given due
consideration to the possible extent.

Clause 18 of the Naval Order which is important for the purpose of the
present case reads as follows: B
"18. Cancellation of Re-engagement. Once re-engagement has been
granted to a sailor consequent to his willingness, the engagement will
generally not be cancelled due to any altered circumstances affecting
the sailor. The sailor will be required to serve upto the period re-
engaged for. C
The provisions of the Naval Str.17, leave no manner of doubt that re-
engagement of sailors can neither be claimed by a sailor as a matter of right
nor can cancellation of re-engagement and release from the force be claimed
by a sailor as a matter of right. It is to be decided by the competent authority D
keeping in view the relevant factors, the most important one being the service
requirements.

From the conspectus of the relevant provisions of the Act, the
Regulations and the Navy Orders including those noted above, the position
is manifest that the Naval Service is to be maintained as a highly disciplined E
service always kept in readiness to face any situation of emergency. The
personnel of the naval service are provided with various facilities and privileges
different from those available to other civil services.

As noticed earlier in Section 16 of the Act a provision is made that a
sailor shall be entitled to be discharged at the expiration of the terms of F
service for which he is engaged. One of the circumstances when this general
rule shall not apply is that he is re- enrolled in accordance with the requirements
made in the Act. No provision in the Navy Regulations, 1965, has been
brought to our notice which expressly or by implication provides that a sailor
can at any time during the subsistence of period of re-engagement demand G
release from service. On the contrary a fair reading of the provisions of the
Regulations shows that a very high standard of discipline is to be maintained
by members of the Naval Force including sailors. Under Regulation 127 sailors
who may have quit their ships without leave, or have overstayed their leave
or have improperly absented themselves when detached on duty, and who
may be apprehended before the expiration of seven days, beyond the precincts H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

.. . dockyard or other government establishment in which they may have
been employed, shall be treated either as absentees or as deserters, according
to the circumstances which ~ire to be judged by their respective commanding
officer_s. From provisions in the Regulations it is also manifest that stringent
measures of punishment are prescribed for any act of indiscipline. It is also
B a matter of common knowledge that the Naval Force which is entrusted with
the sacred duty of guarding the shores of the country against any fonn of
aggression should be a highly disciplined and efficient service.

An incidental question that arises is whether the claim made by the
respondents to be released from the force as of right is in keeping with the
C requirements of strict discipline of the Naval Service. In our considered view
the answer to the question has to be in the negative. To vest a right in a
member of the Naval Force to walk out from the service at any point of time
according to his sweet will is a concept abhorrent to the high standard of
discipline expected of members of defence services. The consequence in
accepting such contention raised on behalf of the respondents will lead to
D disastrous results touching upon security of the nation. It has to be borne
in mind that members of the defence services including the Navy have the
proud privilege of being entrusted with the task of security of the Nation. It
is a privilege which comes the way of only selected persons who have
succeeded in entering the service and have maintained high standards of
E efficiency. It is also clear from the provisions in Regulations like Regulation
217 and 218 that persons who in the opinion of the prescribed authority, are
not found permanently fit for any form of naval service may be terminated and
discharged from the service. The position is clear that a sailor is entitled to
seek discharge from service at the end of the period for which he has been
engaged and even this right is subject to the exceptions provided in the
F Regulations. Such provisions, in our considered view, rule out the concept
of any right in a sailor to claim as of right release during subsistence of period
of engagement or re- engagement as the case may be. Such a measure is
required in the larger interest of the country. A sailor during the 15 or 20 years
of initial engagement whi1;h includes the period of training attains a high
G degree expertise and skill for which substantial amounts are spent from the
exchequer.

Therefore, it is in the fitness of things that the strength of the Naval
Force to be maintained is to be determined after careful planning and study.
In a situation of emergency the country may ill afford losing trained sailors
H from the force. In such a situation if the sailors who have completed the
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.) 207
period of initial engagement and have been granted re-engagement demand A
release from the force and the authorities have no discretion in the matter,
then the efficiency and combat preparedness of the Naval Force may be
adversely affected. Such a situation has to be avoided. The approach of the
High Court that a sailor who has completed 15 years of service and thereby
earned the right of pension can claim release as a matter of right and the B
authority concerned is bound to accept his request doc:s not commend us.
In our considered view, the High Court has erred in its approach to the case
and the error has vitiated the judgment.

At this stage it will be relevant to deal with the contention which has
been raised on behalf of the respondents that they agreed for re-engagement C
only for the reason that they were not eligible to ~eceive pension under the
Navy (Pension) Amendment Regulations, 1982, and since that position no
longer holds good in view of the decision of this Court in Anuj Kumar Dey's
case (supra) they are entitled to withdraw the option given by them earlier.
This contention is wholly unacceptable and has to be rejected. Reasons for
which a sailor may exercise option for re-engagement may be very many. Such D
reasons will vary from person to person. No provision in the Act or Regulation
has been placed before us which shows that the sailor is required to state
the reason in support of the option given by him for re-engagement. Therefore,
the reason which played in the mind of the sailor concerned to exercise option
in favour of re-engagement is not relevant for determination of the question E
raised in the case. In that view of the matter the decision of this Court in Anuj
Kumar Dey's case (supra) is of little assistance to the respondents in the case.
All that was decided by this Court in that case is that the training period as
Artificer Apprentice, will be included in the computation of the qualifying
period of service for earning pension for the reason that during the period
of training as Artificer Apprentice the sailor was in the service of the Navy. F
This Court did not consider any other question which may have a direct or
indirect bearing on the controversy raised in the present case. It follows that
the decision of this Court in Anuj Kumar Dey's case (supra) cannot provide
a legitimate basis for claim of the respondents to be discharged from the
Naval force as a right. G
In the result the appeals are allowed. The Judgment of the learned
single Judge of the High Court in C.W.P. No. 3833/97 dated 4.5.99 as confrrmed
by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No.327 of 1999
and C.W.P. No. 1368/98 as confrrmed in L.P.A. No. 579/98, are set aside. T"ere
will however, be no order as to costs. H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A RUMA PAL, J. I have read the draft judgment prepared by my learned
Brother Mohapatra, J. I wish to express my respectful inability to concur with
the reasoning and the conclusion reached. In my opinion, the impugned
judgment deserves to be confirmed. Although the facts have been set: out by
Brother Mohapatra, J as I have taken a different view, I have stated the fact
B which to my mind are relevant, again.

The respondents in both the appeals are sailors. Both joined the service
of the Indian Navy as Artificer Apprentice for a period of 15 years from the
date of their respective appointments. The question involved in both the
appeals is whether the respondents can be compelled to serve beyond the
C period of their initial engagement.

The terms and conditions of service of sailors such as the respondents,
are governed by the Navy (Ceremonial, Conditions of service 'and
Miscellaneous Provision Regulations 1963 (referred to as the 'Regulations')
which were framed under Section 184 of the Navy Act, 1957 (refem:d to as
D the Act.)
Section 11 relates to the enrolment of sailors. Section 11 (2) of the Act,
as it stood at the material time and insofar as it is relevant, prescribed that:

"11. Enrolment-

E (l)xxx xxx xxx

(2) No person shall be enrolled as a sailor in the Indian Navy for a
period exceeding fifteen years in the first instance...... .

(3)xxx xxx xxx"
F Similarly, the Regulations contain corresponding provisions in Regulation
268(1) and Regulation 269 [I A].

. Reg. 268(1) says "Boys, Artificer Apprentices and Direct EntrY sailors
shall be enrolled for Continuous Service as provided in sub
regulation( I) of Regulation 269".
G
In 1978, Reg. 269(1) was replaced by Reg. 269[JA]. It provides for-
"N ew Entrants:

(a) Boys, Artificer Apprentice and Direct EntrY Sailors may be enrolled
for a period calculated to permit a period of 15 years service to be
H completed from the date of enrolment or from the date of attaining the
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [RUMA PAL, J.] 209
age of 17 years, whichever is later provided their services are so long A
required."

At the end of the period of initial engagement or enrolment for continuous
service, a sailor is entitled to be discharged. Thus Section 16 of the Act
provides:
B
Discharge on expiry of engagement-Subject to the provisions Section
18, a sailor shall be entitled to be discharged at the expiration of the
term of service for which he is engaged unless-.

(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) he is re-enrolled in accordance with the regulations made under C
this Act.

Re-enrolment of sailors such as the respondents is provided for in
Regulation 268 Sub regulation (2) and (3) (a) & (b):

"268. Engagements D
(2) Re-enrolment of Continuous Service sailors shall be as provided
in sub regulatipn (3 ).

(3)(a) Except as provided in Regulation 270, Continuous Service men
who, after completing the period of their initial Continuous Service E
enrolment, volunteer and are permitted to continue to serve, shall,
subject to the provisions of Regulation 269(2), be enrolled by the
Captain Naval Barracks.for a period not exceeding that required to
complete the service necessary to qualify for the minimum pension.
In exceptional cases, however, when the exigencies of the Service so F
warrant, the prior sanction of the Chief of the Naval Staff may be
obtained instead for the re-enrolment of the sailor for a period not
exceeding-8 years.

3(b) Re-enrolment after completing the necessary qualifying service
for minimum pension, shall normally be allowed for a period not G
exceeding 2 years at a time, subject to the proviso in Explanation (ii).
Such re-enrolment for the first spell of 2 years shall be made by the
Captain Naval Barracks, Bombay, but further re-enrolment of two
years at a time may be made by the Captain Naval Barracks with the
prior approval of the Chief of the Naval staff. In cases, however,
where the exigencies of Service so warrant, re-enrolment on completion H
210 SUPREM~ COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A of the necessary qualifying service for minimum pension for a period
not exceeding 5 years at a time may be made, subject to the proviso
in Explanation (ii), by the Captain Naval Barracks, with the prior
approval of the Chief of the Naval staff.
(emphasis added)

B The period of service necessary to qualify for pension· is contained in
Regulation 78 of the Service Pensi1t>n and Gratuity Pension Regulations (Navy),
1964:

"78. Minimum Qualifying Service for Pension: Unless otherwise
provided, the minimum service which qualifies for service-pensions is
c fifteen years."

It is clear from a reading of these provisions that (i) a sailor can initially
be engaged for a maximum period of 15 years or for a lesser initial period and
re-enrolled for the balance period of I 5 years; (ii) if a sailor is initially engaged
D for 15 years he is entitled to get pension; (iii) that a sailor is entitled to ask
for his discharge at the end of his initial engagement; (iv) any extension of
a sailor's service beyond the period of 15 years can be made for two years
at a time. Any re-enrolment for more than two years can be made if the
exigencies of service so warrant and with the prior approval of the Chief of
Naval staff.
E
The procedure according to which a sailor may be re-engaged after the
initial period of service has been provided by a Navy Order. Regulation 2(i)
defines Navy Order as meaning "an order issued by the Chief of the Naval
Staff'. In terms of Navy Order No. STR. 17/94 both non-artificer/artificer
F sailors could apply for further re-engagement of service once their initial
period of service was over subject to certain conditions. Relevant extracts of
the paragraphs of the Navy Order are:

6. Occasions for Re-engagement. A sailor is required to exercise his
option for re-engagement for further service on the following
occasions:-
G
(a) On receipt of Expiry of Engagement Serial CABS (Commodore
Bureau of Sailors).
(b) llXX xxx xxx
(c) llXX xxx xxx
H

r
U.0.1. v. R.P. Y ADAY [RUMA PAL, J.] 211
7. Responsibility for ensuring Re-engagement. A
(a) xxx xxx xxx

(b) xxx xxx xxx

(c) Recommendations for re-engagement in all cases are to be forwarded
to the Commodore, Bureau of Sailors, Bombay, in duplicate on the B
proforma produced at Appendix 'A' to this order. As Expiry of
Engagement Serial is published by CABS 24 months in advance the •
recommendations for re-e!!gagement of sailors are to reach CABS well
in time, but not later than 16 months prior to the date of release.

(d) """ xxx xxx c
xxx xxx xxx

8. Authority to grant re-engagement

(a) The Commodore Bureau of Sailors Bombay. The powers to grant D
re-engagement to sailors including sailors in low medical category,
up to 25 years of service have been deligated to the Commodore,
Bureau of Sailors, Bombay.

9. Period of Re~engagement.
(a) The sailors shall be re-engaged in spells of not exceeding three E
years and not less than one year provided it is not a course/
deputation requirement. However, no sailor shall be re-engaged
beyond the age of superannuation as specified in para 10 below.
(b) On completion of pensionable service the sailors will normally
be re-engaged for the following periods: F
(i) In spells of not exceeding 3 years at a time up to 25 years of
service after expiry of initial engagement.

xxx xxx

(c) Not-withstanding the above, the sailors of Artificer Cadre and G
Submarine Branch will be governed by separate re-engagement norms
inforce time to time. Sailors of Submarine Branch, on expiry of initial
engagement, will be granted further re-engagement in the Submarine
Cadre subject to availability of vacancies in the cadre. Otherwise, if
re-engaged, they will be reverted to general service. Therefore, at the
H

7
\
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A time of requesting for re-engagement, they are to given an undertaking
as per Appendix 'B' to this order that in case of Submarine Cadre
becoming overbone they are liable to be reverted to general service.

xxx xxx

xxx xxx
B
13. Unwillingness for Re-engagement1•

16. Re-engagement on Compassionate Grounds. Re-engagement is a
service requirement, therefore, there is no provision to give re-
engagement to sailors only on compassionate grounds. However,
c while reviewing the re-engagement cases of deserving cases, the
welfare of sailors is also given due consideration to the possible
extent.
18. Cancellation of 8.e-engagement. Once re-engagement has been
granted to a sailor consequent to his willingness, the engagement will
D generally not be cancelled due to any altered circumstances affecting
the sailor. The sailor will be required to serve upto the period re-
engaged for."
As already noted, both the respondents were initially appointed for a
period of 15 years. R.P. Yadav (respondent in S.L.P. (C) No. 9839of1999) was
E appointed on January 1981 and Raj Kumar, (respondent in SLP(C) No. 16848
of 1999) was appointed on 14.1.1983. Therefore, the period of 15 years as far
as R.P. Yadav is concerned, was to expire on 31st January 1996 and as far as
Raj Kumar is concerned it was to expire on 31st January, 1998. Of this period,
both the respondents were required to and in fact served for 4 years in initial
F I. Uawillincness for Re-engagement.

(a) On publication ofExpiry ofEngagement Serial if a sailor does not wish to re-engage for further
service a certificate of unwillingness as per Appendix 'D' to this order is obtained from him. A
copy of this certificate is tobe retained with sailors service documents and another forwatded to
the Bureau of sailors, Bombay.

G <b> Requests for signing for further seni ice from sailors who have once expressed unwillingness,
are not to be entertained under any circumstances, e.g., changed domestic circumstances, loss
of prospective employment opportunity etc. as this upsets manpower planning, recruitm~ntand
progress of pension papers.

(c) However. sailors who have once expressed their unwillingness to sign an undertaking for further,
service and subsequently wish to re-engage on promotion, will be considered for re-engagement
only if they are willing to sign fo a minimum period of two years, provided the request is put
up at least nine months prior to the date of release. Short term re·engagement of one to nine
H months in order to earn pesionofthe rank will not be granted.
U.0.1. v. R.P. Y ADAV [RUMA PAL, J.] 213
training. A
Till 1996 the appellants proceeded on the basis that the period of
training would not be counted in calculating the 15 years of service required
to be completed for pension. On that basis two separate notices called the
> "Expiry of Engagement Serial" were issued to Yadav and Kumar two years
prior to the completion of their service for which they were initially enrolled, B
indicating the dates of expiry of their engagements as 1996 and 1998
respectively and also mentioning that they should apply for re-engagement
to qualify for pension. In other words although each of the respondents had
put in 15 years of service, by excluding the 4 years training period they were
told that they had each completed only eleven years of pensionable service C
and that:

"sailors not completing minimum pensionable service and (are?)
required to re-engage for the same."

Accordingly in terms of paragraph 6(a) ofNavy Order STR 17/94 quoted D
earlier, the respondents applied for re-engagement for a further period of four
years so that they could qualify for pension. Their re-engagement was also
allowed by the appellants.

To use the appellants' language in their counter affidavit before the
High Court, E
"The period of engagement in case of Artificer Apprentice after
completion of the initial engagement had been fixed as 4 years in the
first spell to enable them to complete pensionable service as per para
9 ofNo. (Str.) 17/94.
F
What is noteworthy is that no other reason, let alone, any "exigency
of service" under Reg. 268(3)(b), was mentioned for re-engaging the
respondents. But with this, according to the appellants counter affidavit to
the writ petition, "the contract (of re-engagement) was complete."

On 28.11.1996, this Court in Anuj Kumar Dey and Another v. Union of G
India and Others, [ 1971] I SCC 366 held that there was no basis for the
appellants not counting the training period as service for the purpose of
pension. It was said:

"The qualifying period for earning pension is service of 15 years
H
r
I
under the Navy ........... There is little doubt that the training period as

)
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Artificer Apprentice will have to be included in the computation of the
qualifying period of service."

In view of the decision in Anl{j Kumar Dey's case, on 7.7.1997, R.P.
Yadav wrote to the Directorate of Naval Design for cancellation of his
application for re-engagement and for release from service as he had already
B completed the minimum pensionable service. R.P. Yadav's case was forwarded
to the appellant no. 3 in the following language:

"it is understood that the sailor has already completed the requisite
period towards pensionable service. It is therefore requested that the
sailor be released from service at the earliest."
c
A similar prayer was made by Raj Kumar to the Director, Head Quarter
Naval Technical Group who, while forwarding the request to the Commodore,
Bureau of sailors, "strongly recommcmded" that Raj Kumar's "re-engagement
may be cancelled and he may be permitted to be released from the service as
D per present engagement i.e. on 15.1.1998".

Both the requests were turned down by the Commodore in substantially
similar language. The letter of rejection as far as R.P. Yadav is concerned ,is
dated 20.1.1998 and as far as Raj Kumar is concerned the rejection was on
11.1.1997. The ground of rejection being the same it is sufficient if the letter
E dated 11. 1.1997, is quoted. It reads:

"It is intimated that above named sailor had requested for further re-
engagement for 4 years to earn minimum pensionable service.
Accordingly CABS approved his re-engagement and IN 441 (a) for tjie
period of 15 Jan. 1998 to 31 Jan. 2002 was fotwarded to HQ RTG
F (Bangalore) and same was received duly signed by the sailor.

The cancellation of re-engagement for further service intimated
vide your letter ibid is not in order and cannot be accepted. In this
connection para 18 of NO (Str) 17/94 is relevant.

G In view of the above, it is stated that sailor's re-engagement for
the period from 15 Jan. 1998 to 31 Jan. 2002 is final and cannot be
changed at this stage."

Challenging the rejection of their requests for release from service, both
the respondents filed two separate writ applications before the Delhi High
H Court. R.P. Yadav's writ application was allowed by a learned Single Judge on
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAY [RUMA PAL, J.] 215
23.10.1998. Raj Kumar's application was allowed by another learned Judge of A
the High Court on 4th May, 1999. By the separate decisions, the respondents
were directed to be released from service. The appeals preferred from these
decisions were dismissed by the Division Bench.

• As already indicated, I am of the view that the learned Judges of the
High Court were right in the view they took. But before giving my reasons, B
it needs to be recorded that R.P. Yadav has already been released on 31st
January, 1999. The issue as far as he is concerned is academic. Indeed no one
represented him while the appeal in which he is the respondent was being
argued. But the issue remains alive in Raj Kumar's case as he has more than
two years to serve in terms of the re-engagement. C
The appellants have argued that the High Court's view is erroneous
because it was contrary to paragraphs 7,13,16 and 18 of (Str.) Navy Order 17/
94. It is further submitted that if release of all sailors similarly situated to Raj
Kumar were allowed it would upset the man power planning and might lead
to a crisis as far as the country's defence was concerned. Their stand is that D
the re-engagement was valid and binding on Raj Kumar.

According to Raj Kumar he was legally entitled to be released after he
had completed 15 years of service not only under the Act and Regulations
but also under the Contract Act. It is the case of Raj Kumar in his writ petition
that he agreed to be re-engaged was based on the misrepresentation on the E
part of t.1te appellants to him that he had only completed 11 years of pensionable
service and that he required another four years to earn the pension. As such,
it was contended he had a right to rescind the contract under Section 19 of
the Contract Act.

The primary issue is whether there was a valid re-engagement at all. The F
appointment of a government servant (or re-engagement as in this case) is
based initially on contract although after appointment it is a question of
status. See: Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union ofIndia, AIR (1967) SC 1889. The
re-appointment of Raj Kumar is thus subject to the provisions of the Contract
Act. This is also how the appellants understood it. In their counter affidavit G
filed before the High Court the appellants said:

"In the Navy the service of sailors is contractual in nature and their
engagement is for a specified period only. As such the provision of
the Indian Contract Act are applicable and it is a well settled principle
of law that "once an offer is accepted, it becomes a contract and the H
...
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A party making the offer cannot resile from the offer."

As a general principle, this is true but it is subject inter-alia to the
exceptions recognised statutorily in Sections 19 to 30 of the Contract Act.
Here we ar.e concerned with Raj Kumar's plea to avoid the contract because
it was based on misrepresentation by the appellants.
B
Misrepresentation has been defined in Section 18 of the Contract Act.
For the purpose of this case, we need consider only the meaning ascribed to
the word in sub-sections (1) and (3) of that Section. These read:

"Misrepresentation" means and includes-(1) the positive assertiort, in
C a manner not warranted by the infonnation of the person, making it,
of that which is not true, through he believes it to be true."

(2)xxx: xxx .... JOO(

(3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a
D mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the
agreement."

When consent to an agreement is caused by misrepresentation upder
Section 19 "the agreement is a c:ontract voidable at the option of the party
whose consent was so caused".
E
Thus, in Kalyanpur Lime Works v. State of Bihar, AIR (1954) SC 165,
the Government of Bihar had entered into the lease in respect of certain mines
with Kalyanpur Lime Works (KL W) after forfeiting an earlier lease granted in
respect of the same mines in favour of Kuchwar Co. After the lease was
executed between the Government and KL W, the forfeiture of Kuchwar's lease
F was held to be invalid by the Privy Council. KL W filed a suit against the
Government asking for specific perfonnance of the lease executed ~n its
favour. The suit was resisted by the Government, inter-alia, on the ground
that by reason of the privy Council's decision, it could not have executed the
lease in favour of KL W. The suit filed by KL W was decreed by the trial Court.
G On appeal, the High Court held that the contract was void under Section 20
of the Indian Contract Act as both parties were under a mistake of fact as
regards the title of the Government to the subject matter of the proposed
leases.

This Court found that pursuant to the decision of the Privy Council,
H Kuchwar Co. was re-instated into possession but surrendered it when the
•
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [RUMA PAL,J.) 217
lease in its favour expired in the nonnal course. While negativing the view A
taken by the High Court, this Court· said:

"We think that in the present case the Bihar Government could be
taken to have represented to the plaintiff that they had the right to
forfeit the lease of the Kuchwar Company and grant a fresh lease
to the plaintiff. The plaintiffno doubt believed in that representation B
and entered into the contract on that understanding. As a result of
•
the decision of the Privy Council however, the Bihar Government
became incapable of making out the title which it asserted it had at
the time of the contract. But its title was not wholly gone; it was
restricted only by reason of the lease which had still several years to C
run. In these circumstances, it might have been open to the plaintiff
to repudiate the contract if they so liked, but the defendant No. I
could not certainly plead that the contract was void on the ground
of mistake and refuse to perfonn that part of the agreement which it
was possible for it to perfonn."
(emphasis added) D

In the light of these observations, I would approve the reasoning of the
Full Bene~ of the Delhi High Court in K.R. Raghava v. Union ofIndia, (1979)
Lab.I.C.1294. In that case the petitioner was appointed to the Emergency
Cadre of the l'vfilitary Accounts Department. He executed a contract of service
which was to continue initially for a period of 3 years. The contract was E
renewable. After the 3 years period expired the Government infonned the
petitioner that the Emergency Cadre was being wound up and that he would
be retrenched but offered him pennanent employment in a Class-II post in the
Income Tax Department. Under the circumstances, the petitioner accepted the
offer and was appointed as Income Tax Officer Class-II. However, the F
Emergency Cadre was not in fact wound up. The petitioner asked the
Government to be allowed to continue in the Emergency Cadre of the Military
Accounts Department. The Government refused. The petitioner filed a writ
petition claiming that the Government was under a duty to give an option to
him to go back to the Emergency Cadre after the Government realised that the
Emergency Cadre was not going to be wound up. The High Court while G
allowing the writ application said:

"The Emergency Cadre was added to the Military Accounts Department
only due to the exigencies of the war. It was not meant to be pennanent.
The Government, however, made a wrong forecast that it would be
wound up by 31.3.1952. This forecast was communicated to Shri H
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Ranbir Chandra and others serving in the Emergency Cadre in 1950.
Actually, the Emergem:y Cadre continued till 1957. It is obvious,
therefore, that the representation made by the Government to Shri
Ranbir Chandra was a "misrepresentation" within the meaning of
S. 18( I) of the Indian Contract Act, 1982, because it was a positive
assertion in a manner not warranted by the information of the
B Government of that which was not true, though the Government in
1950-51 believed it to be true. Shri Ranbir Chandra says that it was
because of this representation that he had to accept his appointment
to Income-tax Officers (Class II Grade III) service and this is also the
conclusion of the UPSC. It must be held on this material that the
c consent of Shri Ranbir Chandra to accept the Class II appointment
was "caused by misrepresentation" within the meaning ofS.19 of the
Contract Act. This had a double result. Firstly, it became the duty of
the Government to correct the misrepresentation which had been
made to Shri Ranbir Chandra as soon as the Government realised that
the Emergency Cadre was not being wound up even by 31.J".1972.
D Secondly, it also became the duty of the Government to offer an
option to Shri Ranbir Chandra to go back to the Emergency cadre if
he so desired."

The appellants by sending Raj Kumar the "Expiry of Engagement Serial"
E expressly represented to him that he had put in only 11 years of pensionable
service and that he should apply for extension for four years to qualify for
pension. It is on record that Raj Kumar agreed to be re-engaged to complete
the period of pensionable service. The representation by the appellants was
in fact wrong. It may be that the representation was bonafide, but it would
be a misrepresentation nevertheless, and the agreement for re-engagement
F entered into on the basis of such a mispresentation is avoidable at the
instance of Raj Kumar.

If the re-engagement were sought to be avoided by the Government
because of a wrong representation by Raj Kumar as to material fact, there can
G be no doubt that the stand of the Government would be upheld.

I would therefore concludl} that the High Court rightly held that Raj
Kumar was entitled to avoid the contract of re-engagement under Section 19
of the Contract Act, his consent to the re-engagement having been obtained
by a misrepresentation within the meaning of Section 18 of that Act. Raj
H Kumar having validly exercised the right, the appellants were bound to treat
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [RUMA PAL, J.) 219
the re-engagement at an end and released him. A
I am also of the view that the re-engagement is contrary to the Navy
Act and the Regulations. It must be remembered that Raj Kumar had completed
the necessary qualifying service for minimum pension. He was entitled to ask
for his discharge under Section I6(a) unless he were re-enrolled in accordance
with Regulation 268(3)(b). B
As already noted any extension under Regulation 268(3)(b) could only
be for a period of two years unless (i) the exigencies of service so warranted
and (ii) with the prior approval of the Chief of Naval Staff. It is the admitted
case of the appellants, as noted earlier, that the re-engagement tor four years C
was made only to enable the respondents to qualify for pension and for no
other reason. This is also clear from the order of rejection quoted earlier. In
the absence of any of the pre-conditions registered for re-engagement after
a sailor had served for pension, the re-engagement of Raj Kumar was not in
accordance with the Regulations. It is also not the case of the appellants' that
the prior approval of the Chief of Naval Staff was obtained. D
If it is assumed that para 9 of (Str) Navy Order 17/94 was, as it were,
a blanket prior approval for re-engagement for a period of 3 years, even so,
the re-engagement for a period of four years was not in accordance with the
Navy Order and therefore not in accordance with Regulation 268 (3)(b) or
Section 16(b) of the Navy Act. That being so, in terms of Section 16(a) of the E
Act, Raj Kumar was entitled to be released.

Reliance by the appellants on paragraphs 7,13,16 and 18 of(Str.) Navy
Order 17/94 is misplaced. First, the Navy Order cannot override the Act or the
Regulations. Second, none of the paragraphs relied on are relevant at all. F
Paragraphs 7 and 13 relate to the obligation on the part of the officers
recommending re-engagement to complete the process two years' prior to the
expiry of the period of initial engagement because of the administrative
difficulties which would otherwise be involved. They do not curtail the
sailors' rights under Section 16(a) of the Navy Act. As far as paragraph 16
is concerned it deals with compassionate appointments and I have failed to G
see how it is at all material.

Paragraph 18 which was quoted by the appellants in the order of
objection, deals with a situation where there is a valid re-engagement. It does
not apply when the re-engagement itself is invalid which, for the reasons
stated by me earlier, is the situation in Raj Kumar's case. H
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A In any event, paragraph 18 does not contain a complete embargo on
release. The language is that "the engagement will generally not be cancelled
due to any altered circumstances." In other words there is an element of
discretion left to the concerned authorities to release a validly re-engaged
sailor because of subsequent altered circumstances.

B Now Raj Kumar had asked for release not only because he had served
for 15 years, but also because his mother had died and there was no one to
look after his aged father. The appellants, as is apparent from the letter
rejecting Raj Kumar's application appear to have proceeded on the basi$ that
the embargo on release in Paragraph 18 was absolute and that there was no
C discretion in1hem to consider the personal reasons put forward by Raj Kumar
for release. That the appellants have such a discretion is also clear from the
non-obstante provisions of Regulation 280(2) which provides:

280(2) "Discharge shall not be claimed as a right, however, and nothing
in these regulations shall interfere with the power of the Government
D to suspend discharge on compassionate grounds or to refuse discharge
in particular case."

This brings me to the third and final ground for rejecting the a11peal.
Acting on the basis that the re-engagement was valid, it must be held that
the refusal to release was bad as it ignored the fact that the appellants had
E a discretion in the matter which they could have exercised. By proceeding on
the basis that paragraph 18 of Navy Order (Str.) 17/94 was imperativ~ and
unconditional, the appellants failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them
under Reg. 280(2) read with paragraph 18 itself. The failure is all the more
patent in the light of the Commander's "strong recommendation" for Raj
Kumar's release.
F
Additionally the refusal of the appellants was arbitrary and violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution because the appellants have released others
whose cases were similar to Raj Kumar's. R.P. Yadav who had been re-
• engaged to serve till 31st January, 2000 was released on 31st January 1999.
G Our attention was also drawn by Raj Kumar's counsel to the case of one Azad
Singh Ruhil. Azad Singh had also approached the High Court for his release
under Article 226. This was directed by the Learned Single Judge on 28th
January, 1999. No appeal was preferred by the appellants from this order and
Ruhil was released. The appellants have submitted a 'note' after the arguments
were concluded and judgment reserved, to the effect that since Ruhil had not
H signed the contract of re-engagement as Raj Kumar had, they had decided not
U.0.1. v. R.P. YADAV [RUMA PAL, J.) 221
to prefer an appeal. The reasoning is specious particularly in view of the A
stand taken by the appellants in their counter affidavit before the High Court
viz., that once the offer made for re-engagement by the sailor was accepted
by the appellants the contract was complete and could not be rescinded.

I would, for all these reasons dismiss the appeals and, as far as Raj
Kumar is concerned, with costs. I regret that by expressing my opinion. in B
favour of dismissal of the appeals, I am differing with the views expressed by
my learned Brothers. But I do so with respect and despite the impassioned
submission made by the Learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the
Government that the defence of the country would be jeopardised by a
possible sudden efflux of trained personnel. Apart from the fact that this was C
not the ground stated by the appellants in the order of rejection, to accept
this as a ground for allowing the appeals in the view that I have taken, would
be to decide the case not according to law but on policy. And, speaking for
myself, I would rather the country's defence did not rest on unwilling shoulders.

KKT. Appeals allowed. D