Holding

The earlier decree binds only the 4,971.5 sq. yards dealt with and does not preclude the Union's claim; the Union has proved title to the 2 acres 20 guntas and therefore is not a land grabber.

Summary

The legal heirs of the late S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu claimed that Union of India had illegally grabbed 7,128.5 sq. yards of land that their father had purchased, relying on a prior suit where the plaintiffs were declared owners of 4,971.5 sq. yards. The Union appealed the Tribunal's order under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, arguing that the earlier decree does not bind the present dispute and that it holds valid title to the remaining land. The Supreme Court examined whether the earlier suit's decree operated as res judicata, whether the Union proved title, and whether it was a land grabber under s.2(d) of the Act. It held that the earlier decree was limited to the 4,971.5 sq. yards and could not be invoked as res judicata for the larger parcel, and that the Union's title was complete under the Government Grants Act and Registration Act. Consequently, the Union was declared the owner of the 2 acres 20 guntas in question and not a land grabber, leading to the dismissal of the applicants' petition.

Issues considered

Whether the decree in the first suit operates as res judicata in the present proceedings.
Whether the Union of India has proved its title over the land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas.
Whether the Union of India is a land grabber within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 2(d), s. 8
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 11
Government Grants Act, 1895s. 2
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 74
Registration Act, 1908s. 17

Subjects

land grabbingres judicatagovernment grantsregistration actevidence actcivil appealtitle disputedefence landISF linesUnion of India

Judgment

1198 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 4 S.C.R. 1198 [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
v.
S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD)
THROUGH LRS. AND ORS.
B (Civil Appeal No. 2049 of 2013)
AUGUST 27, 2021
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]
Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 –
ss.2(d) and 8 – Government Grants Act, 1895 – s.2 – Registration
C
Act, 1908 – s.17 – Respondents-applicants’ case that their father
had purchased 2 acres 27 guntas of land from one ‘SA’ and he was
put in possession – Out of the total land purchased by the father of
applicants, some was taken over for the construction of roads – It
was also stated that their father sold the land measuring 4971.5 sq.
D yard, however, the remaining 7128.5 sq. yards was retained by him
– Military Contract Committee started constructing sheds on the
land (measuring 4971.5 sq. yards) sold by their father – Purchaser
of the said land (measuring 4971.5 sq. yards) filed suit against
Union of India and respondents were also made party – First suit
was decreed declaring the purchasers as title holders – Respondents
E
as legal heirs filed an application u/s.8 of the Act alleging that the
land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards was grabbed by Union of India
and relied on the first suit decreed in favour of purchasers – Tribunal
held that findings in the first suit binds the Union of India and
applications were allowed – The High Court affirmed the decision
F of the Tribunal – Questions required to be decided before the
Supreme Court: (i) whether the order passed in the first suit filed by
the plaintiff as affirmed by the High Court operate as res judicata?;
(ii) whether the appellants have proved their title over the land in
question?; (iii) whether appellant is a land grabber within the section
2(d) of the Act – Held: Though the first suit is between the same
G
parties, but the subject matter is not the same – Since the issue in
the suit was restricted to 4971.5 sq. yard, the decree would be binding
qua that extent only – The issue cannot be said to be barred by
constructive res judicata as per Explanation IV as it applies to the
plaintiff in a later suit – The appellants have denied the claim of the
H plaintiffs in the first suit to the extent that it was the subject matter
1198
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1199
THROUGH LRS.

of that suit alone – Therefore, the decree in the first suit will not A
operate as res judicata in the subsequent matters – Since the land in
question was transferred from the State, document of title is not
required to be registered in terms of s.17 of the Registration Act,
1908 and/or in terms of Government Grants Act, 1895 – The letter
dated 19.03.1958 completes the transfer when the possession of
B
the land measuring 1500 acres and 24 guntas was handed over to
Union – Appellants claim possession of 1500 acres and 24 guntas,
although appellants have lost claim of 4971.5 sq. yards which is
falling as part of 2 acres and 20 guntas, but that would not lead to
losing of title of appellants over the entire land measuring 2 acres
and 20 guntas – Further, military land register, which is also a public C
document (s.74 of the Evidence Act) shows possession of the
appellants over the land – Appellants are owner of the land –
Therefore, appellants are not land grabbers.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The following questions are required to be D
decided in the present appeals: (i) whether the order passed in
the first suit filed by the plaintiff as affirmed by the High Court
operate as res judicata?; (ii) whether the appellants have proved
their title over the land in question?; (iii) whether appellant is a
land grabber within the section 2(d) of the Act? [Para 24][1226- E
C-D]
2. The The applicants have claimed possession from the
appellants primarily on the ground that in the suit filed by the
plaintiffs on 14.4.1965, the basis of the suit was purchase of land
by the plaintiffs from the father of the applicants. Since the F
plaintiffs have been found to be the owners on the basis of
purchase of land from the father of the applicants, therefore, the
issue of title decided in the said suit would operate as res judicata.
Therefore, the appellants herein are land grabbers having no
title over the land in question. It may be reiterated that the
plaintiffs had purchased land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards from G
the father of the applicants whereas the remaining land measuring
7128.5 sq. yards was retained by the applicants. Therefore, the
decree in the first suit was only in respect of the schedule property
in the first suit i.e. 4971.5 sq. yards. The patta, the basis of title
of the applicants had not been produced in evidence before the H
1200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Tribunal. Thus, the basic document of title had not been produced.
[Para 25][1226-E-G]
3. In the first suit, the father of the applicants had not filed
any counter claim to assert title or possession over the land in
question. The land admeasuring 4971.5 sq. yards was a schedule
B property and the subject matter of the first suit. The issue no. 1
in the first suit was in respect of the possession of the plaintiffs
and their predecessor-in-interest over the ‘suit land’ within 12
years prior to the suit. Therefore, the rights of the plaintiffs were
examined in respect of such suit land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards
alone, although, to return the finding on possession and title,
C possession of the father of the applicants over the land purchased
by the Plaintiff was clubbed together on the basis of patta claimed
to be granted to ‘SA’, though not produced or proved on record.
[Para 26][1227-A-C]
4. In the second suit filed by the applicants, the entire basis
D of suit was the findings returned in the first suit. There is no
independent evidence produced in respect of purchase of land
by ‘SA’ and the legality or validity of Patta issued to him. Although,
applicants have asserted that they have been visiting the land in
question to verify their possession but apart from such plea, there
E is no evidence that there was any covert and overt act on the
part of the plaintiffs to assert possession over the land in question.
[Para 27][1227-C-D]
5. In fact, the appellants had entered into a settlement with
the plaintiffs by which some of the land in possession was given
F to the decree holder in execution with the leave of the Court on
19.8.1995. Such action would show the assertion of title by the
appellants so as to enter into exchange of land in satisfaction of
the decree. The father of the applicants was party in the execution
proceedings but has not objected to the exchange. It necessarily
leads to an inference that the father of the applicants was not in
G possession and has not asserted the title or possession over the
remaining land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards. On the other hand,
the appellants have categorically asserted that they are in
possession of the land from the date of transfer in the year 1958
when the Collector of Hyderabad handed over the possession to
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1201
THROUGH LRS.

them. The appellants continued to be in unhanded possession A
over the last 30 years. [Para 28][1227-E-G]
The applicants have not claimed any title to the land which
is claimed to be in their possession and the subject matter of the
first suit was only 4971.5 sq. yards. Hence, the decree in the said
suit is binding qua the land in suit only. [Para 36][1233-F-G] B
6. Though the first suit is between the same parties, but
the subject matter is not the same. For res judicata to apply, the
matter in the former suit must have been alleged by one party
and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly by the other.
Since the issue in the suit was restricted to 4971.5 sq. yards, the C
decree would be binding qua to that extent only. The issue cannot
be said to be barred by constructive res judicata as per
Explanation IV as it applies to the plaintiff in a later suit. The
appellants have denied the claim of the plaintiffs in the first suit
to the extent that it was the subject matter of that suit alone.
Therefore, the decree in the first suit will not operate as res D
judicata in the subsequent matters. [Para 37][1233-G-H; 1234-
A-B]
7. Now, the second question as to whether the appellants
have proved their title over the land in question is examined.
The appellants claim title over the land in question. Since the E
land is transferred from the State, document of title is not required
to be registered in terms of Section 17 of the Registration Act,
1908 and/or in terms of Government Grants Act, 1895. The area
of Asafnagar lines is 378 acres 16 guntas. In the appendix to the
letter dated 10.10.1956, the details of the land comprising in the F
area measuring 378 acres 16 guntas is mentioned, which includes
2 acres 20 guntas of Miniature Rifle Range. Such land is reflected
as in a Mallapally Area. The total area of Mallapally area and
Asafnagar Lines is 378 acres and 16 guntas. The Mallapalli Lines
is non-ISF Lines measuring 450 acres and 12 guntas which is
distinct from Asafnagar Lines falling in ISF area measuring 378 G
acres and 16 guntas. Thus, Mallapally area and Mallapalli Lines
are two different parcels of the land. The land in question herein
is part of Asafnagar Lines handed over to the appellants as ISF

H
1202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Lines. The letter dated 19.3.1958 completes the transfer when
the possession of land measuring 1500 acres and 24 guntas was
handed over to the Union. [Para 41][1235-D-G]
The appellants claim to be in possession over the land
measuring 1500 acres and 24 guntas from the year 1958. Although,
B the appellants have lost claim in respect of land measuring 4971.5
sq. yards which is falling as part of 2 acres and 20 guntas of land,
but that would not lead to losing of the title of the appellants over
the entire land measuring 2 acres and 20 guntas. [Para 42][1235-
H; 1236-A]
C 8. Therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Government
Grants Act, 1895 read with Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration
Act, 1908, transfer of land to the appellant is complete. The
appellant is the owner of the aforesaid land. The applicants have
not produced any document regarding the patta in favour of Shaik
Ahmed. They have not proved the title of their vendor so as to
D claim a rightful title over the land in question. Further, no patta
could be granted to the applicants as the land was transferred by
the State in their favour on 19.3.1958 and possession was claimed
on the strength of sale deeds executed on 12.12.1959. [Para
43][1236-B-C]
E 9. Apart from the fact that the transfer of title in favour of
the Union is complete when the possession was delivered, but
even thereafter, the military land register and general land
register produced by the appellants show the possession of the
appellants over such land. The military land register and general
F land register are public documents within the meaning of Section
74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Evidence Act) containing
the records of the acts of the sovereign authority i.e., the Union
as well as official body. Still further, Section 114 of the Evidence
Act grants presumption of correctness being an official act having
been regularly performed. Therefore, in the absence of any
G evidence to show that such records were not maintained properly,
the official record containing entries of ownership and possession
would carry the presumption of correctness. In view of the transfer
of land on 10.10.1956 followed by delivery of possession on

H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1203
THROUGH LRS.

19.3.1958 and continuous assertion of possession thereof, it leads A
to the unequivocal finding that appellants are owners and in
possession of the suit land. [Para 44][1236-C-F]
10. The third question is to examine whether the appellants
are land grabbers and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under the Act. The objection of the appellants that they B
are not land grabbers and that the State Legislature will have no
jurisdiction over the property of the Union need not to be
examined in view of the finding that the appellants are in fact
owners of the land in question. [Para 45][1236-F-G]
K. Ethirajan (Dead) by LRs. v. Lakshmi & Ors. (2003) C
10 SCC 578 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 33 – held
inapplicable.
Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta (2010) 10 SCC
141 : [2010] 11 SCR 756; Daryao & Ors. v. State of
U.P. & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1457 : [1962] SCR 574; D
State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All India Manufacturers
Organisation & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 683 : [ 2006] 1
Suppl. SCR 86; Ramadhar Shrivas v. Bhagwandas
(2005) 13 SCC 1; Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail and
Others (1995) 3 SCC 693 : [1995] 2 SCR 975;
Govindammal (Dead) by LRs & Ors. v. Vaidiyanathan E
& Ors. (2019) 17 SCC 433 : [2019] 17 SCC 433 –
relied on.
Munni Bibi (since deceased) & Anr. v. Tirloki Nath &
Ors. AIR 1931 PC 114 – referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 33 held inapplicable Para 23
[2010] 11 SCR 756 relied on Para 30
[1962] SCR 574 relied on Para 31
G
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 86 relied on Para 32
[1995] 2 SCR 975 relied on Para 34
(2019) 17 SCC 433 relied on Para 35

H
1204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2049
of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2011 of the High Court
of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. 26811
of 2008.
B With
Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2012.
Vinay Navare, B. Adi Narayana Rao, R. Balasubramanian,
Sr. Advs., D. Bharat Kumar, Tadimalla Bhaskar Gowtham, Aman Shukla,
C Hathindra Manda, Dasari Muralee Mohan, Abhijit Sengupta, Pramod
Dayal, Ms. Prerna Singh, K. Subba Rao, K. Satyanarayana Murthy,
Aniruddha P. Mayee, Chandra Prakash, Akshay Amritanshu, Ms. Swati
Ghildiyal, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The present appeals are directed against an order passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Andhra Pradesh on 25.4.2011 whereby
an order passed by the Special Court, Hyderabad1 under the Andhra
Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 19822 on 19.9.2008 was not
E interfered with.
2. Brief facts leading to the present appeals are that the respondent
Nos. 1 to 63 being legal heirs of Late Sri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu filed an
application under Section 8 of the Act before the Tribunal alleging that
the land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards in Survey No. 299/2 (old Survey
F No. 403/1), Ward No. 8, Block-3, Shaikpet Village, Hyderabad, is the
land grabbed by the Union of India. It was pleaded that a notification is
required under Section 8(6) of the Act, which was published in the extra
ordinary Gazette of Andhra Pradesh on 22.1.2004 but no objections
against the same were received. The applicants alleged that their father
had purchased 2 acres 27 guntas of land in Survey No. 299/2 from one
G Shri Shaik Ahmed under two registered sale deeds dated 12.12.1959
(Exhs. A1 and A2). The purchaser, i.e., the father of the applicants was
put in possession thereof. Out of the total land purchased by the father
1
For short, the ‘Tribunal’
2
For short, the ‘Act’
H 3
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘applicants’
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1205
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

of the applicants, 7 guntas of land was taken over for the purpose of A
widening of road and remaining part i.e. 2 acres 20 guntas (12100 sq.
yards) was held by him. It was further alleged by the applicants that
their father sold the land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards out of 12100 sq.
yards in Survey No. 299/2 with specific boundaries via registered sale
deed dated 20.3.1964 (Ex.A3). The remaining part of the land i.e., 7128.5
B
sq. yards was however retained by their father.
3. It was alleged that the Military Contract Committee started
constructing sheds on the land sold by the father of the applicants. As a
result, the purchasers filed original suit4 on or about 14.4.1965 against
the Union of India, State of Andhra Pradesh and the father of the
applicants, which was later assigned as suit OS No. 175 of 1970 (Old C
No. 72 of 1965). The Plaintiff claimed that his vendor Shaik Ahmed and
then the father of the applicants was the owner in possession of the
property since purchase of the property on 20.3.1964, but the contractors
of the first defendant, the appellant herein, trespassed into the schedule
property on 12.7.1964. The Plaintiff thus sought possession of the land D
purchased or in the alternative, recovery of sale consideration paid to
the father of the applicants. It was inter-alia pleaded as under:-
“4. Under these circumstances, Sri Shaik Ahmed sold the entire
Ac.2-27 guntas of the said property to Sri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu,
I.P.S., Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch (C.I.D.), E
Hyderabad, the 3rd defendant herein by means of two sale deeds
dated 12-12-1959 and put the latter in possession of the same.
While in possession and enjoyment of the same, and paying taxes
thereon, the said Sri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu (the third defendant
herein) sold 4971 ½ square yards of site out of the said S.No.299/
2, of Shaikpet village more fully described in the schedule given F
below and herein after called the schedule property to the plaintiffs
herein by means of a sale deed dated 20-3-1964 for a consideration
of Rs. 28,000/-. Ever since the date of sale, the plaintiffs herein
have been in undisputed possession and enjoyment of the schedule
property. Thus the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the schedule G
property enjoying the same with absolute rights.”
4. The schedule property was the property purchased by the
plaintiff. In the written statement filed by the father of the applicants, it
was stated that the said defendant had perfect right and legal title to the
4
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘first suit’ H
1206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A land when he effected sale in favour of the Plaintiffs. The said defendant
asserted that he had no objection to the Plaintiff suit being decreed. It is
pertinent to mention that the said defendant had not filed any counter
claim of possession of the remaining land after selling the land to the
Plaintiff. The parties went to trial on the following issues:
B “1. Whether the plaintiffs and their predecessor in interest had
title to and possession over the suit land within 12 years prior to
the suit?
2. Whether the suit land belonged to Ex-Hyderabad State Army
and whether it was subsequently handed over to defendant No.1
C in 1958?
3. Whether the patta and the settlement relied upon by the plaintiff
were cancelled and if so, whether the cancellation is legal and
valid?
4. Whether the suit land was auctioned by defendant No.1 for
D grazing and grass cutting?
5. To what damage if any, are the plaintiffs entitled against the 3rd
defendant alternatively?
6. To what relief, if any are the plaintiffs entitle?”
E 5. The Learned Trial Court decided Issue No. 1, whereby the
following findings were recorded: -
“19. Another piece of evidence available from the material on
record is Ex.B.22. It is a letter from the Tahsildar (West) to the
commissioner of the Municipality wherein it is clearly mentioned
F that No.299/2 is the patta land of Shaik Ahmed and that Abdul
Gani named mentioned has no concern with it. Third one is the
order of the land record officer B.21 wherein it is clearly mentioned
that S.No.129/(ld) and 403 (new) measuring (7) acres was granted
as patta to Shaik Ahmed this material is quite sufficient to conclude
that Shaik Ahmed has his possession over the suit land since 1339
G Fasli.”
20. Next point to be considered is whether Shaik Ahmed sold the
suit land to the third defendant. His totally manifest by the two
agreement of sale B.2 and B.3 and the two subsequent register
sale deeds Ex.B.4 and B.5. In this matter B.7 entered witness
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1207
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

box. Shaik Ahmed is stated to have died few years ago. DW-2 A
has testified this matter. Third defendant as DW.1 stated that he
purchased the land in 1959 and shortly after one Heeralal filed a
suit against him claiming the suit land. That suit ultimately ended
in a compromise. Ex.B.26 and B.27 are the two receipts of
Heeralal in acknowledgement of the receipt of money and also
B
about compromising the matter.
21. Ex.B.28 to show that Chintal Basti Samshan Committee
member objected and alleged that a portion of the suit land was
the grade land and therefore, the third defendant cannot occupy
it. In that connection, the third defendant made a compromise by
giving some land as well as some cash amount to the said C
committee members and ended that matter. According to D.3 he
did not find time to construct his proposed house on account of
the above mentioned dispute. Meanwhile the plaintiffs approached
him and he sold the suit land to them. The Sale Deed executed by
him i.e. within four months the alleged encroachments was made. D
In this brief period the plaintiffs were not expected to do any thing
in exercising of their rights as purchasers. These facts coupled
with the documents stated above, are quite sufficient to conclude
that the plaintiff and their predecessors in title and undoubted
by their possession over the suit land within twelve years prior
to the alleged trespass. In other words, the plaintiffs have E
successfully, discharged the onus placed on them under issue No.1,
therefore find this issue in the affirmative.
(Emphasis Supplied)
27………………………Thus viewed from any perspective there F
is no material to believe that the suit belonged to the Ex Hyderabad
State Army and that is was subsequently handed over by the
Second defendant to the first defendant. I therefore, find this issue
in the negative.”
6. The suit was thus decreed on 13.8.1970 declaring the plaintiffs G
as title holders of the suit property. An appeal was filed by the Union of
India before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh but the said appeal was
dismissed on 31.3.1975. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in the suit filed execution
petition in which the applicants had chosen not to participate. The father
of the applicants died on 17.6.1993. Thereafter, the applicants invoked
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. H
1208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 7. The applicants asserted before the Tribunal that they are original
owners of the land in question and the Government had no right or title
over the property. While relying upon proceedings initiated by the
Plaintiffs, the applicants asserted as follows:-
“………………..The said suit as contested and the Hon’ble 4th
B Addl. Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad had decided the issues
of title and possession along with other issues vide judgment and
decree dated 13.08.1970. It is submitted that the Hon’ble IV
Additional Judge had held that our father is the owner and was in
possession of the property since more than twelve years.”
C 8. The appellant herein filed a written statement, inter alia, pleading
that the application is not maintainable as it does not disclose the facts
relating to the alleged land grabbing. It was also pleaded that the facts
narrated by the applicants themselves show that they have lost their
possession long ago and after being dispossessed, the applicants had
failed to take any steps to get the land restored to them. The filing of the
D suit and dismissal of appeal was accepted. It was also pleaded that in
execution of the previous decree, the decree holder and the applicants
had entered into a written compromise which was filed in execution
application No. 220/95 seeking recording of satisfaction of the decree.
In such proceedings, the Union proposed for exchange of the defence
E land with the decretal land in response to a letter dated 19.8.1995. In
terms of such compromise, possession of the land measuring 4971.5 sq.
yards was delivered to the decree holder on 14.12.1995. It was stated
that the schedule land is a defence land and appellant is not a land grabber.
It was further asserted that the Tribunal was not competent to decide
the title of the appellant for it being defence land. Still further, it was
F stated that the land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas was in possession of
the applicants since 1.4.1958 when it was handed over to the Government
of India, Ministry of Defence by the Collector, Hyderabad. The stand of
the appellant in the written statement inter-alia is as under:-
“7………………………. Therefore, the Statement of the
G applicant that since the construction was started in the land
belonging to the subsequent purchasers, they filed the suit is
appears to be absolutely ridiculous because the whole extent of
the land measuring 2 acres 20 guntas was under the possession
of the defence and the applicant had not claimed the suit schedule
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1209
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

land at any point of time before 16.01.1996. So it could be clearly A
seen that the suit schedule land was under the possession of the
defence more than 30 years before claiming by the applicant.
The contention of the applicant that IV Additional Judge, City
Civil Court, Hyderabad held that his father is the owner and was
in possession of the property since more than 12 years is wrong.
B
The Hon’ble Judge in issue No. 6 had stated that the “Vendor”,
the third defendant has satisfactorily proved by adducing oral as
well as documentary evidence that he as well as his predecessors-
in-title, Shaik Ahmed were in possession of the suit land i.e. only
4971 sq. yards whereas the applicant is claiming the remaining
extent of land msg 7128.5 sq. yards. C
8……………………. To settle the matter, the Government of
India, Ministry of Defence vide post copy of telegram No. 31/27/
L/L&C/64 dated 11.08.1995 conveyed approval for exchange of
the defence land with that of decretal land within Pension
Paymaster’s Office. Accordingly the Counsel for the decree D
holders have accepted the said exchange proposal on 19.08.1995.
On receipt of the acceptance, joint survey was conducted to mark
the decretal land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards. Accordingly a plan
showing the total extent of the defence land, the land already
decreed by the lower court in OS No. 175/1970. Accordingly an
extent of land admeasuring 4971.5 sq. yards handed over the E
decree holders by a proceedings dated 14.12.1995 of the Advocate
Commissioner and the Contempt Case No. 411/1995 was finally
closed on 15.12.1995, since land was handed over to the parties
as per the compromise Memo.
xxxx xxxx F

10 ………………………………The above land is under the
possession of the Union of India for the last several years which
is more than 30 years. Shri S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu so called owner
of the subject land did not filed any suit of claiming the property
which is under the occupation of the Union of India for the last G
more than 30 years. The said S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu was only
Defendant No.3 in the above suit and appeal and as such by virtue
of the decree passed in the said cases do not create a right in
favour of Sri S.V. Narsimhulu Naidu to claim any land which is
H
1210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A under the occupation of Union of India on the basis of below
grounds:-
xxxx xxxx
13. With regard to unnumbered para 14 to 16 of the petition, it is
submitted that the contention of the applicant in this para is that
B they are the owners of the schedules land is hereby denied. Land
admeasuring 2 acres 20 guntas situated at Shaikpet Village,
Golconda Mandal Hyderabad which was the property of Nizam
forces and used as “Minature Rifle Range” was handed over to
the Government of India, Ministry of Defence on 01.04.1958 vide
C Board proceedings dated 19.03.1958 by the Collector and the same
is vested with the Government of India under Article 295 (i) of
the Constitution of India. Being a defence land, the department is
not the land grabber. For the defence land enactment of the
Parliament is applicable whereas Land Grabbing Court is having
jurisdiction only on the State Land.
D
It is submitted that on the basis of uninterrupted possession
of the defence over the schedule property from more than last 30
years and as the Land Grabbing Court is having the jurisdiction
only on the State Land the above case is not maintainable before
this Hon’ble Court….”.
E
9. The learned Tribunal framed the following issues on the basis
of pleadings of the parties:
“(1) Whether the applicants are the owners of the application
schedule property?
F (2) Whether the rival title set up by the respondents is true, valid
and binding on the applicants?
(3) Whether the respondents are land grabbers within the meaning
of the Act XII of 1982?
(4) Whether the respondents prescribed title by adverse
G possession?
(5) To what relief?”
10. The appellants had never asserted their possession as adverse
or hostile to the knowledge of true owner. The plea of the appellant was
H that they are in possession of the said property as owners for the last 30
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1211
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

years. Therefore, issues were not correctly framed. Accordingly, Issue A
Nos. 1 and 2 were decided together.
11. In evidence, the applicants examined PW 1 - S. Janardhan
who had produced sale deeds by which their father had purchased the
land but the patta said to be executed in favour of Shaik Ahmed was not
produced. A perusal of the two sale deeds Ex A1 and A2 executed by B
the said Shaik Ahmed also does not disclose the date of any patta. Thus,
in the present proceedings, neither the sale deeds have mentioned about
the patta nor such patta had been produced or proved on record. In fact,
the entire claim is based upon the judgment in the first suit, which is
evident from the statement of PW 1, when he said that “a Division
Bench of the Hon’ble High Court reported in 1990 has categorically C
held that once the Hon’ble Court upheld the title and possession in earlier
proceedings, it is not open for any one of the authorities to deny the
same taking untenable pleases. Once the source of title is common, any
party taking a different plea in subsequent proceedings is barred by res
judicata”. D
12. The Tribunal inter-alia returned the following findings:
“52. Srinivasulu Naidu purchased the land under Exs.A-1 and A-
2 in the year 1959. There is a finding in that suit that 12 years
prior to filing of the suit, Shaik Ahmed and Srinivasulu Naidu
had been in possession of the land. So the land has been in E
their continuous possession since 1949-50. Delivery of Acs.2.27
guntas of land to the Defence by the State Government is only a
paper delivery as per Ex.B14 proceedings. So it can be inferred
that actual delivery of land of Acs. 2.27 guntas was not made and
it is only a paper delivery. This land alone was not alleged to have F
been delivered as per Ex.B14 proceedings dt. 19-3-58. About
Acs.1500-24 guntas of land in four different plots in different areas
was ordered to be delivered by the State Government to the Union
of India. According to the Union of India, Acs.2.27 guntas is part
of Asfanagar lines which is shown as item No. V in Ex.B-14 at
page No.2. G
xx xx xx
57. The contention of the Advocate for the respondents is that
when the Union of India claimed that it is in possession since
1958 in the suit OS 175/70, title to the balance land is to be decided
H
1212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A elsewhere. It is further contended that Exs. A1 and A2 sale deeds
are valid and title passed to the applicants but to show whether
Shaik Ahmed had title or not for the remaining land, suit is not
filed by the applicants. Therefore, the applicants waived their right
and their claim is time barred. When a finding is given in the
suit that State Government which gave land to Union of India
B
has no title and that Srinivasulu Naidu and his vendor had
title, there is no need for Srinivasulu Naidu to file another
suit for declaration of his title.
xx xx xx
C 59. If the land which was delivered to R-1 herein and to the other
decree holders in execution proceedings, in exchange of suit
schedule land owned by Srinivasulu Naidu, the exchange itself is
illegal. Without establishing title to the remaining land by the Union
of India the Union of India has entered into the compromise for
exchange of the Application schedule land. A Compromise can
D be made between the decree holders and judgment debtors with
regard to the decree schedule land only but it should not be in
respect of some other land not covered by the decree. For retaining
the decreetal schedule property by Judgment Debtors, some other
land which is not subject matter of the suit was given to the decree
E holders. Union of India was aware that this land which was
delivered to decree holders in exchange was mentioned as
boundary to the decreetal schedule property belonged to Srinivasulu
Naidu. Srinivasulu Naidu was a party to the suit. Even though
no relief is granted against Srinivasulu Naidu in the said suit,
at-least notice should be given to Srinivasulu Naidu or
F Srinivasulu Naidu should be made party to the compromise,
when he claimed title and possession to that land which was
given to the decree holders in exchange.
xx xx xx

G 90. In the case on hand the title to the application schedule land is
not in issue in the earlier suit. The issue was with regard to the
title for the suit schedule land which was purchased by the plaintiffs
from Srinivasulu Naidu. Exs.A1 and A2 are the sale deeds which
were relied on by the plaintiffs to establish their title for 4971 sq.
yards. For the remaining land there was no issue. No finding is
H given with regard to the title for the remaining land of Srinivasulu
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1213
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

Naidu. The remaining land of Srinivasulu Naidu’s is shown as A
boundary on three sides of the suit land purchased by the plaintiffs
from Srinivasulu Naidu. A finding is given in the suit that the land
purchased by Srinivasulu Naidu under Ex.A1 and A2 is patta land
of Shaik Ahmed. To decide the title of the plaintiffs in 4971 sq.
yards title of Srinivasulu Naidu covered by Exs.A1 and A2 was
B
also considered. Therefore, there is identity of title in OS 175/70
and in this land grabbing case. Hence, the finding in the suit binds
the respondents.
91. The findings in the suit binds the Union of India as the
title in the two litigations is one and the same. The State
Government did not prefer the appeal against the Judgment C
and decree in OS 175/70. The Union of India claims title
through the State Government. In the suit, a finding is given
that the land is a patta land of Shaik Ahmed and not the State
Government land. Therefore, that finding became final and binds
both the Governments and other parties to the suit. The appeal D
CCCA No-30/1972 preferred by the Union of India against the
judgment and decree passed in suit OS 175/70 was dismissed by
the Hon’ble High Court. A finding was given by the High Court
that the land covered by Exs.B-38 marked in the i.e. the land
covered by Ex.B25 herein was not correlated to the suit land.
The suit land is part of the land covered by Exs.A1 and A2 sale E
deeds herein. The Union of India contends that the entire land of
Acs.2.20 guntas was delivered as per Ex.B38 proceedings. In
the letter dt. 25-4-1960 which was addressed by the Tahsildar,
Hyderabad to the Collector Hyderabad District it is mentioned
that the tounch map available in this office shows that Sy.No. F
299/2 is the same place where the rifle range is shown in the map
of I.S.F lands, Mallepally. Neither the tounch map nor the map of
ISF lands has been produced. The letter therefore loses all its
importance. The letter however, shows that patta was sanctioned
to Shaik Ahmed prior to the preparation of the maps.” (Emphasis
supplied) G

13. The High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
affirmed the order of the Tribunal and held as under:
“17. Originally, the land to an extent of Acs.2.27 gts in Sy.No.
299/2 was purchased by S.V. Srinivasulu Naidu, the father of the H
1214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A applicants under Exs.A1 and A2 sale deeds. After Ac.0.07 gts of
land was affected in road widening, the remaining extent of land
is Acs.2.20 gts equivalent to 12,100 sq. yards, out of which, 4,971
sq. yards was sold by the father of the applicants to one V. Krishna
Murthy and others under Ex.A3. Now, the disputed land is 7,128.5
sq. yards. The possession of land to an extent of Acs.2.20 gts by
B
Srinivasulu Naidu from 1959 to 1964 was established in O.S. No.
175 of 1970 wherein the dispute with regard to the land to an
extent of 4,971.5 sq. yards out of Acs.2.27 gts between V. Krishna
Murthy and others/plaintiffs with the Union of India/respondent
has been decided through the judgment and decree dated
C 13.08.1970. The delivery of the land to an extent of Acs.2.27 gts
to the Union of India by the State Government was negatived in
that suit. The possession of Srinivasulu Naidu in the land on three
sides of the decretal land is admitted by R.W.2 as per the contents
of Ex.B21. Since the said judgment and decree in O.S. No. 175
of 1990 had attained finality in view of the dismissal of appeal
D
being CCCA No. 30 of 1972 filed by the Union of India, the
plaintiffs have proceeded for its execution. Therefore, the father
of the applicants had got title and possession over the part of the
land sold by him.
18. The contention of the Union of India that the entire land to an
E extent of Acs.2.20 gts was delivered to the Central Government
as per Ex.B28 proceedings cannot be accepted as the land to an
extent of Acs.2.20 gts was shown as Minature Rifle Range at
Mallepally village area as per Ex.B14 and not in Shaikpet village
and as such, the Special Court held that the land to an extent of
F Acs.2.20 gts covered by Exs.A1 and A2 belongs to Srinivasulu
Naidu and they are valid documents.
19. When the execution proceedings are pending, respondent No.1
claimed 1/3rd share in the entire land covered by the decree in
O.S. No.175 of 1990 as assignee from one of the decree holders
G i.e., V. Krishna Murthy under assignment deed dated 18.03.1992,
which admittedly has not been produced before the Court. To
avoid demolition of the Pension Payment Office and to avoid the
contempt proceedings, the Union of India made exchange offer
to five equal extent of vacant land lying adjacent to the decree
schedule property though it is not its property. The Special Court
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1215
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

observed that after exchange, an extent of 2627.87 sq. yards A
covered by decree shown as ‘B’ portion is delivered to R1 and
also observed that respondent No.1 got possession of the land of
Srinivasulu Naidu after exchange, his possession is illegal and
unlawful.”
14. The order passed by the Tribunal and that of the High Court B
was based on the decree in OS No. 175/1970 though the said suit was
only in respect of 4971.5 sq. yards comprising in Survey No. 299/2. The
plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit had pleaded that the applicants had
purchased 2 acres 27 guntas of land vide two sale deeds and that the
plaintiffs are purchasers of 4971.5 sq. yards.
C
15. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the subject matter
of the first suit was only 4971.5 sq. yards which was purchased by the
plaintiffs. The issue was in respect of title of the plaintiffs over the said
land alone. Though there was an issue as to whether the land belongs to
Hyderabad State Army and that it has been handed over to the Union in
1958, but such issue was decided against the appellants. However, the D
finding on such issue would be restricted to the land which is subject
matter of the suit and not the entire land which was handed over to the
Union by the State of Andhra Pradesh.
16. The transfer of land by the State of Andhra Pradesh to the
Union was not required to be registered by a registered instrument in E
view of Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration Act, 1908, which reads as
under:
“17. Documents of which registration is compulsory.
(1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property F
to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if
they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act
XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866, or the
Indian Registration Act, 1871, or the Indian Registration
Act, 1877, or this Act came or comes into force, namely,
G
(a) instruments of gift of immovable property;
(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or
operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether
in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether
H
1216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees
and upwards, to or in immovable property;
(c) non-testamentary instruments which acknowledge the
receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the
creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of
B any such right, title or interest; and
xx xx xx
(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to –
xx xx xx
C (vii) any grant of immovable property by Government;”
17. Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 provides that
the Transfer of Property Act shall not be applicable to Government grants.
Therefore, the condition in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act
that immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards
D can be transferred only by a registered instrument is also not applicable
to the Government Land. Section 2 reads as under:
“2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, not to apply to Government
grants. - Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contained
shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or
E other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made
or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government to, or
in favour of any person whomsoever; but every such grant and
transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had
not been passed.”
F 18. It was argued that the land was transferred to the Union vide
letter dated 10.10.1956 when 1650 acres and 2 guntas of land including
378 acres and 16 guntas of land of Asafnagar lines were transferred to
the Government of India. Subsequently, on 24.8.1957, land measuring
150 acres 8 guntas attached to Chandrayangutta lines was excluded and
the Collector was requested to make early arrangements of handing
G over of the land measuring 1500 acres 24 guntas to the Military Estate
Officer. In pursuance of such communication, the possession of land
measuring 1500 acres 24 guntas was handed over to the Union of India
in the proceedings dated 19.3.1958.

H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1217
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

19. In the communication dated 10.10.1956, as mentioned above, A
the State of Andhra Pradesh had transferred 1650 acres 2 guntas of
land. However, later on 24.8.1957, the land measuring 150 acres and 8
guntas situated in Chandrayangutta Lines was excluded. The
communication dated 10.10.1956 reads as thus:
“From: B
The Chief Secretary to Government
General Administration Department
Hyderabad Deccan.
To C
The Secretary to Govt. of India
Ministry of Defence,
New Delhi.
Subject:- ALLOCATION OF OLD HYDERABAD D
CANTONMENT LANDS BETWEEN THE DEFENCE
MINISTRY AND THE STATE GOVERNMENT
Sir,
I am directed to refer to this Govt. Letter No. 1065 CAD Army E
dated the 9th July, 1952 addressed to the Ministry of States (Now
Home Affairs Ministry) New Delhi (Copy enclosed for ready
reference) and to say that as stated therein agreement was reached
between the Government of India and the Hyderabad Govt. in
regard to the allocation of the late Hyderabad Army buildings and
according to the agreement the following lines in the Hyderabad F
proper have been treated as ISF lines property of the Govt. of
India.
1) Mohammadi Lines.
2) Ibrahim Bagh Lines.
G
3) Makai Darwaza Lines.
4) Asafnagar Lines
5) Masab Lines.
6) Chandrayangutto Lines H
1218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Similarly agreement was reached regarding the following
Hyderabad Army line and building in the Hyderabad proper being
treated as non-ISF lines property of the Hyderabad Govt.
1) Fateh Darwaza Lines.
2) Mallapalli Lines.
B
3) A.C. Guards (Saifabad) Lines.
4) Nampally Lines.
5) Central Military Hospital Building (New Sarojini Devi Hospital)
6) Banjara Darwaza Lines.
C
7) Band lines Fath Maidan.
8) Mysaram Lines.
As stated in the above cited letter the question of allocating the
Hyderabad Cantonment lands between the two Govts has been
D engaging the attention of this Govt. for some time past and in
order to reach an agreement between the Centre and the State
for the allocation of these lands this Govt. had proposed in the
letter referred to above that all lands in the vicinity of the ISF
buildings or meant for the use of occupants of ISF Buildings should
E be treated as ISF or Central Govt. property and the rest as non-
ISF property falling to the share of Hyderabad State. It was also
made known to the Govt. of India, in our above letter and DO No.
661/GAD Army 54 dated the 27th /28th Aug 54 addressed to you
that this Govt. had asked their survey to carry out the survey and
the demarcation of the ISF and non-ISF lands. That work has
F since been completed.
The State Government having examined the entire question of
the demarcation of appurtenant lands carefully suggest for the
acceptance of the Govt. of India the allocations as indicated in a
set of maps (five in number) forwarded herewith. The appurtenant
G lands attached to ISF Lines are shown in green colour while the
lands appurtenant to non-ISF lines are indicated in blue colour.
The recommendation of the State Govt. briefly envisages the
allocation of lands as under:

H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1219
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

A

B
According to the agreement reached between the two Govt.
Banjara Darwaza Lines. Property of the State is being exchanged
for Masab lines. Property of the Centre is being exchanged vide
this Govt’s endorsement No. 197 GAD 21 Army 56 dated 26th
June 56. Hence Masab Lines are omitted here and shown under
non-ISF Lines below - Banjara Darwaza Lines are shown as C
ISF instead.

D

E

F

G
“From the above it will be seen that 1650 acres 32 guntas will go
to the Centre and 974 acres 04 guntas fall to the share of the
State.
I am to request you to kindly to communicate early concurrence
H
of the Govt. of India to the above allocation of the ex Hyderabad
1220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A Cantonment lands to the Centre and the State so that the lands
falling to the share of the Govt. of India may be hand over to the
local Military authorities.
An early reply will be very much appreciated.

B
Yours faithfully
sd/-
BHARAT CHAND DHANNA
Deputy Secretary to the Govt.
C 10.10.1956
ISF AND NON-ISF LANDS-HYDERABAD

D

E

F

G

H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1221
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

A

B

.Sd/-
10/10/56"
20. The ISF lines are the Indian Security Forces lines whereas C
the non-ISF lines refer to the non-Indian Security Forces lines such as
that of State of Hyderabad. The Asafnagar lines measuring 378 acres
and 16 guntas is a part of ISF line. In the appendix attached to the said
communication, the Asafnagar lines are shown as Mallapally area
measuring 378 acres and 16 guntas. The land described as Miniature
D
Rifle Range measuring 2 acres 20 guntas is the subject matter of the
land in the present appeals. Mallapalli lines are mentioned as non-ISF
lines but measures about 450 acres and 12 guntas. Thus, it is argued that
in the appendix, Mallapally area is distinct from Mallapalli lines. The
Mallapally area is either synonymous with Asafnagar lines or on account
of mistake but has equivalent measurements with Asafnagar lines. E
21. The proceedings of the Board of the Appellant with the
Collector of Hyderabad in respect of delivery of possession of 1500
acres and 24 guntas as recorded in the letter dated 19.3.1958 (Ex B-14)
read as thus:
“PROCEEDINGS of a Board of officers F

assembled at the OFFICE OF THE GARRISON
ENGINEER, SECUNDERABAD
On the 19th March 1958 at 1000 hours.
G
by order of STATION HEADQUARTERS
LETTER NO. 17729
DATED 15TH Jan, 1958
for the purpose of TAKING OVER OF EX-
H
1222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A STATE FORCES LANDS IN
HYDERABAD ACCRUING TO
THE SHARE OF THE ARMY
PRESIDING OFFICER
B Brigadier G.S. BAL - Station Commander
MEMBERS
1. Major W.S. Rasalam - DAA & QMG HQ
SECUNDERABAD
C
Station
2. Shri H.S. GUNDAPPA Rep. M.E.S. Garrison
Engineer
3. Shri D.D. ANAND Rep. ML & C MEO
D
SECUNDERABAD
4. SHRI RAMASWAMY NAIDU Rep. of the Collector of
HYDERABAD
The Board having assembled pursuant to order, proceeded
E
to ascertain from the Land Records, the details of the Property to
be taken over and its location and boundary. The Collector’s
Representative Mr. Ramaswamy Naidu furnished the followed
information regarding this from the Land Records, though the
extent of the land to be taken over by the Central Government is
F not finalized.
(a) According to the Government of India letter No. 70732/
Q3(Plg)VOL-II/18-S/Q/D(QTD) & LHD dated 11th March
1957 to the Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh
General Administration (Military Department) Hyderabad,
G 1650 acres and 32 guntas of lands appurtenant to Asaf Nagar
Lines, Mohammadi Lines, Ibrahim Bagh Lines, Makkai
Darwaza Lines, Banzara Darwaza Lines as per Annexure
“A” are to be taken over by the Army authorities. The details
of the above area is contained in the enclosures to the State
Government letter No. 392 GAD 23rd Army 56 dated
H 10th Oct 56 which is enclosed as Annexure “B”.
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1223
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

(b) Subsequently vide GAD Memorandum No.2733/57-2 A
dated 24th Aug 57 addressed to the Collector and copies to
the Military Estates Officer, Administrative Commandant,
Station Headquarters, Secunderabad and the Board of
Revenue appended as Annexure “C” an extent of lands
measuring 150 acres and 8 guntas appurtenant to
B
Chandrayan Gutta Lines should be deducted from 1650
acres 32 guntas and the rest of the land i.e. 1500 acres and
24 guntas alone are to be handed over to the Military
authorities. This is to be confirmed by Army Headquarters.
In pursuance of this, the following areas are to be taken
over by the military authorities:- C

Acres Guntas
1) Mohamadi Lines measuring 361 20
2) Ibhahimbagh Lines measuring 484 2
D
3) Makkai Darwaza Lines 244 8
measuring
4) Banjara Darwaza Lines 32 18
measuring
E
5) Asafnagar Lines measuring 378 16
Total 1500 24
2. The Plans for the above are enclosed as Annexure “D”,
“E”, “F”. The areas have been traversed by the State
Settlement Department and stone pillars have also been fixed F
on the ground. Those have been physically verified by the
Board at the sites. At present the boundary stones are
marked with tar temporarily. Those are to be permanently
engraved.
3. The Board observed during its physical verifications on the G
ground that there are several encroachments in all the Lines,
which are taken over. These encroachments are as furnished
by the Collector ‘Land’ Acquisition Hyderabad in his letter
No. RC-CIO/1522/Hyd/58 dated 9th May, 58. Vide annexure.
The Board observed that the encroachments are in the nature H
1224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A of both built up areas (permanent and temporary) and
cultivated areas. The board was informed by the Collector’s
Representative that some areas of land falling within the
boundary limits of the lands being taken over by the Army
authorities have been leased out by the Civil authorities for
agriculture, grazing and other commercial purposes. A list
B
of such leases with details and terms of those leases, as
furnished by the Collector’s Representative is attached as
Annexure “H”.
4. Though the buildings in Banjara Darwaza Lines, have not
yet been handed over by the State P.W.D, being still in
C occupation by the H.S.R.P. units, the lands appurtenant
thereto, as per the above schedule is taken over.
5. During the physical verification and taking over of lands at
site, the Board observed the following:-

D (a) Asafnagar Lines
i) The demarcation line between Sarojini Devi Hospital
and Asafnagar Line requires to be re-marked by fixing
additional boundary stones from boundary pillars
No.46 to 113 by the State authorities. Action is in
E hand.
ii) The State’s Government representative Shri.
Ramaswamy Naidu stated that an enclave between
pillars 76 to 100 including Asafnagar pumping station
and building known as Hussain Gulshan and adjoining
F cultivated area, comprising of a total acreage of 44
is not now to be handed over and incorrectly computed
in the area of 378 acres and 16 guntas, mentioned at
item (b) of para 1 above, as this comprises of State
Government property (Asafnagar Water Works) and
private property.
G
(b) xxx xxx
(c)
(d)
(e) Ibrahimbagh Lines
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1225
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

The boundary pillars exist as per the plan. A
6. Regarding the recommendation of the areas for the active
use of the Army (units in occupation), their future use and
surplus land is being ascertained from the user units with a
view to determine the surpluses for handing over to the
Military Estates Officer. B
Presiding Officer -Sd/-
Members 1. Sd/-
2. Sd/-
3. Sd/- C
4. Sd/-
22. It is further argued that such land is recorded in possession of
the appellant in the military land register and general land register which
are public documents within the meaning of Section 74 of the Evidence
D
Act, 1872. Still further, the Court may presume the existence of any fact
which it thinks is likely to have happened, regard being given to the
common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case such as (e)
that the judicial and official acts have been regularly performed and (f)
that the common course of business has been followed in particular E
cases. Thus, the documents maintained in the course of official duty
would carry the presumption of correctness on the basis of which the
Union cannot be said to be land grabber, which has entitled the applicants
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Union has unequivocal title
over the land in question. Though, in the first suit, the Union was
F
unsuccessful but the findings in the said suit would be restricted to land
which is subject matter of the said suit and not to the entire land.
23. On the other hand, Mr. Rao argued that the land in question is
Sarf-e-Khas land i.e. crown land of the State of Hyderabad belonging to
Nizam family. Shaik Ahmed, the seller of the land to the predecessor of
the applicants was the holder of Patta under the Nizam. Such Patta is a G
document of title and therefore, a valid title was passed on to the
predecessor of the applicants vide registered sale deed dated 12.12.1959.
It was also argued that the decree in the first suit is in respect of entire
property purchased by predecessor of the applicants, though the claim
of plaintiffs was restricted to the land purchased by him. Therefore, H
1226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A such decree would operate as res judicata. Reliance was placed upon
a judgment reported as K. Ethirajan (Dead) by LRs. v. Lakshmi &
Ors.5 wherein it has been held that where the issues directly and
substantially involved between the same parties in the previous and
subsequent suit are same, though in the previous suit, only part of the
property was involved while in the subsequent suit, the whole of the
B
property was the subject matter, the principle of res judicata would be
applicable. It was also argued that the act of any person of land grabbing
falls within the scope of the Act and the appellants are also persons
within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, the proceedings
initiated before the Tribunal were valid and have been rightly decided.
C 24. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The following
questions are required to be decided in the present appeals.
(i) whether the order passed in the first suit filed by the plaintiffs
as affirmed by the High Court operates as res judicata?

D (ii) whether the appellants have proved their title over the land in
question?
(iii) whether the appellant is a land grabber within the meaning of
Section 2(d) of the Act?
25. The applicants have claimed possession from the appellants
E primarily on the ground that in the suit filed by the plaintiffs on 14.4.1965,
the basis of the suit was purchase of land by the plaintiffs from the
father of the applicants. Since the plaintiffs have been found to be the
owners on the basis of purchase of land from the father of the applicants,
therefore, the issue of title decided in the said suit would operate as res
F judicata. Therefore, the appellants herein are land grabbers having no
title over the land in question. It may be reiterated that the plaintiffs had
purchased land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards from the father of the
applicants whereas the remaining land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards was
retained by the applicants. Therefore, the decree in the first suit was
only in respect of the schedule property in the first suit i.e. 4971.5 sq.
G yards. The patta, the basis of title of the applicants had not been produced
in evidence before the Tribunal. Thus, the basic document of title had
not been produced.

5
H (2003) 10 SCC 578
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1227
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

26. In the first suit, the father of the applicants had not filed any A
counter claim to assert title or possession over the land in question. The
land admeasuring 4971.5 sq. yards was a schedule property and the
subject matter of the first suit. The issue no. 1 in the first suit was in
respect of the possession of the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest
over the ‘suit land’ within 12 years prior to the suit. Therefore, the
B
rights of the plaintiffs were examined in respect of such suit land
measuring 4971.5 sq. yards alone, although, to return the finding on
possession and title, possession of the father of the applicants over the
land purchased by the Plaintiff was clubbed together on the basis of
patta claimed to be granted to Shaik Ahmed, though not produced or
proved on record. C
27. In the second suit filed by the applicants, the entire basis of
suit was the findings returned in the first suit. There is no independent
evidence produced in respect of purchase of land by Shaik Ahmed and
the legality or validity of Patta issued to him. Although, applicants have
asserted that they have been visiting the land in question to verify their D
possession but apart from such plea, there is no evidence that there was
any covert and overt act on the part of the plaintiffs to assert possession
over the land in question.
28. In fact, the appellants had entered into a settlement with the
plaintiffs by which some of the land in possession was given to the decree E
holder in execution with the leave of the Court on 19.8.1995. Such action
would show the assertion of title by the appellants so as to enter into
exchange of land in satisfaction of the decree. The father of the applicants
was party in the execution proceedings but has not objected to the
exchange. It necessarily leads to an inference that the father of the
applicants was not in possession and has not asserted the title or F
possession over the remaining land measuring 7128.5 sq. yards. On the
other hand, the appellants have categorically asserted that they are in
possession of the land from the date of transfer in the year 1958 when
the Collector of Hyderabad handed over the possession to them. The
appellants continued to be in unhanded possession over the last 30 years. G
29. To examine the arguments that the decree in the previous suit
would operate as res judicata, Section 11 CPC may be extracted:
“11. Res Judicata. – No Court shall try any suit or issue in which
the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and
H
1228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or
between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating
under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent
suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised,
and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
B Explanation I.—The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit
which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or
not it was instituted prior thereto.
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, the competence
of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to
C a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
Explanation III.—The matter above referred to must in the
former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or
admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have
D been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall
be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in
issue in such suit.”
30. The plea of res judicata is generally raised against the
plaintiffs who would be the applicants before the Tribunal. This Court in
E a judgment reported as Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta6 held
that the plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a plaintiff to
have an adjudication of his claim. This Court has culled down the essential
requirements to be fulfilled to apply the bar of res judicata to any suit or
issue. It has been observed as under:
F “20. Plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a plaintiff to
have an adjudication of his claim. The plea must be clearly
established, more particularly where the bar sought is on the basis
of constructive res judicata. The plaintiff who is sought to be
prevented by the bar of constructive res judicata should have notice
about the plea and have an opportunity to put forth his contentions
G
against the same. In this case, there was no plea of constructive
res judicata, nor had the appellant-plaintiff an opportunity to meet
the case based on such plea.

6
H (2010) 10 SCC 141
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1229
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

21. Res judicata means “a thing adjudicated”, that is, an issue that A
is finally settled by judicial decision. The Code deals with res
judicata in Section 11, relevant portion of which is extracted below
(excluding Explanations I to VIII):
“11. Res judicata.— xxxx xxxx
22. Section 11 of the Code, on an analysis requires the following B
essential requirements to be fulfilled, to apply the bar of res judicata
to any suit or issue:
(i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the
former suit and in the later suit.
C
(ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons
claiming under them.
(iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier
suit.
(iv) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must have been D
heard and finally decided in the first suit.
(v) The court trying the former suit must have been competent to
try the particular issue in question.”
31. The rule of res judicata is founded on considerations of public
policy that the finality should be attached to the binding decisions E
pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction. This Court in Daryao
& Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors.7 held as under:
“9. …Now, the rule of res judicata as indicated in Section 11 of
the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some technical aspects,
for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may be said to be F
technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is founded on
considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the public at
large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions
pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in
the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over G
with the same kind of litigation. If these two principles form the
foundation of the general rule of res judicata they cannot be treated
as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights
in petitions filed under Article 32.”
7
AIR 1961 SC 1457 H
1230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A 32. In a judgment reported as State of Karnataka & Anr. v. All
India Manufacturers Organisation & Ors.8, this Court has considered
Explanations III & IV of Section 11 CPC. It was held as under:
“32. Res judicata is a doctrine based on the larger public interest
and is founded on two grounds: one being the maxim nemo debet
B bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one ought to be twice
vexed for one and the same cause [P. Ramanatha Aiyer: Advanced
Law Lexicon, (Vol. 3, 3rd Edn., 2005) at p. 3170] ) and second,
public policy that there ought to be an end to the same litigation
[Mulla: Code of Civil Procedure, (Vol. 1, 15th Edn., 1995) at
p. 94] . It is well settled that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure
C Code, 1908 (hereinafter “CPC”) is not the foundation of the
principle of res judicata, but merely statutory recognition thereof
and hence, the section is not to be considered exhaustive of the
general principle of law [See Kalipada De v. Dwijapada Das,
(1929-1930) 57 IA 24 : AIR 1930 PC 22 at p. 23] . The main
purpose of the doctrine is that once a matter has been determined
D
in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to reagitate
the matter again and again. Section 11 CPC recognises this principle
and forbids a court from trying any suit or issue, which is res
judicata, recognising both “cause of action estoppel” and “issue
estoppel”. There are two issues that we need to consider, one,
E whether the doctrine of res judicata, as a matter of principle,
can be applied to public interest litigations and second, whether
the issues and findings in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD
500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] constitute res judicata for the
present litigation.
xx xx xx
F
36. We will presently consider whether the issues and findings
in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ
224 (DB)] actually constitute res judicata for the present
litigation. Section 11 CPC undoubtedly provides that only those
matters that were “directly and substantially in issue” in the
G previous proceeding will constitute res judicata in the subsequent
proceeding. Explanation III to Section 11 provides that for an issue
to be res judicata it should have been raised by one party and
expressly denied by the other:
xx xx xx
H 8
(2006) 4 SCC 683
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1231
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

41. With these legal principles in mind, the question, therefore, A
arises as to what exactly was sought in Somashekar
Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ 224 (DB)] , how it
was decided by the High Court in the first round of litigation, and
what has been sought in the present litigation arising at the instance
of Mr J.C. Madhuswamy and others. In order to show that the
B
issue of excess land was “directly and substantially in issue”
in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1 Kant LJ
224 (DB)] we will first examine the prayers of the parties, the
cause of action, the averments of parties and the findings of the
High Court in Somashekar Reddy [(1999) 1 KLD 500 : (2000) 1
Kant LJ 224 (DB)] .” C
33. The issue can be examined from another angle as to whether
the plea of res judicata can be raised by the applicants against their co-
defendant in the first suit. In the first suit, the defendant had the
opportunity to raise a claim in respect of land measuring 7128.5 sq.
yards. However, no such claim was raised. In view of Section 11, D
Explanation IV CPC, the applicants might and ought to have made grounds
of defence in the former suit to claim possession of the land measuring
7128.5 sq. yards. The consequence would be that failure to raise such
defence or counter claim would be deemed to be constructive res judicata
in terms of Explanation IV of Section 11 CPC. Reference may be made
to judgment of this Court reported as Ramadhar Shrivas v. E
Bhagwandas9. This court was examining a situation where in a suit for
possession, the defendant Bhagwandas was found to be the tenant of
the original owner Hiralal and after a subsequent purchase, he had become
tenant of Ramadhar. The first suit was dismissed on the ground that suit
for possession was not maintainable against Bhagwandas being tenant. F
In another suit filed by the purchaser, the defendant denied the title of
plaintiff, though such was not the plea in the first suit. In these
circumstances, the Court held as under:
“23. In the case on hand, it is clear that in the earlier suit, the court
had recorded a clear finding that the defendant Bhagwandas was G
neither the owner of the property nor could he show any right as
to how he was occupying such property except as a tenant of
Hiralal. If Bhagwandas was claiming to be in lawful possession in
any capacity other than a tenant, he ought to have put forward
9
(2005) 13 SCC 1 H
1232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A such claim as a ground of defence in those proceedings. He ought
to have put forward such claim under Explanation IV to Section
11 of the Code but he had failed to do so. The doctrine of
constructive res judicata engrafted in Explanation IV to Section
11 of the Code thus applies to the facts of the case and the
defendant in the present suit cannot take a contention which ought
B
to have been taken by him in the previous suit and was not taken
by him. Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code is clearly attracted
and the defendant Bhagwandas can be prevented from taking
such contention in the present proceedings.”
34. The issue as to whether there can be res judicata between
C co-defendants was first examined by the Privy Council in a judgment
reported as Munni Bibi (since deceased) & Anr. v. Tirloki Nath &
Ors.10. The three principles of res judicata as between co-defendants
were delineated as: (1) There must be a conflict of interest between the
defendants; (2) it must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to
D give the plaintiff the relief he claims; (3) the question between the
defendants must have been finally decided. This test too is not satisfied
as in order to grant relief of possession to the plaintiffs in the first suit, it
was not necessary to decide the issue of the remaining land between the
father of the applicants and the appellants. The said principle was
reiterated by this Court in a judgment reported as Mahboob Sahab v.
E Syed Ismail and Others11 wherein it has been held as under:
“8. Under these circumstances the question emerges whether
the High Court was right in reversing the appellate decree on the
doctrine of res judicata. At this juncture it may be relevant to
mention that the trial court negatived the plea of res judicata as a
F preliminary issue. Though it was open to sustain the trial court
decree on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata, it was not
argued before the appellate court on its basis. Thereby the findings
of the trial court that the decree in OS No. 3/1/1951 does not
operate as res judicata became final. The question then is whether
the doctrine of res judicata stands attracted to the facts in this
G case. It is true that under Section 11 CPC when the matter has
been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the
same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them
claimed, litigating under the same title, the decree in the former
10
AIR 1931 PC 114
11
H (1995) 3 SCC 693
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1233
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

suit would be res judicata between the plaintiff and the defendant A
or as between the co-plaintiffs or co-defendants…”
35. In a recent judgment reported as Govindammal (Dead) by
LRs & Ors. v. Vaidiyanathan & Ors.12, the applicability of res judicata
between co-defendants was examined. The applicants were the
defendants in the first suit and so were the appellants. In the aforesaid B
case, the suit was filed by the respondents claiming title over A Schedule
property or in the alternative for partition of half share in B Schedule
property. The Court considered the principle of res judicata within the
co-defendants in para 14 which reads as under:
“14. However, there exist certain situations in which the principles
of res judicata may apply as between co-defendants. This has C
been recognised by the English courts as well as our courts for
more than a century. The requisite conditions to apply the principle
of res judicata as between co-defendants are that (a) there must
be conflict of interest between the defendants concerned, (b) it
must be necessary to decide this conflict in order to give the D
plaintiff the relief he claims, and (c) the question between the
defendants must have been finally decided. All the three requisite
conditions are absent in the matter on hand. Firstly, there was no
conflict of interest between the defendants in the suits filed by the
temple and the school. Secondly, since there was no conflict, it
was not necessary to decide any conflict between the defendants E
in those suits in order to give relief to the temple or the school,
which were the plaintiffs. On the other hand, the father of the
plaintiffs and the father of the defendant were colluding in those
suits filed by temple and school. Both of them unitedly opposed
those suits. In view of the same, the principles of res judicata F
would not apply.”
36. The applicants have not claimed any title to the land which is
claimed to be in their possession and the subject matter of the first suit
was only 4971.5 sq. yards. Hence, the decree in the said suit is binding
qua the land in suit only.
G
37. Though the first suit is between the same parties, but the
subject matter is not the same. For res judicata to apply, the matter in
the former suit must have been alleged by one party and either denied or
admitted, expressly or impliedly by the other. Since the issue in the suit
12
(2019) 17 SCC 433 H
1234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A was restricted to 4971.5 sq. yards, the decree would be binding qua to
that extent only. The issue cannot be said to be barred by constructive
res judicata as per Explanation IV as it applies to the plaintiff in a later
suit. The appellants have denied the claim of the plaintiffs in the first suit
to the extent that it was the subject matter of that suit alone. Therefore,
the decree in the first suit will not operate as res judicata in the subsequent
B
matters.
38. The reliance of Mr. Rao on the judgment of this Court in
K. Ethirajan is not tenable. In fact, such judgment has been made the
basis of the impugned orders as well. The reliance is on para 20 of the
judgment, which reads as under:
C “20. The argument that principle of res judicata cannot apply
because in the previous suit only a part of the property was involved
when in the subsequent suit the whole property is the subject-
matter cannot be accepted. The principle of res judicata under
Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is attracted where issues
D directly and substantially involved between the same parties in
the previous and subsequent suit are the same - may be - in the
previous suit only a part of the property was involved when in the
subsequent suit, the whole property is the subject-matter.”
40. The said paragraph cannot be read in isolation. The facts on
E the basis of which judgment is given are required to be kept in view to
have an understanding of the background in which such observation has
been recorded. One line or paragraph cannot be picked up without going
through the facts and the nature of suit. In the first suit, deceased-
M. Gurunathan sought eviction of deceased-K. Ethirajan, (plaintiff in
the second suit), from a portion of the suit property by claiming exclusive
F title. The trial court in the said suit held that the deceased-K. Ethirajan
cannot be held to be in possession of the suit property as a mere licensee
of the deceased-M. Gurunathan. He was held to be in possession of the
suit property as owner since 1940 as evidenced by various documents
of possession filed by him and the joint patta granted by the authorities
under the Act of 1948. The trial court also held that deceased-K. Ethirajan
G
having remained in continuous possession of the suit property as owner
had perfected his title by remaining in adverse possession for more than
the statutory period of 12 years.
40. K. Ethirajan (plaintiff in the second suit), claimed partition of
the land based on joint patta granted to the Plaintiff and the deceased-
H
UNION OF INDIA v. S. NARASIMHULU NAIDU (DEAD) 1235
THROUGH LRS. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

defendant M. Gurunathan. It is on the basis of this joint patta, the suit for A
partition filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the trial court as well as by
the First Appellate Court. This Court found that the issue directly and
substantially involved in the first suit was to claim exclusive ownership
of deceased-M. Gurunathan to the whole property left behind by
deceased-Gangammal, although eviction was sought of the defendant
B
from a particular portion of the land on which he had built a hut for
residence. The claim of ownership over the entire property was specially
raised in the first suit. The findings in para 20 were returned in these
circumstances. It was thus in this background, this Court held that the
principle of res judicata would apply as in the previous suit, the assertion
was in respect of whole property but possession was sought from a C
smaller area. The judgment is clearly not applicable in the present case
as the title over the land in question before the Tribunal is distinct from
the land which was the subject matter in the first suit. The first suit was
only in respect of the land purchased by the Plaintiff and not the entire
land, though his claim was based on sale by the father of the applicants.
D
41. Now, the second question as to whether the appellants have
proved their title over the land in question is examined. The appellants
claim title over the land in question. Since the land is transferred from
the State, document of title is not required to be registered in terms of
Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and/or in terms of Government
Grants Act, 1895. The area of Asafnagar lines is 378 acres 16 guntas. E
In the appendix to the letter dated 10.10.1956, the details of the land
comprising in the area measuring 378 acres 16 guntas is mentioned,
which includes 2 acres 20 guntas of Miniature Rifle Range. Such land is
reflected as in a Mallapally Area. The total area of Mallapally area and
Asafnagar Lines is 378 acres and 16 guntas. The Mallapalli Lines is F
non-ISF Lines measuring 450 acres and 12 guntas which is distinct from
Asafnagar Lines falling in ISF area measuring 378 acres and 16 guntas.
Thus, Mallapally area and Mallapalli Lines are two different parcels of
the land. The land in question herein is part of Asafnagar Lines handed
over to the appellants as ISF Lines. The letter dated 19.3.1958 completes
the transfer when the possession of land measuring 1500 acres and 24 G
guntas was handed over to the Union.
42. The appellants claim to be in possession over the land measuring
1500 acres and 24 guntas from the year 1958. Although, the appellants
have lost claim in respect of land measuring 4971.5 sq. yards which is
falling as part of 2 acres and 20 guntas of land, but that would not lead to H
1236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 4 S.C.R.

A losing of the title of the appellants over the entire land measuring 2 acres
and 20 guntas.
43. Therefore, by virtue of the provisions of Government Grants
Act, 1895 read with Section 17(2)(vii) of the Registration Act, 1908,
transfer of land to the appellant is complete. The appellant is the owner
B of the aforesaid land. The applicants have not produced any document
regarding the patta in favour of Shaik Ahmed. They have not proved the
title of their vendor so as to claim a rightful title over the land in question.
Further, no patta could be granted to the applicants as the land was
transferred by the State in their favour on 19.3.1958 and possession was
claimed on the strength of sale deeds executed on 12.12.1959.
C 44. Apart from the fact that the transfer of title in favour of the
Union is complete when the possession was delivered, but even
thereafter, the military land register and general land register produced
by the appellants show the possession of the appellants over such land.
The military land register and general land register are public documents
D within the meaning of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(Evidence Act) containing the records of the acts of the sovereign
authority i.e., the Union as well as official body. Still further, Section 114
of the Evidence Act grants presumption of correctness being an official
act having been regularly performed. Therefore, in the absence of any
evidence to show that such records were not maintained properly, the
E official record containing entries of ownership and possession would
carry the presumption of correctness. In view of the transfer of land on
10.10.1956 followed by delivery of possession on 19.3.1958 and
continuous assertion of possession thereof, it leads to the unequivocal
finding that appellants are owners and in possession of the suit land.
F 45. The third question is to examine whether the appellants are
land grabbers and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under the Act. The objection of the appellants that they are not land
grabbers and that the State Legislature will have no jurisdiction over the
property of the Union need not to be examined in view of the finding that
the appellants are in fact owners of the land in question.
G
Thus, Civil Appeal No. 2049 of 2013 is allowed and the application
filed by the applicants before the Tribunal is hereby dismissed. In view
thereof, Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2012 is rendered infructuous and
accordingly dismissed.

H Ankit Gyan Appeal disposed of,