Holding

The Central Administrative Tribunal has no power to modify disciplinary penalties unless the dismissal is based solely on a criminal conviction; therefore its order reducing the dismissal is invalid.

Summary

Parma Nand, a time‑keeper, was found guilty of preparing a bogus pay‑bill and was dismissed by the competent authority under the Punjab Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) reduced the dismissal to a stoppage of five future increments, holding the penalty disproportionate. The Union of India appealed, arguing that the CAT has no power to alter a disciplinary penalty when the inquiry findings are supported by evidence, while the respondent sought complete exoneration. The Supreme Court held that, under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to judicial review and does not include the power to modify penalties, except where dismissal is based solely on a criminal conviction under Article 311(2). Consequently, the Tribunal’s order reducing the penalty was set aside, the appeal was allowed, and the respondent’s special leave petition dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal can modify the penalty imposed in a disciplinary proceeding when the inquiry findings are supported by evidence.
Whether the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is equivalent to an appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary orders.
Whether the Tribunal may examine the adequacy of a penalty when dismissal is based solely on a criminal conviction under Article 311(2).
Whether the respondent falls within the category of a workman, allowing the Tribunal to exercise industrial‑court powers.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985s. 14, s. 15, s. 16, s. 27, s. 28, s. 29

Subjects

Administrative Tribunaldisciplinary proceedingspenalty modificationjurisdictionservice lawArticle 311(2)natural justiceproportionality

Judgment

UNION OF INDIA ETC. A
v.
PARMA NAND ETC.

MARCH 14, 1989

[K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, A.M. AHMADI B
AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.)

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: Section 14-16, 27-29.

Disciplinary proceedings-Inquiry-Penalty imposed by Compe-
tent Authority-Punjab Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966- C
Administrative Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Whether could modify
penalty on the ground that it is excessive or disproportionate to the
misconduct proved.

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 31/(2)(a): Civil Servant-
Conviction on a Criminal Charge-Penalty imposed by competent D
authority-Administrative Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Whether can
examine adequacy of penalty.

Article 136: Supreme Court's jurisdiction-Is equitable-Supreme
Court can modify the penalty imposed by Competent Authority-High
Court or Tribunal has no such jurisdiction. E

Words and Phrases: "All Courts'-Meaning of.

The respondent, in the appeal, was in-charge of preparing the pay
bills of the employees of the Beas Sutlej Link Project. He, along with
other two employees, was charged with the fraudulent act of withdrawal F
of Rs.238.90 by preparing a bogus pay bill and identity card in the
name of a fictitions person. An enquiry was conducted against all the
three employees under the Punjab Government Servants Conduct
Rnles, 1966 and the Inquiry Officer found all the three guilty of the
charge framed against each of them. The competent authority accepted
the findings of the Inquiry Officer and after giving an opportunity of G
being heard imposed the penalty of dismissal on the respondent. Minor
penalty of with-holding two or three future inuements was imposed on
each of the other two employees. The respondent challenged the finding
of the Inquiry Officer as well as the order of dismissal by filing a writ
petition in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Subsequently the writ
stood transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal under the H
19
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A provisions of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. The Tribunal
agreed with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer to the effect
that the respondent was guilty of the charge but modified the punish-
ment by reducing the punishment of dismissal imposed to that of stop-
ping his five increments on the ground that the respondent was
measured with a different yardstick than the other two employees.
B Against the aforesaid order of the Tribunal appeals were filed before
\_
this Court; (a) by the Union oflndia contending that the tribunal has no '
powers to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority on the ground that it is disproportionate to the proved misde- ·
meanour, and (b) by the respondent seeking a complete exoneration ,.
from the charge.
c While allowing the appeal of the Union and dismissing the Special
Leave Petition of the respondent the Court set aside the order of the
Tribunal, and,

HELD: 1. Under the provisions of the Administrative Tribunal
D Act, 1985 the powers of the High Courts under Article 226, in so far as
they are exercisable in relation to service matters stand conferred on the
Tribunal established under the Act. The powers of other ordinary civil
C onrts in relation to service matters to try all suits of a civil nature
excepting suits of which their cognisance either expressly or impliedly
barred also stand conferred on the Tribunal. The Act thus excludes the
E jurisdiction, power and authority of all Courts except the Supreme
Court and confers the same on the Tribunal in relation to recruitment
and service matters. The Tribunal is just a substitute to the civil Court
and High Court. The Tribunal thus could exercise only such powers
which the civil Court or the High Court could have exercised by way of
judicial review. It is neither less nor more. [27D-E; 288-C]
F '
S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., [1987] l S.C.C. }-
124 referred to;

2. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disci-
plinary matters or punishment cannot be equated with an appellate
G . jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findi.,gs of the
Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or
utterly perverse. The power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is
conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or
rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If
there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance
H with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND 21

ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the A
competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is
imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal bas no power to sub-
stitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of
penalty unless it is malafide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to
concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if the
B
conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on
evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the
matter. [33D-F]

State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan, [1963] (Suppl.) I S.C.R. 648;
Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, A.I.R. 1955
S.C. 271; State of Mahar(Jshtra v. B.K. Takkamore & Ors., [1967] 2 c
S.C.R. 583; Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon, A,I.R. 1971 S.C. 1537; Rail-
way Board v. Niranjan Singh, [1969] 3 S.C.R, 548; State of U.P. v.
O.P. Gupta, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 679 and Union of India v. Sardar
Bahadur, [1972] 2 S.C.R. 218, applied.
D
Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [1983] 2 S.C.C. 442,
distinguished.

3. There is one exception to this proposition. There may be cases
where the penalty is imposed under clause (a) of the second proviso
to Article 3ll(2) of the Constitution. Where the person, without
enquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of E
conviction by a criminal court, the Tribunal may examine the adequf1CY
of the penalty imposed in the light of the conviction and sentence
inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is apparently un-
reasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature of the criminal
charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial justice. The
F
Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority for re-
consideration or by itself substitute one of the penalities provided under
clause (a). [35E-F]

Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 S.C.C. 398, applied.

4. Since the respondent had made his choice of forum and was G
even otherwise dealt with under the Government Servant (Conduct)
Rules which are applicable to him it cannot be held that he falls iJ1to the
category of a workman empowering the Central Administrative
Tribunal to exercise the powe"s of an Industrial Court for giving
appropriate relief. [35F-G]
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1709 't I-
A
of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 9.10.1987 of the Central
· Administrative Tribunal Chandigarh in Appln. T.-1055 of 1986.
WITH
B .~·
(SLP (Civil) No. 6998 of 1988)
;'-.
V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. Indu Goswami, C.V. Subba Rao, P.

c
Parmeshwaran for the Appellant in C.A. No. 1709 of 1988.
M.K.D. Namboodary for the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No. 6998
of 1988.
-
S.M. Ashri and Mahabir Singh for the Respondents. ·1-
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. The civil appeal, by special leave,
D and the connected SLP raise an important issue as to the power of the
Central Administration Tribunal ("Tribunal") to examine the adequ-
acy of penalty awarded by the competent authority to a Government
servant in disciplinary proceedings.
Short fachial background is this: j-
E Parmanand-Respondent in the appeal was a Time Keeper in
Beas Sutlej Link Project, Sundernagar. He was incharge of preparing
the pay bills and other bills of the work charged employees of the
project. It was alleged that he master-minded and prepared the pay
roll pertaining to 'T' Token of Central Survey Division, Sundernagar
for the month of May 1969 and entered the name of one Shri Ashok
Kumar, Token No. 59-T at serial No. 10 on page 2 of the relevant pay
x
F }.-
roll. He made this entry with ulterior motive to withdraw the pay of
Ashok Kumar for the month of May 1969, even though Ashok Kumar
was not working in that Division. A bogus identity card in the name of
Ashok Kumar T.No. 59-T with the signatures of the issuing officer was
also prepared by the respondent although it was not his duty to pre-
G pare the identity card. The said fictitious identity card was used by one
.A..
Suraj Singh, cleaner T. No. 210-K of Beggi Tunnelling Division for the
purpose of withdrawing the pay of Ashok Kumar. While Suraj Singh
by impersonation was receiving the pay of Ashok Kumar, he was
recognised by the Casl)ier since he knew him personally. There then
started an enquiry followed by departmental proceedings against three
H persons including the respondent herein. The Personnel Officer of the
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND [SHEITY, J.] 23

i' BSL Project was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The enquiry was con-
ducted under the Pun jab Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1966. A

The Inquiry Officer fram~d charge against the respondent in the
following terms:

"That the said Shri Parma Nand, while working as- B
~
Time Keeper in Time Keeping Sub-Division of Beas Sutlej
~. Link Project, Sundernagar during the month of May 1969

-
failed to.maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in
as much as he falsely marked the attendance of Shri Ashok
Kumar, Token No. 59-T in the Pay Roll of Control Survey
Division for the month of May 1969, which resulted in
fictitious drawal of Rs.238-90 as pay of the said Shri Ashok c
Kumar. He also prepared a bogus identity card in the name
of the above Shri Ashok Kumar and initiated it below the
signatures of issuing officer and this identity card was used
by Shri Suraj Singh, Cleaner (Token No. 210-K), Boggi
Tunnelling Division, at the time of attempting to receive D
the pay of Shri Ashok Kumar from the Cashier."

After a detailed enquiry against the respondent and two others,
.'y- the Inquiry Officer found all the three guilty of the charge framed
against each of them. The report of enquiry was forwarded to the
competent authority who after giving an opportunity of being heard E
dismissed the respondent from service. The other two persons were let
,,._ off with minor punishments of withholding two or three future incre-
ments in their pay scales.

-- The respondent moved the High Court of Himachal Pradesh
under Article 226 challenging the findings of Inquiry officer as well as
the order of dismissal passed by the competent authority. During the
pendency of the writ petition, a Bench of the Central Tribunal at
Chandigarh was constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act,
F

1985. Consequently, the said writ petition stood transferred to the
Tribunal by operation of S. 29 of that Act.
~- G
The Tribunal upon consideration of the matter agreed with the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer that the respondent was the
master mind behind the scheme to defraud the project. The Tribunal
observed:
'
"Since the applicant had access to the records which H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

were fabricated at the relevant time the Inquiry Officer had
A
come to the conclusion that the applicant was the master
mind behind the scheme to defraud the Project.

In view of the foregoing, it cannot be termed that the
finding returned by the Inquiry Officeer is without any
B evidence."
.....
I
It was also observed that there was no denial of a reasonable ,,o,
opportunity for the respondent to set up proper defence. After reach-
ing this conclusion, the Tribunal proceeded to examine the adequacy of
penalty awarded to the respondent. This is how the Tribunal dealt with
.
that question:
c
"Lastly, it was argued on behalf of the applicant that the
punishment awarded to him is disproportionate to the
gravity of the charge proved against him and is in stark
contrast to the punishment awarded to his other three
D colleagues in whose cases, only future increments were
stopped, the maximum being for three years in respect of
Shri Sain Ditta, Clerk. The finding regarding the applicant
being the master-mind behind the attempt to defraud the
Project appears to have weighed with the disciplinary
authority while dismissing the applicant from service. An
E appreciation of the evidence, as done in the preceding
pages, would show that the applicant had entered the name
of Shri Ashok Kumar in the pay roll for May 1969 and so
far as other evidence against him is concerned, it is mostly
of a circumstantial nature. There is no direct or expert
evidence that it was he who had marked the attendance of
F Shri Ashok Kumar in the pay roll for May 1969 or that it
was he who had initiated the identity card. The evidence
against him is circumstantial in as much as the pay roll was
under his custody and he could have access to the identity
cards. Under these circumstances, the evidence that the
applicant was the only master mind who sought to defraud
G the project of the funds cannot be termed to be direct."

The Tribunal concluded:

"l..s such it is ,a case where the applicant should not
be measured with a different yardstick than the others, who
H have been punished along with applicant. In ihe interest of
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND ISHETfY, J.J 25

justice, it is necessary to modify the punishment awarded
to the applicant. We, therefore, direct that the punishment A
of dismissal awarded to the applicant be reduced to that of
stopping of his five increments which he had earned for a
period of five years, in terms of clause (iv) of Rule 11 of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 1965. There will be no order as to costs. The respon- B
dents shall comply with this order within four months from
its receipt and pay all consequential benefits to the
applicant."

The Tribunal seems to suggest that the respondent was not the
only master mind to commit the fraudulent act and there were others
too, and as such, he should not be measured with a different yardstick. c
-I The Tribunal however, has held that the respondent was guilty of
entering the name of Ashok Kumar in the pay roll of May· 1969. Yet it
modified the punishment to fall in line with that of others whose part
in the fraudulent act was evidently not similar in nature.

Being aggrieved by the reduction of penalty, the Union of India
has preferred the Civil Appeal No. 1709 of 1988. Parma Nanda seek-
ing a complete exoneration from the charge has preferred the SLP
No. 6998 of 1988.

The question which has to be decided, therefore, is whether the E
Tribunal has power to modify the penalty awarded to the respondent

-- when the findings recorded as to his misdemeanour is supported by
legal evidence. To put in other words, whether the Tribunal could
interfere with the penalty awarded by the Competent authority on the
ground that it is excessive or disproportionate to the misconduct
proved? The answer to the question cannot be determined without F
reference to the scope of judicial review in the pre-Tribunal period. It
is also necessary to remember the purpose for which the Tribunal came
to be established. Before the Tribunal was constituted, the Courts
were exercising judicial review of administrative decisions in public
services. This judicial review was sought to be taken awary by the
Constitution (42nd Amendment Act, 1976). By this amendment, G
,>-. Articles 323A and 323B were introduced in the Constitution, thereby
opening altogether a new chapter in our Administrative law. Article
323A(l) which is relevant for our purpose is confined to matters relat-
ing to the public services. It provides power to Parliament to enact law
for establishment of Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of dis-
putes with regard to service matters. The service matters are of H

'
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19891 2 s.c.Il.

A
persons appointed to the public service and posts. The public service
and posts may be in connection with the affairs of the union or of any
r
State. The law to be enacted by Parliament may also cover persons
appointed in the local or other authority or of any corporation owned
.or controlled by the Government. There should be only one Tribunal
for the Union of India and one for each State or for two or more States
B put together. The law cannot provide for hierarchy of Tribunals. In
pursuance of Articles 323A(l) the Parliament enacted the Administra- i,...
tive Tribunal Act, 1985 ("The Act").
.~

We may briefly examine the statutory framework. Section 4 of
the Act provides for establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal ..
as well as State Administrative Tribunal. It also provides power to
c constitute Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Sections 5
to 11 deal with the composition of Tribunals and Benches thereof and \-
terms of office of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members.
Section 14 provides powers and authority to the Central Administra-
tive Tribunal. Section 15 deals with the similar power and authority of
D the State Administrative Tribunal. Section 16 refers to the powers of a
Joint Administrative Tribunal. Section 22 ~tates that the Tribunal shall
not be bound by the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and sub-
ject to other provisions of the Act and of any Rules made thereunder.
The Tribunal could also regulate its own procedure including the fixing '1-
E of places and time of enquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in
private. Sub-section 2 of sec. 22 requires the Tribunal to decide every
application made to it as expeditiously as possible. Ordinarily, the
Tribunal shall decide every application on a perusal of documents and
written representations and after hearing such oral arguments as may
be advanced. Section 27 provides for execution of orders. Section 28
--
F excludes the jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court. >
Section 29 directs transfer of cases pending in courts to the Tribunal }-
for adjudication.

In pursuance of the provisions of the Act, the Central Govern-
ment has established the Central Administrative Tribunal with a
G Bench at Chandigarh whose order has been challenged before us.
It is now necessary to examine in detail the amplitude of powers
of the Tribunal. Section 14, so far material, provides:
""'
"14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Cent-
H ral Administrative Tribunal·:
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND ISHETIY, J.] 27

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, A
the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and
from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and
authority exercisable immediately before that day by all
courts (except Supreme Court) in relation to:

(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruit- B
ment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the
Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post con-
nected with defence or in the defence services, being in
either case, a post filled by a civilian;

(b) all service matters concerning-
c
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx''

Similar are the powers and authority of the State Service Tri-
bunal under sec. 15 and Joint Administrative Tribunal under sec. 16.·
D
The expression "all courts" in this connection in.eludes civil
courts and High Court but not the Supreme Court. The powers of the
Supreme Court for obvious reasons have been expressly kept undis-
turbed. The powers of the High Courts under Article 226, in so far as
they are exercisable in relation to service matters stand conferred on
the Tribunal established under the Act. The powers of other ordinary E
civil courts in relation to service matters to try all suits of a civil nature
excepting suits of which their cognizance either expressly or impliedly
barred also stand conferred on the Tribunal.

This position becomes further clear by secs. 27, 28 and 29 of the
Act. Section 27 provides for finality of the orders of the Tribunal. F
Section 28 excludes the jurisdiction of courts except the Supreme
Court, or any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court, concerning service
matters. Section 29 provides for automatic transfer of all pending pro-
ceedings in the High Court under ·Articles 226 and 227, relating to
service matters (except appeals) to the Tribunal for adjudication.
Likewise, suits and other proceedings pending before a Court or other G
authority relating to sef\/ice matters also stand transferred to the
Tribunal for determination.

The Act thus excludes the jurisdiction, power and authority of
all Courts except the Supreme Court and confers the same on the
Tribunal in relation io recruitment and service matters. Section 3(2) H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1989] 2 S.C.R.
•
A comprehensively defines 'service matters' to mean all matters relating
to conditions of service including the disciplinary matters.

From an analysis of secs. 14, 15, 16, 27, 28 and 29, it becomes
apparent that in the case of proceedings transferred to the Tribunal
from a civil court or High Court, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to
B exercise all the powers which the civil court could in a suit or the High
Court in a writ proceeding could have respectively exercised. In an
original proceedings instituted before the Tribunal under sec. 19, the
Tribunal can exercise any of the powers of a civil court, or High Court.
The Tribunal thus could exercise only such powers which the Civil
Court or the High Court could have exercised by way of judicial
review. It is neither less nor more. Because, the Tribunal is just a
c substitute to the civil court and High Court. That has been put beyond
the pale of controversy by this Court while upholding constitutional
validity of the Act in S. P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.,
1198711sec124.

D In this backdrop, we may consider the main question that we
have set out at the beginning of the judgment. Mr. Mahajan, learned
counsel for the Central Government urged that the Tribunal has no
powers to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority on the ground that it is disproportionate to the proved mis-
demeanour. He also urged that if the enquiry held against the delin-
E quent officer was proper with the findings supported by evidence then,
the Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment to modify the punish-
ment awarded. Mr. Ashri, learned counsel for the respondent, how-
ever, justified the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in awarding the
lesser punishment. We do not think that we could accept so bold a
submission made for the respondent, nor can it be sustained by othet
F consideration. Indeed, the contentiEJn for the respondent is unsustain-
able in view of the decisions of this Court.

In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan, I1963 I Suppl 1 SCR 648 the
enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on several charges and
eventually he was dismissed from· service. The Orissa High Court
G found that the findings on two of the charges were bad being in viola-
tion of the principles of natural justice. The findings on the remaining
charges were however, found to be justified. The Hiigh Court remitted
the matter to the Government for fresh consideration for awarding a
proper punishment. The High Court observed:

l-1 "That the findings in respect of charges 1(a) and 1(e)
- _.._

U.0.L v. PARMA NAND ISHEITY, J.I 29

should be set aside as beil)g opposed to the rules of natural
A
justice, but the findiugs in respect of charges l(c) and l(d)
and charge 2 need not be disturbed. It will be then left to
Government to decide whether, on the basis of these
charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintained
or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice."
B
The Supreme Court reversed this order on the ground that if the
dismissal could be supported on any {inding as to substantial misde-
meanour for which the punishment could lawfully be imposed, it was
not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have
.. weighed with the authority dismissing the public servant. Shah, J .
observed (at 665-666):
c
" . . . . . in our view the High Court had no power to
direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of
dismissal. The constitutional guarantee afforded to a public
servant is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an
authority subordiuate to that by which he was appointed, D
and that he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in
rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of
showiug cause against the action proposed to be taken in
regard to him. The reasonable opportumty contemplated
has manifestly to be in accordance with the rules framed
under Article 309 of the Constitution. But the Court in a E
case in which an order of dismissal of a public servant is
impugned, is not concerned to decide whether the sentence
imposed, provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate
having regard to the gravity of misdemeanour !'Stablished.
The reasons which induce the punishing authority, if there
has b1>en an enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, is F
not justifiable; nor is the penalty open to review by the
court. If the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all
of the findings of the Tribunal were "unreasonable", the
order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules no
restrictions in determinil)g the appropriate punishment are
placed, was final, and the High Court had no jursidiction to G
direct the Governor tb review the penalty, for as we have
already observed the order of dismiss~! passed by a compe-
tent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the
constitutional protection have been complied with, is not
j1.1stifiable. Therefore if the order may be supported on any
finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the H
.
I

30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the court
A to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed
with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The
court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry
officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of
misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that
B order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it
appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural
justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in
directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the
question."

In Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR
c 1956 SC 271, Mehar Chand Mahajan, C.J., while dealing with a refer-
ence application against an order of Income Tax Tribunal under the
Indian Income Tax Act had struck slightly a different note (at 273):

"The learned Attorney General frankly conceded
D that it could not be denied that to a certain extent the
Tribunal had drawn upon its own imagination and had
made use of a number of surmises and conjectures in reach-
ing its result. He however, contended that eliminating the \.I
irrelevant material employed by the Tribunal in arriving at
its conclusion, there was sufficient material on which the 1
E finding of fact could be supported. In our opinion, this
contention is not well founded. It is well established that
when a court of facts acts on material, partly relevant and
partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to what extent the
mind of the court was affected by the irrelevant material
used by it in arriving at its finding. Such a finding is vitiated '.i :
F because of the use of inadmissible material and thereby an
issue of law arises." ~-
This proposition in Dhirajlal's case was explained and the state- ~
ment of law m Bidyabhushan's case was affirmed m State of
Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore & Ors., [1967] 2 SCR 583. It was case
G of supersession of the Corporation. The show cause notice issued to J
the corporation mentioned two grounds for supersession. One of the \
grounds was held to be irrelevant. This Court, however, upheld the
order of supersession stating that the order cannot be set aside for
reason that one of the grounds is found to be non-existent or irrelevant
if another ground by itself was serious enough to supersede the Corpo-
H ration. Bachawat, J., said (at 594):
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND [SHETIY. J.] 31

-'I "The principle underlying these decisions appears to
A
be this. An administrative or quasi-judicial order based on
several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if
it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or
irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority
would have passed the order on the basis of the other rele-
vant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order B
based on several grounds some of which are found to be
non-existent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the court is
I
f satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on
the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and
.. the exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds
could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision."
c
This principle again receives support from the decision of in Zora
-f- Singh v. J.M. Tandon, AIR 1971SC1537. There the Chief Settlement
Commissioner cancelled the allotment of land made to a person but
the High Court allowed the writ petition quashing the order of the
Chief Settlement Commissioner and directing him to proceed to decide D
the case on merits. The Commissioner re-heard the entire case as
directed by the Court .but came to the same conclusion as before and
reaffirmed his earlier decision cancelling the allotment. The person
unsuccessfully moved the High Court with a writ petition challenging
.-t the order of the Commissioner and finally appealed to the Supreme
Court. In dismissing that appeal, Shala!, J ., made inter alia, the follow- E
ing observations (at 1540):

"The High Court was right in holdmg that even if
there were amongst the reasons given by the Commissio-
ner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant
'\ and could be considered sufficient, the Commissioner's F
~ conclusions would not be vitiated. The principle that if
some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclu-
siofi turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable,
its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the
conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective
satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the G
>- decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of the
reasons tum out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be
impossible for a superior court to find out which of the
reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, had brought
about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion
is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficult H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence
before the Tribunal even if some of it was irrelevant, a
superior court would not interfere if the finding can be
sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in a
writ petition for certiorari, the superior court does not sit in
appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and
B therefore, does not enter into the question of sufficiency of
0
evidence. There was, in our view, legal evidence before the \
Commissioner upon which he was entitled to rest his find- '
ing that the copies relied on by the appellant were not ·-'\ .......
genuine."
~

The view taken in Bidyabhushan case has been repeatedly
c affirmed and reiterated in Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh, [1969] 3
SCR 548 at 552; O.P. Gupta case AIR 1970 SC 679 and Union of India ..\-
v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218. Any doubts as to the incapacity
of the Court to review the merits of the penalty must vanish when we
read the remarks of Mathew, J., in Sardar Bahadur's case (at 225):
D
"A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The
standard of proof required is that of preponderance of
probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
inference that Naud Kumar was a person likely to have
official dealings, with the respondent was one which 'f
E reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the
case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a
decision based on it. Where there are some relevant mate-
rials which the authority has accepted and which materials
may reasonably support the conclusion ·that the officer is
guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its
jurisdiction under Art. 226 to review the materials and to
)( >-
F
arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the ~·
enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or
reliability of the evidence cannot be convassed before the
High Court."

G The learned Judge also said (at 227):
-1
"Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in State
of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, that if the order of a
punisbing authority can be supported on any finding as to
substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be
H imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the
....
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND ISHETfY, J.} 33

charge proved alone would have weighed with the autho- A
rity in imposing the punishment. The Court is not
concerned to decide whether the punishment imposed,
provided it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having
. regard to the misdemeanour established."

So much is, we think, established law on the scope of jurisdiction B
and the amplitude of powers of the Tribunal. However, of late we have
been receiving a large number of appeals from the orders of
Tribunals-Central and States-complaining about the interference
with the penalty awarded in the disciplinary proceedings. The Tribu-
nals seem to take it within their discretion to interfere with the penalty
on the ground that it is not commensurate with the delinquency of the
official. The law already declared by this Court, which we reiterate, C
makes it clear that the Tribunals have no such discretion or power.

We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment cannot be
equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot interfere D
with the findings of the Inquiry Officer or competent authority where
they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to
remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is
-t - conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or
rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If
there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance E
with principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the
ends of justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
competent authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is
imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to
x substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of
~ penalty unless it is malafide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to F
concern with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty if
the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is
based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or
extraneous to the matter.

).-. . Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Bhagat G
Ram v. State ofHimachal Pradesh, [1983] 2 SCC 442. We do not
consider that this decision is of any assistance to support the conten-
tion urged for the respondent. There the facts found were entirely
different. This Court, after considering the matter was of opinion that
the appellant therein was not offered a reasonable opportunity to
defend himself and accordingly the enquiry and consequential order of H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
)'.
removal from service were found to be bad. Ordinarily, where the
A
disciplinary enquiry is shown to have been held in violation of princi-
pies of natural justice, the enquiry would be vitiated and the order
based on such enquiry would be quashed with liberty to hold fresh
enquiry. But that procedure was not adopted by this Court since the
charge against appellant was found to be a very minor infraction of
B duty in checking hammer-marks of trees. That negligence, if any, 'r--
.~
caused no loss to the Government, for, the man who resorted un-
authorised felling of trees, had compensated the Department. The
appellant was a low paid class IV Government servant. Considering all
these facts this Court felt that it would not ,be fair to direct a low paid •
class IV employee to face the hazards of a fresh enquiry. This Court in
the interest of justice and fair play thought that a minor penalty would
c be sufficient. Accordingly, two increments with future effect, of the )\-
appellant were ordered to be withheld. This decision is, therefore, no
authority for the proposition that the High Court or the Tribunal has
jurisdiction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of justice. It
may be noted that this Court exercised the equitable jurisdiction under
D Article 136 and the High Court or Tribunal has no such power or
jurisdiction.

We may however, carve out one exception to this proposition.
There may be cases where the penalty is imposed under clause (a) of -1-
the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Where the

-
E person, without enquiry is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank
solely on the basis of conviction by a criminal court, the Tribunal may
examine the adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the convic-
tion and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penalty impugned is
apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, having regard to the nature
of the criminal charge, the Tribunal may step in to render substantial ~
F justice. The Tribunal may remit the matter to the competent authority
for reconsideration or by itself substitute one of the penalties provided
~
under clause (a). This power has been conceded to the court in Union
of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985 I 3 sec 398 where Madon, J.,
observed (at 501-502):

G "Where a disciplinary authority comes to know that a r1
government servant has been convicted on a criminal
charge, it must consider whether his conduct which has led
to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a
penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be .....
,,
H
U.0.1. v. PARMA NAND [SHE1TY, J.] 35

"': "The disciplinary authority must, however, bear in mind
A
that a conviction on a criminal charge does not automati-
cally entail dismissal, removed or reduction in rank of the
concerned government servant. Having decided which of
these three penalties is required to be imposed, he has to
pass the requisite order. A government servant who is
aggrieved by the penalty imposed can agitate in appeal, B
-(
revision or review, as the case may be, that the penalty was
~' too severe or excessive and not warranted by the facts and
circumstances of the case. If it is his case that he is not the
... government servant who has been in fact convicted, he can
also agitate this question in appeal, revision or review. If he
fails in the departmental· remedies and still wants to pursue
the matter, he can invoke the court's power of judicial c
j review subject to the court permitting it. If the court finds
that he was not in fact the person convicted, it will strike
down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in
service. Where the court finds that the penalty imposed by
the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out D
of all proportion to the offence committed or not warran-
ted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the re-
'quirements of that particular government service the court
will also strike down the impugned order. Thus, in Shankar
Dass v. Union of India this Court set aside the impugned
order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of dismissal E
from service imposed upon the appellant was whimsical
and ordered his reinstatement in service with full back
wages. It is, however, not necessary that the court should
always order reinstatement. The court can instead substi-
:~ tute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper

~
in the circumstances of the case." F

The last contention that the respondent falls into the category of
a workman and the Tribunal could exercise the powers of an industrial
court for giving appropriate relief is unavailable in this case, since the
respondent had made his choice of forum and was even otherwise dealt
with under the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules which are G
~- undisputedly applicable to him.

In the light of the principles to which we have called attention
and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the order of the Tribunal
imposing a lesser penalty on the respondent cannot, therefore, be
sustained. He was found guilty of the charge framed against him. He H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.
)4
A was a party to the fraudulent act for self aggrandisement. He prepared
bogus documents for withdrawal of salary in the name of Ashok
Kumar who was not working in his Division. He has thus proved
himself unbecoming and unworthy to hold any post. Any sympathy or
charitable view on such officials will not be conducive to keep the
streams of administration pure which is so vital for the success of our
a democrary.

.-4.,
'
In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the
Tribunal. Consequently, the SLP of the respondent is dismissed. In
the circumstances of the case however, we make no order as to costs. ~

c T.N.A. Appeal allowed and Petition dismissed. ,
_\-

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)....