UNION OF INDIA & ORS.versusRAM LAKHAN SHARMA

48                      [2018]
              SUPREME COURT    5 S.C.R. 48
                             REPORTS                        [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A                         UNION OF INDIA & ORS.
                                        v.
                          RAM LAKHAN SHARMA
                        (Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2012)
B                                JULY 02, 2018
       [ADARSH KUMAR GOEL AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
            Central Revenue Police Force Rules, 1955 – r.27 – Procedure
     for conducting a departmental enquiry – Non-appointment of
     Presenting Officer in the departmental inquiry – Effect of – On
C
     facts, the High Court set aside the dismissal/removal orders of
     respondents on the ground of non-appointment of Presenting Officer
     in the departmental inquiry resulting in violation of principle of
     natural justice; and that the Enquiry officer acted himself as
     prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry – On appeal,
D    held: Rule 27 does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement
     of appointment of Presenting Officer in the disciplinary inquiry –
     When statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting
     Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles
     of natural justice can be held violated is to be seen – Further, Inquiry
     Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the
E
     disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and
     proceed to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence
     to punish an employee, principle of bias comes into place – On
     facts, the High Court held that Inquiry Officer acted himself as
     prosecutor by leading the examination in chief of the prosecution
F    witness by putting questions, and Judge in the disciplinary enquiry
     – Having acted as prosecutor also, capacity of independent
     adjudicator was lost which adversely affected his independent role
     of adjudicator – Thus, the principle of bias was attracted and High
     Court was right in setting aside the dismissal orders – Central Reserve
     Police Force Act, 1949 – s.11(1) – Service Law.
G
           Dismissing the appeals, the Court
          HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the Rule 27 sub rule (c) of the
     Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 does not indicate that
     Rule contemplates appointment of Presenting Officer. Service
H
                                       48
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                             49


conditions including punishment and appeal procedure of an               A
employee are governed by statutory rules. The CRPF Act, 1949
has been enacted by the Parliament for the constitution and
regulation of an armed Central Reserve Police Force. Section 18
of the Act empowers the Central Government to make rules for
carrying out the purposes of this Act. The disciplinary proceedings
                                                                         B
are quasi-judicial proceedings and Inquiry Officer is in the position
of an independent adjudicator and is obliged to act fairly,
impartially. The authority exercises quasi-judicial power has to
act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner. [Paras
22 and 23][58-G-H; 59-A-B]
      1.2 Rule 27 does not indicate that there is any statutory          C
requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in the
disciplinary inquiry. It is thus clear that statutory provision does
not mandate appointment of Presenting Officer. When the
statutory provision does not require appointment of Presenting
Officer whether there can be any circumstances where principles          D
of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question
which needs to be answered. The High Court found breach of
principles of natural justice in Inquiry Officer acting as the
prosecutor against the respondents. The Inquiry Officer who has
to be independent and not representative of the disciplinary
authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceed to act      E
in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish
an employee, the principle of bias comes into place. [Para 27][61-
D-E]
      1.3 There is no requirement of appointment of Presenting
Officer in each and every case, whether statutory rules enable           F
the authorities to make an appointment or are silent. When the
statutory rules are silent with regard to the applicability of any
facet of principles of natural justice the applicability of principles
of natural justice which are not specifically excluded in the
statutory scheme are not prohibited. When there is no express            G
exclusion of particular principle of natural justice, the said
principle shall be applicable in a given case to advance the cause
of justice. [Para 33][66-B-C]
     1.4 The question as to whether Inquiry Officer who is
supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as                 H
50            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    prosecutor or not is a question of fact which has to be decided on
     the facts and proceedings of particular case. In the instant case,
     the High Court had summoned the entire inquiry proceedings
     and after perusing the proceedings the High Court came to the
     conclusion that Inquiry Officer acted himself as prosecutor by
     himself leading the examination in chief of the prosecution witness
B
     by putting questions, and Judge in the said disciplinary enquiry.
     [Para 35][67-F-H]
           1.5 The High Court having come to the conclusion that
     Inquiry Officer has acted as prosecutor also, the capacity of
     independent adjudicator was lost which adversely affecting his
C    independent role of adjudicator. In the circumstances, the
     principle of bias would come into play and the High Court was
     right in setting aside the dismissal orders by giving liberty to the
     appellants to proceed with inquiry afresh. [Para 36][38-A-B]
           Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala and others
D          AIR 1969 SC 198 : 1969 SCR 317; A.K. Kraipak and
           others v. Union of India and others AIR 1970 SC 150
           : [1970] 1 SCR 457; State of Uttar Pradesh and others
           v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772 : [2010] 2
           SCR 326; Bharath Electronics Ltd. v. K. Kasi ILR 1987
E          Karnataka 366; Workmen of Lambabari Tea Estate v.
           Lambabari Tea Estate 1966 (2) LLJ 315; Union of India
           and ors. v. Mohd. Naseem Siddiqui ILR (2004) MP
           821; Punjab National Bank and others v. Kunj Behari
           Misra (1998) 7 SCC 84 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 22 –
           referred to.
F
                            Case Law Reference
           1969 SCR 317                     referred to     Para 24
           [1970] 1 SCR 457                 referred to     Para 25
           [2010] 2 SCR 326                 referred to     Para 26
G
           ILR 1987 Karnataka 366           referred to     Para 28
           1966 (2) LLJ 315                 referred to     Para 29
           ILR (2004) MP 821                referred to     Para 30

H
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                  51


      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2608                     A
of 2012.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 10.01.2011 of the High Court
of Gauhati Judicature at Agartala in WA No. 25 of 2010.
                                  WITH
                                                                              B
      C.A. Nos. 6745/2013, 9373-9374/2013 and 1800/2014.
      Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, ASG, R. Bala, Ms. Kiran Bhardwaj,
Akshay Amritanshu, Ayush Anand, Shubhendu Anand, Sarthak Raizada,
B.V, Balaram Das, Shreekant N. Terdal, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for
the Appellant.                                                                C
      Ms. Susmita Lal, M. Devananda Singh, Mr. Leishangthem
Roshmani Kh, Miss Maibam Babina, Vipin Kumar, K. K. Shrivastava,
Vijay Pal, Deepak Goel, Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                              D
        ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been filed by
the Union of India questioning the judgments of the Gauhati High Court
by which writ petitions filed by the respondents challenging their orders
of removal were allowed by setting aside the removal/dismissal orders
and the respondents were directed to be reinstated. The High Court had
allowed the writ petitions filed by the respondents on more or less similar   E
grounds, hence, it shall be sufficient to notice the facts and pleadings in
detail in Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2012 for deciding this batch of appeals.
      Civil Appeal No. 2608 of 2012
       2. The respondent- Ram Lakhan Sharma was appointed as
constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to        F
as “CRPF”) on 10.04.1991. On 23.10.1999 while he was posted as
constable 11 Bn., CRPF at Agartala, Tripura he went out from Guard
duty at 09.00 a.m. and returned back at 09.50 a.m. In the afternoon, an
allegation was made by one lady Smt. Gita Paul making allegation of
rape against the respondent and First Information Report was registered       G
on 23.10.1999 at the Police Station under Section 376 IPC.
      3. On 23.10.1999 the appellant was placed under suspension. On
04.12.1999 chargesheet was issued to the respondent containing articles
of charges I and II. First charge was that the appellant remained absent
without proper permission of competent authority with consent of his          H
52             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    Guard Commander from his duty on 23.10.1999 from 0900 hrs. to 0930
     hrs. Second charge was that he while functioning as constable (Guard)
     has committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the
     force in that he tried to do sexual intercourse with a woman with mutual
     consent by giving money which amounts to indiscipline/moral turpitude.
B          4. The disciplinary authority appointed one Shri S.S. Bisht, Second-
     in-Command, 11 Bn CRPF as Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer
     recorded the prosecution evidence. The Inquiry Report was submitted
     which was also supplied to the delinquent vide letter dated 07.02.2000
     asking the respondent to submit reply within 15 days. The Commandant,
     11 Bn passed an order on 19.03.2000 imposing penalty of removal from
C    service w.e.f. 19.03.2000 under Section 11(1) of the Central Reserve
     Police Force Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police
     Force Rules, 1955.
             5. On the basis of First Information Report registered against the
     respondent a chargesheet was submitted in the Court of Sessions Judge,
D    Tripura, Agartala. Learned Sessions Judge after completing the trial on
     20.09.2001 acquitted the respondent from charges levelled against him.
     After acquittal from criminal case the respondent filed a Writ Petition
     No.6778 of 2000 in the High Court of Allahabad challenging his order of
     removal. The High Court by order dated 20.05.2004 disposed of the writ
E    petition giving liberty to the respondent to file an appeal under CRPF
     Rules, 1955 within two weeks. In pursuance of the order of the High
     Court an appeal was filed before D.I.G.R., CRPF, Patna. The Appellate
     Authority rejected the appeal by its order dated 22.07.2004 against which
     order a revision was filed before the Inspector General of Police, CRPF
     which too was rejected on 02.03.2005. Challenging the order of removal
F    as well as orders passed in appeal and revision the respondent filed Writ
     Petition (C) No.14 of 2006. Learned Single Judge vide judgment dated
     12.04.2010 allowed the writ petition by setting aside the removal order
     and directed for reinstatement of the respondent. The learned Single
     Judge also permitted the appellant to initiate the disciplinary inquiry afresh
G    from the stage of appointing Presenting Officer. It was further directed
     that if the departmental proceeding is required to be started afresh, the
     respondent shall be placed under suspension and during the period of
     suspension, subsistence allowance should be paid. It was left to the wisdom
     of the authority to decide on arrear pay and allowances of the respondent.

H           6. Union of India filed an appeal against the judgment of the learned
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                 53
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

Single Judge being Writ Appeal No.25 of 2010. The Division Bench of          A
the High Court by its judgment dated 10.01.2011 dismissed the writ appeal
aggrieved by which order Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2012 has been filed
by the Union of India.
       7. The facts and pleadings in other civil appeals being more or
less similar they need to be only briefly noted.                             B
      Civil Appeal No.6745 of 2013
       8. Union of India has filed this appeal challenging the judgment of
the Division Bench dated 18.01.2013 by which Writ Appeal No.1 of
2013 filed by the Union of India questioning the judgment of the learned
Single Judge was dismissed. The respondent, Shri T. Lupheng while            C
posted at Manipur on 24.03.2008 sought permission from his senior during
his duty hours for going to the Bank to withdraw his salary. He was
allowed to go and directed to report back to his duties. On his return he
was found under the influence of alcohol. On 07.04.2008 the personnel
was suspended. On four articles of charges inquiry was held. The Inquiry     D
Officer recorded the evidence of prosecution. The inquiry was completed
and report was submitted on 19.06.2008. The disciplinary authority vide
its order dated 05.07.2008 awarded the punishment of dismissal from
service. An appeal was filed which was dismissed by DIG, CRPF on
07.11.2008. The revision was also dismissed by IGP-C/S, CRPF on
05.06.2009. Writ Petition No.556 of 2009 was filed in the Gauhati High       E
Court which was allowed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated
04.08.2012. A writ appeal was filed by the Union of India which was
dismissed by the Division Bench on 18.01.2013 against which this appeal
has been filed.
      Civil Appeal Nos.9373-74 of 2013                                       F
       9. These appeals have been filed by the Union of India against
the Division Bench judgment dated 24.08.2012 by which the appeal filed
by the Union of India questioning the judgment dated 08.02.2012 has
been dismissed. The respondent was serving as constable in F/27 Bn
CRPF. It was alleged that on 13.04.2000 he left lines without seeking        G
prior permission, consumed liquor and created nuisance in the market.
The chargesheet was issued to the respondent containing two articles of
charges. The Inquiry Officer was appointed. Inquiry Officer recorded
the statement of 12 prosecution witnesses. By an order dated 30.08.2000
the respondent was dismissed from services. There were two other
                                                                             H
54             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    delinquents apart from the respondent who were proceeded with and
     dismissed by the common order. Learned Single Judge relying on an
     order of the High Court in Writ Petition (C) No.297 of 2002 (Sri Mutum
     Shanti Kumar Singh vs. Union of India) on 08.02.2012 set aside the
     order of the dismissal and directed reinstatement of the respondent. Union
     of India filed Writ Appeal No.32 of 2012 challenging the order of Learned
B
     Single Judge before the Gauhati High Court. The Division Bench of the
     High Court by order dated 24.08.2012 dismissed the writ appeal. Review
     petition was filed by the Union of India which too was dismissed on
     18.01.2013. Consequently, these appeals have been filed by the Union
     of India.
C          Civil Appeal No.1800 of 2014
            10. This appeal has been filed by the Union of India against the
     Division Bench judgment of the High Court dated 29.05.2013 by which
     writ petition filed by the respondent challenging the disciplinary
     proceedings for dismissal of the respondent was allowed. The respondent
D    while serving at Chothegaon, Bishnupur (Manipur) on 12.03.2007 deserted
     from line without permission of competent authority. Subsequently, an
     FIR was lodged on 12.03.2007. A warrant was issued to apprehend him
     on 29.07.2007 but he could not be apprehended. A Court of Inquiry was
     conducted and the respondent was declared “DESERTER” w.e.f.
E    12.03.2007 vide order dated 13.07.2007. A Departmental proceeding
     was initiated with articles of charges on 12.11.2007. Since, the respondent
     had not reported in the Unit, the inquiry proceeded ex parte. Charges
     levelled against the respondent were found proved. An order dated
     20.05.2008 was passed awarding dismissal from service to the
     respondent. Thereafter, he submitted appeal before DIG, CRPF. A writ
F    petition was filed by the respondent. The writ petition was disposed of
     on 29.05.2013 setting aside the dismissal order and directing for
     reinstatement. The appeal has been filed against the above said judgment.
            11. The Gauhati High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by
     the respondents on the ground that in the disciplinary inquiry the principles
G    of natural justice were violated. The High Court found that no Presenting
     Officer was appointed and the Inquiry Officer acted as prosecutor which
     violates the principles of natural justice and the entire inquiry was set
     aside on the aforesaid ground with liberty to the respondent to hold afresh
     inquiry from the stage of appointing of the Presenting Officer.
H
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                    55
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       12. All the appeals filed by the Union of India raises almost similar    A
question of law and facts and the learned counsel for the Union of India
has also raised common submission in all the appeals.
       13. Learned counsel for the appellant, Shri Vikramjit Banerjee,
Addl. Solicitor General contends that the High Court committed error in
setting aside the dismissal order on the ground of non-appointment of           B
Presenting Officer. It is submitted that Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955
which provides for holding of disciplinary inquiry does not provide for
appointment of Presenting Officer. The appellants have followed the
requirement of Rule 27 in holding disciplinary inquiry in consonance with
principles of natural justice, hence, there was no occasion to set aside
the dismissal order. It is submitted that the respondents were given full       C
opportunity in the disciplinary inquiry including serving chargesheet, giving
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, opportunity to lead evidence
and submit a reply to the Inquiry Report.
       14. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Rule 27 does
not mandate the appointment of Presenting Officer to hold disciplinary          D
inquiry. It is further submitted that even if it is assumed that while non-
appointment of Presenting Officer, principles of natural justice have been
violated, respondents have to show what prejudice has been caused due
to non-appointment of the Presenting Officer in the department enquiry.
No prejudice having been caused to any of the respondents, they were            E
not entitled for grant of relief as has been granted by the High Court.
       15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents refuting the
above submissions contends that the High Court has rightly set aside the
dismissal/removal orders of the respondents. In the facts and
circumstances of the present case, appointment of Presenting Officer            F
was necessary to ensure compliance of principles of natural justice which
having not been done the respondents have been seriously prejudiced. It
is submitted that Inquiry Officer himself acted as prosecutor by putting
questions to the prosecution witnesses. Inquiry Officer having become
prosecutor with entire approach towards inquiry was tainted with bias
and has rightly been interfered by the High Court. It is submitted that         G
Inquiry Officer having acted as a prosecutor no further prejudice needs
to be proved.
       16. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the records.
                                                                                H
56            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A          17. Before we proceed to consider the rival submissions of the
     learned counsel for the parties, it is relevant to look into the reasons
     given by the High Court for allowing the writ petitions filed by the
     respondents.
             18. In Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2012(leading appeal) judgment of
B    learned Single Judge allowing the writ petition is dated 12.04.2010 which
     is filed at Annexure P-7 to the appeal. After elaborately considering the
     facts of the case, the nature of charges and affidavit filed in the writ
     petition, learned Judge proceeded to decide the writ petition. Learned
     Single Judge had directed to make available the proceedings of the
     disciplinary inquiry and on perusal of the proceedings of the disciplinary
C    inquiry Learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that no Presenting
     Officer was appointed in the said proceedings and the Enquiry Officer
     himself led the examination in chief of the prosecution witness by putting
     questions. The High Court further came to the conclusion that Enquiry
     Officer acted himself as prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary
D    enquiry. It is useful to extract paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment
     which are to the following effect:
           “(9) This Court directed the learned Asstt. S.G. appearing for
           the respondents to make available the proceedings of the
           disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. On perusal of the
E          proceeding, it is crystal clear that no Presenting Officer was
           appointed in the said proceedings and the Enquiry Officer
           himself led the examination in chief of the prosecution witness
           by putting questions. This fact is not disputed by the learned
           Asstt. S.G. appearing for the respondents, but his only
           submission is that all opportunities were given to the writ
F          petitioner to put up his defence case and also the writ
           petitioner had pleaded guilty for both the charges levelled
           against him.
           (10) It is, therefore, crystal clear that the Enquiry Officer
           acted himself as Prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary
G          enquiry against the writ petitioner. From this admitted fact, it
           may not be wrong to infer that there were no fair procedures
           in the disciplinary proceedings as a result of which principle
           of natural justice was undisputedly denied to the writ
           petitioner.”
H
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                    57
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       19. The Division Bench of the High Court in writ appeal against          A
the aforesaid judgment also affirmed the aforesaid view of the learned
Single Judge while dismissing the writ appeal.
       20. As noted above there are two principal submissions raised by
the learned counsel for the appellant, they are: (i) The disciplinary inquiry
is required to be conducted under Rule 27 of 1955 Rules which does not          B
contemplate appointment of a Presenting Officer. Hence, the inquiry
proceedings are not vitiated by the non-appointment of Presenting Officer.
(ii) The disciplinary inquiry has been held against the respondents by
complying with the principles of natural justice. No principle of natural
justice is violated by non-appointment of Presenting Officer. No prejudice
has been caused to the respondents by non-appointment of Presenting             C
Officer.
      21. Rule 27 sub-rule (c) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 provides for the
procedure for conducting a departmental enquiry which is as follows:
       “Rule 27(c) The procedure for conducting a departmental                  D
      enquiry shall be as follows:-
        (1) The substance of the accusation shall be reduced to the
      form of a written charge which should be as precise as
      possible. The charge shall be read out to the accused and a
      copy of it given to him at least 48 hrs. before the                       E
      commencement of the enquiry.
       (2) At the commencement of the enquiry the accused shall
      be asked to enter a plea of Guilty or Not Guilty after which
      evidence necessary to establish the charge shall be let in.
      The evidence shall be material to the charge and may either               F
      be oral or documentary, if oral:
          (i) it shall be direct:
          (ii) it shall be recorded by the Officer conducting, the
          enquiry himself in the presence of the accused:
          (iii) the accused shall be allowed to cross examine the               G
          witnesses.
        (3) When documents are relied upon in support of the charge,
      they shall be put in evidence as exhibits and the accused shall,
      before he is called upon to make his defence be allowed to
      inspect such exhibits.                                                    H
58            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A            (4) The accused shall then be examined and his statement
           recorded by the officer conducting the enquiry. If the accused
           has pleaded guilty and does not challenge the evidence on
           record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he pleads
           “Not guilty”, he shall be required to file a written statement
           and a list of such witnesses as he may wish to cite in his defence
B
           within such period, which shall in any case be not less than a
           fortnight, as the officer conducting enquiry may deem
           reasonable in the circumstances of the case. If he declines to
           file a written statement, he shall again be examined by the
           officer conducting the enquiry on the expiry of the period
C          allowed.
           (5) If the accused refuses to cite any witnesses or to produce
           any evidence in his defence, the proceedings shall be closed
           for orders. If he produces any evidence the officer conducting
           the enquiry shall proceed to record the evidence. If the officer
D          conducting the enquiry considers that the evidence of any
           witness or any document which the accused wants to produce
           in his defence is not material to the issues involved in the
           case he may refuse to call such witness or to allow such
           document to be produced in evidence, but in all such cases
           he must briefly record his reasons for considering the evidence
E          inadmissible. When all relevant evidence has been brought
           on record, the proceedings shall be closed for orders.
           (6) If the Commandant has himself held the enquiry, he shall
           record his findings and pass orders where he has power to
           do so. If the enquiry has been held by any officer other than
F          the Commandant, the officer conducting the enquiry shall
           forward his report together with the proceedings to the
           Commandant who shall record his findings and pass order
           where he has power to do so.”
           22. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule does not indicate that Rule
G    contemplates appointment of Presenting Officer. Service conditions
     including punishment and appeal procedure of an employee are governed
     by statutory rules. The CRPF Act, 1949 has been enacted by the
     Parliament for the constitution and regulation of an armed Central Reserve
     Police Force. Section 18 of the Act empowers the Central Government
H    to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                    59
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      23. The disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial proceedings           A
and Inquiry Officer is in the position of an independent adjudicator and is
obliged to act fairly, impartially. The authority exercises quasi-judicial
power has to act in good faith without bias, in a fair and impartial manner.
       24. Rules of natural justice have been recognised and developed
as principles of administrative law. Natural justice has many facets. Its       B
all facets are steps to ensure justice and fair play. This Court in Suresh
Koshy George vs. University of Kerala and others, AIR 1969 SC
198 had occasion to consider the principles of natural justice in the context
of a case where disciplinary action was taken against a student who
was alleged to have adopted malpractice in the examination. In paragraph
7 this Court held that the question whether the requirements of natural         C
justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must
depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in
point, the constitution of Tribunal and the rules under which it
functions. Following was held in paragraphs 7 and 8:
        “7....The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules.              D
      The question whether the requirements of natural justice have
      been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend
      to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in
      point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under
      which it functions.                                                       E
        8. In Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, Tucker, L. J. observed:
        “There are, in my view, no words which are of universal
      application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic
      tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on
      the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the             F
      rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter
      that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not
      derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice
      which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard
      is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should             G
      have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.”
      25. A Constitution Bench of this Court has elaborately considered
and explained the principles of natural justice in A.K. Kraipak and others
vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 150. This Court held
                                                                                H
60             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    that the aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it
     negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. The concept of natural justice
     has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Initially recognised
     as consisting of two principles that is no one shall be a judge in his own
     cause and no decision shall be given against a party without affording
     him a reasonable hearing, various other facets have been recognised. In
B
     paragraph 20 following has been held:
            “20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice
            or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These
            rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly
            made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land
C           but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone
            a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was
            thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall
            be a judge in his own case (Nemo debet esse judex propria
            causa) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party
D           without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram
            partem).Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and
            that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith,
            without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably....”
           26. In State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha,
E    2010 (2) SCC 772, this Court had laid down that inquiry officer is a
     quasi-judicial authority, he has to act as independent adjudicator and he
     is not a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/
     Government. In paragraphs 28 and 30 following has been held:
            “28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is
F           in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not
            supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary
            authority/ Government. His function is to examine the evidence
            presented by the Department, even in the absence of the
            delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted
            evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In
G           the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been
            observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the
            documents have not been proved, and could not have been
            taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have
            been proved against the respondents.
H
          UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                    61
                   [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the                  A
       government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise.
       The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a
       closed mind. The inquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased.
       The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to
       ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to
                                                                                 B
       be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure
       that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings
       which may culminate in imposition of punishment including
       dismissal/removal from service.”
        27. When the statutory rule does not contemplate appointment
of Presenting Officer whether non-appointment of Presenting Officer              C
ipso facto vitiates the inquiry? We have noticed the statutory provision
of Rule 27 which does not indicate that there is any statutory requirement
of appointment of Presenting officer in the disciplinary inquiry. It is thus
clear that statutory provision does not mandate appointment of Presenting
Officer. When the statutory provision does not require appointment of            D
Presenting Officer whether there can be any circumstances where
principles of natural justice can be held to be violated is the broad question
which needs to be answered in this case. We have noticed above that
the High Court found breach of principles of natural justice in Inquiry
Officer acting as the prosecutor against the respondents. The Inquiry
Officer who has to be independent and not representative of the                  E
disciplinary authority if starts acting in any other capacity and proceed
to act in a manner as if he is interested in eliciting evidence to punish an
employee, the principle of bias comes into place.
       28. Justice M. Rama Jois of the Karnataka High Court had
occasion to consider the above aspect in Bharath Electronics Ltd. vs.            F
K. Kasi, ILR 1987 Karnataka 366. In the above case the order of
domestic inquiry was challenged before the Labour and Industrial Tribunal.
The grounds taken were, that inquiry is vitiated since Presenting Officer
was not appointed and further Inquiry Officer played the role of
prosecutor. This Court held that there is no legal compulsion that               G
Presenting Officer should be appointed but if the Inquiry Officer plays
the role of Presenting Officer, the inquiry would be invalid. Following
was held in paragraphs 8 and 9:


                                                                                 H
62     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    “8. One other ground on which the domestic inquiry was held
     invalid was that Presenting Officer was not appointed. This
     view of the Tribunal is also patently untenable. There is no
     legal compulsion that Presenting Officer should be appointed.
     Therefore, the mere fact that the Presenting Officer was not
     appointed is no ground to set aside the inquiry See :
B
     Gopalakrishna Reddy v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1980 Kar
     575). It is true that in the absence of Presenting Officer if the
     Inquiring Authority plays the role of the Presenting Officer,
     the inquiry would be invalid and this aspect arises out of the
     next point raised for the petitioner, which I shall consider
C    immediately hereafter.
     9. The third ground on which the Industrial Tribunal held
     that the domestic inquiry was invalid was that the Inquiry
     Officer had played the role of the Presenting Officer. The
     relevant part of the findings reads :
D    “The Learned Counsel for the workman further contended
     that the questions put by the Enquiry Officer to the
     Management’s witnesses themselves suggest that he was biased
     and prejudiced against the workman. There has been no
     explanation as to why no Presenting Officer was appointed
E    and as to why the Enquiry Officer took upon himself the burden
     of putting questions to the Management witnesses. The enquiry
     proceedings at Ext. A-6 disclose that after the cross-
     examination of the Management’s witnesses by the defence,
     the Enquiry Officer has further put certain questions by way
     of explanation, but from their nature an inference arises that
F    they are directed to fill in the lacuna. The Learned Counsel
     for the Management contended that the Enquiry Officer has
     followed the principles of natural justice and that the domestic
     enquiry is quite valid. I am of the view that the fact that the
     Enquiry Officer has himself taken up the role of the Presenting
G    Officer for the management goes to the root of the matter and
     vitiates the enquiry,”
     As far as position in law is concerned, it is common ground
     that if the Inquiring Authority plays the role of a Prosecutor
     and cross-examines defence witnesses or puts leading
H    questions to the prosecution witnesses clearly exposing a
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                 63
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      biased state of mind, the inquiry would be opposed to                  A
      principles of natural justice. But the question for consideration
      in this case is : Whether the Inquiry Officer did so ? It is also
      settled law that an Inquiring Authority is entitled to put
      questions to the witnesses for clarification wherever it becomes
      necessary and so long the delinquent employee is permitted
                                                                             B
      to cross-examine the witnesses after the Inquiring Authority
      questions the witnesses, the inquiry proceedings cannot be
      impeached as unfair. See : Munchandani Electric and Radio
      Industries Ltd. v. Their Workman.”
      29. This Court had occasion to observe in Workmen of
Lambabari Tea Estate vs. Lambabari Tea Estate, 1966 (2)                      C
LLJ 315, that if Inquiry Officer did not keep his function as Inquiry
Officer but becomes prosecutor, the inquiry is vitiated. Following was
observed:
      “The inquiry which was held by the management on the first
      charge was presided over by the manager himself. It was                D
      conducted in the presence of the assistant manager and two
      others. The enquiry was not correct in its procedure. The
      manager recorded the statements, cross-examined the
      labourers who were the offenders and made and recorded
      his own statements on facts and questioned the offending               E
      labourers about the truth of his own statements recorded by
      himself. The manager did not keep his function as the
      enquiring officer distinct but became witness, prosecutor and
      manager in turns. The record of the enquiry as a result is
      staccato and unsatisfactory.”
                                                                             F
        30. A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court speaking
through Justice R.V. Raveendran, CJ (as he then was) had occasion to
consider the question of vitiation of the inquiry when the Inquiry Officer
starts himself acting as prosecutor in Union of India and ors. vs. Mohd.
Naseem Siddiqui, ILR (2004) MP 821. In the above case the Court
considered Rule 9(9) of the Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal)           G
Rules, 1968. The Division Bench while elaborating fundamental principles
of natural justice enumerated the seven well recognised facets in
paragraph 7 of the judgment which is to the following effect:
      “7. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is
                                                                             H
64            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A          that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. This principle
           consists of seven well recognised facets: (i) The adjudicator
           shall be impartial and free from bias, (ii) The adjudicator
           shall not be the prosecutor, (iii) The complainant shall not be
           an adjudicator, A witness cannot be the Adjudicator, The
           Adjudicator must not import his personal knowledge of the
B
           facts of the case while inquiring into charges, (vi) The
           Adjudicator shall not decide on the dictates of his Superiors
           or others, (vii) The Adjudicator shall decide the issue with
           reference to material on record and not reference to
           extraneous material or on extraneous considerations. If any
C          one of these fundamental rules is breached, the inquiry will
           be vitiated.”
            31. The Division Bench further held that where the Inquiry Officer
     acts as Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. In paragraph 9 is as
     follows:
D          “9. A domestic inquiry must be held by an unbiased person
           who is unconnected with the incident so that he can be
           impartial and objective in deciding the subject matters of
           inquiry. He should have an open mind till the inquiry is
           completed and should neither act with bias nor give an
E          impression of bias. Where the Inquiry Officer acts as the
           Presenting Officer, bias can be presumed. At all events, it
           clearly gives an impression of bias. An Inquiry Officer is in
           position of a Judge or Adjudicator. The Presenting Officer is
           in the position of a Prosecutor. If the Inquiry Officer acts as
           a Presenting Officer, then it would amount to Judge acting as
F          the prosecutor. When the Inquiry Officer conducts the
           examination-in- chief of the prosecution witnesses and leads
           them through the facts so as to present the case of the
           disciplinary authority against the employee or cross- examines
           the delinquent employee or his witnesses to establish the case
G          of the employer/disciplinary authority evidently, the Inquiry
           Officer cannot be said to have an open mind. The very fact
           that he presents the case of the employer and supports the
           case of the employer is sufficient to hold that the Inquiry
           Officer does not have an open mind.”

H
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                  65
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

     32. The Division Bench after elaborately considering the issue           A
summarised the principles in paragraph 16 which is to the following effect:
          “16. We may summarise the principles thus:
          (i) The Inquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge
          shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position
          of a prosecutor.                                                    B

          (ii) It is not necessary for the Disciplinary Authority to
          appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry.
          Non- appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not
          vitiate the inquiry.
                                                                              C
          (iii) The Inquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth
          or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the
          prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In the
          absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Inquiry Officer puts
          any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit the facts,
          he should thereafter permit the delinquent employee to              D
          cross-examine such witnesses on those clarifications.
          (iv) If the Inquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-
          in-chief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the
          prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the
          departmental witnesses pregnant with answers, or cross-             E
          examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions
          to establish the prosecution case employee, the Inquiry
          Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry.
          (v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not
          vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised that the Inquiry           F
          Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit
          the truth, the question whether an Inquiry Officer acted
          as a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with
          reference to the manner in which the evidence is let in and
          recorded in the inquiry.
                                                                              G
      Whether an Inquiry Officer has merely acted only as an
      Inquiry Officer or has also acted as a Presenting Officer
      depends on the facts of each case. To avoid any allegations
      of bias and running the risk of inquiry being declared as
      illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to be to
                                                                              H
66             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A           invariably appoint Presenting Officers, except in simple cases.
            Be that as it may.”
             33. We fully endorse the principles as enumerated above, however,
     the principles have to be carefully applied in facts situation of a particular
     case. There is no requirement of appointment of Presenting Officer in
B    each and every case, whether statutory rules enable the authorities to
     make an appointment or are silent. When the statutory rules are silent
     with regard to the applicability of any facet of principles of natural justice
     the applicability of principles of natural justice which are not specifically
     excluded in the statutory scheme are not prohibited. When there is no
     express exclusion of particular principle of natural justice, the said
C    principle shall be applicable in a given case to advance the cause of
     justice. In this context reference is made of a case of this Court in
     Punjab National Bank and others vs. Kunj Behari Misra, 1998 (7)
     SCC 84. In the above case, this Court had occasion to consider the
     provisions of Punjab National Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and
D    Appeal) Regulations, 1977. Regulation 7 provides for action on the
     enquiry report. Regulation 7 as extracted in paragraph 10 of the judgment
     is as follows:
            “7. Action on the enquiry report.—(1) The disciplinary
            authority, if it is not itself the enquiring authority, may, for
E           reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the
            enquiring authority for fresh or further enquiry and report
            and the enquiring authority shall thereupon proceed to hold
            the further enquiry according to the provisions of Regulation
            6 as far as may be.

F           (2) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the
            findings of the enquiring authority on any article of charge,
            record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own
            findings on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient
            for the purpose.

G           (3) If the disciplinary authority, having regard to its findings
            on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that
            any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 should be
            imposed on the officer employee, it shall, notwithstanding
            anything contained in Regulation 8, make an order imposing
            such penalty.
H
         UNION OF INDIA v. RAM LAKHAN SHARMA                                 67
                  [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       (4) If the disciplinary authority having regard to its findings       A
       on all or any of the articles of charge, is of the opinion that
       no penalty is called for, it may pass an order exonerating the
       officer employee concerned.”
       34. The question which was debated before this Court was that
since Regulation 7(2) does not contain any provision for giving an           B
opportunity to the delinquent officer to represent before disciplinary
authority who reverses the findings which were in favour of the delinquent
employee, the rules of natural justice are not applicable. This Court
held that principle of natural justice has to be read in Regulation 7(2)
even though rule does not specifically require hearing of delinquent
officer. In paragraph 19 following was held:                                 C
          “19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that
       the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation
       7(2). As a result thereof, whenever the disciplinary authority
       disagrees with the enquiry authority on any article of charge,
       then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must       D
       record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to
       the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it
       records its findings. The report of the enquiry officer
       containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the
       delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the
       disciplinary authority to accept the favourable conclusion of         E
       the enquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we
       have already observed, require the authority which has to
       take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an
       opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a
       representation before the disciplinary authority records its          F
       findings on the charges framed against the officer.”
       35. Thus, the question as to whether Inquiry Officer who is
supposed to act independently in an inquiry has acted as prosecutor or
not is a question of fact which has to be decided on the facts and
proceedings of particular case. In the present case we have noticed that
                                                                             G
the High Court had summoned the entire inquiry proceedings and after
perusing the proceedings the High Court came to the conclusion that
Inquiry Officer himself led the examination in chief of the prosecution
witness by putting questions. The High Court further held that the Inquiry
Officer acted himself as prosecutor and Judge in the said disciplinary
enquiry. The above conclusion of the High Court has already been noticed     H
68                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2018] 5 S.C.R.


A    from paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment of the High court giving rise
     to Civil Appeal No.2608 of 2012.
            36. The High Court having come to the conclusion that Inquiry
     Officer has acted as prosecutor also, the capacity of independent
     adjudicator was lost which adversely affecting his independent role of
B    adjudicator. In the circumstances, the principle of bias shall come into
     play and the High Court was right in setting aside the dismissal orders by
     giving liberty to the appellants to proceed with inquiry afresh. We make
     it clear that our observations as made above are in the facts of the
     present cases.

C          37. In result, all the appeals are dismissed subject to the liberty as
     granted by the High Court that it shall be open for the appellants to
     proceed with the inquiry afresh from the stage as directed by the High
     Court and it shall be open for the appellant to decide on arrear pay and
     allowances of the respondents.

D
     Nidhi Jain                                                  Appeals dismissed.




E




F




G




H