UNION OF INDIAversusKULDEEP SINGH

A                              UNION OF INDIA
                                        v.
                               KULDEEP SINGH

                             DECEMBER 8, 2003

B           [DORAJSWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

         Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, l 985~Sections
    9-A, 25-A and 29-Sentence-Reduction in-Propriety of-880 litres of a
    controlled substance used in manufacture of heroine recovered from
C   accused-Sentence reduced by the High Court taking into account age of
    father of accused and accused not being habitiial offender-Held, the
    grounds for reduction of sentence untenable-Criminal Law-Sentence.

         Criminal Law--Sentence:........Reduction of-Discretion with the appel-
D late court-Exercise of-High Court reducing sentence in case ofa person
    in possession oflarge amount of material used for manufacture ofnarcotic
    drugs-Held, discretion not properly exercised.

         Words & Phrases: 'Discretion '-Meaning of

E        From the kotha belonging to the accused, 880 litres of Acitic N
    Hydride (used for manufacture of heroine) were recovered. The Trial
    Court convicted the accused for commission of offences under Sections
    9A/25A and Sections 9A/25A read with Section 29 of the ·Narcotics
    Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and sentenced him to 10
F   years' rigorous imprisonment.

          On appeal by the accused, High Court upheld the conviction but
    reduced the sentence of the accused to 6\12 years. The High Court took
    into consideration the fact that the accused was not a habitual offender,
G   his father was 85 years old, mother of the accused had died and that
    there was no other earning member in the family of the accused.

         The State filed appeal before the Court challenging the quantum
    of sentence awarded to the accused. The accused contended that no
    minimum sentence was prescribed for the offences for which the
H   accused had been convicted and therefore, the exercise of discretion by
                                        526
                   UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH              527

the High Court in reducing the sentence of the accused to 6'/z years A
should not be interfered with.

     Allowing the appeal and restoring the sentence awarded by the
Trial Court, the Court

                                                                      B
      HELD: I.I. Law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting
claims and demand. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict when
living law must find answers to the new challenges and the courts are
required to mould the sentencing system' to meet the challenges. In
operating the sentencing system, law :;hould adopt the corrective ma-
chinery or the deterrence based on factual matirx. By deft modulation C
sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with
mercy where it warrants to be? The facts and given circumstances in
each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned
and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of
the accused, and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts D
which would enter into the area of consideration. (534-D-F)

     1.2. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do
more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence
in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such E
serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every Court to award
proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the
manner to which it was executed or committed etc. (534-G-H)

     Sevaka Perumal Etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR (1991) SC 1463, F
referred to.
           -:·'"

     1.3. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of
each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant
discretion to the Judge in arriving at the sentence in each case, G
presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations
of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case.
Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in
principle, and in spite of errant nations, it remains a strong influence
in determination of sentences. (535-A-B; C-D)                         H
    528               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A        1.4. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances
    of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded
    for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circum-
    stances in which a crime has been committed are to -be delicately
    balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassion-
B   ate manner by the Court. [535-F-Gl

         Dennies Councle MCG Dautha v. State of California, 402 US
    183 : 28 L.D. 2d 711, referred to.

          1.5. Th~ object should be to protect the society and to deter the
C criminal in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing appropri-
   ate sentence. It is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing
   system. so as to impose such .sentence which reflects the conscience .of
   the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where ~t should
   be. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social
D order in many cases may be in reality a fu~ile exercise. The social
   impact of the crime cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary
   treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing mearge sentence or taking
  .to sympathetic .a view merely on account of lapse of time or personal
   inconveniences in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter-
   productive in the long run and against societal interest which need to
E be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence in built in t~e
   sentencing system. [536-B-EJ

          Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., [199412SCC220 an<t Ravji
    v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 2 SCC 175, referred to.
F
         2.1. Drugs abuse and drugs addiction are corroding the health
    fabric of the society. The efficiency of the Narcotics Drugs and
    Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 depends on its implementation and
    a proper use of it to meet the challenges posed by the drug traffickers
    and smugglers and their tribe. The law has been made very stringent
G   and, therefore, the Court had occasion to highlight the need for strict
    compliance with the requirements of the Narcotics Drugs and
    Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. [534-B-C)

         2.2. An offence relatifig to narcotic drugs or psychotropic sub-
H   stances is more heinous than a culpable homicide because the latter
                 UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH                     529

  affects only an individual while the former affects and leaves it A
  deleterious impact on the society, besides shattering the economy of the
  nation as well. That the legislature intended to make the offences under
  the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 so serious
  to be dealt with sternly and with an iron hand is made clear by
  providing for enhanced penalties, including even dealt sentence in B
  certain class of cases, when convicted for the second time. (537-B-D)

         3. It is that no minimum sentence is prescribed under Section
   25-A or Section 29 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotrop.ic Substances
   Act, 1985, but the sentence imposed should fit in with the gravity of C
   the offence committed. In the teeth of the other indications in the
   enactment, mere absence of a provision for minimum sentence is no
•. reason or justification to treat the offences under the Narcotics Drugs
   and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 as any less serious as assumed
   by the High Court. The High Court seems to only misdirect itself not D
   only as to the seriousness of the offences but also with reference to the
   relevant consideration which should weigh with the court in exercising
   its discretion. (537-D-Fl

        4.1. Discretion is to know through law what is just. If a certain
  latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules to a Judge as distin- E
  guished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicating
  on maters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and
  regulates the exercise of the discretion, and prevents it from being
  wholly :absolute, capricious, or exempt from review. Such discretion is
  usually given on matters of procedure for punishment, or costs of F
  administration rather than with reference to vested substantive rights.
  When a statute gives a Judge a discretion, what is meant is a judicial
  discretion, regulated according to known rule of law, and not the mere
  whim or caprice of the person to whom it is given on the assumption
  that he is discreet. (537-F-G; 539-C-E]                                 G

       Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) Appeal Cases 173; S.G. Jaisinghani v.
  Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427; Hindson and Kersey,
  (1680) 8 How. St. Tr. 57; Lee v. Budge Railway Co., (1871) LR 6 CP
  576; Morgan v. Morgan, (1869) LR 1 P & M 644, referred to.            H
    530                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A         Tomlin's Law DictionaT)', referred to.

          4.2. Where a Judge has and exercise a judicial discretion his order
    is unappealable unless he did so under a mistake of law or fact or .in
    disregard of principle, or after taking into account irrelevant matters.
B   It will help to show this if it can be shown that there were no materiais
    on which he could exercise his discretion in the way he did. 1537-F-GI

          4.3. The discretion does not appear to have been judiciously and
    judi_chtlly exercised by the High Court in this case. The High Court
    seems to have been swayed by the age of the accused's father, his family
C   problems and more importantly he being not a habitual conduct. Such
    considerations are really meaningless when one considers the fact that
    the accused was in possession of contrabands \vhich would have
    destroyed the health and mental equilibrium of thousands of people.
    The court was not dealing with an accused charged with commission
D   of any minor offence where he being not a habitual offender may have
    some relevance. But it is really inconsequential for a drug trafficker
    and smuggler. The reasons given by the High Court to reduce the
    sentence have no foundation. (539-F-H; 540-A-B)

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
E   1468 of 2003.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 17.9.2002 of the Rajasthan High
    Court in Crl. A. No. 271 of 200 I.

F         U.U. Lalit for Ms. Sushma. Suri for the Appellant.

          D.S. Bali and Ms. Shalu Sharma for the'·Respondent.
                                                 ~



          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G         ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted.

          The Union of India questions legality, _desirability and proprietary of
    reducing sentence after conviction as done by the Rajasthan High Court
    in the impugned judgment. The respondent was found guilty of o~fences
H   punishable under Section 9A/25A and 9A/25A read with Section 29 of the
           UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH [PASAYAT, J.]                 531

    Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in sho1t the 'Act'). A

            Factual background which led to trial of the respondent is essen-
    tially as follows:

            Shri R.P. Shanna, Director of Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur
    received a confidential information on telephone in the night dated B
    12.12.1995 about illicit transactions of Acitic N Hydride and on the basis
    of it he constituted a team of officers of the Department vi de order Exb.P-
    1 and the team along with the Director, Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur
    started for Sri Ganganagar at 21.00 hours. Dr. R.P. Sharma informed
    officers of the team that one thousand litre Acitic N Hydride has been C
    rep01tedly concealed in a Kachha Kotha (unripe-room) constructed in the
    field situated on the way of village Bhagasar Aborlya and village Chak
    Maharajka or in the nearby area. B.S. Vasistha (PW-I) was appointed as
    the seizing officer and he was ordered to execute the proceedings. In
    compliance thereof he reached on the site on 13.12.95 at about 6.30 hours, D
    called independent witnesses Tiku Ram and Sakata Ram and made
    inquiries about the Kotha constructed in the field situated on the way of
    Bhagasar and Chak Maharajka village. He came to know that the Kotha
    belongs to accused-respondent Kuldeep Singh and the agriculture field has


-   been given to one Fateh Mohammad for cultivation, whereupon Fateh E
    Mohammad was called and interrogated. He informed that the Kotha
    belongs to accused-Kuldeep Singh. Thereupon Kuldeep Singh was called
     from his house and the closed Kotha was opened by the accused wherein
     forty four plastic containers kept under the chaff of wheat were found. Out
    of them 43 containers were of black colour and one was of white colour.
    When the licence in respect of keeping and bringing Acitic N Hydride was F
    demanded from the accused, same was not produced. In the presence of
    Panchas and Kuldeep Singh, B.S. Vasistha divided 44 containers in two-
    two batches and marked them separately, which on weighing came to 880
    litres of Acitic N Hydride. Two samples from each of the lots were taken
    in glass bottles and marks were made thereon and the remaining materials G
    were seized separately and sealed. On the seal labels affixed on each
    container signatures of accused-Kuldeep Singh and the panch witnesses
    were obtained. The accused was given notice in respect of recording his
    statemeRt, which was recorded, and he was arrested. The material was kept
    in Kotwali, Ganganagar for safety. The seized samples and the material H
    532                SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   articles were deposited in the malkhana of the Narcotics Control Bureau,
    Jodhpur. The report under Section 57 was forwarded to the higher
    authorities. The samples '"'ere sent for examination. The search of ac-
    cused's house was conducted on 24.11.95 wherein one diary and one
    inland letter were found and seized. Therefrom it appeared that the other
B   accused persons Major Singh and Jagtar Singh had relations with him and
    they were participants in this conspiracy. Information was sent to the higher
    authorities. The recovered a11icle was found to be Acitic N Hydride from
    the report of Revenue Control Laboratory. After investigation the challan
    was tiled against the accused under Section 9A read with Section 25A and
C   Section 29 of the Act. The charges under Sections 9N25A and Sections
    9A/25A read with Section 29 of the Act were framed, read over and
    explained to accused-Kuldeep Singh, who denied the charge and claimed
    trial. Evidences of ten witnesses were recorded and the statement of the
    accused was recorded under Section 3 I 3 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
    dure, 1973 (in short the 'Code'). He was convicted and sentenced as noted
D   supra.

        In the appeal filed before the High Court, the accused as appellant
  did not seriously question the conviction, but took the stand that sentence
  of I 0 years rigorous imprisonment on each of the convictions and fine of
E Rs.1,00,000 on each ground with default stipulation of one year is the
  maximum sentence which has been awarded by the trial Court. This was
  not a case where the maximum sentence should have been awarded. As
  there is no provision for awarding any minimum sentence for both the
  charges and the provisions only stipulated maximum sentence of I 0 years
  imprisonment and tine upto Rs.1,00,000, the maximum sentences both
F custodial and tine should not have been imposed. It was pointed out that
  the trial Court had not considered this aspect and merely on the ground
  that 880 litres of the contraband had been recovered and the quantity of
  heroine which could have been made therefrom should not have weighed
  for awarding the maximum sentence. With reference to the submissions
G made before the trial Court, it was pointed out that the father of the accused
  is a person of 85 years of age and the mother had expired four months
  earlier and there is no other earning member. Further, it was pointed out
  that the accused had also remained in custody for six and half years and,
  therefore, the custodial sentence should be reduced to the period undergone
H and fine imposed should also be reduced. The High Court noticed the
       UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH [PASA YAT, J.]                533

factual position and held that the conviction has been rightly made but A
taking note of the fact that there was no evidence to show that the accused
was a habitual offender the sentence was reduced to the period of custody
undergone which was taken to be 6 1h years, and the fine was also reduced
to Rs. 25,000 on each count. The reduction in sentence is assailed in the
present appeal.                                                              B
       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the leniency shown
by the High Cou1t in essence amounts to showing misplaced sympathy. The
Act was enacted to curb growing menace of the illicit drug traffic and drug
abuse. The factors which weighed with the High Court to reduce sentence
had no rationale with the object sought to be achieved by imposing C
stringent punishments. The prayer therefore was to restore the sentence
awarded. by the trial Court.

        In response, learned counsel for the accused submitted that the
legislative intent is clear from the fact that no minimum sentence is D
prescribed and the sentence to be awarded is discretionary. The Court has
power to impose appropriate sentence looking into the facts of a particular
case. In the case at hand, the High Court has taken note of several relevant
factors in directing reduction of sentence and this is not a fit case where
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short E
the 'Constitution') is to be exercised.

        Before dealing with the respective submissions it would be appro-
priate to take a journey along the legislative history leading to enactment
of the Act. The statutory control over narcotic drugs was earlier exercised
through a number of Central and State enactments. The principal Central F
enactments were the Opium Act, 1857, the Opium Act, 1878 and the
Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 which had become more or less obsolete, and
practically ineffective in combating the ever-growing menace of illicit drug
traffic and drug abuse, both at the national and international levels. In the
Statement of Objects and Reasons leading to enactment of the Act it was G
clearly noticed that during recent years new drugs of addiction which are
commonly known as psychotropic substances have appeared on the scene
and posed serious problems endangering the health and safety of the
citizens seriously eroding the morale of the society. The devastating effects
of narcotic drugs on any person who comes to its touch are too well known.   H
    534                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Normally, such a person ceases to be a normal human being, and is more
    or less reduced to a zombie living animal existence and rushing fast to meet
    the maker. Divine qualities of an individual who consumes narcotic drugs
    disappear and they are the first sacrifices one normally makes while falling
    prey to use of drugs. Anxiety of the legislature is to prevent the adverse
B   affect of such drugs and substances on the society. The Act like any other
    enactment aims at regulating human conduct. Drugs abuse and drugs
    addi_ction are corroding the health fabric of the society. The efficacy of the
    Act deptnds on its impleinentation and a proper use of it to meet the
    challenges posed by the drug traffickers and smugglers and their tribe.
    The law has been made very stringent and, therefore, this court had
c   occasion to highlight the need for strict compliance with the requirements
    of the Act.

          In that background the sufficiency of sentence in the case at hand has
    to be gauzed. Law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims
D   and demands. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural conflict where living
    law must find answer to the new challenges and the courts are required
    to mould the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of
    lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins. Friedman in
    his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law continues
E   to be - as it should be - a decisive reflection of social consciousness
    of society". Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should
    adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix.
    By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and
    tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
    circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which
F   it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime,
    the conduct of the accused, and all other attending circumstances are
    relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.

        Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm
G to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy
  of law and S()ciety could not long endure under such serious threats. It
  is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having
  regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed
  or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in
H Sevaka Perumal ~tc. v. State of Tamil Naidu, AIR (1991) SC 1463.
        UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH [PASA YAT, J.]                 535

      The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality A
in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal
conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in
arriving at a sentence in each case, prcsmnably to permit sentences that
reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the
special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment ought B
always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by
other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpe-
trator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of
keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of
his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert C
as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are
serious and widespread.

       Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal respected in
principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains a strong influence in
the determination of sentences. The practice of punishing all serious crimes D
with equal severity is now unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical
departure from the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the
law only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic
sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of greatest severity
for any serious crime is thought then to be a measure of toleration that is E
unwarranted and unwise. But in fact, quite apart from those considerations
that make punishment unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the
crime, uniformly dispropo1tionate punishment has some very undesirable
practical consequences.

      After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each F
case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an
offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which
a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of
really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner b~ the Court. Such
act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated G
in Dennis Councle MCGDautha v. State of Callifornia, 402 US 183 : 28.
L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would
provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate
punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the
gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may H
    536                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003]SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A   provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various
    circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the
    discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which
    such judgment may be equitably distinguished.

B         The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal
    in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing appropriate sentence.
    It is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as
    to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and
    the sentencing process has to be stem where it should be.

C         Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social
    order in many cases may be in reai ity a futile exercise. The social impact
    of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences relating to narcotic drugs or
    psychotropic substances which have great impact not only on the health
    fabric but also on the social order and public interest, cannot be lost sight
D   of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing
    meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of
    lapse of time or personal inconveniences in respect of such offences will
    be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal
    interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of
E   deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.

          In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B., [1994] 2 SCC 220, this
    Court has observed that shockingly large number of criminals go unpun-
    ished thereby increasingly, encouraging the criminals and in the ultimate
    making justice suffer by weakening the system's creditability. The impo-
F   sition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Court responds
    to the society's cry for justice against the criminal. Justice demands that
    Courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the Courts
    reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Court must not only keep ·in
    view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime
G   and the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate
    punishment.

         Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji v. State of Rajasthan,
    [1996] 2 sec 175. It has been held in the said case that it is the nature
H   and gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which are germane for
               UNION OF INDIA v. KULDEEP SINGH [PASAYAT, J.]                   537

       consideration of appropriate punishment in a criminal trial. The Court will A
       be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime
       which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also
       against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punish-
       ment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform
       to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime B
       has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhor-
       rence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the
       criminal".

               An offence relating to narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances is
       more heinous than a culpable homicide because the latter affects only an C
       individual while the former affects and leaves its deleterious impact on the
       society, besides shattering the economy of the nation as well. That the
       legislature intended to make the offences under the Act so serious to be
       dealt with sternly and with an iron hand is made clear by providing for
       enhanced penalties, including even death sentence, in certain class of cases, D
       when convicted for the second time.

             It is true as contended by learned counsel for the respondent-accused
       that no minimum sentence is prescribed, but the sentence imposed should
       fit in with the gravity of offence committed but in the teeth of the other
       indications in the enactment, mere absence of a provision for minimum E
       sentence is no reason or justification to treat the offences under the Act
       as any less serious as assumed by the High Court. It was highlighted by
       learned counsel for the respondent that the Court had a discretion which
       according to him has been rightly exercised. The High Court seems to
       wholly misdirected itself not only as to the seriousness of the offences but F
       also with reference to the relevant consideration which should weigh with
       the Court in exercising its discretion.

               Discretion is to know through law what is just. Where a Judge has
       and exercises a judicial discretion his order is unappealable unless he did
       so under a mistake of law or fact or in disregard of principle, or after taking G
       into account irrelevant matters. It will help to show this if it can be shown
....   that there were no materials on which he could exercise his discretion in
       the way he did. Not any one of the reasons attempted to be enumerated
       by the High Court in this case could in law be viewed as either relevant
       or reasonable reasons carrying even any resemblance of nexus in adjudging H
         538                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R_.

     A the quantum of punishment in respect of an offence punishable under the
         Act.

               When any thing is left to any person, Judge or magistrate to be done
'·       according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with sound
     B   discretion, and according to law. (See Tomlin's Law Dictionary) In its
         ordinary meaning, the word "discretion" signifies unrestrained exercise of
         choice or will; freedom to act according to one's own judgment; unre-
         strained exercise of will; the liberty of power of acting without other
                                                                                         ...
         control than one's own judgment. But, when applied to public function-
     C   aries, it means a power or right <:onferred upon them by law, of acting
         officially in certain circumstance~ according to the dictates of their own
         judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of



     D
         others·. Discretion is to discern between right and wrong; and therefore
         whoever hath power to act at discretion, is bound by the rule of reason and
         law. (See Tomlin's Law Dictionary).
                                                                                         ---
             · Discretion, in general, is the discernment of what is right and proper.
         It denotes knowledge and prudence, that discernment which enables a
         person to judge critically of what is correct and proper united with caution;
         nice discernment, and judgment directed by circumspection; deliberate
     E   judgment; soundness of judgment; a science or understanding to discern
         between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadow and
         substance, between equity and colorable glosses and pretences, and not to
         do according to the will and private affections of persons. When it is said
         that something is t0 be done within the discretion of the authorities, that
     F   something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not
         according to private opinion; according to law and not humour. It is to be
         not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be
         exercised within the limit, to which an honest man, competent to the
         discharge of his office ought to confine himself [Per Lord Halsbury, L.C.,
     G   in Sharp v. Wakefield, (1891) Appeal Cases 173). Also (See S.G. Jaisinghani
         v. Union of India and Ors., AIR (1967) SC 1427).

                The word "discretion" standing single and unsupported by circum-
         stances s~~ifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished
     H   from .folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be
        UNION OF 'NOIA v. KULDEEP SINGH [PASAYAT, J.]                    539.

arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking. The word in itself implies A
vigilant circumspection and care; therefore where the legislature concedes
discretion it also imposes a heavy responsibility.

       "The discretion ofa Judge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown.
It is different in different men. It is casual, and depends upon constitution, B
temper, passion. In the best it is often times caprice; in the worst it is every
vice, folly, and passion to which human nature is liable," said [Lord
Camden, L.C.J., in Hindson and Kersey (1680) 8 How, St. Tr. 57.)

      If a certain latitude or liberty accorded by statute or rules to a judge C
as distinguished from a ministerial or administrative official, in adjudicat-
ing on matters brought before him, it is judicial discretion. It limits and
regulates the exercise of the discretion, and prevents it from being wholly
absolute, capricious, or exempt from review.

      Such discretion is usually given on matters of procedure or punish- D
ment, or costs of administration rather than with reference to vested
substantive rights. The matters which should regulate the exercise of
discretion have been stated by eminent judges in somewhat different forms
of words but with substantial identity. When a statute gives a judge a
discretion, what is meant is a judicial discretion, regulated according to the E
known rules of law, and not the mere whim or caprice of the person to
whom it is given on the assumption that he is discreet [Per Willes J. in Lee
v Budge Railway Co., (1871) LR 6 CP 576, and in Morgan v. Morgan,
1869, LR 1 P & M 644).

                                                                                F
        As indicated supra, the discretion does not appear to have been
judiciously and judicially exercised by the High Court in this case. When
the volume of contraband articles is taken note of, it is sufficient for a
conclusion that the quantity of finished product out of it which would have
been extracted it would have been nearly 300 kilograms of heroine, and
the accused would have got about fo1ty kilograms as admitted by him. The G
disastrous effect (of this quantity of heroin) would be mind-boggling. The
High Court seems to have been swayed by the age of accused's father, his
family problems and more importantly he being not a "habitual offender".
Such considerations are really meaningless when one considers the fact that
the accused was in possession of contrabands which would have destroyed H
    540               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the health and mental equilibrium of thousands of people. The Court was
    not dealing with an accused charged with commission of any minor offence
    where he being not a habitual offender may have some relevance. But it
    is really inconsequential for a drug trafficker and smuggler. The reasons
    given by the High Court to reduce the sentence, according to us, have no
B   foundation. The inevitable conclusion is that the appeal deserves to be
    allowed which we direct. To put it differently, the sentence imposed by
    the trial Court is restored. The respondent has been released pursuant to
    the High Court's judgment. He shall surrender to custody to suffer
    remainder of the sentence as awarded by the trial Court. The appeal is
    allowed.
c
    B.K.M.                                                  Appeal allowed.