Holding

The Supreme Court held that the definition of "person interested" under Section 18 is inclusive and liberal, and the Union of India is a person interested, thus its application for impleadment is allowed and it may appeal the compensation order.

Summary

The State of Haryana acquired land in Gurgaon for the National Security Guard at the request of the Union of India. Landowners filed reference petitions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 seeking higher compensation. The Union of India applied to be impleaded as a respondent, arguing that it was a "person interested" and would be deprived of its right to appeal the compensation order if not joined. The Additional District Judge rejected the application, and the High Court upheld that decision, relying on earlier High Court decisions. The Supreme Court held that the definition of "person interested" in Section 18 is inclusive and must be liberally construed, thereby qualifying the Union of India as an interested party. Consequently, the Union’s application for impleadment was allowed, and it was granted permission to appeal the compensation enhancement order.

Issues considered

Whether the Union of India qualifies as a "person interested" under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of being impleaded in a reference proceeding.
Whether the liberal construction of "person interested" under Section 18 overrides the view expressed in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad case.
Whether the Union of India is entitled to file an appeal against the Additional District Judge’s order enhancing compensation if it is not impleaded.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 1 Rule 10
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12, s. 18, s. 4, s. 50(2), s. 6

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 18Person interestedUnion of IndiaCompensation enhancementImpleadmentAppeal rightsLiberal construction

Judgment

r

A UNION OF INDIA
v.
SHER SINGH AND ORS.

JANUARY 28, 1993

B [KULDIP SINGH AND N.M. KASLIWAL, JJ.)

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 : Section 18-'Any person interested'-
Scope of-Includes person directly or indirectly interested either in the title to
the lanJ or in the quantum of compensation.
c
Lan~Acquisition by State for the purpose of National Security Guard
as desired by Union of lndirr-Land owners' reference for enhancement of
compensation-Application by Union fl..
India for impleadment as respon-
dents-Maintainability of-Held Union of India is entitled to be impleaded
as respondents.
D
The State of Haryana acquired some land in District Gurgaon for
the benefit of National Security Guard as desired by the Union of India.
Being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded the landowners filed
reference petitions under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
E During the pendency of the reference, an application was moved by the
Union of India for being impleaded as respondents on the ground that the
land had been acquired for the purpose of National Security Guard being
controlled by the Union of India and that any order enhancing the com·
pensation would adversely affect the Union of India and it would be
deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal, in case it is not impleaded as
F a party. The Additional District Judge declined to implead the Union of
India as a party. Union of India filed a revision petition before the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana which by its order dated 24.5.1989 dismissed
the same. Against the order of the High Court Union of India preferred
an appeal in this court. In the meantime, by its order dated 17.1.1990 the
G Additional District Judge enhanced the compensation.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court,
this Court,

HELD : 1. The definition of 'a person interested' given in Section 18
H is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace
326
U.0,L v. SHER SINGH 327
all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title A
to the land or in the quantum of compensation. (3388)

Himalayan Titles and Marbles (P) ltd. v. Francis Victor Countinhq
(dead) by Lrs. and Ors., (1980) 3 S.C.R. 235; Neelgangabai andAnr. v. State
of Kamataka and Ors., (1990] 3 S.C.C. 617 and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti
v. Ashok Singhal and Ors., (1991) Supp. 2 S.C.C. 419, relied on. B

'!' Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahemdabad v. Chandula/
Shamaldas Patel and Ors., 1970 (1) S.C.W.R. 183, distinguished.

Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh, S.L.P.
No. 5389 of 1981 decided on January 11, 1982, referred to.
c
Kulbhushan Kumar and Company v. State of Punjab and Anr., A.l.R.
_..... 1984 P & H 55 (F8), overruled.

Mis lndo Swiss Time Ltd., Dundahera v. Umrao and Ors., A.I.R. 1981 D
P & H 213 overruled (Minority view of SS. Sandbawalia, J. approved)

Hindustan Sanitary Ware and Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. State of
Haryana and Ors., A.I.R. 1972 P & H 59, referred to as approved.
)_ 2. The Union of India bas been deprived of tiling an appeal against · E
the order of the Additional District Judge dated 17.U990 as its applica-
lion for impleadment was itself dismissed. Accordingly, the application of
the Union of India for impleadment is allowed as a result of which it is
entitled to file an appeal in the High Court against the judgment of the
Additional District Judge dated 17.1.1990. (3398-C]
F
~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1639 of
1990.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.5.1989 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 124 of 1989.
G
Dr. Gouri Shankar, Vipin Sanghi and C.V. Sobba Rao for the Ap-
"'- pellant.

Harbans Lal and Sarva Mitter (for M/s. Mitter and Mitter Co.) for
the Respondents. H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
/

KASLIWAL, J. The short controversy raised in the above appeal is
whether the Union of India through the Deputy Inspector General, Nation-
al Security Guard is a necessary and proper party to be impleaded when
the land in question w~s acquired by the State of Haryana for the purpose
B
of National Security Guard as desired by the Union of India.

The State of Haryana acquired some land situated in District Gur-
gaon for the purposes of National Security Guard in 1985 as desired by the
Union oflndia. The land owners being not satisfied with the compensation
c awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, submitted reference petitions
under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Act'). During the pendency of the reference j1pplication before
the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, an application was moved by the
Union of India for being impleaded in the array of the respondents on the
ground that the land had been acquired for the purpose of National
D
Security Guard being controlled by the Union of India. It was submitted
that any order enhancing the compensation would adversely affect the
Union oflndia and it would be deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal,
in case it is not impleaded as a party. The Additional District Judge by his
Order dated 28.11.1988 dismissed the application filed by the Union of
E India. It may be noted that some of the land owners had impleaded Union
of India as a party, but in 25 qses including the present case the Union of
India was not impleaded as a party. The Union of India aggrieved against
the order of the Additional District Judge filed a revision Ile fore the High
Court. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its order dated 24.5.1989
F dismissed the revision placing reliance upon the Full Bench decision of the
same Court in M/s. Kulbhushan Kumar & Company v. State of ' Punjab &
Another, AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 55. This Full Bench decision in
turn relied on the decision of the Full Bench of the same Court in Mis.
llldo Swiss Time Limited, Dundahera v. Umrao and Others, AIR 1981
Punjab & Haryana 213.
G
In order to resolve the controversy and to decide the question raised
in this appeal by grant of special leave, we would refer to the cases decided _)
by this Cpurt and the Full Bench decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court relied in the impugned order. In The Municipal Corporation of the
H City of Ahemdabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors., (1970) 1 SCWR
U.0.1. '" SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.J
183 decided on 8.1.1970, a Division Bench of two judges of this Court held ,\ .
that the land was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the
use of the Municipal Corporation, but that did not confer any interest in
the Municipal Corporation so as to enable it to file an appeal against the
order of the High C.ourt allowing the petition. In the said case certain lands
belonging to Chandulal Shamaldas Patel, the respondents were notified for !
acquisition under Section 4 of the Act by the Government of Bombay by
a Notification dated February 19, 1959. The area in which the land was
situated was subsequently allotted to the State of Gujarat on the bifurcation
of the State of Bombay under the States Reorganization Act, 1960, as such
the Divisional Commissioner of the State of Gujarat issued a Notification
under Section 6 on May 2, 1961. Both the Notifications were challenged in
c
the High Court of Gujarat on various grounds and the petition was allowed
by the High Court. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahcmdabad
being the fourth respondent in the writ petition in the High Court filed an
appeal before this Court against the order of the High Court. A preliminary
objection was ra!sed against the maintainability of the appeal on the ground D
that the Corporation was not aggrieved by the order uf the High Court.
This Court allowed the preliminary objection on a short ground that though
the property was notified for acquisition by the State Government for the
use of the Municipal Corporation after it was acquired by the Government,
but that did not confer any interest in the Municipal Corporation so as to E
enable it to file an appeal against the order of the High Court. It was
further observed that substantially the grounds on which the writ petition
was filed were that the Notifications were invalid on account of diverse
reasons. Some of these reasons had been upheld and some had not been
upheld, but all those grounds related to the validity of the Notifications F
issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of Gujarat. This
Court further observed as under :

"Not even an order of costs has been passed against the
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahemdabad. We fail
to see what interest the Municipal Corporation has which G
would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High
Court allowing the writ petition filed by the first respon-
dent.

The appeal is dismissed as not maintainable."
H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.

A A perusal of the above order shows that this Court did not examine
any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act nor applied its mind on the
question of 'any person interested' under the provisions of the Act having
a right to challenge the order of the enhanced compensation passed by the
Court in a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The preliminary objection
was allowed simply on the ground that the impugned Notifications in that
B
case were issued by the Government of Bombay and the Government of
Gujarat and the challenge was relating to the validity of such Notifications
and no order had been passed against the Municipal Corporation of the
City of Ahemdabad.

C A Division Bench of this Court of two Judges in Himalayan Tiles &
Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by Lrs. & Others, [1980)
3 SCR 235 examined the question of 'person interested' under the land
acquisition proceedings in detail and categorically held that the appellant
Himalayan Tiles & Marbles being a private company for which the land ~
D · was acquired was undoubtedly 'a person interested' as contemplated by
Section 18 (1) of the Act. It was held that the definition of 'a person
interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be
liberally construed so as to embrace all pe1 ;ons who may be directly or
indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of
compensation. It was further held that the lands were actually acquired for
E the purpose of the Company and once the land vested in the Government
after acquisition, it stood transferred to the Company under the agreement
entered into between the Company and the Government. Thus, it cannot
be said that the Company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly,
since under the agreement the Company had to pay the compensation, it
F was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compen-
sation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy
amount of money. This Court categorically held that the view taken by the
Orrisa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company,
local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an
interested person is not correct. In the above case this Court further held
G that the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that
the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to
include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is
acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation.
This view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good con-
H science. It may be further important to note that this Court in the above
U.0.1. "· SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.] 331
case approved the case of Punjab & Haryana High Court in The Hindustan A
,J.. Sa11itaryware and llldustries Ltd. Bahadurgarh & Anr. v. The State of
Harayana & Ors., AIR 1972 Punjab & Haryana 59.

The point came up for consideration before a Full Bench of three
Judges of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Mis Inda Swiss
B
Time Limited (supra). S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ, followed the view taken in
Himalayan Tiles & MarlJles's case (supra) and did not follow the view of
this Court in T71e Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahemdabad's case
"' (supra). Sandhawalia, CJ, held that in the case of The Municipal Corpora-
tion of the City of Ailemdabad, a short order was passed upholding a
preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. In that case c
their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the Municipal Cor-
poration of the City of Ahemdabad for whose benefit the land had been
acquired could not maintain an appeal in the Supreme Court against the
---oi,, judgment of the High Court setting aside that Notification. It is evident
from the brief order that the matter was disposed of at the very th~eshold D
without any elaborate reference to either principle or by diverting to any
authority. The appeal was held to be not maintainable on the short ground
that their Lordships failed to see what interest the Municipality had which
would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High Court allowing
the writ petition med by the land owners. Sandhawalia, CJ, as such held
that a company for whose benefit the land is acquired, can be impleaded E
as a party in the Court of the District Judge, in a reference preferred under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It was further held that there
was no conflict or inconsistency between Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil
Procedure Code and Section 50(2) of the Act. The two provisions can be
construed harmoniously and the provisions of Order 1 rule 10 of the Civil F
Procedure Code would apply within the confines of Section 50 (2) and the
:Ji-_ petitioner company (Inda $wiss Time Ltd.) was entitled to be impleaded
as a party thereunder. On the other hand P.C. Jain aitd J.M. Tandon, JJ
holding a majority view followed the view propounded in the Municipal
Corporation of the City of Ahemdabad's case (supra) and did not agree with
the view enunciMcd in Himalayan Wes & MarlJles's case (supra). The G
majority view was that an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil
Procedure Code for being impleaded as a party by the company is not
~
legally maintainable. The company is not an interested person so as to give
it a right to become a party to the proceedings in reference before the
District Judge. The only right under the Act available to the company is to H
•

332 SUPREME COl!RT REPORTS [1993) 1 S.C.R.
A appear and adduce evidence for lhe determination of the amount of
compensation and the company by itself would have no right to file an
appeal. It was also held that when a company has no right to file an appeal
then afortiori, it follows that an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the
Civil Procedure Code by a company to become a party in the proceedings
would not be maintainable, because once an application for becoming a
B
party is allowed and a company is made a party then the company would
have a right to file an appeal. The only right given to a company under
Section 50(2) of the Act is to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose
of determination of the amount of compensation and for the exercise of
that right, it is not necessary nor is there any provision in the Act which
c may entitle the Company to ask for being impleaded as a party under the
provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 ofc the Civil Procedure Code.

Before a Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court consisting
of S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ, P.C. Jain and S.C. Mittal, JJ. in M/s. Ku/bhushan
D Kumar & Company, Ahmadgarh, Petitioner v. State of Punjab and another
respondent, AIR 1984 Punjab and Haryana 55, the question again came up
for consideration whether the ratio in the Full Bench Judgment of /ndo
Swiss Time Ltd.'s case (supra) still held the field or not. The question arose
because of a short observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in
special leave petition No. 5389 of 1981 (Punjab United Pesticides and
E Chemicals Ltd. v. Puran Singh) decided on January 11, 1982. In that case
Supreme Court had affirmed the earlier judgment in Himalayan Tiles &
Matbles's case (supra). The Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High
Court in the above case of Mis Kulbhushan Kumar & Company held that
in the Punjab United Pesticides and Chemicals Limited's case (supra), the
F special leave petition and the appeal were directed agains! an order in
liminc of dismissal by a Letters Patent Bench of tht: High Court, th'e
coriectness or otherwise of the Ful! Bench decision in Inda Swiss Tin1e
Li11dted's case was not even remotely canvassed before the Supreme Coui"t.
It was held that it is well-settled that a Full Bench Judgment could not be
presumed to have been expressly overruled, which far from being con-
G sidered had not been even referred to by the superior Court. It was thus
held that the order of their Lordships in Punjab United Pesticides and
Chemicals Limited's case (supra) did not overrule either expressly or
impliedly the Jndo Swiss Time Limited's case. It was also highlighted that
a special leave petition against the Full Bench judgment in lndo Swiss Time
H Limited's case (supra) was decided by the Supreme Court on the basis of
)
U.0.1. v. SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.] 333
a compromise. A short order recorded in that special leave petition was in A
the following terms : -

"It is agreed by all the parties that the Company for whose
benefit the acquisition has been made viz. Jndo Swiss Time
Ltd., may be impleaded as a party to the proceedings. The
application made by the appellant under Order 1 Rule 10 B
C.P.C. to the District Judge will stand allowed. The matter
may by disposed of expeditiously by the learned District
Judge. Special leave to appeal granted and the appeals
are allowed in the manner indicated above with no order
as to costs.11 c
It was thus held that the above agreed order in Indo Swiss Time
Limited's case (supra) before their Lordships of the Supreme Court does
not alter the situation or fact the precedential value of the earlier Full
Bench. It was thus held that the ratios in lndo Swiss Time Limited's case
D
(supra) still held the field.

In Neelagangabai & Another v. State of Kamataka & Others, [1990] 3
SCC 617, a Division Bench of this Court of two Judges affirmed the
decision of the High Court of Karnataka dated March 4, 1987 which had .
relied upon the decision in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles's case (supra). Jn E
this case the High Court of Karnataka in a writ petition filed by Hubli
Dharwar Municipal Corporation, set aside an award made under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the compensation payable to the
appellants · T. Ramakrishniah and directed to reopen the proceedings
before the Civil Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, for fresh F
disposal in accordance with law. After the case was received by the Civil
Court on reference, no notice was issued to the respondent - Corporation.
The Court did not, however, proceed to take evidence and record its own
finding on the valuation, as it was conceded on behalf of the State Govern-
ment that the market value of the land could be calculated at the rate of
Rs. 3,800 per guntha. The Court answered the reference on the basis of G
the consent of the land owners and the State. The State, however, was not
"'--.. satisfied with the award and filed an appeal which was dismissed on the
_ ground of being not maintainable as the impugned judgment was held to
be a compromise decree. An attempt by the respondent-Corporation to
intervene also failed. The Corporation thereafter moved the High Court H
\
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 1 S.C.R.
A with a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, inter alia,
challenging the validity of the Civil Court's judgment directing higher
compensation to be paid. The High Court held that admittedly the land .
was acquired for the purpose of the Corporation and the burden of the
payment of the compensation was on the Corporation. In this background
the High Court held that it was mandatory for the Court of reference to
B
have caused a notice to be served on the respondent-Corporation before
proceeding to determine the compensation claim. Since no notice was
given to the Corporation, it was deprived of an opportunity to place its
case before the Court and the judgment rendered in the reference case was
illegal and not binding on the Corporation. This Court confirmed the view
c taken by the High Court.

In Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Ashok Singhal & Others, [1991] Supp.
2 SCC 419, a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party,
it was held that the land was acquired by the Government for the benefit
D of the appellant Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti which as a statutory body was
a distinct entity. The Land Acquisition Officer under his award made
under Section 11 of the Act determined the market value of the acquired
lands at Rs. 500 per bigha and awarded compensation accordingly. On a
reference sought by the respondent land owners the Additional District
Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 1,000 per bigha. In the first
E appeal at the instance of the claimant land owners the High Court made
a further enhancement of the compensation to Rs. 2,000 per bigha. The
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti came in appeal before this Court and contended
that the acquisition not having been for the Government itself, but for a
statutory authority, it was incumbent upon the Court of reference as also
F the High Court in the appeal to issue notice to the appellant before
considering the claim of the land owners for enhancement of the compen-
sation. It was not disputed that the provisions of the Act which required
the service or notice to the body for whose benefit the acquisition was made
were attracted in this case and such notice was not served on the appellants
and the appellant had not been given an opportunity of being heard.
G However, the learned counsel for the respondent land owners appearing
in the above case fairly submitted that the judgment under appeal be set
aside and the matter be remitted to the High Court for a fresh disposal
after affording an opportunity to the appellant of being heard in the matter.
In view of this submission, the judgment of the High Court was set aside
H and the appeal was remitted to the High Court for a fresh disposal in

/
)
U.0.1. v. SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.] 335
accordance with law after affording an opportunity of hearing to the A
,,;: appellant.

In the case in hand before us, it is an admitted position that the State
of Haryana acquired the land in District Gurgaon for the benefit of
National Security Guard as desired by the Union of India. The land owners
including the respondents of the present case filed reference petitions
B
under Section 18 of the Act. During the pendency of the reference applica-
tion before the Additional District Judge, Gurgaon, an application was
moved by the Union of India through Deputy Inspector General, National
Security Guard for being impleaded as respondents on the ground that the
land had been acquired for the purpose of National Security Guard. It was c
submitted in the application that the interest of the applicant Union of
India will adversely suffer in case the rate of compensation was enhanced
and it would also be deprived of an opportunity to file an appeal in case
Union of India is not impleaded as a party. The Additional District Judge
. ""' . declined to implead the Union of India as a party. A revision application
was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 24.5.1989.
D
The High Court in the impugned order took the view that the matter stands
concluded hy the Full Bench judgment in the case of Mis Ku/bhushan
Kumar & Company's case (supra).

J... We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have thoroughly E
perused the record. It was contended on behalf of the appellant Union of
India that the Central Government is neither a company nor a firm and as
such the Full Bench judgment of the High Court relied upon in the
impugned order has no application in the instant case. The Central
Government has no machinery of its own for acquiring of land and as such F
it had to depend upon the State Government for the above purpose.
However, the financial implication with regard to the payment of compen-
sation is to be borne by the Central Government. It was contended that
the point is fully covered by the decision of this Court in the case of
Himalayan Ti/q & Marbles (supra). It was also submitted that in the
meantime the learned Additional District Judge, Gurgaon by its order G
dated 17.1.1990 has decided the reference and has enhanced the compen-
sation. It was submitted that a great injustice has been done to the appel-
lant as it has not been given an opportunity to contest. the order of
enhanced compensation and in view of the fact that its application for
impleadment has been dismissed, it has been left with no remedy of filing H
~
~ ~
"
33(. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 1 S.C.R.
A an appeal against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge
enhancing the compensation.

On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the respondent - ·'""
land owners that the learned Single Judge of the High Court passing the
impugned order dated 24.5.1989 was bound by the Full Bench decisions of
B
the said Court and there was no infirmity in taking such view. It was further
contended that even if there was a conflict between the two decisions of
this Court in The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v.
Chandulal Shamaldas Patel & Ors. and in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (P)
Ltd. 's case, both by a Division Bench romprising of two Hon'ble Judges,
c the ronflict can only be resolved by referring the case to a larger Bench of
this Court.

In our view, there is no necessity of referring the case to a larger
Bench. So far as the case of ·The Municipal Corporation of the City of
D Ahmedabad decided as back as in 1970 is coneerned, it is a short order
based on the peculiar facts of that case alone. In that case there is no
discussion of the relevant provisions of the Act nor any case has been
discussed. The Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued by the
Government of Bombay on February 19, 1959. Another Notification under
Section 6 of the Act was issued by the Divisional Commissioner of the State
E of Gujarat under section 6 of the Act on May 2, 1961. Both the Notifica- ~'
tions were challenged by the land owner on various grounds by filing a writ
petition in the High Court. The petition was allowed by the High Court. I;

F
The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad came in appeal to
this Court and a preliminary objection was raised against the main-
tainability of the appeal filed by the Corporation. It was urged that the
Corporation was not aggrieved by the order. This Court upheld the prelimi-
nary objection on the ground that all the grounds related to the validity of ~-
,
'·~

the Notifications issued by the Government of Bombay and the Govern-
ment of Gujarat. It was held that not even an order of costs has been
passed against The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad. It
•
'
G was further observed "we fail to see what interest the Municipal Corpora-
tion has which would sustain an appeal by it against the order of the High
I
Court allowing the writ petiti;in riled by the first respondent." It admittedly _)
shows that in the above case neither any stage of filing any reference under
Section 18 of t!;e Act before the Court had arrived nor any compensation l
H had been determined by the Court adverse to the interest of The Municipal '
¢:::
u.o.r. V. SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.] 337
Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad for whose benefit the land was A
acquired. Even no award had been passed by the Land Acquisition Col-
lector and it was only the Notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of
the Act by the Government of Bombay and Government of Gujarat had
been challenged by a writ petition in the High Court. In these circumstan-
ces; this Court took the view that not even an order of costs had been
passed against The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and
B
no interest of the Municipal Corporation was affected and on this ground
alone the preliminary objection was sustained. Thus, the above case cannot
be considered as an authority for deciding the question raised in the case
in hand before us.
c
In Himalayan Tiles & Marbles's case {supra), the appellant, a private
company was carrying on the business of manufacture and sale of artificial
marbles and tiles. In or about 1957 the company moved the Government
for acquiring additional land for purposes of the company and the Govern-
ment on January 7, 1958 issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land D
Acquisition Act, 1894, which was followed by a separate notice by the Land
Acquisition Officer acquiring the land in dispute. This was followed by
another notification under Section 6 of the Act which was served on the
respondent on January 25, 1960. The purpose of the acquisition was
mentioned in the Notification, as "public purposes for which the land is
needed for Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd." The acquisition proceed- E
ings culminated in an award made under Section 12 of the Act on April
11, 1961, which was published in the State Gazette on April 18, 1961. On
December 11, 1961 a letter was written on behalf of the Government
informing the owner of the acquired land that possession would be taken
on or about the 12th of January, 1962. The first respondent in his writ F
petition to the High Court, contended that the Government was not
competent to acquire the land for purposes of a private company which
-,;... could not be said to be a public purpose under Section 4 of the Act and
prayed that the entire land acquisition proceedings should be quashed. A
single Judge of the High Court accepted the plea, allowed the writ petition
and quashed the land acquisition proceedings along with the notifications. G
The appellant filed an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench which
confirmed the view of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the appellant had no locus standi to file the appeal, as it was
not 'a person interested' within the meaning of Section 18 (1) of the Act.
The Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. came in appeal to this Court by H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 1 S.C.R.
A grant of special leave. The Court in this case examined the question
elaborately with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act including
Section 18 and the entire case law on the point. It was clearly held that the
definition of 'a person interested' given in Section 18 is an inclusive
definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who ,
may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in
B
the quantum of compensation. It was observed that since under the agree-
ment the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly
interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so
that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. After
examining the various case law on the subject, it was observed that the
c preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the defini-
tion of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a
body, local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired
and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In their
Lordships opinion this view accorded with the principles of equity, justice
D and good conscience. It may be further noted that the above decision in
Himalayan Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. 's case was given on March 28, 1980
and has been consistently followed by this Court as already mentioned
above in the cases of Neelagangabai & Another (sl!pra) and Krishi Upaj
Mandi Samiti (supra) decided on May 3, 1990 and March 25, 1991 respec-
tively. No decision was brought to our notice by the learned counsel taking
E a contrary view after the decision in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles's case.
Even in the case of Indo Swiss Time Limited, S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ., had
followed the judgment in the Himalayan Tiles & Marbles case and had
rightly distinguished the case of The Municipal Corporation of the a1y of
Ahmedabad. The majority view in the above case which followed the
F Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad is held to be wrong. So
far as later Full Bench of the Punjab & Harayana High Court in Mis.
Kulbhushan Kumar& Company's case (supra) is concerned, it had followed
its earlier decision in lndo Swiss Time Limited's case and as such while
approving the minority view of S.S. Sandhawalia, CJ., we overruled both
the above Full Bench decisions of the Punjab & Haryana High Court being
G contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Himalayan Tiles & Marbles's
case (supra).

We fully agree with the reasons and conclusion arrived at in I
~
Himalayan Tiles & Marbles case. We accordingly allow this appeal and set
H aside the order of the High Court dated 24.5.1989. However, after dismiss-
U.0.1. v. SHER SINGH [KASLIWAL, J.] 339
ing the application for impleadment filed by the Union of India by the A
Additional District Judge by order dated 28.11.1988, it has been brought
to our notice that by decision dated 17.1.1990, the Additional District
. Judge has enhanced the compensation. The Union of India has been
deprived of filing an appeal against the said order of the Additional District
Judge dated 17.1.1990 as its application for impleadment was itself dis-
missed by the Additional District Judge, we now direct that the application
B
of the Union of India for impleadment is allowed as a result of which it is
entitled to file an appeal in the High Court against the judgment of the
Additional District Judge dated 17.1.1990. The period of limitation of 90
days for filing an appeal in the High Court shall be counted from the date
of the present order. In case such appeal is filed, the High Court shall pass c
an appropriate order in accordance with law on the m~rits of the appeal.
In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed.