Holding

The High Court erred; the Court Receiver cannot deal with the property without court leave and the dispute must be decided under the Bombay Rents Act, so the order dismissing the Chamber Summons is quashed.

Summary

The appellant, Usha Harshad Kumar Dalal, a co‑owner of a building, filed a partition suit in 1978 and a Court Receiver was appointed who took symbolic possession while Suhrid Geigy Trading Ltd. (R‑2) occupied the premises. After the licence expired, the amendment to the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 deemed the licencee a protected tenant under s.15A, and the premises later came to be occupied by ORG Systems (R‑1) following an amalgamation approved by the Gujarat High Court. The High Court dismissed a Chamber Summons seeking possession from ORG Systems, holding that the Receiver could not use summary proceedings and directing the parties not to sub‑let further. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had failed to consider the effect of the licence non‑renewal, sections 15 and 15A, and the change in occupancy, and that a Court Receiver cannot act without leave of the court, especially where eviction must be pursued under the Bombay Rent Act. Consequently, the order dismissing the Chamber Summons was quashed and the matter remitted to the High Court for proper determination.

Issues considered

Whether a Court Receiver may, without leave of the court, permit sub‑letting or induction of a third party after taking symbolic possession of the suit property.
Whether the non‑renewal of the Leave and Licence Agreement and the provisions of sections 15 and 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 affect the status of the occupier as a tenant.
Whether eviction of the occupier (ORG Systems) must be pursued under the Bombay Rent Act rather than by summary proceedings under Order XL of the CPC.
Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the Chamber Summons without considering the rival contentions and statutory provisions.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947s. 15, s. 15A
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XL Rule 1, s. Order XL Rule 3
Companies Act

Subjects

Rent controlEvictionCourt ReceiverLeave and Licence AgreementSub‑lettingProtected tenantSummary proceedingsPartition suit

Judgment

USHA HARSHAD KUMAR DALAL A
v.
M/S. ORG SYSTEMS AND ORS.

JANUARY 6, 2000

[S.P. KURDIJKAR AND SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, JJ.] B

Rent Control & Eviction :

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 :
Sections lS and ISA-Sub- letting-Suit premises given to R-2 by a Leave C
and Licence Agreement in 1970-Sub-letting to subsidiaries and affiliate
concerns allowed by the Agreement-The Act amended in 1971--Subsisting
licensees became tenants governed by the Act-Sub-letting made a ground of
eviction--Suit for partition filed between the co-owners of the suit property in
the High Court-<:ourt Receiver took symbolic possession of the suit premises
as R-2 found in occupation-- R-1 came into possession in 1979 pursuant to D
amalgamation of R-2 into the parent company of R-1-lnduction of R-1 in
the suit premises challenged before High Court in the said suit-High Court
directed Receiver to adopt proceedings under the Act for appropriate declara-
tion and relief--On appea~ Held: High Court failed to consider rival conten-
tiorn--High Court did not consider the effect of non-renewal of the licence E
agreement after its expiry-Effect of Section JS and ISA not con-
sidered-Order of the High Court quashed-Matter remitted back.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order XL Rules 1 and J-Appointment
of Court Receiver--<:ourt Receiver acts on behalf on the Court-Duty of the
Court Receiver to maintain status quo and to protect property-Receiver not F
to deal with the property without leave of the Court-{)b/igation of the Court
as well as the Receiver to preserve and maintain the property as far as
practicable in the ;·ame f onn when it was taken into possession.

The appellant is one of the co-owners of the property in dispute. In
1970, the co-owners of the suit property entered into a Leave and Licence G
Agreement with R-2 company, permitting R-2 to occupy the premises on
certain terms and conditions. The said licence W'dS renewable for a further
term of five years un a three months' notice and the Licensees were alsu
entitled to give the licensed premises or any portion thereof to their own
subsidiary or affiliate companies/concerns etc. Before the expiry of the H
57
58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2UC0] 1 S.C.R.

A licence period of five years, an amendment in the Bombay Rents, Hotel alid
Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 was introduced in 1973 whereby
subsisting licensees became protected tenants and were governed by the
said Act. Section 15(1) of the Act provided that subject to any contract to
the contrary, it was unlawful for any tenant to sub-let the whole or any part
B of the premises let to him or to assign or transfer in any manner. The Act
also made the landlord entitled to recover possession of the premises on
that ground. After the expiry of the Leave and Licence Agreement in 1975,
occupation of the suit premises by R-2 was governed by provisions of the
Act. In 1978, the appellant filed a suit in the High Court for partition and
possession of her share in the suit property against M who was another
C co-owner of the said suit property. The High Court, by an interim order,
appointed a Receiver to the suit property directing him to take possession
and manage the suit property and do all other incidental things in relation
thereto.

D When the Court Receiver came to be appointed, the suit premises was
found tu be in possession of R-2 company, therefore, the Receiver took
symbolic possession. The said interim order was confirmed later. In 1996,
some of the co-owners took Chamber Summons bringing to the notice of the
High Court the fact that when the Court Receiver took symbolic possession,
R-2 was in occupation but thereafter the said premises was being occupied
E by R-1 company. On the High Court's direction, the Receiver filed a report
stating that the sign board was in the name of R-1; premises was in posses-
sion of R-1 and that S.G. Pharmaceuticals and R-1 were two companies of
the same group. In its affidavit before the High Court against the Chamber
Summons, R-1 stated that tbe name of R-2 i.e. Suhrid Geigy Trading Ltd.
F was changed to S.G. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. and in 1981, by an order of the
Gujarat Higlt Court, tbe said S.G. Pharmaceuticals was amalg-dmated into
Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. and thereafter the said ORG Systems
i.e. R-1 was given possession uf the premises as it was the electronics
division of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. R-1 also stated that amal-
gamation scheme was sanctioned by the Gujarat High Court in December,
G 1987 and therefore, their possession cannot be said to be unauthorised. The
High Court rejected the Chamber Summons on maintainability itself
directing respondents not to create any further sub- letting at all. The High
Court was of the opinion that the dispute of the present nature could not be
resolved by summary proceedings, instead the court Receiver had to adopt
H the proper procedure under the Act. Hence the present appeal.
l.'SHA HARSHADKL MAR DAI .AL v. ORG SYSTEMS 59

Disposing the appeal and remitting the matter to the High Court, A
this court

HELD : 1.1. When the Receiver tooll symbolic possession, R-2 was in
occupation a.nd by virtue of Section 15A of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and
Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947 such a Licensee shall be deemed to
B
be a tenant. R-1 came in possession in 1979 pursuant to amalgamation
scheme approved by the Gujarat High Court on December 24, 1987. It is well
settled principle that when a Court Recei'l'er is appointed in respect of any
property it is said to be in custodia legis and court holds the property for the
I benefit of the true owner. The Court Receiver acts on behalf of the court.
)
Even the Court Recei'l'er will ha'l'e no power to deal with such property C
without the leave of the Court. It is the duty of the Court Receiver to
maintain status quo and also to protect the property from being put to waste
or allow it to diminish its value. The Court Receiver cannot encumber the
property in any manner without the leave of the Court. It is the obligation
of the Court as wdl as the Court Receiver to preserve and maintain the D
property as far as possible and practicable in the same form when it was
taken in possession. When the possession of the property was taken by the
Court Receiver in 1978, R-2 was in occupation and the Court Receiver took
symbolic possession thereof. It must be presumed that R-2 was very much
aware of the appointment of Court Recei'l'er. [65-A-E]
E
1.2. The High Court has not considered various rival contentions
, raised by the parties in their pleadings. It has also not considered the effect
'-
of non-renewal of the Leave and Licence Agreement after the expiry of its
period nor it had considered the effect of Sections, 15 and 15A of the Act.
The High Court has also not considered what would be the effect of F
changes in the composition of R-2 after the Receiver took symbolic posses-
> sion. All these factual and legal contentions will ha'l'e to be considered by
the High Court bearing in mind the provisions of the Act as well as the
Companies Act. [67-E]

1.3. If a person who is put in possession as an agent of the Receiver G
inducts a stranger and if such a third person claims a tenancy and then
if the Receiver is directed to adopt the proceedings under the said Act for
appropriate declaration and reliefs then the very object of Order XL, Rules
1 and 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be defeated. However, it is
not in every case that the Receiver can resort to the summary procedure. H
60 SUPRhME COURT REPORTS [2GOOJ 1 S.C.R.

A The question would have to be decided by the Court with reference to the
pleadings of the parties and the proof thereof. [67-B-C]

Anthony C. Leo v. Nandlal Bal f(Jishnan and Ors., [1996] 11 SCC 376,
referred to.

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appe::al No. 39 OF
2000.

From !ht: Judgmi.:nt and Ordt:r dated 8/9.12.97 of the Bombay High
Court in C.S. No. 436/96 in Suit No. 120 of 1978.

C Rafiq A. Dada, Atul S. Dayal, R. Sasiprabhu and Chirag Balsara for
the Appellant.

C. Mukund and T.V. Ratnam for the Respondent No. l.

Miland Sathe::, B.V. Deepak and M.P. Vinod for the Respond1.mt.
D
The Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by

S.P. KURDUKAR, J. Leave granted.

This civil appeal arises out of an order dated December 819, 1997,
E passed by the !t:arned single Judge of the Bombay High Court on Chamber
Summons {for short Ch/S) taken out by the:: appellants defendant Nos. 2,
7, 8, 11 and 13 to 26. By this Ch/S the appellants sought a direction to the
respondent No. 1 i.e. M/s. ORG Systems to handover quiet, vacant and
peaceful possession of the premise~ i11 their occupation forthwith. The
dispute in this Ch/S is restricted to the fourth floor premises in
F 'Shreenikatan'. It is alleged by the appellants that M/s. ORG Systems have
been in illegal and unauthorise occupation of the:: premises in question as
they have bet:n inducted in the premises when the property was in posses-
sion of the Court Receiver without leave of the:: court.

G It would be necessary to summarise briefly a few facts to indicate as
to how the present Ch/S was required to be take::n out by the appellants.

Usha Harshadkumar Dalal fikd Suit No. 120 of 1978 on the:: Original
5ide of the Bombay High Court for partition of the said property against
Manibhai Jhaverbhai Patel & Ors. seeking partition and possession of her
·H share in the said property. Obviously ;ince it was a 5Uit for partition
CSHAHARSHADKUMAR DALAL v. ORG SYSTEMS :s.P. KURDCKAR J .J 61

amongst the co-owners the first respondent, namely, M/s. ORG Systems as A
well as second respondent Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited were not arrayed
as defendants since they were not concerned with the partition of the joint
family property. The appellant took out a Notice of Motion No. 115178 in
the said suit for various interim reliefs including the appointment of the
Court Receiver. The learned single Judge vide its order dated 13th B
February, 1978, passed an ad interim order whereby Court Receivt:r, the
Bombay High Court, was appointed as a Receiver of the suit property with
a direction to take possession of the suit property and manage the same
and do all other incidental things in relation thereto. Admittedly when the
Court Receivt:r came to be appointed the premises in question was found
to be in actual possession of Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited and, therefore, c
thi: Receiver took symbolic possession without disturbing the possession of
;
/ Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited. The ad interim ordi:r was confirmed by the
learned single Judge on July 24, 1978.

On September 7, 1970 (prior to suit) a Leave and Licence Agreement D
between the co-owners of a building called Shreeniketan Building was
entered inrn with Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited whereby the said Suhrid
Geigy Trading Limited was permitted to occupy the premises in qm:stion
admeasuring 4850 square feet on terms and conditions set out therein. The
rdevant clause of the said agreement is as under: E

"7. If the Licencees shall be desirous of having this licence
renewed for further term of five yi:ars and >hall at least three
months before the expiration of the period of the Licence have
givt:n to the Licensors in writing a notice of their intention to take F
such renewed licence, the Licensors shall upon receiving such
notice and if there shall not be at the time of such request by the
Licensees any existing breach, non- performance or non-obst:r-
vance of any of the covenants and conditions on the part of the
1
Licensees herein contained grant to the Lia:nsees a fresh Licence
of the Licensed Premises for a further period of 5 y.:ars at the G
same Licence fee or compensation (at the rate of Rs. 1.50 paise
per sq. ft. for part of fourth floor) hereby dt:mised and up'Jn the
same terms and conditions as are herein contained provided how-
ever that such fresh licence shall not contain a covenant for
renewal." H
-\

62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) 1 S.C.R.

A There does not seem to be any dispute that the said agreement was
not renewed for any further period. Other relevant clause in the said
agreement is as under :

"11. The Licensees shall be entitled to give the licensed
Premises or any part thereof terms and conditions not inconsistent
B with the provisions hereof to their subsidiary associate concerns
or affiliate Companies and establishments in Sarabhai Group of
Companies including Suhrid Geigy Limited, Karamchand Prem-
chand Private Limited, Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co.
Ltd. Sarabhai Sons Private Limited, Sarabhai Management Cor-
c poration Ltd., Sarabhai Technological Development Syndicate Pvt.
Ltd., Bakubhai Ambalal Private Limited, Shilpi Advt:rtising Ltd.,
St:rcon Pvt. Ltd., Sarabhai M. Chemicals Ltd., Standard Phar-
maceuticals Ltd., Systrocix Ltd., Synbiotics Ltd., Te!erad Private
Limited, Travelers Ltd., for use by way of sub- licence without
being required to obtain the liccn&ors consent to such sub-licence
D and the Licensees shall continue to be responsible to the Licensors
for the performance and discharge of their obligations hen:under".

Before the expiry of the licence period of hve years on !st February,
1973, an amendment in the Bombay Rents, Hotd and Lodging House
Rates Control Act, L947 (Bombay Rent Act) was introduced whereby all
E subsisting licensees became protected tenants and were governtd by tht
provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act
provides that subject to any contract to the contrary it shall not be lawful
for any tenant to sub-let the whok or any part of the premises lt:t to him
or to assign or transfer in any other manner. The Bombay Rent Act
F provides that a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any
premises if the Court is satisfied that the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the
whole or part of the premises or assigned or transforred in any other
manner his interest therein. The Leave and Licence Agreement came to
be terminated on September 7, 1975 and the occupation of the said
G premises by Suhrid Geigy Tracling Limited was governed by the provisions
of the Bombay Rent Act.

Some of the co-owners took out Ch/S !'lo. 436 of 1996 on 17th April,
1996, bringing to the notice of the High Court that when the Court
Receiver took symbolic possession the Suhrid Geigy Trading Ltd. was in
H occupation but now the said premises are being occupied by the first
USHA HARSHADKUMAR DAlAL v. ORG SYSTEMS [S.P. KCRDLKAR. J.) 63

respondent ORG Systems. The applicants in the said Ch/S sought ap- A
propriatc orders from the court directing tht: Court Rect:iver to submit a
report to the High Court and recowr possession of the said premises from
the first respondent ORG Systems. The High Court while passing the order
directed the Court Receiver to submit a n:port relating to the use, occupa-
tion and possession of the premises in question. On April 22, 1996, the
Court Receiver submitted the report stating therein :
B

(a) The sign board on the said premises was in the name of ORG
Systems.

(b) The Section Officer met one Mr. Patwardhan, the accounts C
officer of the said ORG Systems and one Mr. R. Veershlin-
gam an employee of ORG Systems, both of whom expressed
their inability to state the manner in which the said ORG
Systems came to occupy the said premises.

(c) Both the officers, however, informed the Section Officer that D
the entire premises were in the possession of ORG Systems
under their lock and keys and they would furnish relevant
documents on April 18, 1996. The Section Officer submitted
his report to the court Receiver on 20th April, 1996.

(d) The Court Rcceivt:r thereafter submitted his report to the
E
court annexing a letter dated March 16, 1994, addressed by
one S.G. Pharmaceuticals stating that the said S.G. Phar-
maceuticals and the said ORG Systems were companies
within the Sarabhai Group.
F
While opposing the Ch/S the first respondent ORG Systems filed
four affidavits stating therein :

That Suhrid Geigy Trading Limittd gave exclusive possession of the
said premises to ORG Systems. In November L979, the name of Suhrid
Geigy Trading Limited changed to S.G. Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals G
Ltd. By an order dated 27th March, 1981 passed by the Gujarat High
Court, a scheme of amalgamation was approved whereby the said S.G
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (Transferor) was amalgamated into
Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. (Transfon:e). Pursuant to the said
amalgamation of S.G. Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. with Ambalal H
64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (20001 l S.C.K
A Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. in March 1981, ORG Systems which w.as the
electronics division of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. was given pos-
session of the said premises. The amalgamation scheme was sanctioned by
thc Gujarat High Court by an order dated 24th Decemba, 1987 and
because of this amalgamation scheme their possession cannot be said to bc
B unauthorised. The first respondent ORG Systems also raised a contcntion
that the present Ch/S was taken out afkr a lapse of 16 years which would
indicate that the applicants in the Ch/S or any other co-owm.:r had no
objection to the possession of ORG Systems of the premises in question.
It was also contended that as the Court Receiver alone could take ap-
propriate action in accordance with law, the applicants had no right to take
C out such Ch/S.

Both the parties in support of tht:ir rival contentions filed the af-
fidavits. The karned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and
order dated 8/9th December, 1997, held as under :

D "Hence, so far as chamber summons is concerm:d, the same is
not maintainable and, therefort:, stands rejected. Resuondents are
directed not to crt:atc further subletting either in favour of their
sister conccrns or third party."

E It is this order passed by the learned Single Judge on C'1/S which is
the subject matter of challenge in this appeal.

The entire reasoning of the impugned judgment is based upon the
judgment ofthis Court in Anthony C. Leo v. Nandla/ Bal Krishnan and Ors.,
[1996[ ll s.c.c. 376.
F
In the opinion of the !tamed single Judge the dispute: of the pn:sent
nature could not be resolved by summary proceedings (ChJS) but the Court
Receiver has to adopt the proper procedun: under the Bombay Rent Act.

Some of the J:.asic and admitted facts of the case before us are that
G under the Leave and Licence agreement dated September 7, 1970, the
premises in question was given to Suhrid Geigy Trading Ltd. for ii" peri9d
of five years. This licence was never renew.:d. During the subsistence of
this Leave and licence Agreement, Bombay Rent Act came to be amended ·
and such of the liccncees who were in possession pursuant to a valid !icence
H on 1st of February, !973 shall be deemed to have become the tenant of the
USlL\HAR~HADKUMAR lJAlAL v. ORO SYSTEMS (S.P. KURDt.:KAR J.J 65

landlord in rnspect of the premises or any part thereof in its possession A.
(Section 15A inserted by Maharashtra 17of1973). When the Receiver took
- the symbolic possession, Suhrid Geigy Trading Limited was in occupation
and by virtue of section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act such a Licensee shall
be deemed to be a tenant. The first respondent came in possession in 1979
pursuant to the amalgamation scheme approved by the Gujarat High Court
B
on December 24, 1987. In view of these admitted facts the question is as
to whether induction of tht: first respondent in the premises without leave
of tht: court and/or without any intimation to the Court Receiver will be
valid or otherwise. Lt is well settkd principle that when a Court Receiver
is appointed in rcspcct of any property it is said to be in custodia legis and
court holds the property for the benefit of the true owner. The Court C
Rtcciv~r acts on behalf of the court. Even the court receiver will have no
power to deal with such property without the leave of the court. It is the
duty of the Court Receiver to maintain the status quo and also to protect
the property from being put to waste or allow it to diminish its value. The
Court Receiver cannot encumber the property in any manner without the D
leave of the court. lt is the obligation of the Court as well as the Court
Receiver to preserve and maintain the property as far as possible and
practicable in the same form when it was taken in possession. If these
pnnciples are borne in mind, in our view, it is quite dear that when the
possession of the property was taken by the Court Receiver in 1978, Suhrid
E
Geigy Trading Limited was in occupation and the Court Receiver took
symbolic possession thereof. It must be presumed that Suhrid Gcigy Trad-
ing Limited was very much aware of the appointment of the Court
Receiver. In Anthony C. Leo's case (Supra) admittedly the tenant was in
occupation of the premises before the Court Receiver took symbolic
possession. The tcn;mt had committed certain breaches and had resorted F
to unauthorised and illegal activity prior to the filing of tht: civil suit. The
landlord who had a cause of action under the Bombay Rent Act did not
file any proceedings under the said Act for necessary reliefs before the
appropriate forum. The landlord filed a suit on the original side of the
Bombay High Court and got the Receiv..:r appointed for the suit property. G
In that suit the landlord took out a C..1t/S to evict tht: tenant on the gr~ttnd
that he has committed bn:ach of lease agreement inasmuch it carried out
construction of lofts and put up two stand-type boxes on the outer wall for
storage of gas cylinders and air~conditioning units. In the Ch!S it was
pray,;d that the Court Rt:c..:iver be din:ch:d to remove the said lofts and H
66 SUPREME COURT Rl'.PORTS (2000] 1 S.C.R.
A the said box-type stands. The High Court granted the relief to tht: landlord
in the said Ch/S and it was against this order the tenant had filed the appeal
in Court. Therefore, the admitted position that flows fromAnthony C. Leo's
case is that the landlord had a cause of action before the filing of the civil
suit in the High Court to initiate proceedings for appropriate reliefs under
B the Bombay Rent Act in the competent court but he did nut do so. When
the Receiver came tu be appointed in the suit fiied by the landlord on the
original side obviously he could nut have b.:tter rights to enforce the cause
of action accrm:d under the Bombay Rent Act. It is in these circumstances
this Court in paragraph 34 has observed as under :

c "34. lt appears to us that since the court must be presumed tu
be fully unbiased in deciding the allegation of unauthorised and
illegal activities of a tenant causing prt:judice against the lawful
owner in the matter of preservation and maintenance of the
property pendente lite, the necessity of ad.indication of such dispute
by another court by bringing a legal action before it, as a matter
D of course, is neither necessary nor expedient. It, however, should
be made clt:ar that if for the purpose of deciding the dispute of
unauthorised and illt:gal activity afkcting maintenance and preser-
vation of the property in custodia lt:gis it bi:comes necessary tu
determine i:lllY right claimed under a statute or flowing from some
E action inter partes as may be pleaded and required to be decided,
it is only d1::sirable that the court would refrain from such deter-
mination in the summary proceeding initiated before it on the
complaint of the receiver or a party to the suit and the court will
direct the receiver tu seek adjudication of the dispute bdon: a
competent court by bringing appropriate legal action. Save as
F aforesaid, it will not be correct to contend that in no case the court
exercising control and supervision of the property in suit by ap-
pointing a receiver will be incompetent even to pass direction
against a third party for the purpose of preservation of th~ proper-
ty, once such third p<>rty pleads defonce in justification of his
action. The question of summary adjudication by the court ap-
G pointing the receiver or relegating the receiver tu a regular suit for
adjudication of the dispute concerning third party will depend on
the nature of dispute and the defence claimed by the third party." r-
I
\
The above observations in our opinion is the ratio of the judgment
H in Anthony C. Lev case (Supra) and it would not be correct to read the
l:SHA HARSHADKUMAR DALAL v. ORU SY~TEMS [S.P. KURDLKAR. J.J 67

" said judgment to mean that if the trespasser or any person who obtains the A:
possession after the Receiver took over symbolic possession or actual
possession of the property and if such person pleads that he is a tenant the
only remedy fur the Court Receiver is to approach the Rent court under
the Bombay Rent Act. For instance, a person who is put in possession as
an agent of the Receiver inducts a strangt:r and if such a third person
B
claims a tenancy the question is whether Receiver should be directed to
adopt the proceedings under the Bombay Rent Act for appropriate decla-
ration and reliefs. If such a course is n:quired to follow, in our opinion, the
very object of Order XL Rule 1 & 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure would
be defeated. The High Court in our opinion has totally misread and
misinterpreted tht ratio of Anthony C. Leo's case (supra). We must, c
however, make it clear that we are not laying down a broad proposition
that in every case the Receiver can resort to the summary proceeding of
ilii~ nature. The question would have to be decided by the Court with
reference to the pleadings of the parties and the proof thereof. On perusal
of the judgment of the High Court we find that the High Court has not D
considered variow, rival contentions raised by the parties in their pleadings.
The High Court has also nut considered the effect of non-renewal of the
Leaw and Licence Agreement after the expiry of its period nor it had
considered the effoct of Sections 15 and 15A of the Bombay Rent Act. The
High Court has also not considered what would be the effect of changes · E
in the composition of Subrid Geigy Trading Limited after the Receiver
took the symbolic possession. All these various factual and legal conten-
tions will have to be considered bearing in mind the provisions of tht:
Bombay Rent Act as well as Companies Act.

Mr. C. Mukund, learned Advocate appearing for the first respon-
F
dent, however, urged that the judgment in Anthony C. Leo's case (supra)
squarely applies to the facts of the present case and the rights of the first
respondent cannot be adjudicated by taking recourse to the summary
proceedings. The Court Receiver if so advised may adopt the proper
proceedings undt:r the Bombay Rent Act before the competent court. He G
urged that the judgment of the High Court does not call for interference.
-.._
We see no substance in any of these contentions.
'
' In the result the impugned judgment and order dated 8/9.12.1997
passt:d by the learned singlt: Judge of the High Court on Ch/S No. 436 of H
68 SVPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) l S.C.R.
A 1996 is quashed and set aside and the matter iF remitted back to the High
Court for disposal in accordance with law.

In the circumstance then: will be no order as to costs.

R.C.K. Appeal dbposed of.

\
"---