Supreme Court of India
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR.versusTHE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 407
- Decided
- 18 September 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
A purchaser of land after a Section 4 notification is not entitled to challenge the acquisition, and once land vests in the State it cannot be divested or reconveyed; the quashing of a declaration in other cases does not confer any benefit on such persons, rendering the sale deeds void.
Summary
The case concerned land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where a Section 4 notification was issued in 1978 and a Section 6 declaration in 1981 covering a parcel of land (the suit land). The original tenure‑holders accepted compensation under protest, did not file any objection under Section 5A, and later transferred the land to the appellants in 2004‑05. The appellants sought quashing of the acquisition notification and reconveyance of the land. The High Court’s single judge allowed the relief, but a division bench set aside that order. The Supreme Court held that a purchaser who acquires land after a Section 4 notification cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings, that once land vests in the State it cannot be divested or reconveyed, that the quashing of a declaration in other cases does not benefit persons who did not raise objections, and that the sale deeds are void under the nemo‑dat rule and Section 16‑A. The Court also found the appellants had abused the judicial process and were not ‘clean‑handed’. The appeals were dismissed with costs of Rs 25 lakh.
Issues considered
- The competence of a subsequent purchaser to challenge acquisition proceedings under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether a declaration quashed in other proceedings benefits persons who did not file objections under Section 5A.
- Whether land vested in the State can be divested or reconveyed to the original or subsequent owners.
- The effect of the nemo‑dat quod non habet principle and Section 16‑A on the validity of the sale deeds.
- Whether the appellants’ conduct amounts to an abuse of process and precludes equitable relief.
Legislation cited
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. 21
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 16, s. 16A, s. 17(2), s. 4, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 41
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 4 notificationSection 6 declarationVested landNemo dat quod non habetAbuse of processClean hands doctrineReconveyanceCompensationPublic purpose
Judgment
[2012] 10 S.C.R. 603
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. A
v.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6342-6343 of 2012)
SEPTEMBER 18, 2012
B
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND JAGDISH SINGH
KHEHAR, JJ.]
Land Acquisition - Acquisition proceeding - Under Land
Acquisition Act - Proceeding never challenged in respect of C
land in question - Compensation accepted - Possession of
land given to authority concerned - Declaration uls. 6, in
respect of the land other than the land in question, quashed
- The original tenure-holder selfing the land in question to the
appellants (vendees) - Applications, by original tenure- D
holders for re-conveyance of the land in question, rejected -
Writ petitions by the vendees seeking quashing of Notification
u/s. 4 and in another petition seeking direction to re-convey
the land in their favour - Single Judge of High Court allowing
the petitions - Division Bench of High Court setting aside E
order of Single Judge - Vendees seeking release of the land
in question in their favour subject to refund of compensation
amount - On appeal, held: The person interested, if does not
raise any objection uls. 5A, accepts the compensation and
does not challenge acquisition proceedings, cannot be F
permitted to challenge the proceeding after about 3 decades
- The quashing of the declaration in some other case, would
not enure any benefit to such person - Once the possession
of the land was taken by the State and the land got vested in
it free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and G
restored to the person interested - The person interested
becomes persona non grata once the land vests in the State
- The person who purchases the land subsequent to the
issuance of notification u/s. 4, is not competent to challenge
603 H
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A the validity of the acquisition proceedings because the sale
deed does not confer upon him any title - The vendees have
also not approached the court with clean hands as they have
played fraud upon the authorities and used forged document
- Hence not ~titled to any equitable relief either - Appeals
B dismissed with cost of Rs. 25 lacs - Land Acquisition Act,
1894 - ss. 4 and 6.
Administration of Justice - Abuse of process of court -
Held: A petition or an affidavit containing a misleading/
C inaccurate statement, only to achieve ulterior purpose,
amounts to an abuse of process of the court.
Maxims:
'Nemo dat quod non habet' - Applicability of
D
'Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius
Detrimento Et lnjuria Fieri Locupletiorem' - Meaning and
applicability of.
A notificatioi;t uls. 4(1) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894
E was issued in the year 1978. The notification was in
respect of land including the suit land. A declaration u/s.
6 of the Act was also issued.
Writ Petitions were filed challenging the acquisition
F proceedings in respect of the land other than the suit
land. In that round of litigation, which went up to Supreme
Court, the declaration u/s. 6 was quashed and notification
u/s. 4 was quashed only qua those lands, in respect of
which the acquisition proceedings were challenged. In
G the meantime, award was passed in respect of the land
including the suit land.
Second batch of writ petitions were filed challenging
the acquisition proceedings and the award. The petitions
were allowed. Thereafter, second award was made in
H
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 605
OFFICER & ORS.
respect of the remaining part of the acquired land which A
also included the suit land.
In respect of the suit land, the persons interested/
tenure-holders never filed any objections u/s. 5A of the
Act, nor did they challenge the acquisition proceedings
8
at any stage. They accepted the compensation amount
under protest for inadequacy of compensation amount.
Possession of the sui.t land was taken over by the
Authority.
Thereafter, the tenure-holders transferred the suit C
land in favour of the appellants in the year 2004 and 2005.
Appellants claimed to have acquired possession of the
suit land. They also obtained permission from the
Development Authority to construct flat thereon.
D
The original tenure-holders filed applications for re-
conveya n ce of the suit land, which was rejected.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed two writ petitions.
In one petition they sought for the quashing of the
Notification u/s. 4 issued in the year 1978 pertaining to E
the land that comprised 9 survey numbers including the
suit land. In another petition they sought quashing of the
letter dated 7.7.2008 and for the issuance of directions to
re-convey the suit land in their favour.
Single Judge of High Court allowed both the F
petitions, observing that since declaration u/s. 6 was
quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was issued
thereafter, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed
and hence the suit land was free from all acquisition
proceedings. Division Bench of the High Court reversed G
the judgment of Single Judge. Hence the present
appeals.
In appeal, the appellants inter-alia contended that as
the High Powered Committee, constituted by the H
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A respondent-Board, submitted the report which noted that
the suit land was not required by the Board and the same
stands vested in the State, the land could be released in
favour of the appellants, subject to the refunding of the
compensation amount which the tenure-holders had
B received in 1983, to the authority, though the same had
not been accepted. The appellants were still willing to
refund the compensation amount.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
C HELD: 1. A person who purchases land subsequent
to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect
to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the
acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for
the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does
D not confer upon him any title, and at the most he can
claim compensation on the basis of his vendor's title.
[Para 9] [624-C-D]
Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC
E 2112: 1976 (1) SCR 341; Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar
Pradesh AIR 1996 SC 540: 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264;
Union of india v. Shri Shiv Kumar Bhargava and Ors. JT
(1995) 6 SC 274: 1995 (1) SCR 354; U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Mis. Katra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 1170: 1996 (1)
F SCR 683 ; Ajay Kishan Singha/ v. Union of India AIR 1996
SC 2677: 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 319; Mahavir and Anr. v.
Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 335: 1995
(2) Suppl. SCR 421 ; Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. (1995)
2 SCC 528: 1995 (1) SCR 412; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant
Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177: 2008 (10)
G SCR 1012 - relied on.
Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (1996)
11 SCC 698: 1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 6; Tika Ram v. State of
U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689: 2009 (14) SCR 905 - referred to.
H
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 607
OFFICER & ORS.
2.1. The relief obtained by some persons, by A
approaching the court immediately after the cause of
action has arisen, cannot be the basis for other persons
who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the benefit
of earlier relief provided, for the reason that, such
persons cannot be permitted to take impetus of an order B
passed by the court, at tl)e behest of another more
diligent person. [Para 1O] [624-F]
2.2. Therefore, in the event that the person interested
has not filed objections in response to a notice issued
under Section 5-A, and has not challenged the acquisition C
proceedings, the quashing of the declaration issued
under Section 6 in some other case, would not enure any
benefit to such person. More so, where the possession
of land has already been taken, and such land stands
vested. in the State, free from all encumbrances as D
provided under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act, prior to
the date of decision of the court quashing the declaration
in toto, no benefit can be taken by him. Where a party has
not filed objections to the notice issued under Section 5-
A, the declaration qua such persons is generally neither E
quashed, nor does it stand vitiated qua him, by any error
of law warranting interference. There is also another view
with respect to this matter, which is that, in case the said
land has been acquired for a Scheme, which does not fall
within the ambit of "public purpose" then, in such a case, F
it would not be a case of acquisition under the Act,
instead, it would amount to colourable exercise of power.
[Para 15] [626-E-H; 627-A]
2.3. Quashing the declaration under Section 6 in G
cases filed by others, would not enure any benefit to the
original tenure holders/appellants. Furthermore, even if
the declaration stood quashed in toto, it could not save
the suit land, as its possession had already been taken
over. [Para 42] [637-C-D]
H
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors. AIR 1993 SC 2276: 1993 (3) SCR 751 ; State of
Kamataka and Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC
267: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 426; Jagdih Lal and Ors. v.
State of Haryana and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 2366; Abhey Ram
B (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1997
SC 2564: 1997 (3) SCR 931 ; H.M. T. House Building Co-
operative Society v. Syed Khader and Ors. AIR 1995 SC
2244: 1995 (2) SCR 200 ; Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh
Uban and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 3822: 1999 (1) Suppl.
c SCR 650; Om Prakash v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2010
SC 2430 - relied on.
H.M. T. House Building Cooperative Society v. M.
Venkataswamappa and Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 128 - referred to.
D 3.1. Once the land is vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances, it cannot be divested and proceedings
under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not
made within the statutorily stipulated period. [Para 16]
[627-C]
E
Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Biharand. Ors. (1995) 6
SCC 31: 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 197 ; U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Mis. Katra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 1170: 1996 (1)
SCR 683; Allahabad Development Authority v.
Nasiruzzaman and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 424: 1996 (5) Suppl.
F SCR 435; M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Ors. (2000) 4 SCC 322: 2000 (3) SCR 167; Government of
Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar and Ors. AIR 2005 SC 492:
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 208 - relied on.
G 3.2. The land, once acquired, cannot be restored to
the tenure holders/persons-interested, even if it is not
used for the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for
any other purpose either. The proceedings cannot be
withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of Section 48
H of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 609
OFFICER & ORS.
once the possession of the land has been taken and the A
land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances. Once
the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all
encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner,
whether the land is being used for the purpose for which
it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes B
persona non-grata once the land vests in the State. He
has a right to only receive compensation for the same,
unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged.
The State neither has the requisite power to reconvey the
land to the person-interested, nor can such person claim C
any right of restitution on any ground, whatsoever,
unless there is some statutory amendment to this effect.
[Paras 17 and 22] [627-E-F; 629-E-G]
State of Madhya Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma AIR 1966 SC
1593: 1966 SCR 557; Lt. Governor of Himacha/ Pradesh D
and Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma AIR 1970 SC 1576: 1971
(1) SCR 413; Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. and Ors.
AIR 1993 SC 2517: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336; Rajasthan
Housing Board and Ors. v. Shri Kishan and Ors. (1993) 2
SCC 84: 1993 (1) SCR 269; Dedicated Freight Corridor E
Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh and Ors. (2011) 11 SCC
100: 2011 (3) SCR 1160; Fruit and Vegetable Merchants
Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust AIR 1957 SC 344:
1957 SCR 1; Gu/am Mustafa and Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1977 SC 448; 1977 (1) SCR F
875 ; State of Kera/a and Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai and Anr.
(1997) 5 SCC 432: 1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 87; Government
of Andhra Pradesh v. Syed Akbar and Ors. AIR 2005 SC
492: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 208- relied on.
C. Padma and Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the G
Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 627: 1996
(9) Suppl. SCR 158 ; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors.
AIR 1999 SC 436 1998 (3) Suppl. SCR 404:; Niladri
Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of West Bengal AIR 2002
SC 2532; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh H
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 335: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 534 ;
Leelawanti and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2012) 1
SCC 66; Pratap v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1996 SC 1296:
1996 (2) SCR 1088 ; Chandragaudaj Ramgonda Patil v.
State of Maharashtra (1996) 6 SCC 405 : 1996 (5) Suppl.
B SCR 445; State of Kera/a and Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai
and Anr. AIR 1997 SC 2703: 1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 87;
Printers Mysore Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed and Ors. (2004) 4 SCC
460: 2004 (3) SCR 799; Bangalore Development Authority
V. R. Hanumaiah (2005) 12 sec 508: 2005 (3) Suppl.
c SCR 901; Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. State
of U.P. and Anr. (2011) 9 sec 354: 2012 (12) SCR 191 -
referred to.
4.1. The general rule of law is that no one can transfer
a better title than he himself possesses; Nemo dat quod
D non habet. However, this Rule has certain exceptions and
one of them is, that the transfer must be in good faith for
value, and there must be no misrepresentation or fraud,
which would render the transactions as void and also
that the property is purchased after taking reasonable
E care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite
power to transfer the said land, and finally that the parties
have acted in good faith, as is required under Section 41
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. [Para 23) [629-H;
630-A-B]
F
4.2. In the instant case, the tenure holders/person-
interested neither filed objections under Section 5-A of the
Act, nor have they challenged the land acquisition
proceedings, so far as the suit land is concerned, instead
G they chose to withdraw the compensation awarded in
1983 and 1986; after the expiry of about three decades
and hence, they cannot be permitted to challenge the
acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever. The
appellants cannot claim title/relief better than what the
H original vendors were entitled to. [Para 30) [633-A-B]
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 611
OFFICER & ORS.
Asa Ram and Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali and Anr. AIR 1958 A
SC 183: 1958 SCR 988; State Bank of India v. Rajendra
Kumar Singh and Ors. AIR 1969 SC 401: 1969 SCR 216;
Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra AIR 1981
SC 102: 1981 (1) SCR 943; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v.
Mohal Lal AIR 1988 SC 299: 1988 (2) SCR 99; State of B
Punjab v. Surjit Kaur(Dead) through LRs. JT (2001) 10 SC
42 - relied on.
Wardington Lyngdoh and Ors. v. Collector, Mawkyrwat
(1995) 4 SCC 428: 1995 (3) SCR 354; Ajit Singh and Anr. C
v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 67 - referred to.
5. The reliefs sought by the appellants in their two
writ petitions are mutually inconsistent and contradictory.
In the event that the appellants wanted a declaration. to
the effect that the acquisition proceedings in pursuance D
of issuance of the Section 4 notification, dated 15.5.1978
had lapsed or were void, the questicn of seeking re-
conveyance of the said land could not arise. More so, the
appellants cannot claim relief in respect of 9 survey
numbers as in the present appeals, relief is restricted only E
to 4 of the survey numbers. It is apparent that the
appellants' claim cannot co-exist and can be said to be
blowing hot and blowing cold, simultaneously. As the
original vendors i.e. vendors of the first sale were not
vested with any title over the said land, the transfer by F
them, was itself void and all subsequent transfers would
also, as a result, remain ineffective and unenforceable in
law. Therefore, sale deeds executed in the years 2004-05
would not confer any title on the appellants. [Paras 28
and 42] [632-B-D; 637-G-H; 638-A] G
Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor Resources
(International) Company Limited (2011) 10 SCC 420 : 2011
(12) SCR 473 - relied on.
6.1. The High Court observed that the appellant have H
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A played fraud upon the authorities in order to obtain the
c;anction of their plan of construction of flats on the land
in question. The High Court also recorded findings to the
effect that the appellants have "managed", not only to
obtain certain orders from the department, but have also
B misused the process of the court to achieve a sinister
design. The court further took note that one of the
appellants had filed an additional affidavit before the High
Court in a writ petition by way of which, had attempted
to mislead the court through furnishing of false
c information. It has even been admitted at the Bar, that the
letter dated 7.7.2005 which was placed on the record by
the appellants before the High Court, was in fact, a forged
document. The appellants have not approached the court
with clean hands, and are therefore, not entitled for any
0
relief. Whenever a person approaches a Court of Equity,
in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, it is
expected that he will approach the said court not only
with clean hands but also with a clean mind, a clean heart
and clean objectives. Thus, he who seeks equity must do
equity. The legal maxim "Jure Naturae Aequum Est
E Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et lnjuria Fieri .
Locupletiorem", means that it is a law of nature that one
should not be enriched by causing loss or injury to
another. [Paras 32, 33 and 34) [633-E-H; 634-A-C]
F The Ramjas Foundation and Ors. v. Union of India and
Ors. AIR 1993 SC 852: 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 426;
Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand (1995) 1 SCC 242; Ramnik/a/
N. Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. AIR 1997
SC 1236: 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 787 - relied on.
G
6.2. The appellants filed an affidavit before the High
Court only to mtslead the court by furnishing false
information. The judicial process cannot become an
instrument of oppression or abuse, or a means in the
H process of the court to subvert justice, for the reason that
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 613
OFFICER & ORS.
the court exercises its jurisdiction, only in furtherance of A
justice. The interests of justice and public interest
coalesce, and therefore, they are very often one and the
same. A petition or an affidavit containing a misleading
and/or an inaccurate statement, only to achieve an
ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of process of the 8
court. [Paras 35 and 42] [634-E-F; 638-F]
Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. (2010) 2 SCC
114: 2009 (16) SCR 111 - relied on.
6.3. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire C
judicial process. "Every trial is a voyage of discovery in
which truth is the quest". An action at law is not a game
of chess, therefore, a litigant cannot prevaricate and take
inconsistent positions. It is one of those fundamental
principles of jurisprudence that litigants must observe o
total clarity and candour in their pleadings. [Para 37] [635-
B-C]
Ritesh Tewari and Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
(2010) 10SCC 677: 2010 (11) SCR 589; Amar Singh v.
Union of India (2011) 7 SCC 69: 2011 (6) SCR 403 - relied E
on.
6.4. Wrongdoers must be denied profit from their
frivolous litigation, and that they should be prevented
from introducing and relying upon, false pleadings and F
forged or fabricated documents in the records furnished
by them to the court. Thus, the appellants have
disentitled themselves for any equitable relief. [Para 38,
39] [635-G-H]
G
Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and Ors. v. Erasmo
Jack deSequeria (dead) (2012) 5 SCC 370; Ramrameshwari
Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011) 8 SCC 249: 2011 (8) SCR 992
- relied on.
H
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A 7.1. Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the
State Amendment Act, 1996, and the same imposes a
complete restriction on the sale of acquired land by the
tenure holder. In case the land is transferred in
contravention of these provisions, the Government may,
8 by way of an order, declare the transfer to be null and
void, and on such declaration, the land shall, as penalty,
be forfeited to, and vest in, the Revenue Department of
the Government, free from all encumbrances. Therefore,
the sale deeds in favour of the appellants are void and
C unenforceable. In such a fact-situation, the appellants
could not have come in possession of the suit land which
had been vested in the State ages ago, in the years 1983
and 1986. Such a course is not possible without the
collusion of the officers of the State/Board. [Paras 40 and
D 41] [635-H; 636-A-D]
7.2. The Chief Secretary of the State is requested to
examine the issues involved in the case and find out as
who were the officials of the State or Board responsible
for this loot of the public properties and proceed against
E them in accordance with law. He is further directed to
ensure eviction of the appellants from the public land
forthwith. [Para 44] [640-G-H]
8. The appeals are dismissed with the costs of
F Rupees Twenty Five lacs, which the appellants are
directed to deposit with the Supreme Court Legal
Services Authority within a period of six weeks. [Para 43]
[640-F]
Case Law Reference:
G
1976 (1) SCR 341 Relied on Para 6
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 264 Relied on Para 6
1995 (1) SCR 354 Relied on Para 6
H 1996 (1) SCR 683 Relied on Para 7
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 615
OFFICER & ORS.
1996 (7) Suppl. SCR 6 Referred to Para 7 A
1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 319 Relied on Para 8
1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421 Relied on Para 8
1995 (1) SCR 412 Relied on Para 8 B
2008 (10) SCR 1012 Relied on Para 8
2009 (14) SCR 905 Referred to Para 8
1993 (3) SCR 751 Relied on Para 10
c
1996 ( 5) Suppl. SCR 426 Relied on Para 10
AIR 1997 SC 2366 Relied on Para 10
1997 (3) SCR 931 Relied on Para 11
1995 (2) SCR 200 Relied on Para 12 D
(1995) 3 sec 128 Referred to Para 12
1999 (1) Suppl. SCR 650 Relied on Para 13
AIR 2010 SC 2430 Relied on Para 14 E
1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 197 Relied on Para 16
1996 (1) SCR 683 Relied on Para 16
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 435 Relied on Para 16
F
2000 (3) SCR 167 Relied on Para 16
2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 208 Relied on Para 16
1966 SCR 557 Relied on Para 17
G
1971 (1) SCR 413 Relied on Para 17
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336 Relied on Para 17
1993 (1) SCR 269 Relied on Para 17
2011 (3) SCR 1160 Relied on Para 17 H
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2012] 10 S.C.R.
'
A 1957 SCR 1 Relied on Para 18
1977 (1) SCR 875 . Relied on Para 19
1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 87 · Relied on Para 20
B 1996 (9) Suppl: SC::_R_ 158 Relied on Para 20
1998 _(3) Suppl. SCR · 404 Relied on ·· · Para 20
AIR 2002 SC 2532 Relied on Para 20
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 534 Relied on Para 20
c
(2012) 1 sec 66 Relied on Para 20
· 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 208 Relied on Para 21
1996 (2) SCR 1088 Referred to · Para 21
. - •- .:-
D 1996 (5) Suppl. 'SCR 445 Referred to Para 21
-
1997 (1) Suppl. SCR 87 . Referred to ·Para 21
2004 (3) SCR 799 · Referred to Para 21
E 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 901 __ Referred to Para 21
2012 (12) SCR 191
. - .
Referred to · Para 21
1958 SCR 988 Relied on Para 23
1969 SCR 216 Relied on Para 23
F -
1981 (1) SCR 943 Relied on Para 23
1988 (2) SCR 99 Relied on · Para 23
JT (2001) 10 SC 42 Relied on ·Para 23
G
1995 (3) SCR 354 Relied on Para 23
.
(1994) 4 sec 67 Referred to Para 25
2011 (12) SCR 473 Relied on Para 29
H 1992 (2) Suppl. SCR 426-Relied on Para 34
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 617
OFFICER & ORS.
(1995) 1 sec 242 Relied on Para 34 A
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 787 Relied on Para 34
2009 (16) SCR 111 Relied on Para 36
2010 (11) SCR 589 Relied on Para 37
B
2011 (6) SCR 403 Relied on Para 37
c2012) 5 sec 370 Relied on Para 38
2011 (8) SCR 992 Relied on Para 38
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
6342-6343 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 24.1.2012 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras in W.A. Nos. 805 & 806 of 2011.
D
Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Rajiv Dutta, K.K. Mani, Krishna
Ravindran, Jayveer, T. Sheela, Abhishek Krishna for the
Appellants.
S. Gomathi Nayagam, AAG, B. Balaji, G. Hari hara Arun E
Soma Sankar, Rakesh Sharma, P. Krishnamoorthy for the
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been F
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated
24.1.2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras
in Writ Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2011, by which, the Division
Bench reversed the judgment and order of the learned Single
Judge, dated 1.11.2010 passed in relation to land acquisition G
proceedings.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are as under:
A. A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), was issued
on 15.5.1978 with respect to land measuring 58.59 acres,
in the revenue estate of Tambaram Village, Saidapet Taluk,
Chengalpet District, Tamil Nadu, including the suit land
measuring 2.26 acres in Survey Nos. 283/1 (extent of 27
B ·cents), 284/1 (extent of 70 cents), 284/2 (extent of 65
cents) and 284/3 (extent of 64 cents). As the provisions
of the Urgency Clause under Section 17 of the Act were
not invoked, the persons interested were at liberty to file
objections under Section 5-A of the Act. A declaration
c under Section 6 of the Act with respect to the said land
was issued on 6.6.1981. Very few among the persons
interested, challenged the land acquisition proceedings by
way of filing 8 writ petitions, including Writ Petition Nos.
8897 and 8899 of 1983 etc. which were filed by some of
the original tenure-holders of the suit land on several
D
grounds. However, the said petitioners did not challenge
the acquisition proceedings so far as the suit land is
concerned, rather they chose to restrict their cases to the
other parts of their lands. The batch of said writ petitions
was allowed by way of a common judgment and order,
E dated 16.12.1983, quashing the declaration issued under
Section 6 of the Act on the ground that the inquiry was not
conducted fairly, and that the objections raised by the said
writ petitioners under Section 5-A, were also not dealt with
properly. However, the learned Single Judge upheld the
F Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act and hence,
granted liberty to the Government of Tamil Nadu to
continue with the said acquisition proceedings, in
accordance with law.
G B. Being aggrieved by this, the writ petitioners including
the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, preferred
Writ Appeal Nos. 214 to 225 and 435of1984, before the
Division Bench of the High Court, against the judgment and
order dated 16.12.1983, praying for quashing of the
H Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, as well. The
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 619
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Government did not challenge the judgment and order A
dated 16.12.1983. The said writ appeals were allowed
vide judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, and the said
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, only in respect
of the land, which constituted the subject matter of the
aforementioned appeals, was quashed. Against the B
judgment and order dated 23.8.1985, the Government of
Tamil Nadu preferred a Special Leave Petition before this
Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 6.5.1992.
Thus, those orders attained finality.
C. In the meantime, an Award was passed with respect C
to the said land, including the suit land, on 28.6.1983, to
the extent of 4.26 acres i.e. Survey Nos. 283/1, 284/1 and
284/3.
D. A second batch of writ petitions was filed before the D
High Court challenging the acquisition proceedings, as well
as the Award. All the said writ petitions were allowed,
following the earlier judgments dated 16.12.1983 and
23.8.1985 vide judgment and order dated 22.12.1986.
E
E. A second award was made on 14.8.1986, in relation
to the remaining part of said land, including a part of the
suit land, i.e. Survey No. 284/2.
F. So far as the suit land is concerned, the persons-
interested/tenure-holders never filed any objection under F
Section 5-A of the Act, and nor have they challenged the
acquisition proceedings, at any stage. Instead, they
accepted the compensation amount under protest.
Possession of the suit land was taken over by the authority
subsequently. There is nothing on record to show whether G
the claimants had filed any application for making a
reference under Section 18 of the Act.
G. The tenure-holders/persons-interested in the suit land,
after receiving compensation, and handing over the H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A possession to the respondents authorities with respect to
the suit land, transferred the said land to some persons,
and ultimately, after undergoing multiple sales, the suit land
was purchased by the appellants herein, vide sale-deeds
dated 4.3.2004, 10.11.2004, 7.7.2005 and 11.8.2005. As
B a result thereof, they claim to have acquired possession
of the said suit land. The appellants planned to construct
flats upon the said land, for the purpose of which, they had
also obtained permission from the Chennai Metropolitan
Development Authority on 16.3.2007. Applications were
c filed by the original tenure-holders for re-conveyance of the
suit land which stood as rejected vide order dated
7.7.2008.
H. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition No.
6108 of 20"09 for the quashing of the Notification dated
D 15.5.1978, issued under Section 4 of the Act, pertaining
to the land that comprised 9 Survey Numbers, including the
suit land contending that the declaration under Section 6
had been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was
subsequently issued. The proceedings therefore,
E automatically lapsed as there could be no Award without
a fresh declaration, and therefore, all subsequent
proceedings would be void ab-initio. Another Writ Petition
No. 20896 of 2009, was also filed seeking totally
inconsistent/contrary reliefs i.e. praying for the quashing of
F the letter dated 7.7.2005, as also for the issuance of
directions to re-convey the suit land in favour of the
appellants.
I. A learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated
1.11.2010 allowed both Writ Petitions, observing that as
G
the Section 6 declaration had been quashed in toto and
no fresh dec.laration was issued thereafter, the land
acquisition proceedings had lapsed and the suit land was
hence, free from any and all acquisition proceedings.
H J. Being aggrieved, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 621
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') - the respondents, A
then filed writ appeals which have been allowed vide
impugned judgment and order dated 24.1.2012, reversing
the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.
Hence, these appeals.
B
3. Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi and Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellants, have submitted
that, since the Section 6 declaration dated 6.6.1981 has been
quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was made thereafter,
subsequent proceedings are void ab-initio. The appellants, C
before purchasing the suit land made various inquiries and were
informed in writing by various authorities, that the said land was
not the subject matter of any acquisition proceedings at the
relevant time. More so, a high powered committee, constituted
by the Board itself, submitted a report that the suit land was not D
required by the Board, and that even though the possession of
the land had been taken, the land vested in the State. There
was no approach road to the suit land and thus, the said land
could not be utilised for the purpose for which, it was acquired.
The Board was not in a position to utilise the suit land and, thus, E
it could be released in favour of the appellants, subject to
refunding the compensation amount received by the land
owners. More so, the compensation amount received by the
persons aggrieved in 1983 was received under protest, and
was refunded to them in 2010, by way of demand draft, though F
the same was not accepted by the Board and was therefore,
returned to the tenure-holders. The appellants are still willing to
refund the amount of compensation received by the persons-
interested, in pursuance of the illegal and void awards, dated
28.6.1983 and 14.8.1986. Therefore, the impugned judgment G
and order are liable to be set aside and the present appeals
should be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri S. Gomathi Nayagam, learned
Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents,
has vehemently opposed the appeals, contending that the H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A predecessor-in-interest, of the appellants did not raise any
objection under Section 5-A of the Act, with respect to such
acquisition proceedings at any stage, rather they accepted the
compensation granted under protest. To receive an award
under protest is a legal requirement for the purpose of making
B a reference under Section 18 of the Act. The quashing of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not automatically
apply to the suit land, as it was not the subject matter of
challenge with respect to the acquisition proceedings before
court. The appellants did not make any inquiry whatsoever, with
c respect to the title of the suit land, though inquiry was sought
to be made in relation to the said land, by different persons in
altogether different contexts. The report of the high powered
committee appointed by the Board itself, is self-contradictory,
as they clearly provided that possession had been taken and,
in view of the fact that once possession is taken, the said land
0
vests in the State, free from all encumbrances under Section
16 of the Act, the same cannot be divested. Therefore, the
question of re-conveying the suit land in favour of the appellants
cannot possibly arise. Land can be released from acquisition
E proceedings either under Section 48 of the Act, or in exercise
of powers under the General Clauses Act, 1897, but this can
be done only prior to the vesting of the land in the State, which
in itself is prior to taking possession thereof. The appellants,
being purchasers of the said suit land, after more than 20 years
of the Award, cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings at
F such a belated stage. More so, the vendors were not
competent to make any transfer, as none of them had good title
over the suit land. Therefore, any and all sale transactions are
illegal and void. The sale-deeds executed in favour of the
appellants, do not confer upon them, any title. More so, the
G subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the validity of the land
acquisition. The appeals lack merit and are therefore liable to
be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
H learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 623
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
However, before coming to the merit of the case, it is A
desirable to consider the legal issues involved herein.
Whether subsequent purchaser can challenge the
acquisition proceedings:
6. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the 8
person who purchases the land subsequent to a notification
being issued under Section 4 of the Act has been considered
by this Court time and again.
In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC C
2112, this Court held that, any one who deals with the land
subsequent to a Section 4 notification being issued, does so,
at his own peril. In Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR
1996 SC 540, this Court held that a Section 4 notification gives
a notice to the public at large that the land in respect to which D
it has been issued, is needed for a public purpose, and it further
points out that there will be "an impediment to any one to
encumber the land acquired thereunder." The alienation
thereafter does not bind the State or the beneficiary under the
acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive E
compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was
placed on an earlier judgment of this Court in Union of india v.
Shri Shiv Kumar Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.
7. Similarly, in UP. Jal Nigam v. Mis. Katra Properties
Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of F
land after publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to
such land, is void against the State and at the most, the
purchaser may be a person-interested in compensation, since
he steps into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and may
therefore, merely claim compensation. (See also: Star Wire G
(India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC 698).
8. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC
2677; Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr.,
(1995) 5 SCC 335; Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A SCC 528; and Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi
& Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177, this Court categorically held that, a
person who purchases land after the publication of a Section
4 notification with respect to it, is not entitled to challenge the
proceedings for the reason, that his title is void and he can at
B best claim compensation on the basis of vendor's title. In view
of this, the sale of land after issuance of a Section 4 notification
is void and the purchaser cannot challenge the acquisition
proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P., (2009) 10
sec 689).
c 9. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarized to the effect that a person who purchases land
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with
respect to it, is not competent to challenge the validity of the
acquisition proceedings on any ground whatsoever, for the
D reason that the sale deed executed in his favour does not confer
upon him, any title and at the most he can claim compensation
on the basis of his vendor's title.
The acquisition challenged by one - whether others can
E also take the benefit of the same.
10. The relief obtained by some persons, by approaching
the Court immediately after the cause of action has arisen,
cannot be the basis for other persons who have belatedly filed
F their petition, to take the benefit of earlier relief provided, for
the reason that, such persons cannot be permitted to take
impetus of an order passed by the court, at the behest of
another more diligent person. (Vide: Ratan Chandra
Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2276;
State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6
G SCC 267; and Jagdih Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.,
AIR 1997 SC 2366).
11. In Abhey Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. Union of
India & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2564. a three Judge Bench of this
H Court, dealt with an issue similar to the one involved herein.
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 625
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
The question that arose was whether the quashing of the A
notification/declaration under the Act by the court in respect of
other matters, would confer benefit upon non-parties also. The
Court held as under:
'The question then arises is whether the quashing of the 8
declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other
matters would enure the benefit to the appellants also.
Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned counsel
is attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to give
acceptance to the contention ..... If it were a case entirely C
relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by
the High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to '
others also, though they did not file any petition, except to
those whose lands were taken possession of and were
vested in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the
Act free from all encumbrances." (Emphasis added) D
12. In H.M. T. House Building Co-operative Society v.
Syed Khader & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 2244, this Court quashed
the land acquisition proceedings in toto, wherein the land had
been acquired by the Government for the use of the cooperative E
society which had planned a housing scheme upon it, in view
of the conclusion that it could not be called a "public purpose'',
within the meaning of the Act. The Court further directed the
respondents therein to restore the possession of the land to the
tenure-holders/persons-interested, and such persons were F
thereafter, directed to refund the amount received by them as
compensation. (See also: H.M. T. House Building Cooperative
Society v. M. Venkataswamappa & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 128)
13. The said judgment has subsequently been approved
and followed by this Court, in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh G
Uban & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3822, wherein this Courf held as
follows:
"Quashing the notification in the cases of individual writ
petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A That was what was held in Abhey Ram case (supra). The
main points raised before us are fully covered by the
judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's case."
14. In Om Prakash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 201 O·sc
2430, this Court considered a similar issue and reiterated the
8
view taken by this Court in Abhey Ram (supra), wherein it was
held that, in case a person interested has not filed any objection
to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act, or challenged
the acquisition proceedings, he cannot claim that the order of
quashing the declaration in some other matter, would also
C cover his case. The Court held as under:
"The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in the
case in hand as many as four declarations under Section
6 of the Act were issued from time to time. Finally when
D declaration is quashed by any Court, it would only enure
to the benefit of those who had approached the Court. It
would certainly not extend the benefit to those who had not
approached the Court or who might have gone into
slumber."
E
15. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to
state that, in the event that the person interested has not filed
objections in response to a notice issued under Section 5-A,
and has not challenged the acquisition proceedings, the
quashing of the declaration issued under Section 6 in some
F other case, would not enure any benefit to such person. More
so, where the possession of land has already been taken, and
such land stands vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the
Act, prior to the date of decision of the Court quashing the
G declaration in toto, no benefit can be taken by him. Where a
party has not filed objections to the notice issued under Section
5-A, the declaration qua such persons is generally neither
quashed, nor does it stand vitiated qua him, by any error of law
warranting interference. There is also another view with respect
H to this matter, which is that, in case the said land has been
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 627
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
acquired for a Scheme, which does not fall within the ambit of A
"public purpiose" then, in such a case, it would not be a case of
acquisition under the Act, instead, it would amount to colourable
exercise of power.
Land once vested in the Government - whether can be
8
divested:
16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is
vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be
divested and proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even
if an award is not made within the statutorily stipulated period. C
(Vide: Avadh Behari Yadav v. State of Bihar &. Ors., (1995)
6 SCC 31; UP. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra);
Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman & Ors.,
(1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil
Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra D
Pradesh v. Syed Akbar & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492).
17. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to
the tenure holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for
the purpose for which it was so acquired, or for any other E
purpose either. The proceedings cannot be withdrawn/
abandoned under the provisions of Section 48 of the Act, or
under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, once the
possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in
the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide: State of Madhya F
Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593; Lt. Governor of
Himachal Pradesh & Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970
SC 1576; Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of UP. & Ors., AIR
1993 SC 2517; Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri
Kishan & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 84 and Dedicated Freight
Corridor Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh & Ors., (2011) G
11 sec 100).
18. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been
considered by this Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable
Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A SC 344, this Court held that the meaning of word 'vesting' varies
as per the context of the Statute, under which the property vests.
So far as the vesting under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act is
concerned, the Court held as under.-
"ln the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the
B
property acquired becomes the property of Government
without any condition or ; limitations either as to title or
possession. The legislature has made it clear that vesting
of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited
duration."
c
19. In Gu/am Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra &
Ors., AIR 1977 SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held
as under:-
D "Once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested
in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no
concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for
invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by
which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided
because long later the requiring Authority diverts it to a
E
public purpose other than the one stated in the
.... declaration."
20. Similarly, in State of Kera/a & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran
Pillai & Anr., (1997) 5 SCC 432, this Court held as under:
F
"It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public
purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest
of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In
case there is no other public purpose for which the land is
needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the
G
erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction
and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better
utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive
Principles of the Constitution.
H (See also: C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 629
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627; Bhagat A
Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri
Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2002
SC 2532; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh
& Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; and Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of
Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66). B
21. In Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Syed
Akbar (Supra}, this Court considered this very issue and held
that, once the land has vested in the State, it can neither be
divested, by virtue of Section 48 of the Act, nor can it be
reconveyed to the persons-interested/tenure holders, and that C
therefore, the question of restitution of possession to the tenure
holder, does not arise. (See also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan,
AIR 1996 SC 1296; Chandragaudaj Ramgonda Patil v. State
of Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405; State of Kera/a & Ors. v.
M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703; Printers D
(Mysore) . Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed & Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 460;
Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah, (2005)
12 SCC 508; and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v.
State of U.P. & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 354).
E
22. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to
mean, that once the land is acquired and it vests in the State,
free from all encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land
owner, whether the land is being used for the purpose for which
it was acquired or for any other purpose. He becomes persona F
non-grata once the land vests in the State. He has a right to
only receive compensation for the same, unless the acquisition
proceeding is itself challenged. The State neither has the
requisite power to reconvey the land to the person-interested,
nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any ground, G
whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this
effect.
23. The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can
transfer a better title than he himself possesses; Nemo dat quod
non habet. However. this Rule has certain exceptions and one H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A of them is, that the transfer must be in good faith for value, and
there must be no misrepresentation or fraud, which would
render the transactions as void and also that the property is
purchased after taking reasonable care to ascertain that the
transferee has the requisite power to transfer the said land, and
B finally that, the parties have acted in good faith, as is required
under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Vide:
Asa Ram & Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali & Anr., AIR 1958 SC 183;
State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh & Ors., AIR
1969 SC 401, Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke
C Mitra, AIR 1981 SC 102; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mahal
Lal, Al R 1988 SC 299; and State of Punjab v. Surjit Kaur
(Dead) through LRs., JT (2001) 10 SC 42).
24. This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the
award is not accepted under protest, the persons interested
D cannot make an application to make a reference under Section
18, (Vide: Wardington Lyngdoh & Ors. v. Collector, Mawkyrwat,
(1995) 4 SCC 428), wherein this Court held that, a person who
has received the amount of award made under Section 11 of
the Act, without protest, will not be entitled to make an
E application under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, receipt of
the said amount under protest, is a condition precedent for
making an application under Section 18, within the limitation
prescribed under the Act.
F 25. The aforesaid view however, has not been consistently
reiterated, as is evident from the judgment in Ajit Singh & Anr.
v. State of Punjab & Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 67, wherein it was
held that, merely an application under Section 18 of the Act
would make it clear that the person-interested has not accepted
G the award made by the authority.
26. The instant case requires to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid legal propositions.
From the facts it is evident that, the predecessor-in-interest
H of the appellants approached the court by filing Writ Petitions
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 631
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
as weil as writ appeals, with respect to some of their lands, but A
for the reasons best known to them, they did not challenge the
acquisition proceedings so far as the suit land is concerned.
The appellants filed a writ petition for quashing the land
acquisition proceedings and/or seeking a declaration to the
effect that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act on B
15.5.1978, in relation to Survey Nos. 282/1, 282/2, 283/1, 283/
2, 284/1, 284/2, 284/3, 284/4 situated in Tambaram Village,
Chennai, had lapsed and become inoperative and
consequently, to issue a mandamus, barring the respondents,
their men, their agents, subordinates, servants or anyone acting c
under them, from interfering in any manner, with the peaceful
enjoyment of the properties belonging to the appellants, as
stipulated in the aforementioned surveys.
27. The appellants also filed another writ petition for
quashing the orders passed in relation to the applications of D
their predecessors-in-interest with respect to re-conveyance of
the said land. The reliefs claimed therein inter-alia, are as
under:
"Issue a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any other E
order or direction in the nature of a writ of Certiorarified
Mandamus by calling for the records comprised in the
proceedings of the 4th respondent bearing Letter No.
2899/LA1(1)/2007-6 dated 7.7.2008 and quash the same
as illegal and unconstitutional and consequently issue a F
Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to reconvey
the property situate at Survey No. 283/1 measuring about
0.27 cents, Survey No. 284/1 measuring about 0.70 cents,
Survey No.284/2 measuring about 0.65 cents and Survey
No.284/3 measuring about 0.64 cents in 166 of Tambaram G
Village, Old State Bank Colony, Saidapet Taluk,
Chengalpat District as per the provisions contained in
Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu
Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act of 16 of 1997) and
pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble Court may H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 10 S.C.R.
A deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the
case and thus render justice."
28. It is evident from the relief clauses of the two writ
petitions filed by the appellants, that the reliefs sought by them
8 are mutually inconsistent and contradictory. In the event that the
appellants wanted a declaration to the effect that the acquisition
proceedings in pursuance of issuance of the Section 4
notification, dated 15.5.1978 had lapsed or were void, the
question of seeking re-conveyance of the said land could not
C arise. More so, it is difficult to understand, how the appellants
can claim relief in respect of 9 survey numbers. In the present
appeals, relief is restricted only to 4 of the survey numbers. Dr.
A.M. Singhvi has not pressed for the relief of reconveyance.
However, it is apparent that the appellants' claim cannot co-
exist and can be said to be blowing hot and blowing cold,
D simultaneously.
29. In Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor
Resources (International) Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC
420, this Court considered a large number of judgments on the
E issue of estoppels and held as under:
"A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast
and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one
knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance
or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding
F effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This
rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied
in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good
conscience .....
G .......... The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the
species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which
is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded
by his actiofis or conduct or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would
H have had."
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 633
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
30. In the instant case, the tenure holders/person-interested A
neither filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, nor have
they challenged the land acquisition proceedings, so far as the
suit land is concerned, instead they chose to withdraw the
compensation awarded in 1983 and 1986; after the expiry of
about three decade~ and hence, they cannot be permitted to B
challenge the acquisition proceedings on any ground
whatsoever. The appellants cannot claim title/relief better than
what the original vendors were entitled to.
31. In fact, the appellants have claimed reliefs in the writ
petitions with respect to not just the suit land but also in relation C
to the land which was the subject matter of an earlier litigation
by their predecessors-in-interest. We fail to understand for what
purpose the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings has
been sought when, in respect of the said land, the proceedings
already stood quashed. D
32. The High Court dealt with the proceeding, issued ir. RC
No. 8222/95/F5, which is purported to have been issued by one
K.Muthu, Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), and observed
that the said proceeding itself stood cancelled and somehow E
a xerox copy of the said proceeding was obtained by the
appellants and they utilised the same to secure permission for
sanctioning their plan of construction of flats on the said land.
Thus, the appellant have played fraud upon the authorities in
order to obtain the said sanction. Even as per the RC No. 8222/ F
95/F5, it is evident that the possession of the suit land was
taken over ages ago and therefore, the said suit land was the
subject matter of the earlier litigation.
33. The High Court also recorded findings to the effect that
the appellants have "managed", not only to obtain certain orders G
from the department, but have also misused the process of the
court to achieve a sinister design. The court further took note
that one of the appellants had filed an additional affidavit before
the High Court in a writ petition by way of which, had attempted
to mislead the court through furnishing of false information. H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A It has even been admitted at the Bar, that the letter dated
7.7.2005 which was placed on the record by the appellants
before the High Court, was in fact, a forged document.
34. The appellants have not approached the court with
clean hands, and are therefore, not entitled for any relief.
8
Whenever a person approaches a Court of Equity, in the
exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, it is expected that he
will approach the said court not only with clean hands but also
with a clean mind, a clean heart and clean objectives. Thus, he
who seeks equity must do equity. The legal maxim "Jure
C Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et
lnjuria Fieri Locupletiorem'', means that it is a law of nature that
o'le should not be enriched by causing loss or injury to another.
(Vide: The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1993 SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand, (1995) 1
D SCC 242; and Ramnik/al N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236).
35. The judicial process cannot become an instrument of
oppression or abuse, or a means in the process of the court
E to subvert justice, for the reason that the court exercises its
jurisdiction, only in furtherance of justice. The interests of justice
and public interest coalesce, and therefore, they are very often
one and the same. A petition or an affidavit containing a
misleading and/or an inaccurate statement, only to achieve an
ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of process of the court.
F
36. In Dalip Singh v. State of UP. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC
114, this Court noticed an altogether new creed of litigants, that
is, dishonest litigants and went on to strongly deprecate their
conduct by observing that. the truth constitutes an integral part
G of the justice delivery system. The quest for personal gain has
become so intense that those involved in litigation do not
hesitate to seek shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and
suppression of facts in the course of court proceedings. A
litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of justice, or who
H
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 635
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not A
entitled to any relief, interim or final.
37. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial
process. "Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is
the quest". An action at law is not a game of chess, therefore, 8
a litigant cannot prevaricate and take inconsistent positions. It
is one of those fundamental principles of jurisprudence that
litigants must observe total clarity and candour in their
pleadings. (Vide: Ritesh Tewari & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 677; and Amar Singh v. Union of India, C
(2011) 1 sec 69).
38. In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes & Ors. v.
Erasmo Jack de Sequeria (dead), (2012) 5 SCC 370), this
Court taking note of its earlier judgment in Ramrameshwari
Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249 held: D
"False claims and defences are really serious problems
with real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever-
escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining
to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by E
unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will
tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a
huge amount. This happens because of the enormous
delay in adjudication of cases in our courts. If pragmatic
approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimised F
to a large extent."
The Court further observed that wrongdoers must be
denied profit from their frivolous litigation, and that they should
be prevented from introducing and relying upon, false pleadings
and forged or fabricated documents in the records furnished G
by them to the court.
39. In view of the above, the appellants have disentitled
themselves for any equitable relief.
40. Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the State H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A Amendment Act, 1996, and the same imposes a complete
restriction on the sale of acquired land by the tenure holder. In
case the land is transferred in contravention of these provisions,
the Government may, by way of an order, declare the transfer
to be null and void, and on such declaration, the land shall, as
B penalty, be forfeited to, and vest in, the Revenue Department
of the Government, free from all encumbrances.
In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the sale deeds in favour of the appellants are void and
unenforceable.
c
41. !n such a fact-situation, we fail to understand how the
appellants came to possess the suit land which had been
vested in the State ages ago, in the years 1983 and 1986.
Such a course is not possible without the collusion of the officers
D of the State/Board.
42. After considering the entire material on record, we
reach the following inescapable conclusions:-
(i) The suit land stood notified under Section 4 of the
E Act as on 15.5.1978. There is nothing on record to
show, nor have the appellants made any pleadings
to the effect that, the persons interested at the
relevant time ever filed any objections whatsoever,
in response to the notice issued under Section 5-
F A of the Act.
(ii) Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have
filed two writ petitions challenging the validity of
acquisition of some of their land but they did not
G raise the issue of validity of the acquisition in
respect of the suit land.
(iii) Award no.14/1983 was made on 28.6.1983, in
respect of Survey Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3. The
amount of compensation, was withdrawn by the
H original tenure holders/persons-interested, though
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 637
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
of course, under protest, and the same was limited A
to the extent of quantum of compensation, so that
they could approach the Collector for making a
reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act.
(iv) The judgment of the learned Single Judge is B
subsequent to the aforesaid award. As the
compensation related to the land had been
withdrawn, and the land stood vested in the State,
free from all encumbrances, quashing the
declaration under Section 6 in cases filed by
others, would not enure any benefit t0 the original
c
tenure holders/appellants, as has been explained by
this Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra), and
furthermore, even if the declaration stood quashed
in toto, it could not save the suit land, as its
possession had already been taken over. D
\v) In the instant case, the High Court C:id not declare
the acquisition proceedings to be void, or the
purpose for which the land had been acquired not
to be a "public purpose" within the meaning of the E
Act. There has also been no direction whatsoever,
to restore the possession of the said land to the
tenure holders, upon refund of the compensation
amount by them.
F
(vi) Another award no.11 /1986 in respect of Survey
No.284/2 was made on 14.8.1986. Compensation
awarded in relation to the said piece of land was
withdrawn. The land thus, vested in the State, free
from all encumbrances.
G
(vii) In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e.
vendors of the first sale were not vested with any
title over the said land, the transfer by them, was
itself void and all subsequent transfers would also,
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 10 S.C.R.
A as a result, remain ineffective and unenforceable in
law. Therefore, sale deeds executed in the years
2004-05 would not confer any title on the appellants.
(viii) The appellants claimed to have made some
B enquiries in relation to the acquisition proceedings
qua the suit land, to which the competent authorities
replied, that the land was free from acquisition
proceedings and therefore, the appellants
proceeded to purchase the said suit land. The
letters written by the Authorities dated 4.3.2004,
c 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not make any reference
to the present appellants, nor was any information
sought by any of them in this regard. Some of the
said letters had been addressed to the original
tenure holders and other were merely found to be
D inter-departmental communications.
(ix) Letter dated 7.7.2005, filed by the appellants before
the Court is admittedly a forged document.
(x) So far as the matter relating to the proceedings
E
issued in R.C. No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed
that the appellants have used unfair means to
obtain sanction for their plan of construction of flats.
(xi) The appellants filed an affidavit before the High
F Court only to mislead the court by furnishing false
information.
(xii) The appellants also managed to obtain certain
orders from the Department and further have
G abused the process of the court.
(xiii) The appellants did neither approach the statutory
authority nor the court with clean hands.
(xiv) Compensation was paid to the original tenure
H
V. CHANDRASEKARAN & ANR. v. ADMINISTRATIVE 639
OFFICER & ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
holders in 1983 and 1986. The same was refunded A
by the present appellants in the name of the original
tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the
same has not been accepted by the Board and has
been duly returned to the appellants.
B
(xv) The recommendations of the High Level
Committee contained in Annexure-P.11 make it
clear that the said Committee was constituted, only
upon the request of the appellants to consider their
grievances. The recommendations suggest that
although possession of the suit land was taken, as C
the land was inaccessible, it remained unutilized for
the purpose for which it was acquired. Therefore,
reconveyance of the same was suggested.
(xvi) An application for re-conveyance was filed by the D
original tenure holders and their legal heirs, and not
by the appellants with respect to the said part of the
suit land, as is evident from the orders dated
18.12.2007 and 7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact,
were addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal, Tmt. E
Girija, Tmt. Nagammal, Thiru A.E. Kothandaraman
Mudaliar, and Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to
an application made by them.
(xvii) It is evident from the record that there was no
application for reconveyance of the land in Survey F
No.284/2, though the appellants have sought relief
in relation to this land also.
(xviii) The appellants filed applications for re-conveyance
through the original tenure holders/legal heirs. This G
clearly reveals that the appellants themselves had
been of the view that the suit land had already
vested in the State, otherwise there could be no
question of re-conveyance.
H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R.
A (xix) The land once vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances cannot be divested.
(xx) The appellants had attempted to be succeeded in
illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public
B land, by connivance with the officers of the State
Govt./Board and raised a huge construction upon
the said land, after getting the Plan sanctioned from
the competent statutory authority.
(xxi) The State/Board authorities never made an attempt
c to stop the construction. Nor the Board approached
the court to restrain the appellants from encroaching
upon its land and construction of the flats.
Connivance of the officers of the Board in the
scandal is writ large and does not require any
D proof.
Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs as how
the public property can be looted with the connivance and
collusion of the so called trustees of the public properties. It
E reflects on the very bad governance of the State authorities
within a period of six weeks.
43. The aforesaid conclusions do not warrant any relief to
the appellants. The appeals are dismissed with the costs of
Rupees Twenty Five lacs, which the appellants are directed to
F deposit with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority. With
in a period of six weeks.
44. In addition thereto, the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu
is requested to examine the issues involved in the case and
G find out as who were the officials of the State or Board
responsible for this loot of the public properties and proceed
against them in accordance with law. He is further directed to
ensure eviction of the appellants from the public land forthwith.
K.K.T. Appeals dismissed.
H
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