Holding

A High Court exercising revision under Section 15(6) cannot reassess evidence to reach a contrary factual finding; it may intervene only if the lower court's finding is wholly unreasonable, and in this case the landlord's need was bona‑fide.

Summary

The landlord applied to the Rent Controller under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973, seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of a bona‑fide need to start a Karyana business, despite being unemployed and suffering from asthma. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority found the landlord's need bona‑fide and allowed eviction. The tenant obtained a revision from the High Court under Section 15(6), which held the landlord's need not bona‑fide because he was on the employment‑exchange roll, and set aside the lower orders. The Supreme Court held that the High Court, in a revision, cannot reassess or re‑appraise evidence to reach a different factual finding; it may only test the legality or propriety of the order and intervene only if the lower finding is wholly unreasonable. Finding that the lower courts' conclusion was not wholly unreasonable, the Court set aside the High Court's revision, allowed the appeal, and directed that the tenant not be evicted until 30 April 2001 subject to conditions.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, may re‑appraise evidence and overturn the factual finding of the Rent Controller/Appellate Authority.
Whether the landlord's claim of a bona‑fide need to occupy the premises for a business is valid under the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. 115
Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973s. 13, s. 15(6)

Subjects

evictionbona fide needrevisional jurisdictionrent controllandlord‑tenant disputeHaryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Actevidence appraisal

Judgment

\

A VANEETJAIN
v.
JAGJIT SINGH

MAY2, 2000

B [V.N. KHARE AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]

Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973:

Ss. 15(6) and 13-,-Revision-Power of High Court-Shop-Tenant-
Application by landlord for eviction of tenant on ground of bona fide need-
c Landlord, an unemployed commerce graduate!__Wanted to start his own busi-
ness in the shop-Rent Controller and appellate authority allowing the appli-
cation holding the need of landlord to be bonafide-High Court dismissing
application oflandlord on the ground that his need was not bonafide as he was
enrolled in employment exchange-Held, High Court did not find that the
D conclusion reached by two authorities below was unreasonable-In the circum-
stances, it is, not permissible for High Court to reassess or re-appraise the
e_vidence to arrive at a finding contrary to finding offact Tf!corded by the two
authorities below-On request oftenant and there being no objection on behalf
of landlord, tenant allowed one year's time to vacate premises.
E Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, [1999] 6 SCC 222 and
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., [1998) 8 SCC 119,
relied.on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil appeal No. 7109 of 1999.

F From the Judgment and Order dated 7.9.99 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in C.R. No. 2o·p of 1998.
\

M.L. Verma, A.P. Sipha, Dhannendra Sinha and Pavan Kumar for the
Appellant. '
\
G G.L. Sanghi, Atul Kurtl~. Hari Shankar, (Sunil Kr. Bharti) for Ranbir
Singh Yadav for the Respond~nt.
\
The following Judgment Of the Court was delivered :

Appellant herein is the landlord of the premises whereas the respondent
H /
. 918
J

V. JAIN v. JAGJIT SJNGH 919
is the tenant. The appellant filed an application before the Rent Controller A
under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent) and Eviction Act,
1973 (in short 'the Act') for eviction of respondent-tenant on the ground of
his bona fide need for the premises. The need set up by the appellant in the
said application was that he is un-employed and his elder brother is carrying
on business at Balasaur ~ Orissa and the said business is in the name of his
B
elder brother wherein the appellant has no interest. It was also stated that he
was suffering from asthma and as per medical advice coastal area is not fit
for his habitation. It was further asserted that the appellant intended to carry
on business of Karyana in the premises in dispute and for that purpose he
deposited a sum of Rs. 45,000 in the fixed deposit. The need set up by the
landlord was denied by the tenant. However, the Rent Controller, after c
considering the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the need of
the landlord was bona fide and consequently, the application filed by the

-~ landlord was allowed. Aggrieved, the tenant filed an appeal before the
appellate authority constimted under the Act. The appellate authority affirmed
the decision of the Rent Controller. The tenant thereafter preferred a revision
D
under sub-see<:tion (6) of Section 15 of the Act. The High Court recorded at
a fmding that the need of the appellant is not bona fide. Consequently, the
revision was allowed and the order of the Court below was set aside. It is
against the said judgment the landlord is in appeal before us.
> ,..
Shri Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, urged E
that in view of the limited jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court, it was
not open to the High Court to reassess and reappreciate the evidence and
come to a different finding. We fmd merit in the submission. The Rent
Controller, after considering the evidence on record, recorded a fmding that
p
••
the need of the landlord was bona fide. The said fmding was affirmed by the
appellate authority. The appellate authority recorded fmding to the following
effect.

"10. Then bona fide requirement of the landlord for the demised shop
cannot be said to he his mere wish. He, no doubt, is permanently
residing with· his family members in Orissa but he wants to start his G
business in the demised shop of Karyana food grains. Though after
- .1 the institution of the petitiOn but he has also deposited Rs. 45,000 in
the bank so as to start business in the shop. He is a commerce
graduate. No. doubt, he has got his name registered with the Employ-
ment Exchange for service but he has not got any service by now. So H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A looking to his unemployment he has got every reason to start his
business in the shop, which belongs to him. Though the petitioner has
produced the medical certificate Mark-A and Mark-B to show that he
is suffering from asthma and the climate of Balasaur, which is sea
shore, is not suitable to him but even if these certificates are ignored
there is no reason to hold his need to be mala fide when he has got
B
means as well qualification to support the business."

Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act confers revisional jurisdiction X. _
upon the High Court which reads as under :

"The High Court, as revisional authority, may, at any time, on its own
c motion or on the application of any aggrieved party, made within a
period of ninety days, call for and examine the record relating to any
order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or
proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may
D deem fit. In computing the period of ninety days the time taken to
obtain a certified copy of the order shall be excluded".

Sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act empowers the High Court to
exercise its revisional jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself if an
order passed by the Rent Controller or the appellate authority is in accordance
E with law. The question that arises for consideration is whether the High Court
in its revisional jurisdiction can reassess or re-evaluate the evidence only to
come to a different finding than what has been recorded by the court below.
This Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta,
[1999] 6 SCC 222 held, that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation
F or reapreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to take a different
view of the facts as if it were a court of facts. However, the High Court is
obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of whether
such an order is in accordance to law. For that limited purpose the High Court
would be justified in re-appraising the evidence. In Sarla Ahuja v. United
India Insurance Company Ltd., (1998] 8 SCC 119, it was held that the High
G
Court while exercising the jurisdiction can re-appraise the evidence only for
a limited purpose for ascertaining as to whether the conclusion arrived at by
the fact finding court is wholly unreasonable.

A perusal of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act shows that the
H power of High Court to revise an order is not an appellate power, but it is
'
J

V. JAIN v. JAGJIT SINGH 921
--J also true that is not akin to power exercisable under Section 115 of Code of A
Civil Procedure. It is no doubt true that the High Court would be justified
in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority if legality or
propriety of such order demands such interference. We are, therefore, of the
view that it is not permissible for the High Court to reassess or re-appraise
the evidence to arrive at a finding contrary to the finding of fact recorded
B
by the court below. Keeping in. view the scope of the revisional power under
sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, in the present case, we find that the
case of the appellant was. that he was unemployed. He was neither in service
nor has any business and, therefore, he bona fide required the premises for
carrying on business. The High Court merely on the fact that the appellant
was emolled in the Employment Exchange· at Orissa, concluded that the need c
of the landlord was not bona fide. Thus recorded the finding that the appellant
does not intend to carry on business in the premises and his need is not bona
fide. From the fact that the appellant was emolled in the Employment
Exchange at Orissa, the Rent Controller and the appellant authority concluded
that the appellant is unemployed and is seeking his employment by running
D
a business in the premises in dispute. Such a conclusion by the court below
cannot be said as wholly unreasonable. It is not the case of the respondent
that as a result of appellant being on the roll of employment exchange he
has g-0t appointment in any service. The High Court did not find that such
a conclusion arrived at by the courts below was wholly unreasonable. We
are, therefore, of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court E
after reassessment of evidence was not permissible under law. Consequently,
the judgment under appeal deserves to be set aside. We order accordingly.
The appeal is allowed. No costs.

Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel, appearing for the respondent,
F
expressed an apprehension that the landlord, after taking possession of the
premises either alienate the premises or let it out to another tenant and for
that eventuality the interest of the respondent may be safeguarded. We are
not required to pass any such order as the tenants' interest is very well
protected by virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 13 of the Act.
G
After the judgment was dictated, Shri Sanghi, learned senior counsel,
appearing for the respondent stated that in the event the respondent is to
vacate the premises immediately, he would suffer a great hardship and for
that purpose he may be allowed to continue to stay in the premises for one
year. To this, learned counsel for the appellant has no · objection. We, H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 3 S.C.R.
A therefore, direct that the respondent shall not be evicted from the premises
in dispute till 30th April, 2001 provided he files a usual undertaking within
four weeks from today and he shall further deposit the entire arrears of rent/
damages, if any within the same period and shall further continue to deposit
the damages as and when it falls due during the period he continues in
possession by virtue of our order, failing which this order shall automatically
B
stand ".acated without further reference to this Court.
i
R.P. , Appeal disposed of.

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