Holding

A managing co‑owner acting as an agent is deemed a landlord under Section 3(j) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, and the tenant's failure to raise non‑maintainability in the written statement precludes questioning the plaintiff's authority, rendering the High Court's reversal erroneous.

Summary

The case arose from an eviction suit filed by Shashi Srivastava, who, along with her sister Sarojini Sinha, succeeded to a property after their father's death. Shashi, acting as the manager of the house, had inducted Harpal Singh Chauhan as tenant; later his wife Kamla Chauhan claimed tenancy and deposited rent under Section 30 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Shashi sued for eviction on non‑payment of rent but did not join her sister as a co‑plaintiff. The trial court decreed in favour of Shashi, but the Allahabad High Court reversed the decree on the ground of non‑joinder of the co‑owner. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that under Section 3(j) the term "landlord" includes a person authorised to receive rent and his agent, so the tenant could not challenge Shashi's authority, and the failure to raise non‑maintainability in the written statement made the High Court's reversal erroneous. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and restored the trial court decree, allowing the eviction suit to proceed.

Issues considered

Whether a person managing a co‑owned property, without the co‑owner joining as plaintiff, can be treated as a "landlord" under Section 3(j) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act.
Whether the tenant can contest the authority of such a managing co‑owner and raise non‑maintainability as a defence.
Whether the non‑joinder of a co‑owner as plaintiff renders the eviction suit void.
Whether the question of who is the actual tenant (husband or wife) can be reopened on appeal.

Legislation cited

Small Causes Courts Acts. 25
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 12, s. 30, s. 3(j)

Subjects

landlordtenantevictionnon‑joinderagencyU.P. Urban Buildings Actrent depositsmall causes courtcivil appeal

Judgment

;
VASUDHA' SRIVASTAVA AND ORS.
A
v.
}.
SMT.KAMLACHAUHANANDANR.

JANUARY 24, 1992

B [LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, V. RAMASWAMI AND
B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, JJ.)

UP. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Le11i11g. Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972:

c Sections 3(j), 12 and 30:

Tenant inducted by one of the co-owners-The other residing
elsewhere-Authority q( such person who inducted the tenant-Whether
could be questioned in an eviction suit on the ground q( non-joinder q(
par~inding of fact recorded by trial court-Confirmed by High
D Court-Whether could be reopened in appeal.

The first appellant and her sister succeeded to the suit premises
on the death of their father, Respondent No. 2 was the tenant in the
premises. The first appellant who was managing the property on
her behalf as also on behalf of her sister, who was residing elsewhere,
E instituted a suit for eviction of Respondent No.2 on the. ground of
non-payment of rent. She did not join her sister as co-pl.aintiff. The
defendant-Respondent No.2 took the pica that his wife was the tenant
and that she had already deposited the rent under Section 30 of the
U.P, Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972, The trial court rejected the defence and decreed the suit.
F On an app~al by the defendants, the High Court reversed the decree
and dismissed the suit for non-joinder of the plaintiff's sister.

The present appeal, by special leave, is against the High Court's ~
/'
order. The appellant contended that the expression 'land-lord' in
Section 3(j) of the Act was not limited to denote the owner of the
G house, but should be understood in a wider sense to include a per-
son to whom rent is payable, as also, the agent of such a person,
such as the plaintiff-appellant in the instant case.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

H HELD: I. Since appellant No. 1 was entrusted '"th the man-

356
SRIVASTAVA v. CHAUHAN !SHARMA,).] 357
....(
agement of the house as her sister was staying with her husband A
elsewhere and it was appellant No. I who had inducted the respond-
ent No. 2 in the premises as a tenant, it was not open to the tenant-
respondent to question her authority. If he was desirous of contest-
ing the factual aspect, ii was essential for. him to have raised the
issue of non-maintainability in his written statement which was not
done. In reversing the decree passed by the trial court the High B
Court committed a serious error in not appreciating this position.
[358 F-H]

2. Much significance cannot he attached to the aspect as to
whether the husband became defaulter or not when the wife had
already offered to pay the rent, in view of the importance of the C
issue in the proceeding under Section 12 of the U.P. Urban Build-
ings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Jn that
background the parties went to trial and led their full evidence on
the point and the trial court dealt with the dispute thoroughly and
recorded a finding in favour of the appellants which has been con-
firmed by the High Court. The respondent, therefore, cannot be D
aliowed to reopen this question. [359C-D]

- CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 243 of
1992.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11.1989 of the Allahabad E
High Court in Civil Revision No. 480of1983.

Sunil Gupta, Vikram Nath and H.K. Puri for the Appellants.

Manoj Swarup and Ms. Lalita Kohli for ihe Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHARMA, J. Special le.ave is granted.

2. The appeal arises out of a suit for eviction of the respondents
from a building in the city of Allahabad. The premises belonged to one G
G.D. Srivastava, who on his death was succeeded by his two daughters
Smt. Shashi Srivastava, the sole original plaintiff since dead (substituted,
by her legal representatives) and the appellant No. 6 Smt. Sarojini.
According to the case of the appellants the property remained under the
J..... management of Shashi Srivastava on her own behalf as well as her sister
Sarojini ·Sinha, who was not residing in Allahabad. The house was let out H
/
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ J 992] 1 S.C.R.

A to the respondent No. 2 Harpal Singh Chauhan, a Government servant, in
1968. Jn 1978 Harpal Singh Chauhan was transferred outside Allahabad,
and certain strangers initiated a proceeding under section 12 (3A) of the
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act,
1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') with a prayer to declare the
premises vacant. Harpal Singh contested the case on the ground that his
B wife, respondent No. 1 Smt. Kamla Chauhan and not he was the tenant. It
is not necessary to set out the details relating to the said proceeding
except stating that Rent Control Officer as well as the appellate authority
rejected the case of tenancy in favour of Smt. Kamla Chauhan and held
that Harpal Singh was the tenant. It is said on behalf of the appellants that
the proceeding, however, has not finally terminated in view of a remand
c order by the appellate authority on another issue. In the meantime Shashi
Srivastava instituted the present suit for eviction of Harpal Singh without
Sarojini Sinha joining as a co-plaintiff, as according to the appellant's
case she was .not available in Allahabad, on the ground of non-payment of
rent. Although the action was opposed, the defendants did not take a plea
of non-maintainability of the suit on the ground of non-joinder of Sarojini
D Sinha as a plaintiff. The defe11ce was once more the same plea whiCh was
taken in the proceeding under section 12 (3A) that Smt. Kamla Chauhan
was the tenant who had deposited the rent under section 30 of the Act.
The Judge, Small Causes Court, rejected the defence and decreed the suit.
The defendants challenged the decree before the Allahabad High Court
under section .25 of the Small Causes Courts Act. The High Court has, by
E impugned judgment, reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the
ground of non-joinder of Sarojini Sinlia.

3. TI1e learned counsel for the appellants was right in relying upon
the definition of 'landlord' .in section 3 (j) of the Act in support of the
appeal. The expression is not limited to denote the owner of the house but
F it has to be, for the purposes of the Act understood in the wide sense to
include a person to whom the rent is payable as also his agent. As has
been stated earlier, according to the case of Shashi Srivastava she was
entrusted v..rith the managen1ent of the house as her sister \Vas staying with
her husband outside Allahabad and it was Shashi Srivastava who had
inducted tJ1e tenant-respondent in the pre1nises as a tenant. "It was, there-
G fore not open' to the tenant-respondent to question the authority of Shashi
Srivastava. If he was desirous of contesting the factual aspect pleaded by
Shashi Srivastava, it was essential for him to have raised the issue of non-
maintainability in his written statement which was not done. In reversing
the decree passed by the trial court the High Court committed a serious
error in not appreciating this position. The impugned judgment has, there-
H
SRJVASTA VA v. CHAUHAN [SHARMA,J. J 359
-( fore, to be set aside. A

4. It has been strenuously contended by Mr. Manoj SwarujJ, ap-
pearing on behalf of the respondents that in view of the facts and circuin-
stances of the case Smt. Kamla Chauhan must be held to be the tenant and
not her husband. We are not inclined to go into this issue of fact afresh as
both the courts below have categorically recorded .their findings against B
them.

5. Mr. Swarup, next, argued that in any event, the suit is fit to be
dismissed as Smt. Kamla Chauhan has deposited the arrears of rent under
section 30 of the Act. Stress was laid on the close relationship of husband
and wife and it was suggested that it will be highly technical to hold the C
husband defaulter when the wife had already offered to pay the rent. We
have considered the matter closely and held that whatever be the weight
given to this argument in an ordinary case, ·much significance cannot be
attached to this aspect in view of the importance of the issue in the
proceeding under section 12 of the Act. In that background the parties
went to trial and led· their full evidence on the point and the trial court D
dealt with the dispute thoroughly and recorded. a finding in favour of the
appellant which has been confirmed by the High Court. The respondent,
in .the circumstances, cannot be allowed to reopen this question.

6. In the· result the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
aside and the decree passed by the trial court is restored. The appeal is E
accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as .,to costs of the High
Court and this Court.
,.
G.N. Appeal allowe.d.