VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA @ MANJUversusRAGHUNANDAN SHARMA @ BABURAM & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 8
- Decided
- 5 January 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
A unilateral declaration by a testator does not satisfy the statutory requirements of an arbitration agreement under Section 7, rendering the appointment of an arbitrator under Sections 11 and 15(2) invalid, although pendency of an appeal does not preclude such appointment.
Summary
The appellant and his brother were involved in two civil suits concerning a will. The trial court dismissed the suits under Order 7 Rule 11, directing the parties to arbitrate based on a declaration by their deceased father that any future disputes should be referred to a named arbitrator. The appellant appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Designate of the Chief Justice appointed an arbitrator under Sections 11 and 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court examined (1) whether the pendency of the appeal barred such an appointment and (2) whether the father's unilateral declaration or the will constituted a valid arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the Act. It held that pendency does not preclude appointment, but a unilateral declaration is not an arbitration agreement because it is not a written agreement between the parties. Consequently, the appointment of the arbitrator was invalid and the appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower court’s order.
Issues considered
- Does the pendency of an appeal under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC bar the appointment of an arbitrator under Sections 11 and 15(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
- Whether a unilateral declaration by a testator, or a provision in a will, can be treated as an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 11, s. 15, s. 7, s. 8
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Subjects
Judgment
[2010) 1 S.C.R. 582
A VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA @ MANJU
V.
RAGHUNANDAN SHARMA @ BABURAM & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 89 of 2010)
JANUARY 5, 2010
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:
c ss. 8(1), (3), 11 and 15(2) - Appointment of arbitrator
pending appeal filed against dismissal of suit under Or. 7, r. 11
CPC read withs. 8(1) of the Act- HELD: An application uls
11 or s. 15(2) of the Act, for appointment of an arbitrator, will
not be barred by pendency of an application uls 8 in any suit,
0 nor will the Designate of the Chief Justice be precluded from
considering and disposing of an application uls 11 or s. 15(2)
- Thus, if an arbitrator is appointed by the Designate of the
Chief Justice u/s 11, nothing prevents the arbitrator from
proceeding with the arbitration - Therefore, the mere fact that
E an appeal from order dismissing the suit under Or. 7 r. 11 CPC
(on the ground that the disputes require to be settled by
Arbitration) is pending before the High Court, will not come
in the way of appointment of an arbitrator uls 11 read with
s. 15(2), if the authority uls 11 finds it necessary to appoint an
arbitrator - Practice and Procedure.
F
s. 7 - Arbitration agreement - Declaration by father that
any future disputes among his sons should be settled by an
arbitrator - HELD: Cannot be considered as an arbitration
agreement among the children or such of the children who
G became parties to a dispute - Even if the Will provided for
reference of disputes to arbitration, it would be merely an
expression of a wish by the testator that the disputes should
be settled by arbitration and cannot be considered as an
arbitration agreement among the legatees - Such a wish,
H 582
VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA@ MANJU v. RAGHUNANDAN 563
SHARMA@ BABURAM
even if proved, cannot be construed as an agreement in A
writing between the parties to the dispute, agreeing to refer
their disputes to arbitration - Will.
Raj Kumar vs. Shiva Prasad Gupta AIR 1939 Cal. 600,
held inapplicable. B
Case Law Reference :
AIR 1939 Cal. 500 held inapplicable Para 11
CIVIL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 89
of 2010. C
From the Judgment & Order dated 16.05.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench is SB Civil
Arbitration Application No. 72 of 2007.
D
P.N. Mishra, K.N. Tripathy, R.M. Patnaik, H.P. Sahu and
V . K. Sidharthan for the Appellant.
K.V. Vijwanthan, Neha, Sanjeeb Panigrahi, Vikas Mehta,
Jayanat K. Mehta and Amit Bhandari for the Respondents.
E
The Order of the Court was delivered by
ORDER
R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard the
learned counsel. F
2. The first respondent and appellant are brothers. The first
respondent filed a suit (Civil Suit No.100 of 2006) against the
appellant alleging that their father Durganarayan Sharma died
on 20.10.2005 leaving a will dated 21.10.2003 bequeathing G
portions of property bearing No.B-133, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur (for
short the suit premises) to him, and that the appellant who was
in possession of the said portions, was liable to deliver
possession thereof to the first respondent on the basis of the
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A said will. The Executors of the said will were impleaded as
defendants 2 and 3 (respondents 2 and 3 herein).
3. The appellant herein, in turn filed a Civil Suit No.53 of
2007 for partition and separate possession of his one-sixth
8 share in the ancestral properties. He also sought a declaration
that the will dated 21.10.2003 propounded by the first
respondent was fabricated, null and void. In the said partition
suit, first respondent and his son were impleaded as
defendants 1 and 6; appellant's another brother and three
C sisters were impleaded as defendants 2 to 5; the son of
another brother who had been given away in adoption was
impleaded as defendant no.7; and the executors under the will
were impleaded as defendants 8 and 9.
4. The two suits were consolidated for trial. Respondents
D 2 and 3 claiming to be the executors of the will of Durganarayan
Sharma filed an application under section 8 of the Arbitration
& Conciliation Act, 1996 ('Act' for short) in the said suits
alleging that the deceased Durganarayan Sharma had made
a declaration on 15.10.2005, shortly before his death, that if
E there was any dispute in connection with the will, the same
should be decided by Shri U.N. Bhandari, Advocate; that the
parties to the two suits being children and grandchildren of
Durganarayan Sharma were bound by the said declaration and
the disputes which were the subject matter of the two suits
F should therefore be decided by arbitration. The trial court heard
the said application and by order dated 19.9.12007, held that
in view of the said provision for resolution of disputes by
arbitration, its jurisdiction was barred by the provisions of the
Act. Consequently, the trial court dismissed both the suits, under
G Order 7 rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for
short).
5. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 19.9.2007, the
appellant herein filed an appeal (SB Civil Appeal No.664 of
2007) contending that there was no agreement for arbitration
H and that there was no ground for dismissal of his suit and a
VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA@ MANJU v. RAGHUNANDAN 585
SHARMA@ BABURAM [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Division Bench of the High Court, while issuing notice to show A
cause why the appeal should not be admitted, stayed the order
dated 19.9.2007 passed by the trial court, by order dated
14.11.2007.
6. The first respondent accepted the decision of the trial
B
court and filed a claim statement on 20.10.2007 before Shri
U.N. Bhandari, the sole Arbitrator named in the declarations
of his father, the reliefs earlier sought by him in Civil Suit No.
100/2006. The said U.N. Bhandari issued notices to the
appellant and other non-petitioners in the claim. The appellant C
appeared before Shri U.N. Bhandari, and objected to his
jurisdiction to act as an arbitrator, contending that there was
no arbitration agreement between the parties. He also pointed
out that neither he nor first respondent had signed the
declaration of his father giving consent to Shri U.N. Bhandari
being the Arbitrator. He also brought to the notice of Shri D
Bhandari, that the order dated 19.9.2007 passed by the trial
court had been stayed by the High Court. He also challenged
the continuation of Shri Bhandari as an arbitrator by alleging
bias against him. In these circumstances on 17.11.2007, Shri
Bhandari withdrew himself from the arbitrator. On such E
withdrawal, the first respondent filed an application under
section 11(6) read with section 14(1)(b) and 15(2) of the Act
for appointment of an independent arbitrator. The designate
of the Chief Justice who heard the matter, allowed the said
application by the impugned order dated 16.5.2008, and F
appointed an Arbitrator to resolve the disputes. The said order
is challenged in this appeal by special leave.
7. The first contention raised by the appellant is that when
the question (whether there is a valid arbitration agreement G
between the appellant and first respondent) is pending
consideration by the High Court in S.B. Civil First Appeal
No.664 of 2007, the designate of the Chief Justice could not
have entertained or decided an application under Sections 11,
14 and 15 of the Act involving the same question. It is
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 1 S.C.R.
A submitted that the order of the trial court dated 19. 9.2007
holding that the parties should resolve their disputes by
arbitration had been stayed by the High Court in the pending
appeal. In view of the pendency of S.B. Civil first Appal No.664
of 2007 and the interim stay of the order dated 19.9.2007,
B granted by the High Court on 14.11.2007, the appellant
submitted that the learned designate of the Chief Justice ought
not to have proceeded to decide the application for
appointment of a fresh arbitrator, but ought to have awaited the
decision in the first appeal. It was submitted that in the pending
c first appeal (against the decision dismissing his suit under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code), if it is held that there is no
arbitration agreement between the parties or if the court refuses
to refer the parties to arbitration, the suits will have to proceed
• and that will lead to conflicting decisions.
D 8. Section 8 of the Act which is relevant is extracted below:
"8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an
arbitration agreement. - (1) A juridical authority before
which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject
E of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not
later than when submitting his first statement on the
substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
(2) The application referred to in sub-section (1) shall not
be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original
F
arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof.
(3) Notwithstanding that an application has been made
under sub-section (1) and that the issue is pending before
the judicial authority, an arbitration may be commenced or
G continued and an arbitral award made."
9. It is evident from sub-section (3) of section 8 that the
pendency of an application under section 8 before any court
will not come in the way of an arbitration being commenced or
H continued and an arbitral award being made. The obvious
' VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA@ MANJU v. RAGHUNANDAN 587
SHARMA@ BABURAM [R.V. RAVEENDRAN. J.]
intention of this provision is that neither the filing of any suit by A
any party to the arbitration agreement nor any application being
made by the other party under section 8 to the court, should
obstruct or preclude a party from initiating any proceedings for
appointment of an arbitrator or proceeding with the arbitration
before the Arb1tral Tribunal. Having regard to the specific 8
provision in section 8(3) providing that the pendency of an
application under section 8(1) will not come in the way of an
arbitration being commenced or continued, we are of the view
that an application under section 11 or section 15(2) of the Act,
for appointment of an arbitrator, will not be barred by pendency C
of an application under Section 8 of the Act in any suit, nor will
the Designate of the Chief Justice be precluded from
considering and disposing of an application under Section 11
or 15(2) of the Act. It follows that if an arbitrator is appointed
by the Designate of the Chief Justice under section 11 of the
Act, nothing prevents the arbitrator from proceeding with the D
arbitration. It also therefore follows that the mere fact that an
appeal from an order dismissing the suit under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC (on the ground that the disputes require to be settled
by Arbitration) is pending before the High Court, will not come
in the way of the appointment of an arbitrator under section 11 E
read with section 15(2) of the Act, if the Authority under section
11 finds it necessary to appoint an Arbitrator. Therefore the first
contention of the appellant is liable to be rejected.
10. The appellant next contended that the parties to the F
dispute have not entered into an arbitration agreement, there
is no arbitration agreement in existence as contemplated under
section 7 of the Act, and the Authority under section 11 of the
Act was not justified in appointing an arbitrator.
11. The learned Designate held that an arbitration G
agreement need not be signed by the parties and if a provision
for arbitration is incorporated by a Testator in his Will, such a
provision will be binding on his children/legatees, after his
death. He held that a provision in a Will providing for arbitration,
in the event of a dispute among the legatees, is an arbitration H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C R.
A agreement under section 7 of the Act, for the purposes deciding
any disputes among the legatees. He relied upon a decision
of the Calcutta High Court in Raj Kumar v. Shiva Prasad Gupta
- [AIR 1939 Cal. 500] where it was observed that a father has
the power to refer to arbitration the disputes relating to a joint
B family property, provided such reference was for the benefit of
the family, and that an award made by an arbitrator upon such
reference, will be binding upon all members of the family,
including any minors.
12. We are of the view that the said decision has no
C relevance to the question on hand and at all events, is not of
any assistance to determine whether there was any arbitration
agreement, as contemplated under section 7 of the Act.
Section 7 defines 'arbitration agreement' as meaning an
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
D disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 7 require that an
arbitration agreement shall be in writing (whether it is in the form
of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate
E agreement). Sub-section (4) of section 7 enumerating the
circumstances in which an arbitration agreement will be
considered as being in writing, is extracted below:
"7(4). An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained
F in -
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means
of telecommunication which provide a record of the
G agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in
which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one
party and not denied by the other.
H 13. In this case, admittedly, there is no document signed
VIJAY KUMAR SHARMA@ MANJU v. RAGHUNANDAN 589
SHARMA@ BABURAM [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
by the parties to the dispute, nor any exchange of letters, telex, A
telegrams (or other means of telecommunication) referring to
or recording an arbitration agreement between the parties. It
is also not in dispu\e that there is no exchange of statement of
claims or defence Vihere the allegation of existence of an
arbitration agreement by one party is not denied by the other. B
In other words, tQ.ere -isrno arbitration agreement as defined in
section r. between thC..parties. In Jagdish Chander vs.
Ramesh Chander- 2007 (5) SCC 519, this Court held:
"The existence of an arbitration agreement as defined
under section 7 of the Act is a condition precedent for C
exercise of power to appoint an arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal,
under section 11 of the Act by the chief Justice or his
designate. It is not permissible to appoint an arbitrator to
adjudicate the disputes between the parties, in the
absence of an arbitration agreement of mutual consent." D
14. While the respondents rely upon the Will, the appellant
denies the existence of any such Will. The validity of the Will is
pending consideration in the two civil suits filed by the appellant
and the first respondent, referred to above. The alleged Will, E
admittedly, does not contain any provision for arbitration, though
the learned Designate has proceeded on an erroneous
assumption that the Will provides for arbitration. Even if the Will
had provided for reference of disputes to arbitration, it would
be merely an expression of a wish by the testator that the F
disputes should be settled by arbitration and cannot be
considered as an Arbitrator agreement among the legatees.
In this case, according to the respondents, the provision for
arbitration is not in the Will but in a subsequent declaration
allegedly made by Durganarayan Sharma, stating that if there
is any dispute in regard to his Will dated 28.12.2003, it shall G
be referred to his friend, U.M. Bhandari, Advocate, as the sole
arbitrator whose decision shall be final and binding on the
parties. A unilateral declaration by a father that any future
disputes among the sons should be settled by an arbitrator
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 1 S.C.R.
A named by him, can by no stretch of imagination, be considered
as an arbitration agreement among his children, or such of his
children who become parties to a dispute. At best, such a
declaration can be expression of a fond hope by a father that
his children, in the event of a dispute, should get the same
B settled by arbitration. It is for the children, if and when they
become parties to a dispute, to decide whether they would
heed to the advice of their father or not. Such a wish expressed
in a declaration by a father, even if proved, cannot be construed
as an agreement in writing between the parties to the dispute
c agreeing to refer their disputes to arbitration.
15. We are therefore of the view that there is no arbitration
agreement between the parties and the learned Designate
committed a serious error in allowing the application under
sections 11 and 15(2) of the Act and holding that there is an
D arbitration agreement between the parties to the dispute and
appointing an arbitrator.
16. What has been considered and decided above is only
the question whether there is an arbitration agreement or not.
E We have not examined or recorded any finding as to the
existence or validity of the Will dated 21.10.2003 or the
declaration dated 15.10.2005 said to have been made by Mr.
Durganarayan Sharma, propounded by the respondents and
denied by the appellant.
F 17. In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the
impugned order of the Designate of the Chief Justice
appointing an Arbitrator is set aside.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
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