Holding

The proviso to Section 6 is mandatory; the second Section 6 notification is time‑barred and the High Court’s judgment is per incuriam.

Summary

The appellants challenged a second notification issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, alleging it was barred by the one‑year limitation in the proviso to Section 6. The Supreme Court examined whether the proviso is a mandatory, peremptory rule and whether the High Court's earlier judgment, which failed to consider the limitation period, was per incuriam. Applying the literal rule of statutory interpretation, the Court held that the proviso is mandatory, the second notification dated 30‑Oct‑2006 is time‑barred, and the High Court’s judgment is per incuriam. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the State was directed to issue a fresh notification under Section 4 if it wishes to proceed.

Issues considered

Whether the proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory and renders a second Section 6 notification time‑barred.
Whether the High Court's earlier judgment is per incuriam for omitting the limitation period.
Whether estoppel can be invoked against a statutory provision.
Whether the State may issue a fresh notification under Section 4 after the second notification is held invalid.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Land acquisitionSection 6 notificationStatutory interpretationLiteral ruleMandatory provisionPer incuriamEstoppelMimamsa principles

Judgment

(2009] 14 S.C.R. 891

VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5614 of 2009)
AUGUST 18, 2009
B
[MARKANDEY KATJU AND ASOK KUMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
Sections 4, SA, 6 ...;. Notifications under Sections 4 and 6
- Challenged by filing a writ petition - High Court quashing
the Notification under Section 6 - Subsequently second
notice under Section 6 was issued - Writ petition rejected by
High Court - On appeal, Held: Second Notification is time- D
barred - The language of proviso to Section 6 is clear -
Hence literal interpretation to be applied - In the impugned
judgment no specific reference made in Clause (ii) to proviso
to Section 6, there has b(!en general reference to Section 6 -
Hence the observations in para 3 of the impugned judgment E
have to be construed as per incuriam - Impugned judgment
set aside - However, it is open to the State Government to
issue a fresh Notification under Section 6 and take
proceedings in accordance with law thereafter - Interpretation
of statutes - Literal interpretation.
F
Mimans~ Principles of Interpretation - Discussed.

maxims:

'Dura Lex Sed Lex - Meaning of.
G
Law and Equity:

When there is conflict between law and equity it is the law
which must prevail.
891 H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Law of Estoppal - There can be no estoppal against a •
statute. '
Judgments:

Judgment per incuriam - Meaning of - Discussed. ~

B
In respect of the lands in question, Notification under
Section 4 was issued. Thereafter Notification under
Section 6 was issued, which was challenged in a writ r
petition and quashed by the High Court. Again, a second
c Notification under Section 6 was issued and challenge
thereto was rejected by the High Court. Hence the
appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
(,.. I
D HELD: 1.1. Nishedha Vidhis of Mimansa Rules of
Interpretation is to be interpreted most comprehensively
and ,as mandatory. The proviso to Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act is totally mandatory and bears no
't
exceptions. [Paras 16 and 17) [900-E-F]
E
'{:: 1.2. The proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and
hence the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006
is t~me barred. When the language of the Statute is plain
and clear then the literal rule of interpretation has to be
F applied and there is ordinarily no scope for consideration
of equity, public interest or seeking the intention of the
legislature. It is only when the language of the Statute is
not clear or ambiguous or there is some conflict etc. or
the plain language leads to some absurdity that one can
depart from the literal rule of interpretation. [Para 18)
G
[900-G-H; 901-A]

1.3. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that
the language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule
of interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a
H conflict between the law and equity it is the law which
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 893
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

must prevail. As stated in the Latin Maxim 'Dura Lex Sed A
Lex' which means "the law is hard but it is the law". [Para
19] [901-B]

Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi 1892 ILR 14 All 67 and
.. Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of T.N. And B
Others (2002) 3 sec 533, relied on.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh
:>('
11th Edition, 2008; K.L. Sarkar's 'Mimansa Rules of
Interpretation', a collection of Tagore Law Lectures
delivered in 1905 and P. V. Kane's 'History of the c
Dharmashastra', Vol. V, Pt.II, Ch.XXIX and Ch.XXX, pp.
1282-1351, referred to.

2. There can be no estoppel against a Statute. Since
the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation provided D
in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act has to
be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have
no effect. The proviso is mandatory in nature, and must
operate with its full rigour. [Para 21] [902-D-E]

Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2007) 3 SCC 470, E
relied on.

3.1. The observations in para 3 of the impugned
judgment dated 20.1.2004 have to be regarded as per
incuriam. [Para 24] [904-C-D] F

3.2. In the aforesaid judgment no specific reference
has been made to the limitation period prescribed in
clause (ii) to proviso to Section 6 of the Act, though no
doubt Section 6 has been generally referred to. Hence,
G
the observations in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment
~
dated 20.1.2004 have to be construed as per incuriam.
[Para 24] [904-C-D]

3.3. The impugned judgment and order dated
H -
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 21.01.2008 is set aside. However, it is open to the
respondent-State of Maharashtra to issue a fresh
Notification under Section 4 _of the Act and take
proceedings in accordance with law thereafter. [Para 25]
(904-0-E]
B
Babu Parasu Kaikadi (Dead) by Lrs. vs. Babu (Dead)
through Lrs. (2004) 1 SCC 681, relied on.

Case Law Reference:

c 1892 ILR 14 All 67 relied on Para 7
(2002) 3 sec 533 relied on Para 18
(2007) 3 sec 470 relied on Para 21
(2004) 1 sec 681 relied on Para 24
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5614 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 21.1.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No. 2934 of
E 2007.
~
I
G.E. Vahanvati, Attorney General for India, Harish N. Salve,
Shyam Divan, Shekhar Naphade, D.A. Dave, Shyel Trehan,
Divya Kapur, Paromita Mukherjee, Hitesh Jain, Vikas Mehta,
..
F Rahul Joshi, Brij Kisha~ Sah, Lenin H. Hijam, M.P. Parthiban,
Shivaji M. Jadhav, Sanjay V. Kharde, Asha G. Nair, Mohit D.
Ram, Meenakshi Arora for the appearing parties.
The following Order of the Court was delivered
G ORDER

1. Heard Shri Harish Salve and Shri Shyam Divan, learned
senior counsel for the appellants and learned Attorney General
of India and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned learned senior
H counsel for the respondents.
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 895
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

2. Leave granted. A
' J
111111(
3. This appeal has been filed against the impugned
judgment and order dated 21.01.2008 passed by a Division
Bench of the High Court of Bombay whereby the writ petition
I
""'!!"'!J" filed by the appellants herein has been rejected.
-. B
4. The facts in brief are that a Notification under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for short 'the
Act') was issued in respect of the land in question on
29.8.2002. Thereafter a Notification under Section 6 of the Act
was issued on 18.6.2003. The said Notification under Section c
6 was challenged and the writ petition filed by the appellants
was allowed on 20.1.2004 and the Notification under Section
6 of the Act dated 18.06.2003 was quashed. Subsequently a
second Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 was
issued by the State Government. D

5. The short question that arises for consideration is
whether the Notification under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 is
valid. In our opinion, the said Notification was clearly barred by
clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act which reads
E
as under:-

"[Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section
(1),-
F
(i) ........................

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after
the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of
G
the notification;"
)
It can be seen from the aforesaid proviso to Section 6 that it is
couched in negative language. It is well settled that when a
Statute is couched in negative language it is ordinarily regarded
as peremptory and mandatory in nature. [See Principles of H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh 11th Edition, 2008
pages 390 to 392]. As stated by Crawford "Prohibitive or
negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory. And this is so
even though the statute provides no penalty for disobedience."
[See Crawford : Statutory Construction P. 523; See also in this
B connection Haridwar Singh vs. Begum Sumbra, Al R 1972 SC '\ml
'•
1242 (1247), Lachmi Narain vs. Union of India AIR 1976 SC
714 (726), Manna/al Khetan vs. Kedamath Khetan AIR 1977
SC 536 etc.]
'(
6. In this connection we may also refer to the Mimansa
c Rules of Interpretation, which were our traditional principles of
interpretation for over 2500 years, but which are unfortunately
ignored in our Courts of law today.

7. It is deeply regrettable that in our Courts of law lawyers
D quote Maxwell and Craies but nobody refers to the Mimansa
Principles of Interpretation. Most lawyers would not have even
heard of their existence. Today our so-called educated people
are largely ignorant about the great intellectual achievements •'
of our ancestors and the intellectual treasury which they have
E bequeathed us. The Mimansa Principles of Interpretation is part
of that great intellectual treasury, but it is distressing to note that
apart from the referenc~ to these principles in the judgment of
Sir John Edge, the then Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court
in Beni Prasad vs. Hardai Bibi 1892 ILR 14 All 67 (FB), a
F hundred years ago and in some judgments of one of us (M.
Katju, J.) there has been almost no utilization of these principles
even in our own country. Most of the Mimansa Principles are
rational and scientific and can be utilized in the legal field (see
in this connection K.L. Sarkar's 'Mimansa Rules of
Interpretation' which is a collection of Tagore Law Lectures
G
delivered in 1905 and which contains the best exposition of
these principles). ~

8. The Mimansa Principles of Interpretation, as laid down
by Jaimini in his sutras around 6th Century B.C. and as
H explained by Sabar, Kumarila Bhatta, Prabhakar, Mandan
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 897
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

Mishra, etc., were regularly used by our renowned jurists like A
~- Vijnaneshwara (author of Mitakshara), Jimutvahana (author of
1111111>
Dayabhaga), Nanda Pandit (author of Dattaka Mimansa), etc.
Whenever there was any conflict between two Smritis, e.g.,
Manusmriti and Yajnavalkya Smriti, or ambiguity or absurdity
..... in any Smriti these principles were utilized. Thus, the Mimansa B
Principles were our traditional system of interpretation of legal
'"""' texts. Although originally they were created for interpreting
religious texts pertaining to the Yagya (sacrifice), gradually they
came to be utilized for interpreting legal texts also (see in this
connection P.V. Kane's 'History of the Dharmashastra', Vol.V, c
Pt.II, Ch.XXIX and Ch.XXX, pp. 1282-1351), and also for
interpreting texts on philosophy, grammar, etc. i.e. they became
of universal application. Thus, Shankaracharya has used the
Mimansa adhikaranas in his bhashya on the Vedanta sutras.
9. While the first edition of Maxwell's book was published 0
in 1875, in India we have been doing interpretation for over
2500 years, as already stated above. There were hundreds of
books (all in Sanskrit) written on the subject, though only a few
dozens have survived the ravages of time, but even these show
how deep our ancestors went into the subject of interpretation . E
.......
10. To give an example the Mimansakas examine the
~ subject of negative Vidhis (negative injunctions such as the one
,,. in the proviso to Section 6) very searchingly and exhaustively.
First of all, they distinguish between what may be called F
prohibitions against the whole world, and those against
particular persons only. This distinction resembles that between
judgments or rights in rem and judgments or rights in personam.
The former prqhibitions are called Pratishedha and the latter
Paryudasa. For example, the prohibitory clause 'Do not eat
fermented (stale) food (na kalanjam bhakshayet) is a
G
Pratishedha; while the prohibition 'those who have taken the
Prajapati vow must not see the rising sun' is a Paryudasa. In
the second place, Pratished has are divided practically into two
sub-clauses viz. those which prohibit a thing without any
H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) $.C.R.

A referenc~ to the manner in which it may be used, and those
which prohibit it only as regards a particular mode of using. For
instance, 'Do not eat fermented food' prohibits the use of it
c-under all circumstances, while 'Do not use the Sorasi vessel
at dead of night' .(orbids the use of the vessel only at the dead
B of night.

11. Then Paryudasa is also of two kinds. In one case, it
relates to a person performing some special act which is not
enjoined by a Vidhi~ as in the case of the Prajapati vow. In the
C other, it relates to a person engaged in performing1 a Vidhi; as
for instance, when one is to do Shradh during the full moon by
virtue of a Vidhi but not in the night of the full moon. In this case,
the prohibition of doing Shradh in the night is a Paryudasa,
which is the same as an exception or proviso as we understand
these terms. For, the clause 'not in the night' is an exception
D to the rule 'Perform the Shradh during the full moon'. These are
the four classes of negative clauses. The first class, of which
the Kalanja (fermented food) clause is an example, may well
be called a condemnatory prohibition. The second class
consists also of absolute prohibitions of things under certain
E circumstances, as in the case of the Sorasi vessel. The third
class consists of prohibitions in relation to persons in a given
situation, as in the case of the Prajapati vow. The fourth class
restricts the scope of action of persons engaged in fulfilling an
injunction, as regards the time, place or manner of carrying out ....
F the substantive element of the injunction.

12. Thus we see that in the Mimansa system as regards
negative injunctions (such as the one contained in the proviso
to Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act) there is a much deeper
discussion on the subject than that done by Western Jurists.
G The Western writers on the subject of interpretation (like
Maxwell, Craies, etc.) only say that ordinarily negative words
are mandatory, but there is no deeper discussion on the subject,
no classification of the kinds of negative injunctions and their
effects.
H
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 899
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

. J 13. In the Mimansa system illustrations of many principles
of interpretation are given in the form of maxims (nyayas). The
negative injunction is illustrated by the Kalanj.a nyaya or Kalanja
maxim.
A

14. The Kalanja maxim (na kalanjam bhakshayet) states
that 'a general condemnatory text is to be understood not only B
as prohibiting an act, but also the tendency, including the
·intention and attempt to do it.' It is thus mandatory.
>:
15. A plain reading of the proviso to Section 6 of the Land
--{
Acquisition Act shows that it is a general prohibition against c
the whole world and not against a particular person. Hence the
Kalanja maxim of the Mimansa system will in our opinion apply
to the proviso to Section 6.
.... 16. Laughakshi Bhaskara, one of the great Mimansa
D
writers, taking the prohibitory text 'one is not to eat Kalanja or

-
fermented/stale food' (na kalanjam bhakshayet), explains the
idiomatic force of the phrase (na bhakshayet). He explains that
the suffix 'yat' means 'shall', and that the negative particle 'not'
is to be taken as attached to the suffix 'yat' (shall), and not to
the idea of Kalanja eating. For if it be taken as attached to the E
latter idea, then the sentence might mean 'you shall eat but not
Kalanja'. In this case strictly there would be no prohibition. So
t
,.. he labours to demonstrate that the gist of the sentence is 'shall
not' and therefore the object of it is to turn off from eating
,-
Kalanja (fermented/stale food). This may appear to be making F
a hair splitting distinction, but it is of great importance from the
Mirnansa point of view because it indicates the mandatory
.... nature of the negative injunction (nishedha). The explanation of
a Nishedha Vidhi appears more clearly from Jaimini's Sutras
")
on the Kalanja maxim. G

The objector says :

In a case of prohibition, mentally you entertain the
idea of the action prohibited~ for you have to discriminate
H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A between the prohibited act and the negation of that act.

. The objector means to say 'what is the good of a
' ,
prohibition when it invites the imagination to gloat on the
action prohibited'. The author answers :
B 'When an act is enjoined by the Shastra, it is for the
purpose of the good of a person; if the good object be
divorced from the meaning of the Shastra, then it becomes
a case of transgressing it.'

c The meaning of this is:

'In a case of prohibition you must take it that not only
is the particular external act prohibited, but the very
intention of it is also prohibited:'
~
I
D Roughly speaking, the principle Jaid down is this : ,,_

E
'In a case of prohibition one should abstain from the
very idea of the act prohibited, and there ought to be no
evasion of the Vidhi in any way.'

Thus, this class of Nishedha Vidhis is to be
-
. interpreted most comprehensively and as mandatory.

17. In view of the above discussion, it is evident that the
proviso. to S.ection 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is totally
..
. ... '
F mandatory a.n~. bears no exceptions. -,
'
18. In fact, ·a Constitution bench decision of this Court in
Padma- SundaFa Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of T.N. And
Others (2002) 3 SCC 533 is clearly in support of the
?
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that the
G proviso to Section 6 is mandatory, and hence the Notification
<
under Section 6 dated 30.10.2006 is time barred. In our
opinion, when the language of the Statute is plain and clear then
the litera~ rule of interpretation has to be applied and there is
ordinarily no scope for consideration of equity, public interest
H
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 901
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

or seeking the intention of the legislature. It is only when the A
language of the Statute is not clear or ambiguous or there is
some conflict etc. or the plain language leads to some absurdity
that one can depart from the literal rule of interpretation.

19. A perusal of the proviso to Section 6 shows that the
B
language of the proviso is clear. Hence the literal rule of
interpretation must be applied to it. When there is a conflict
between the law and equity it is the law which must prevail. As
stated in the Latin Maxim 'Dura Lex Sed Lex' which means "the
law is hard but it is the law".
c
20. Learned Attorney General appearing for the
respondents submitted that the judgment of the High Court

- dated 20.1.2004 permitted the authorities to issue a second
Section 6 Notification even beyond the time provided by the
proviso to Section 6 of the Act. He has invited our intention to D
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the said judgment which reads:-

"2. Having gone through the record of the petition and the
file which is made available to us by Mr. Patil, with respect
to the acquisition of lands of the Petitioners, we are of the
E
view that the Petitioners did not appear to have been
afforded reasonable opportunity as is required under
Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. No reasons
are insisted upon injustification of this conclusion which we
have arrived at as declaration under Section 6 issued
concerning the lands of the Petitioner dated 29.8.2002 will F
have to be set aside and the same is hereby quashed and
set aside. The Petitioner need inspection of the record
from the office of the Land Acquisition Officer, Mr. Patil,
A.G.P. Assures that within one week from today,
inspection will be offered to the Petitioners. G

Dr. Tulzapurkar states that the Petitioner will file their
objections within two weeks thereafter.

3. All parties agree that hearing contemplated under
H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Section 5A by the Special Land Acquisition Officer should
be completed within two months thereafter as far as
possible. Dr. Tulzapurkar makes a statement on
instructions from the Petitioner that the objections with
respect to the period within which Section 6 notification
B has to be issued from the date of Section 4 notification, ~-

will not be raised by the Petitioner if the Petitioners are
finally aggrieved by the 5A report and subsequent
declaration under Section 6. Needless to say that the
J'.
Special Land Acquisition Officer should pass a reasoned
c Order when he considers the objections from the
Petitioners. The entire proceeding will be based on
Section 4 notice which has led to the present proceedings
and that notice will continue to govern the acquisition of

D
these lands."
..
...
21. In our opinion, there can be no estoppel against a
Statute. Since the Statute is very clear, the period of limitation
provided in Clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act
has to be followed, and concessions of the counsel can have
no effect. As already stated above, the proviso is mandatory
E in nature, and must operate with its full rigour vide Ashok
Kumar vs. State of Haryana (2007). 3 SCC 4 70 (para 17).

22. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Maharashtra then submitted that the
F judgment dated 20.1.2004 in the earlier writ petition No. 9248/
2003 is res judicata and since the said judgment was not
challenged before this Court, it had become final. He submitted
that in the aforesaid judgment it had been clearly stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioners on instructions from the
petitioners that the objection with respect to the limitation period
G
within which the second Section 6 Notification wi" be issued ~

will not be raised by the petitioners if the petitioners are finally
aggrieved by the Section 5A report and subsequent declaration
under Section 6 of the Act. Accordingly, he submitted that now
no objection can be taken in the present proceedings urging
H
VIJAY NARAYAN THATTE & ORS. v. STATE OF 903
MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
' ' the bar of limitation provided in clause (ii) to the proviso to A
Section 6 of the Act.

1
. '23. In this connection, we wish to state that no statement
or concession of a learned counsel can override a mandatory
statutory provision. B
24. Moreover, the observations in para 3 of the judgment
dated 20.1.2004 have to be regarded as per incuriam. In this
" connection we may refer to the decision of a three Judge Bench
of this Court in the case of Babu Parasu Kaikadi (Dead) by
Lrs. vs. Babu (Dead) through Lrs. (2004) 1 SCC 681 wherein c
in paras 15 to 17 it has been observed as under:-

"15. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 26 it is
stated :
- .
"A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has D
acted in ignorance of a previous deCision of its own or of
a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case
before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow;
or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords
decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when E
the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a
statute or rule having statutory force."
•
16. In State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. This
-t-
' Court observed : (SCC pp. 162-63, para 40) F
"40. 'lncuria' literally means 'carelessness'. In practice per

- incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts
have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of
stare decisis. The 'quotable in iaw' is avoided and ignored
if it is rendered, 'in ignoratium of a statute or other binding G
authority'. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.) Same has
been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while
interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies
the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law."
H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 17. In Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao it has been
held as follows :(SCC p. 264, para 8)
'·
"The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court l
~
omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court
or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where
B
a court omits to cons_ider any statute while deciding that
issue."
;..
..
It may be seen from the judgment dated 20.1.2004 of the High
Court that in the aforesaid judgment no specific reference has
c been made to the limitation period prescribed in clause (ii) to
proviso to Section 6 of the Act, though no doubt Section 6 has
been generally referred to. Hence, in our opinion, the
observations in paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment dated
20.1.2004 have to be construed as per incuriam. ,,,_
D
25. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow this appeal
and set aside the impugned judgment and order dated
21.01.2008. However, it is open to the respondent-State of
Maharashtra to issue a fresh Notification under Section 4 of the
Act and take proceedings in accordance with law thereafter.
E
Appeal allowed. No order as to the costs.

G.N. Appeal allowed. 4.

-
!
t-