Holding

Order X is an enabling provision and does not preclude the court from seeking clarification at any time, and the court may validly exercise its inherent power under Section 151 CPC to strike off the defence.

Summary

The appellant and respondent married and later separated, with the appellant filing for divorce in a U.S. court while the respondent returned to India and filed a suit for judicial separation and maintenance. The Delhi High Court, through a Single Judge, initially restrained the appellant from proceeding in the U.S. court for 30 days and later ordered the appellant to appear personally under Order X of the CPC to clarify matters. The appellant failed to appear, leading the court to strike off his defence under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that Order X did not apply, that an injunction could not be issued against a foreign court under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, and that the court’s inherent powers were improperly invoked. The Supreme Court held that Order X is an enabling provision and does not bar the court from seeking clarification at any stage, and that the court may exercise its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to pass consequential orders in the interest of justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

The applicability of Order X CPC to compel personal appearance of a party before the first hearing of a suit.
Whether an injunction restraining proceedings in a foreign court is barred by Section 41(a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act.
The scope of the court’s inherent power under Section 151 CPC to strike off a defence and pass consequential orders.
The validity of the Delhi High Court’s interim restraint order against the appellant in the foreign divorce proceeding.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order X, s. Section 151
Specific Relief Acts. Section 41(a), s. Section 41(b)

Subjects

Order X CPCSection 151 CPCinherent powersinjunctionforeign courtSpecific Relief Actpersonal appearancedefence struck offjudicial separationmaintenance

Judgment

A VIK.AS AGGARWAL
v.
ANUB HA

APRIL 12, 2002

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

Civil Procedure Code. 1908; Order X, XX.XIX, Section 151.

Order X-Examination of Parties-Scope and ambit of-Held, It is an
C enabling provision for the Court to seek clarification from any party at any ·
date even before the date fu:ed for framing issues in the interest of justice.

Section 151-Inherent power of the Court-Exercise of-Held, it is open
for the Court to pass a suitable consequential order as may be necessary for
D meeting the ends of justice-Specific Relief Act; Section 41(a) and (b).

Appellant and respondent had solemnized marriage and went to U.S.A.
but did not pull on well and appellant filed a Divorce petition in u;s.A.
Meanwhile respondent managed to return tolndia and filed a suit for judicial
separation and for payment of maintenance allowance. Single Judge passed
E an interim order directing the appellant-defendant to get the hearing in
divorce case pending in the Superior Court in U.S.A. deferred for a period
of 30 days. Appellant instead of complying with the order moved an
application for recall of the Order passed by the Single Judge and
subsequently informed the Court that Superior Court in U.S.A. had passed a
decree of divorce in the pending matter. Single Judge directed the respondent
F to appear in person by issuing an Order under Order X, CPC, against which ·
appellant preferred an appeal but with-drew it later. Ultimately, the High
Court struck down the defence of the appellant. Aggrie)'ed, appellant
preferred an appeal which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High
Court. Hence the present appeal.

G It was contended for the appellant that Order X, C.P.C. would not be
applicable at all and the Order of the High Court in that respect was invalid;
that a party can be examined under Order X on the 1st hearing of the suit
since 1st hearing date would not be any date before a date fixed for settlement
of issues; and that under Order X Rule 4, defendant's personal attendance
H was not necessary; that no material or important question relating to the suit
1084
VIKAS AGGARWAL v. ANUBHA 1085
need to be answered by the defendant; and that no injunction order could be A
passed against a foreign Court under Section 4l(a) and (b) of the Specific
Relief Act.

It was contended for the respondent that Section 4l(a) and (b) of the
Specific Relief Act put a bar on Courts to pass an order in relation to Superior
Courts in India and not apply to Courts in foreign country; that restraint B
order was against the defendant restraining him from proceeding further in
the matter for a period of one month; that under the circumstances of the
case, Single Judge was justified to order defendant-appellant to personally
appear before the Court for clarification; and that inherent powers of the
Court under Section 151 CPC can be exercised in the interest of justice. C
Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. There was nothing in Order XXXIX of the Code which
expressly or by necessary implication precluded the exercise of inherent power
of Court under Section 151 CPC and it was open for the Court to pass a D
suitable consequential Order striking off th~ defence under Section 151 CPC
as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process
-"' . of Court (1091-F]

Mis. Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd v. Kanhaya Lal Bhargava
and Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 856 and Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja E
Seth Hira/a/, (1962] Supp. 1 SCR 450, relied on.

2. The question regarding first date of hearing is too technical a ground
to consider the matter like the present one. Order X CPC in an enabling
provision providing that the Court at the first hearing of the suit shall ascertain
from each party about their pleadings. It does not in any manner place any F
bar on the powers of the Court to seek clarification from any party in an
appropriate case, at.any date earlier than one fixed for framing of issues so
as to advance the interest of justice. It would not be in violation of Order X
CPC or in conflict thereof. Considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case, no interference is called for under Article 136 of the Constitution. G
[1092-B-C)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 2660 of
2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.10.2000 of the Delhi High H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R .

. ·. A Court in F.A.O. No. 281 of 2000.
Vikas Singh and Vishwajit Singh for the Appellant.
-- '
•

Dr. Shanti Bhushan, K.K. Lahiri, Ejaz Maqbool, Ujjwal Kumar Jha,
Aslam Ahmed and Ranjan Kumar Jha for the Respondent.
B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BRdESH KUMAR, J. Leave granted.

Heard learned counsel for the parties. This appeal has been preferred
C against the judgment and order dated 18. l 0.2000 passed by Delhi High Court
dismissing the appeal challenging the order by which appellant's defence was
struck of in the proceeding, suit No. 1966 of 1999 pending in Delhi High
Court on the Original side.

The appellant and the respondent were married on 11.05.1999. Thereafter
D they went to USA. They do not seem to have pulled on well so much so that
the appellant filed a divorce petition in America as early as on 22.7.1999. . '
The notice of the said proceedings was served on the respondent. She however,
left America and somehow managed to come back to India. She filed a suit
on 6.9.1999 in Delhi High_ Court being Suit No. 1966 of 1999 impleading the
appellant Shri Vikas Agarwal as defendant and praying that a decree be
E passed declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to live separately, for maintenance
amounting to 1500 dollars (Rs. 65,250) expenses pendantalite etc. and for
such other, further orders, directions as the Court would deem fit and proper .
I

in the circumstances of the case, so as to meet the ends of justice. The $-
learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court passed an interim order on 5.11.1999
F in the following terms:-

"For the present in the interest of justice, and since no permanent .'
prejudice is likely to be caused to the Defendants if the hearing in l
I
I-
divorce case pending in the Superior Court, State of Connecticut,
U.S.A. is deferred for a short period, I restrain the Defendant from
G proceeding further in the Superior Court, State at Connecticut, U.S.A.
for a period of thirty days from today."
The appellant however, moved an application on 12.11.1999 for recall
of the order dated 5.11.1999. The Court was later on informed on 16.12.1999
that decree for divorce had been passed at Connecticut U.S.A. The learned
H Single Judge, on 9.3.2000 passed an order, directing the defendant to appear
,_
I
VIKAS AGGARWAL v. ANUBHA [BRIJESH KUMAR. J.J I 087

--
•
in person, under order 10 C.P.C. The defendant preferred an appeal against ·A
the Order dated 9.3.2000 before the Division Bench which was withdrawn
with a statement that an application will be moved before the learned Single
Judge for recall of the order. It will not be necessary to mention about many
other applications, which have been moved in that connection from time to
time. The fact remains that ultimately by order dated 24.8.2000, the Court
· struck of the defence of the appellaat: The operative part of the order reads B
as under:-

"It is quite clear that despite several opportunities granted to the
defendant to appear before this Court he has resolutely refused to do
so. The defence of defendant is therefore, struck of.". C
An appeal preferred against the said order before the Division Bench
of the High Court has also been dismissed which order has been impugned
in the present appeal.

It appears that need to seek clarification from the defendant-appellant
arose when it came to the notice of the learned Single Judge of Delhi High D
•
Court that on 23rd November, 1999 the Court in Amerjca passed decree of
divorce despite the order of restraint against the defendant passed on 5.11.1999.
The Court seems to have doubts if the order passed by it was truly
communicated to the American Court since there was no mention at all about
that fact in the order passed by the American Court. The appellant also E
moved an application for seeking exemption from appearing in the Court in
Delhi, as he apprehended .that on coming to India he may be arrested in
pursuance of the proceedings initiated against him under Section 498-A of
the Indian Penal Code. By order dated July 3, 2000 the learned Single Judge
took care of the same and provided that the defendant would not be arrested
in pursuance to any complaint or pending FIR filed by the plaintiff. The F
defendant was required to appear on August 24, 2000. He again failed to
appear in the Court, instead an affidavit of the Attorney of the appellant in
America was filed stating that he had brought the injunction order to the
notice of the American Court, but the Court had refused to enforce any
restraint order, as Indian Court had no jurisdiction over the U.S. Court's G
proceedings. Such information, it is submitted on behalf of Respondent, as
furnished through affidavit also leads to the inference that the interim order
dated November 5, I 999 was not correctly placed at all before the American
Court as the Delhi High Court had not passed any order putting any restraint
• American Court to. proceed with the matter. The restraint order was
on the
against the defendant; namely the appellant before us. !t is submitted on H ;
. 1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] 2 S.C.R. t
A behalf of the Respondent that the defendant-appellant should also have moved
appropriate application along with interim order before the court in America:
In this back ground, the learned Single Judge ordered for presence of the
- t

defendant in Court under Order I 0 CPC. On non-compliance of the said
order, ultimately the defence was struck of.
B Shri Vikas Singh learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
vehemently urged that Order X CPC would not be applicable at all and the
order of the Delhi High Court in that respect is invalid. Our attention has
been brought to Order X CPC which reads as under:-

Examination of parties by the Court.
c I. Ascertainment whether allegations in pleadings are admitted or
denied - At the first hearing of the suit the court shall ascertain from
each party or his pleader whether he admits or denies such allegations
of fact as are made in the plaint or written statement (if any) of the
opposite party, and as are not expressly or by necessary implication
D admitted or denied by the party against whom they are made. The
court shall record such admission and denials.

2. Oral examination of party, or companion of party.- (1) At the .:v-
first hearing of the suit, the court

(a) shall, with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in the
E suit examine orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in
person or present in the court, as it deems fit; and
(b) may orally examine any person, able to answer any material
question relating to the suit, by whom any party appearing in
person or present in court or his pleader is accompanied.
F
(2) At any subsequent hearing the court may orally examine
any party appearing in person or present in court, or any
person, able to answer any material question relating to the
suit, by whom such party or his pleader is accompanied.

G (3) The court may, if it thinks fit, put in the course of an
examination un~er this rule questions suggested by either
party. ·-
3. Substance of examination to be written. The substance of the
examination shall be reduced to writing by the J1;1dge, and shall form part of
H the record.
...,. VlKAS AGGARWAL v. ANUB HA [BRIJESH KUMAR, J.] 1089
....' __ _ 4. Consequence of refusal or inability of pleader to answer. (I) Where A
the pleader of any party who appears by a pleader or any such person
accompanying a pleader as is referred to in Rule 2, refuses or is
unable to answer any material question relating to the suit which the
court is of opinion that the party whom he represents ought to answer,
and is likely to be able to answer if interrogated in person, the court B
may postpone the hearing of the suit to a fupire day and direct that
such party shall appear in person on such day.
(2) If such party fails without lawful excuse to appear in person on
the day so appointed, the court may pronounce judgment against
him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit." C

On the basis of the above provision, it is submitted that a party can be
examined under Order X CPC on the first hearing of the suit, but L'tat stage
has not yet reached in the present case. It is submitted that first hearing of
the suit would not be any date before a date fixed for settlement of issues.
In that connection, he has placed reliance upon certain decisions in which D
first date of hearing has been indicated in reference to rent control disputes
between landlord and tenant. The next contention is that under Rule. 4 of
Order X a party may be required to appear where the counsel or the person
accompanying the pleader refuses to or is unable to answer any material
question relating to the suit. In the present case, it is submitted that the
information sought was furnished to the Court. There was no refusal on the E
part of the counsel or the person accompanying the counsel, namely father
of the defendant appellant to answer the questions. Therefore, it was not
necessary to order for personal attendance of the defendant. Yet another
submission is that question in relation to which a party is required to be
present to be examined should be an important or material question relating
to tl)e suit. It is submitted that the defendant was not required to give F
clarification to any such important or material question. It is submitted that
for the above three reasons the order is bad. Yet another submission which
has been made is that no order of injunction could be passed against a foreign
court in view of the provisions contained under Section 4l(a) and (b) of the
Specific Relief Act. G

-- Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
re&pondent submitted that the questions raised by the learned counsel for the
.)
appellant are not relevant, since undisputedly there is non-compliance of the
order passed by the Court requiring the defendant to be personally present in
the Court. It is submitted that the Section 41 (a) and (b) of the Specific Relief H·
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A Act would not bar passing of an order as passed on 5.11.1999 by the learned
Single Judge of Delhi High Court since such a bar is in relation to the
superior Courts i.e. to say the Courts in India, it would not apply to Courts
out side India and next that the restraint order is against the party namely, the
defendant, who was restrained from proceedings in the matter for a period of
B one month. (reliance has been placed on [1987] l sec 496 Oil arid Natural
Gas Commission v. Western Company of North America. It has been held in
an appropriate case, it is open to pass a restraint order against a party in
proceedings pending in foreign courts. It is further submitted that the learned
Single Judge had passed the injunction order on 5.11.1999 for a period of
one month, bi.It the decree was.granted on 23.11.1999. ,The defendant was
C •bou~d by the o;der _and should not have taken any steps in furtheran·ce of the
proceeµings pending in American Court. On the other hand, the decree of
divorce shows that the decree was sought and passed on agreement (no fault
divorce) between the parties which is described as fair and equitable. The
agreement is also stated to be attached with the decree. It is also to be seen
that columns meant for alimony etc. were left blank. The· defendant was
D restrained by the learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court, at the instance
of the wife, the respondent, from further proceeding in the divorce case. It
is submitted that this itself shows that the divorce was far from one on the
basis of agreement. In this view of the matter, · learned counsel for the
respondent· submits that the Court rightly felt need for personal appearance
E of ,the defendant for clarification. The defendant failed to appear on one
ground or the other and lastly on the ground of apprehension of loosing job
in America.

This Court also gave time to the_ learned counsel for the appellant to
find out in case it would be possible for him to appear before the learned
F Singie Judge of Delhi High Court. The learned ~ounsel has placed before the
Court a letter received from the appellant addressed to his counsel dated
March 7,2002 expressing his inability to visit mdia for another 6 to 9 months
due to financial and job constraints .. He further informs that he is involved
in many mission- critical projects .. Therefore, granting of leave, would also
G not be possible, to him. It is also indicated that he has no property, no house,
no bank account, no job and no place to live in India. These facts are hardly
relevant for the purposes of present matter. We need not go into the other
facts and circumstances, which have been placed by the learned counsel for
the respondent _to show the manner in which, within two months of the
marriage, the appellant had filed "no fault divorce" in American Court and
H obtained decree on agreement in the teeth of injunction order dated 5. 11.1999
'
VIKAS AGGARWAL v. ANUBHA [BRJJESH KUMAR, J.] I 091

passed by Delhi High Court and the appellant having abandoned the plaintiff- A
· respondent in America and the difficulties with which she managed to return
to India.

Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent submits that in the facts and circumstances of the case as indicated
above, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court was quite justified B
in requiring the defendant-appellant to personally appear before the Court for
his clarification. It is further submitted that the affidavit of the counsel for the
appellant in America annexed with the affidavit filed in the trial court was
not enough to clarify the position and the father of the appellant, as found by
the trial court, could not throw further light in the matter, having not been C
present during the proceedings in America. So far the question regarding first
date of hearing is concerned, it is too technical a ground to consider the
matter like one in hand. The decisions which have been relied upon relate to
the disputes between tenant and landlord and while interpreting the term
"first date", the provisions of the Rent Control Statutes have also been taken

- into account. It is submitted that inherent powers of the Court under Section
151 C.P.C. can always be exercised to advance interests of justice and the
technicalities will have no place in such matters. In this connection a reference
has been made to a decision of this Court reported in (1966) 3 S.C.R. 856
D

- Mis. Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Kanhaya Lal Bhargava
and Ors. In this case also the defendant was required to attend the Court to E
answer certain questions but flouted the order and did not appear. Ultimately
the defence was struck of. The contention that inherent powers under Section
151 CPC could not be exercised was repelled and it was held that there was
nothing in Order XXXIX of the Code which expressly or by necessary
implication precluded the exercise of inherent power of Court under Section
151 CPC and it was open for the Court to pass a suitable consequential order F
under Section 151 CPC as may be necessary for ends of justice or to prevent
the abuse of process of Court. A reference has also been made to a decision
reported in 1962 Supp. I SCR 450 . Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur
Rao Raja Seth Hiralal so as to indicate the wide scope of Section 151 CPC
where as per the majority view, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
it was open to pass an injunction order under Section 151 CPC where it may G
not be in conflict with any provision of .Order XXXIX of the Code or other
provision of law. The submission which has been advanced by the learned
counsel for the respondent is that in the present case the learned trial court
was totally justified in requiring the presence of the defendant and on his
failure to comply with that order the trial court rightly struck of defence H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R ..

A which order would be perfectly justified in view of inherent powers' of the
Court under Section 151 CPC besides other powers vested in it. ---e.
.
We would like to observe that Order X CPC in an enabling provision
prcviding that the court at the first hearing of the sui\ shall ascertain from
each party about their pleadings. It does not in any manner place any bar on
B the powers of the court to seek clarification from any party in an appropriate
case, at any date earlier than one fixed for framing of issues so as to advance
the Interest of justice. It would not be in violation of Order X CPC or in
conflict thereof. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we agree
with the submission made on behalf of the respondent and find that the
C appeal lacks merit so as to call for any interference by us under Article 136
of the Constitution.

In the result the appeal is dismissed with cost

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

-