Holding

The burden to prove that a confession was voluntary rests on the department, and a retracted confession cannot by itself justify a penalty; it must be substantively corroborated by independent evidence.

Summary

Vinod Solanki's office was searched and cash seized; he subsequently made statements to Enforcement officials under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) admitting to foreign exchange remittances, but later retracted those statements alleging coercion. The authorities imposed a Rs 10 lakh penalty based largely on the confession. The Tribunal and the High Court placed the burden on Solanki to prove the confession was obtained by threat, contrary to law. The Supreme Court held that the initial burden to prove a confession's voluntariness lies on the department, and a retracted confession cannot alone support a penalty; it must be corroborated by independent evidence. Consequently, the Tribunal and High Court orders were set aside and the appeal was allowed, with the seized cash refunded to the appellant.

Issues considered

The burden of proof for the voluntariness of a confession under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, especially when the confession is retracted.
Whether a retracted confession can be used as the sole basis for imposing a penalty under the Act.
Whether Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act applies to confessions made before non‑police authorities under the Act.
Whether the Act imposes a reverse burden of proof under Section 71.
The requirement of independent corroboration for a retracted confession in quasi‑criminal proceedings.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 164
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973s. 50, s. 71(2), s. 8(3), s. 9(1)(a)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 24

Subjects

retracted confessionburden of proofForeign Exchange Regulation ActpenaltyIndian Evidence Actquasi‑criminal proceedingreverse burdencorroboration

Judgment

,IJ

[2008] 16 S.C.R. 1070

VINOD SOLANKI
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 7407 of 2008)
DECEMBER 18, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act: ss.8(3), 9(1) -
Violation of - Confession - Retraction of - Imposition of ' !

c penalty- Tribunal placed burden to prove that c;onfession was \-"f ' y

D
obtained from him by threat, coercion or force upon
proceedee - Affirmed by High Court - Held: Initial burden to
prove that confession was voluntary in nature and not obtained
as an outcome of threat is on the department - Special or
peculiar knowledge of person proceeded against would not
-
relieve prosecution or department altogether of burden of
producing evidence in support· of its case - With a view to
arrive at a finding as regards the voluntary nature of statement
or otherwise of a confession which has since been retracted,
r
the Court must bear in mind attending circumstances which
E would include time of retraction, nature thereof, manner in
which such retraction was made and other relevant factors -
Law does not say that the accused has to prove that retraction
of confession made by him was because of threat, coercion, ...
etc. but the requirement is that it may appear to the court as
F such - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.24.
The office premises of appellant was searched and
Indian currency amounting to Rs.2.65 lakhs was
" -4 '
recovered. Appellant was detained. On the next two ,
succeeding dates, he allegedly made two statements
G before the authorities under the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 disclosing that all the transactions
in the name of two companies related to import of goods
made by him and stating that no import of goods took
place in the name of said companies. He also confessed )--.. :
H 1070
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1071

that he was responsible for remittance of foreign A
exchange worth US $ 11,400 and US $ 22,830. In view of
the said purported confession, he was arrested for
violation of provisions of a.8(3) and s.9(1 )(a) of the Act.
When he was produced before CMM, he filed an
application retracting his confession. Respondent, B
however, initiated proceedings under s.8 (3) of the Act. A
show-cause Notice was issued on him. In reply to show-
cause Notice, appellant stated that no reliance should be
placed on the retracted confessional statement unless the
same was corroborated sub~tantially in material c
particulars by some independent evidence.
The appropriate authority relying on the basis of
confession made by appellant imposed a consolidated
penalty of Rs.10 lakhs. It held that appellant was guilty
of contravention of s.8 (3) to the extent of US $ 34,230 in D
as much as he failed to utilize the said foreign exchange
for the purpose it was released to him. Further, it also held
him guilty of contravention of charge under s.9(1)(a) of
the Act for the same amount in as much he deposited in
a foreign bank account without exemption from RBI.
Appellant filed appeal before the Tribunal. Tribunal placed E
the onus of proof upon appellant that the confession was
obtained from him by threat, coercion or force. The
Tribunal held that retraction alone would not make the
confession inadmissible and as even retracted
confessional statement may be- sufficient to hold the F
proceedee guilty of violation of the provisions of the Act,
imposition of penalty was legally permissible. High Court
affirmed the decision of the Tribunal. Hence the present
appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court G
HELD:1. The proceeding under the Foreign
Exchange Regulation Act is quasi criminal in nature. The
Act is a special Act, which confers various powers upon
the authorities prescribed therein. Even the sarutory
principles of mens rea and actus reus in a proceeding H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

-
\.-

A under the Act may not be held to be applicable. It is now
a well settled principle that presumption of .innocence as
contained in Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on 4;.'.-
I.:
Civil and Political Rights is a human right although per
se it may not be treated to be a fundamental right within
B the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The
Act, thus, does not provide for a 'reverse burden'. No
presumption of commission of an offence is raised under
the Act. [Paras 17, 19 and 21] [1083-H; 1084-8-D-G]
Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2008) 9 SCALE \ .....
c 681; Alok Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal (2p06) 13
SCALE 467 and BabubhaiUdesinh Parmar vs. State of
Gujarat (2006) 12 SCC 268, relied on.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article
11 (1 ); European Convention for the protection of Human
D Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) Article 6.2;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
Article 14.2, referred to.
2.1. It is a trite law that evidences brought on record
by way of confession which stood retracted must be·
E substantially corroborated by other independent and
cogent evidences, which would lend adequate assurance
to the court that it may seek to rely thereupon. [Para 22]
[1085-G-H]
Pon Adithan v. Deputy Director, Narcotics Control
F Bureau, Madras (1999) 6 SCC 1, relied on.
2.2. The initial burden to prove that the confession
was voluntary in nature would be on the Department. The
special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded
'. 'I

against would not relieve the prosecution or the
Department altogether of the burden of producing some
G
evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It may only
alleviate that burden to discharge and very slight
evidence may suffice. [Para 25] [1087-G-H; 1088-A]
~
Shanti Prasad Jain vs. The Director of Enforcement
(1963) 2 SCR 297; K. T.M.S. Mohd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1073
...
(1992) 3 SCC 178; Collector of Customs, Madras & ors. Vs. A
. D. Bhoormall (1974) 2 SCC 544; Ramesh Chandra Mehta
vs. State of West Bengal (1969) 2 SCR 461; State (NCT of
< .; Delhi) vs. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru (2005) 11 SCC
600; Mirah Exports Pvt. Ltd. vs. Collector of Customs (1998)
3 SCC 292; Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs. J.D. B
Orgochem Ltd. (2008) 6 SCALE 669; K./. Pavunny vs.
Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin
(1997) 3 SCC 721; Assistant Collector of Central Excise,
Rajamundry vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. & Ors. (2000) 7
>--~
SCC 53 and Gu/am Hussain Shaikh Chougule vs. S.
Reynolds, Supdt. of Customs, Marmgoa (2002) 1 SCC 155,
c
referred to .
.. 2.3. A person accused of commission of an offence
is not expected to prove to the hilt that confession had
been· obtained from him by any inducement, threat or
D
promise by a person in authority. The burden is on the
prosecution to show that the confession is voluntary in
nature and not obtained as an outcome of threat, etc. if
the same is to be relied upon solely for the purpose of
securing a conviction. With a view to arrive at a finding
as regards the voluntary nature of statement or otherwise E
of a confession which has since been retracted, the
Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances
,,
which would include the time of retraction, th~ nature
thereof, the manner in which such retraction has been
made and other relevant factors. Law does not say that F
the accused has to prove that retraction of .confes·sion
• 't made by him was because of threat, coercion, etc. but the
requirement is that it may appear to the court as such.
[Para 34] [1091-F-H; 1092-A]
3. In the instant case, the Investigating Officers did G
not examine themselves. The authorities under the Act as
also the ·Tribunal did not arrive at a finding upon
application of their mind to the retraction and rejected the
,~
same upon assigning cogent and valid reasons therefor.
Whereas mere retraction of a confession may not be
H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.
..
A sufficient to make the confessional statement irrelevant
for the purpose of a proceeding ,in a criminal case or a
quasi criminal case but there cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the court is obligated to take into
consideration the pros and cons of both the confession
8 and retraction made by the accused. It is one thing to say
that a retracted confession is used as a corroborative
piece of evidence to record a finding of guilt but it is
another thing to say that such a finding is arrived at only
on the basis of such confession although retracted at a
C later stage. [Para 35] [1092-A-D]
4. Appellant is said to have been arrested on
27.10.1994; he was produced before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate on 28.10.1994. He retracted his
confession and categorically stated the manner in which
such confession was purported to have been obtained.
D According to him, he had no connection with any alleged
import transactions, opening of bank accounts, or
floating of company, export control, Bill of Entry and other
documents or alleged remittances. He state'd that r
confess-ions were not only untrue but also involuntary ..
E The allegation that he was detained in the Office of
Enforcement Department for two days and two nights
had not been refuted. No attempt has been made to
controvert the statements made by appellant in his
application filed on 28.10.1994 before \
the Chief
F Metropolitan Magistrate. Furthermore, th~ Tribunal as also
the Authorities misdirected themselves m law insofar as
they ,failed to pose unto themselves a correct question.
The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that issuance and
services of a show cause notice subserves the
requirements of law only because by reason thereof an
G opportunity was afforded to the proceedee to submit its,
explanation. The Tribunal ought to have based it$
de'cision on applying the correct principles of law. The
statement made by the appellant before the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate was not a bald statement. The
H inference that burden of proof that he had made those
.. VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
[S.S. SINHA, J.]

statements under threat and coercion was solely on the
1075

A
proceedee does not rest on any legal principle. The
question of the appellant's failure to discharge the burden
would arise only when the burden was on him. If the
burden was on the revenue, it was for it to prove the said
fact. The Tribunal on its independent examination of the
8
factual matrix placed before it did not arrive at any finding
that the confession being free from any threat,
inducement or force could not attract the provisions of
Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. [Paras 36 and 37]
(1092-D-H; 1093-A-C]
Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail vs. Sp/. Director, Enforcement C
Directorate & Anr. (2007) 8 SCC 2~4 referred to.
5. There is another aspect of, the matter which cannot
be lost sight of. The allegations made in the show cause
notice form the foundation of the case. Appellant was
asked to show cause that he instead of utilizing the D
foreign exchange acquired on the basis of forged
documents, for import of rough diamonds, got the same,
\ after remitting abroad, credited in the foreign bank
account in Banks maintained by foreign nationals. The
finding that he was the brain behind and not involved in E
the actual transaction, therefore, does not meet the
requirements of law. (Para 39] (1094-A-C-F]
Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore vs.
Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 5 SCC 388,
referred to. F
Case Law Reference:
-(2008) 9 SCALE 681 relied on Para 21
(2006) 13 SCALE 467 relied on Para 21
(2006) 12 sec 268 relied on Para 21
(1999) 6 sec 1 relied on Para 22 G
(1963) 2 SCR 297 referred to Para 23
(1992) a sec 178 referred to Para 24
(1974) 2 sec 544 referred to Para 25
(1969) 2 SCR 461 referred to Para 26
H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
...
A (2005) 11 sec 600 referred to Para 27
(1998) 3 sec 292 referred to Para 28
..,:
(2008) 6 SCALE 669 referred to Para 29 \ ~

(1997) 3 sec 121 referred to Para 31
(2000) 1 sec 53 referred to Para 32
B (2002) 1 sec 155 referred to Para 33
(2001) 8 sec 254 referred to Para 38
(2001) 5 sec 388 referred to Para 40
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
~.A
7407 of 2008.
c From the final Judgment dated 30.11.2007 of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in FERA ~ppeal No. 85 of
2007.
Tarun Gulati, Tushar Jarwal, Jaiveer, Shergill, Kishore
Kunal and 1 Praveen Kumar for the Appellant. ?
D
P.V. Shetty, Kiran Bhardwaj, Anil Katiyar and B.V. Balaram
Das for the Respodents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. '"
E 2. What would be the effect of a retracted confession for
the purpose of levy of penalty under Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 (for short, "the Act") is the question
involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order
dated 30.1,1.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Bombay in FERA Appeal No. 85 of 2007. ·~
F
3. On or about 25.10.1994, the office premises of the . ~

appellant was searched. Recovery of Indian currency amounting 1 '4
to Rs. 2,65,000/- was made: He was thereafter detained. On
the next two succeeding dates, i.e., on 26.10.1994 and
27 .10.1994, he allegedly made two statements before the
G
Authorities under the Act, disclosing that all theiransactions in
the' name of Mis Sun Enterprises, Ahmedabad and M/s Suraj
Enterprises, Bombay relating to import of goods had been
f-..
made by .him and no import of goods had taken place in the
name of the said firms. He is stated to have confessed that he
was responsible for remittance of the foreign exchange worth

...ho
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1077
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

US Dollars t1 ,400 and US Dollars 22,830. In view of the said A
purported confession, he was arrested for alleged violation of
the provisions of Section 8(3) and Section 9(1)(a) of the Act.
We are not concerned with the rest of the statements.
4. He was produced before the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bombay on 28.10.1994. Before the said court, he B
filed an application retracting his confession, stating:
"That from 26-10-94 evening till today when I am being,
produced before this Hon'ble Court, I was illegally detained,
in the office of the Enforcement Directorate, and during my'
illegal detention my involuntary, untrue and false statements',c
have been recorded by force, ~oercion, threat and coercion
and also threatened to detain under COFEPQSA if I will
not write the statements as per their say and hence I retract
my said statements as the same are not my true and ·
voluntary statements. D
I further state that Indian currency seized from me was my ·
legitimate business money and had nothing to do with .
alleged FERA violation. I further say that I have no '
connection with any alleged import transactions, opening ,
of bank accounts, or floating of company by name of Mis ·
Sun Enterprises, export control, Bill of Entry and other E
documents or alleged remittances. I have not been
furnished copy of Panchnama, though my signatures have
been taken in token of having furnished the copy of the
same.
I hereby rebut the false averments made in the remand · F
application, Panchnama and in my alleged statements and '
hereby retract the same as the facts stated therein are not
true and voluntary.
I pray that my application may be taken on record and copy
of the same is annexed for the officer of the Dept." G
5. Respondents, however, initiated a proceeding under
Section 8(3) of the Act. A show cause notice was issued on or
about 25.4.1995, the operative part whereof reads as under:-
"NOW THEREFORE, the said Shri Vinod M Solanki is
hereby required to show cause in writing (IN DUPLICATE) H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A within· 30 days from the date of receipt of this
memorandum, why Adjudication Proceedings as
contemplated in· Section 51 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 (46 of 1973) should not be held
against him for the said contravention of Section 8(3) and
B 9(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.
IN ISSUING this memorandum, reliance is placed inter alia
on the list of documents as per Annexure 'A' the original
of the said documents will, on demand, be made available
for inspection to the party or his lawyer or other authorized ·
representative at the office of the Deputy Director,
c Enforcement Directorate, Mittal Chambers, 2nd Floor,
Nariman Point Bombay - 400 021 in his office by- prior
appointment with him on any working day."
6. Pursuant to or in furtherance thereof cause was shown
by the appellant, inter alia, contending that no reliance should
D be placed on the retracted confessional statement unless the .
same was corroborated substantially in material particulars by
some independent evidence.
1
7. By reason of an order dated 19.3.1996, the appropriate
authority, inter alia, relying on or on the basis of the confession
E made by him imposed a consolidated penalty of Rs. 10 lakhs,
stating:
"11. I have independently gone through the evidence on
record too based on which the impugned show cause
notice has been issued. The notice has abundantly and
F clearly explained the documents seized from him. He has
also admitted to the offence in his statements recorded u/
s 40 of FERA, which to date, stand. These confessional
statements are amply corroborated by the material
evidence seized from him which is disclosed above. By
G not contesting the charges, either in reply to the Show-
cause. Notice or during Personal hearings fixed, these
further stand uncontested and thus confirmed and admitted
by the notice.
>--
12. I have, therefore, no hesitation in confirming the
charges in impugned SCN again the notice and
H
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1079
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

accordingly hold him guilty of contravention of Sec. 8(3) to A
the extent of US $ 34,230/- in as much as he failed to utilize
the said Foreign exchange for the purpose it was released
to him. Further, he is also held guilty of contravention of
charge u/s. 9(1 )(a) for the same amount in as much he
deposited it in a Foreign bank account withounhe General 8
or Special exemption from the Reserve Bank of India."
8. Appellant preferred an appeal thereagainst before the
Foreign Exchange Regulation and Appellate Board which on
repeal of FERA stood transferred to the Appellate Tribunal for
Foreign Exchange (for short, "the Tribunal") under the provisions c
of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. The Tribunal
despite noticing the contentions raised on behalf of the
appellant that no enquiry had been made by the Department
( 1) from the bank in which the transactions in question had taken
place; (2) as regards the date on which the application was
signed and by whom the foreign exchange had been acquired; D
(3) whether the appellant had acquired the said foreign
exchange from· authorized dealer on the basis of any forged
import documents; (4) whether the alleged documents were not
produced by him before any authorized dealer; and (5) whether
the impugned order was based on the confessional statement E
which was retracted on first available opportunity when he was
produced before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai for
remand on 28.10.1994, dismissed the appeal, stating:
"10. -In the present appeal the confessional statement of
the appellant is acceptable in evidence. The appellant has F
..... not brought out anything to displace his confessional
statement to prove its untruthfulness or involuntary nature.
Along with his confessional statements, there is seized
documentary evidence coupled with attendant
circumstantial evidence to demonstrate and prove the G
charges against the appellant."
9. In arriving at the said finding, the Tribunal placed the
, ~, onus of proof upon appellant th~t the confession was obtained
from him by threat, coercion or force. The Tribunal held that
retraction alone would not make the confession inadmissible H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A and as even retracted confessional statement may be sufficient
to hold the proceedee guilty of violation of the provisions of the
Act, imposition of penalty was legally permissible. ~

'
It was furthermore held:
"18. The charges under Section 8(3) is proved against the
B appellant for having acquired foreign exchange by forging
import documents and remitting it abroad to foreign
nationals particularly When import documents relating to
bogus firms along with stamps were recovered from his
custody. The appellant has not been able to explain why \-,,.....
c the names of persons Milan and Anil Verma were told by
him to the officers of ED which, on enquiry were found to
be wrong and what benefit could be given to him out of
his wrong assertion made by him to Enforcement Officers.
19. According to confessional statement of the appellant,
D bogus trading firms were established and run by him where
he used to take foreign exchange for remittance to foreign
. country for the purposes of import of goods but no import
took place despite the fact that the foreign exchange was
remitted to Hongkong. On the basis of aforesaid
discussion we are of the considered opinion that the
E
remittance of foreign e~change was taken by the appellant
for purposes of import of goods but no import of goods ·
was made and foreign exchange was credited on the bank
account of foreign national abroacl where contravention of
Section 8(3) and 9(1 )(a) of the Foreign Exchange 1973
F is clearly made out. Looking towards this situation, we are,
of the cons.idered opinion that the impugned order
withstands judicial scrutiny and is liable to be confirmed
, ..
arid upheld where the appeal is liable to be dismissed."
10. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the ~pp~llant
G preferred an appeal before the High Court. Concurring with the
judgment of the Tribunal, the High Court, opined:
"The burden is on the person retracting the confessional
I~
statement to lead some evidence as to why the
confessional statement has to be rejected. No evidence
H
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1081
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

on that count was led. Coupled with the confessional A
statement wherein some facts were recorded which was
... )
personal to the appellant alone, there were other
documentary evidence coupled with the attendant
circumstantial as noted by the tribunal to demonstrate and
prove the charges against the appellant." B
Appellant is, thus, before us.
11. Mr. Tarun Gulati, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant would, inter alia, submit:
~ I i. The courts below have wrongly placed the burden
of proof on the appellant. c
ii. As the provisions of Section 24 of the Indian
Evidence Act are attracted also in the matter of
confession made before the authorities under the
Act, the findings arrived at, inter alia, relying on or
on the basis of the purported confession made by D'
appellant were wholly illegal and without jurisdiction.
12. Mr.P.V. Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would contend:
i. The burden of proof has rightly been placed on the
appellant as he, in view of Section 106 of the Indian E
Evidence Act, had special knowledge as to how he
had entered into the transactions of import and on
whose behalf.
ii. The very fact that the appellant had given details of
the transactions is a clear pointer to the fact that F
only he and he alone knew thereabout and in that
'""" view of the matter no illegality can be said to have
~ '
l

been committed in placing the burden of proof on
him.
iii. The authorities under the Act having the power of G
carrying out search and seizure as also issuance
of summons on any person and as the person so
summoned has a statutory obligation to make a true
,.,\
statement, confession made by him would not be
hit by the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A Evidence Act inasmuch as when such ·a statement
was made by him he was not an accused and the
officer under the Act was not a police officer.
13. Section 8 of the Act imposes restrictions on dealings
in foreign exchange. Foreign exchange can be acquired only
B from a dealer authorized by the R~serve Bank of India. Sub-
section (2) of Section 8 of the Act prohibits entering into any
transaction providing for conversion of Indian currency into
foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency at rates
of exchange other than the ones for the time being authorized
c by the Reserve Bank of India without its previous general or
special permission. ~ub-section (3) of Section 8, and Section
9(1 )(a) of the Act which are material for our p~rpose, read as
under:
"8. Restrictions on dealings in foreign exchange.-
D · (1) ........... .
(2) ........... .
(3) Where any foreign exchange is acquired by any person,
other than an authorized dealer or a money-changer, for
any particular purpose, or where any person has been
permitted conditionally to acquire foreign exchange, the
said person shall not use the foreign exchange so
acquired otherwise than for that purpose or, as the case
may be, fail to comply with any condition to which the
permission granted to him is subject, and where any
F foreign exchange so acquired cannot be so used or the
conditions cannot be complied with, the said person shall,
within a period of thirty days from the date on which he
comes to know that such foreign exchange cannot be so
used or the conditions cannot be complied with, sell the
G foreign exchange to an authorized dealer or to a money-
changer."
9. Restrictions on payments.- (1) Save as may be
provided in and in accordance with any general or special
· exemption from the provisions of this sub-section which
may be granted conditionally or unconditionally by the
H
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1083

-
\..,
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in, India shall- A
(
,. (a) make any payment to or for the credit of any
, person resident outside India"
14. As indicated heretobefore, the courts below proceeded
on the premise that a confession was made by appellant,
although retracted later, that he had acquired foreign exchange B
during the period 1993-94 on the basis of forged import
documents whereafter he got the same transferred to his bank
acco_unt Nos. 564-000-4888-5 and No. 96300-1254-9 in
;.- .+ Standard Chartered Bank, Asian House VI Branch and'
American E. Bank, Central Branch, at Hongkong and. c
misutilized the said foreign exchange and failed to import any:
rough diamonds for which purpose the same was acquired.
15. The questions which would arise for our consideration .
are: (1) whether the appellant had made bald statement at the ,
time of retraction alleging threat and coercion so as to shift the ' D
burden of proof from him to the Enforcement Directorate; and '
(2) whether consolidated penalty could have been imposed only
on the basis of such retracted confession .
....._
16. Indisputably, a confession made by an accused would .
come within the purview of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence E
Act, 1872, which reads as under:
"24. Confession caused by inducement, threat or
promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding.- A
confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a
criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession . F
~

.' appears to the Court to have been caused by any
inducement, threat or promise, having reference to the
charge against the accused person, proceeding from a
person in authority and sufficient in the opinion of the Court,
to give the accused person grounds, which would appear
G
to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal
nature in reference to the proceedings against him."
,.. ~
~
17. The proceeding under the Act is quasi criminal in
nature. Section 50 of the Act is a penal provision prescribing
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
.,/

A that in the event of contravention of any of the provisions of the
Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, a penalty ~,

not exceeding five times' the amount or value involved in any ...
such contravention may br imposed.
18. Section 71 of the Act provides for burden of proof in
B certain cases. Sub-section (2) of Section 71 provides that the
burden of proving that the foreign exchange acquired by such
person has been used for the purpose for which permission to
acquire 'ii was granted shall be on such person.
19. The Act is a special Act, which confers various powers
c upon the authorities prescribed therein. Even the salutary +• .._

principles of mens rea and actus reus in a proceeding under
the Act may not be held to be applicable. It is now a well settled
principle that presumption of innocence as contained in Article
14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
is a human right although per se it may not be treated to be a
D
fundamental right within the meaning of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.
[See Article 11 ( 1) of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) and Article 6.2 of the European Convention for
E the protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950) and Article 14.2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966)]
20. Sub-section· (2) of Section 71 places the burden of
proof upon an accused or a proceedee only when the foreign
exchange acquired has been used for the purpose for which
F
permission to acquire it was granted and not for mere
possession thereof. The Parliament, therefore, advisedly did not ~
'1y

make any provision placing the burden of proof on the accused/
proceedee.
21. The Act, thus, does not provide for a 'reverse burden'.
G
No presumption of commission of an offence is raised under ~
the Act. Even in a case where the law provld-es for a burden ~
on the accused having regard to th~e- afor'ementioned r
I
)--.
presumption of innocence as a human right, this Court in Noor
Aga vs~ State of Punjab & Anr. [2008 (9) SCALE 681] held
H
-
- VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1085
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

as under: A
"114. Only when these things are established, a staten:ient
made by an accused would become relevant in a
prosecution under the Act. Only then, it can be used for the
purpose of proving the truth of the facts contained therein.
It deals with anothe! category of case which provides for 8
a further clarification. Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of
Section 1388 deals with one type of persons and Clause
(b) deals with another. The Legislature might have in mind
~~ its experience that sometimes witnesses do not support
the prosecution case as for example panch witnesses and c
only in such an event an additional opportunity is afforded
to the prosecution to criticize the said witness and to invite
a finding from the court not to rely onithe assurance of the
cowt on the basis of the statement recorded by the
Customs Department and for that purpose it is envisaged
D
that a person may be such whose statement was recorded
but while he was examined before the court, it arrived at
an opinion that is statement should be admitted in
evidence in the interest of justice which was evidently to
make that situation and to confirm the witness who is the
author of such statement but does not support the E
prosecution although he made a statement in terms of
Section 108 of the Customs Act. We are not concerned
with such category of witnesses. Confessional statement

- t
-<I I
of an accused, therefore, cannot be made use of in any
manner under Section 1388 of the Customs Act. Even
otherwise such an evidence is considered to be of weak
nature."
F

{See also Alok Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal (2006
(13) SCALE 467] and Babubhai Udesinh Parmar vs. State of
Gujarat ((2006) 12 SCC 268]} G
22. It is a trite law that evidences brought on recorq by way
of confession which stood retracted must be substantially
~ ~
corroborated by other independent and cogent evidences,
.""
----i which would lend adequate assurance to the court that it may
seek to rely thereupon. We are not oblivious of some decisions H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
_,'
A of this Court wherein reliance has been placed for supporting
such contention but we must also notice that in some of the
cases retracted confession has been used as a piece of ~

corroborative evidence and not as the evidence on the basis '
whereof alone a judgment of conviction and sentence has been
B recorded. {See Pon Adithan v. Deputy Director, Narcotics
Control Bureau, Madras [(1999) 6 SCC 1]}
23. The question came up for consideration before a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Shanti Prasad Jain vs. The
Director of Enforcement [(1963) 2 SCR 297], wherein, inter alia, ,.., .....
c it was held that the initial burden would be on the Department.
,.
24. It is interesting to note that both the learned counsel
have placed strong reliance upon a decision of this Court in
K. T.M.S. Mohd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 178].
This Court therein made a distinction between the provisions
D of the FERA and the Income Tax Act, opining:
"31. Leave apart, even if the officers of the Enforcement
intend to take action against the deponent of a statement
on the basis of his inculpatory statement which has been ,Ir

subsequently repudiated, the officer concerned must take
E both the statements together, give a finding about the
nature of the repudiation and then act upon the earlier
inculpatory one. If on the other hand, the officer concerned
bisect the two statements and make use of the inculpatory
statement alone conveniently bypassing the other such a )-

stand cannot be a legally permissible because
F admissibility, reliability and the, evidentiary value of the •
";-
statement of the inculpatory statement depend on the I ; \
bench mark of the provisions of the Evidence Act and the
general criminal law." ',-
Holding in categorical terms that Section 24 of the Indian
G Evidence Act shall apply, it was held:
"But suffice to say that the core of all the decisions of this
Court is to the effect that the voluntary nature of any -'~
statement made either before the Custom Authorities or

H
the officers of Enforcement under the relevant provisions '
1087

-....
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

of the respective Acts is a sine qua non to act on it for any A
purpose and if the statement appears to have been
obtained by any inducement, threat, coercion or by any
~

improper means that statement must be rejected brevi
manu. At the same time, it is to be. noted that merely
because a statement is retracted, it cannot be recorded B
as involuntary or unlawfully obtained. It is only for the maker
of the statement who alleges inducement, threat, promise
etc. to establish that_such improper means has been
adopted. However, even if the maker of the statement fails
. .... -1 to establish his allegations of inducement, threat etc.
against the officer who recorded the statement, the
c
authority while acting on the inculpatory statement of the
maker is not completely relieved of his obligations in at
least subjectively applying its mind to the subsequent
retraction to hold that the inculpatory statement was not
extorted. It thus boils down that the authority or any Court D
intending to act upon the inculpatory statement as a
voluntary one should apply its mind to the retraction and
reject the same in writing. It is only on this principle of law,
~
this Court in several decisions has ruled that even in
passing a detention order on the basis of an inculpatory E
statement of a detenu who has violated the provisions of
the FERA or the Customs Act etc. the detaining authority
should consider the subsequent retraction and record its
'
opinion before accepting the inculpatory statement lest the
order will be vitiated."
F
(emphasis supplied)
,(

\ 25. Submission of Mr. P.V. Shetty that appellant had special
"" knowledge and that burden of proof would be on him in terms
of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, in a situation of this
nature, cannot be held to have any substance. The initial burden G
to prove that the confession was voluntary in nature would be
on the Department. The special or peculiar knowledge of the
~ person proceeded against would not relieve the prosecution or
, ~
( the Department altogether of the burden of producing some

• evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It may only alleviate
H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A . that burden to discharge and very slight evidence may suffice.
This Court· in Collector of Customs, Madras & ors. Vs. D.
Bhoorma/I ((1974) 2 SCC 544)) while examining the provisions
of Sections 167(8) and 178A of the Sea Customs Act, held:
"33. Another point to be noted is that the incidence, extent
B and nature of the burden of proof for. proceedings for
confiscation under the first part of the entry in the 3rd
colunin of Clause (8) of Section 167, may not be the same
as in proceedings when the imposition of the other kind
of- penalty under the second part of the entry is
c contemplated. We have already alluded to, this aspect of
the matter. It will be sufficient to reiterate that the penalty
of confiscation is a penalty in rem which is enforced against
the goods and the second kind of penalty is one in
personam which is enforced against the person concerned
in the smuggling of the goods. In the case of the former,
D therefore, it is not necessary for the Customs authorities
to prove that any particular person is concerned with their
illicit importation or exportation. It is enough if the
Department furnishes prima facie proof of the goods being
smuggled stocks. In the case of the latterperialty, the
E Department has to prove further that the person
proceeded against was concerned in the smuggling."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Yet again in Romesh Chandra Mehta vs. State of
West Bengal ((1969) 2 SCR 461] although this Court held that
F any statement made under Sections 107 and 108 of the
Customs Act by a person against whom an enquiry is made
by a Customs Officer is not a statement made by .a person
accused of an offence, but as indicated hereinbefore, he being
an officer concerned or the person in authority, Section 24 of
G the Indian Evidence Act would be attracted.
27. Reliance has been placed by the Tribunal on the
decision of this Court in State (NCT of 1Delhi) vs. Navjot
Sandhu alias Afsan Guru ((2005) 11 SCC 600), commonly
known as the 'Parliament Attack case.' Therein also this Court ·
H held:
..
~
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
[S.S. SINHA, J.]

"We start with the confessions. Under the general law of
the land as reflected in the Indian Evidence Act, no
1·089

A

confession made to a police officer can be proved against
~
an accused. 'Confessions'-which is a terminology used in
criminal law is a species of 'admissions' as defined in
Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act. An admission is a B
statement-oral or documentary whiCh enables the court to
draw an inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact.
It is trite to say that every confession must necessarily be
an admission, but, every admission does not necessarily
~ .,, amount to a confession. \/Vhile Sections 17 to 23 deals with
admissions, the law as to confessions is embodied in
c
Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act. Section 25 bars
proof of a confession made to a police officer. Section 26
goes a step further and prohibits proof of confession made
by any person while he is in the custody of a police officer,
unless it be made in the immediate presence of a D
Magistrate. Section 24 lays down the obvious rule that a
confession made under any inducement, threat or promise
becomes irrelevant in a criminal proceeding. Such
., inducement, threat or promise need not be proved to the
hilt. If it appears to the court that the making of the E
confession was caused by any inducement, threat or
promise proceeding from a person in authority, the
confession is liable to be excluded from evidence. The
expression 'appears' connotes that the Court need not go
to the extent of holding that the threat etc. has in fact been
F
proved. If the facts and circumstances emerging from the
evidence adduced make it reasonably probable that the
1 \ confession could be the result of threat, inducement or
pressure, the court will refrain from acting on such
confession, even if it be a confession made to a
Magistrate or a person other than police officer." G
(emphasis supplied)
28. In Mirah Exports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Collector of Customs
. " [(1998) 3 sec 292) while considering a question of
undervaluation under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, this
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 17 S.C.R.
--
A Court held that the burden of proving a charge of undervaluation
lies upon the revenue, stating:
"13. The legal position is well settled that the burden of ...
proving a charge of under-valuation lies upon Revenue and
Revenue has to produce the necessary evidence to prove
B the said charge ',Ordinarily the Court should proceed on
'
the basis that the apparent tenor of the agreements reflect
the real state of affairs' and what is to be examined is
'whether the revenue has succeeded in showing that the
apparent is not the real and that the price shown in the
~ "
c invoices does not reflect the true sale price."'
29. Recently, in Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs.
J.D. Orgochem Ltd. [2008 (6) SCALE 669] in regard to a case
of determination of transactional value, it was held:
"11. Upon whom the onus of proof lies to establish the .
I
;
D transaction value must be considered having regard to
phraseology used in the Act and the Rules framed
thereunder."
30. We may at this stage notice some decisions ,.
whereupon Mr. P.V. Shetty has placed strong reliance. -
E 31. In K.I. Pavunny vs. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central
Excise Collectorate, Cochin [(1997) 3 SCC 721}, a finding of
fact was arriv_~d at that the confession was voluntary in nature.
Reliance therein for the purpose of arriving at the guilt of the
accused was not only placed on the statement given ·under
F Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 but also on the
deposition of evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3 and~s.
32. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Rajamundry I ~

vs. Duncan Agro Industries Ltd. & ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 53], this
Court opined that an authority under the Act while recording a
G statement need not follow the safeguards provided in Section
164 .of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Therein also, it
was held:
"The inculpatory statement made by any person under )-
Section 108 is to non-police personnel and herice it has
H no tinge of inadmissibility in evidence if it was made when "
.. \
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

the person concerned was not then in police custody.
1091

Nonetheless the caution contained in law is that such a
A

statement should be scrutinized by the court in the same
"' manner as confession made by an accused person to
any non-police personnel. The court has to be satisfied
in such cases, that any inculpatory statement made by an B
accused person to a gazetted officer must also pass the
tests prescribed in Section 24 of the Evidence Act. If such
a statement is impaired by any of the vitiating premises
enumerated in Section 24 that statement becomes useless
" _,,. in any criminal proceedings."
c
(emphasis supplied)
Yet again it was observed:
"We hold that a statement recorded by Customs Officers
under Section 108 of the Customs Act is admissible in
evidence. The court has to test whether the inculpating D
portions were made voluntarily or whether it is vitiated on
account of any of the premises envisaged in Section 24
of the Evidence Act."
33. In Gu/am Hussain Shaikh Chougule vs. S. Reynolds,
Supdt. Of Customs, Marmgoa ((2002) 1 SCC 155], this Court E
refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India opining that the confession was
rightly held by the High Court to be voluntary in nature.
34. A person accused of commission of an offence is not
expected to prove to the hilt that confession had been obtained F
from him by any inducement, threat or promise by a person in
authority. The burden is on the prosecution to show that the
~. \
confession is voluntary in nature and not obtained as an
outcome of threat, etc. if the same is to be relied upon solely
for the purpose of securing a conviction. With a view to arrive G
at a finding as regards the voluntary nature of statement or
otherwise of a confession which has since been retracted, the
Court must bear in mind the attending circumstances which

-'--
-~
(
'
' would include the time of retraction, the nature thereof, the
manner in which such retraction has been made and other
relevant factors. Law does not say that the accused ha~:to prove . H
-
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A that retraction of confession made by him was. because of
threat; coercion, etc. but the requirement is that it may appear
to the court as such.
35. In the instant case, the Investigating Officers did not
...
examine themselves. The authorities under the Act as also the
B Tribunal did not arrive at a finding ~pon application of their mind
to the retraction and rejected the same upon assigning cogent
and valid reasons therefor. Whereas mere retraction of a
confession may not be sufficient to make the confessional

c
statement irrelevant for the purpose of a proceeding in a
criminal case or a quasi criminal case but there cannot be any .. ,.,,
doubt whatsoever that the court is obligated to take into
consideration the pros· and cons of both the confession and
retraction made by the accused. It is one thing to say that a
retracted confession is used as a corroborative piece of_
evidence to record a finding of guilt but it is another thing to
0 say that such a finding is arrived at only on the basis of such
confession although retracted at a later stage.
36. Appellant is said to have been arrested on 27.10.1994;
he was produced before the learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate. on 28.10.1994. He retracted his confession and
E categorically stated the manner in which such confession was
purported to have been obtained. According to him, he had no
connection with any alleged import transactions, opening of
bank accounts, or floating of company by name of Mis Sun
Enterprises, export control, Bill of Entry and other documents
F or alleged remittances. He stated that confessions were not only
untrue but also involuntary.
37. The allegation that he was detained in the Office of , ~
Enforcement Department for two days and two nights had not
been refuted. No attempt has been made to controvert the
G statements made by appellant in his application filed on
28.10.1994 before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
Furthermore, the Tribunal as also the Authorities misdirected
themselves in law insofar as they failed to pose unto themselves
a correct question. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that )-Jm
~
H issuance and services of a show cause notice subserves the 'I
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1093
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

requirements of law only because by r_eason thereof an A
.... opportunity was afforded to the proceedee ,to submit its
explanation. The Tribunal ought to have based its decision on
'I applying the correct principles of law. The statement made by
the appellant before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
was not a bald statement. The inference that burden of proof B
that he had made those statements under threat and coercion
was solely on the\j)roceedee does not rest on any legal
principle. The question of the appellant's failure to discharge
the burden would arise only when the burden was on him. If the
-..~ burden was on the revenue, it was for it to prove the said fact.
The Tribunal on its independent examination' of the factual matrix
c
placed before it did not arrive at any finding that the confession
being free from any threat, inducement or force could not attract
the provisions of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act.
38. In Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail vs. Sp/. Director,
Enforcement Directorate & Anr. [(2007) 8 SCC 254], this Court
D
held:
"15. Apart therefrom the High Court was bound to take into
consideration the factum of r~traction of the confession by
the appellant. It is now a well- settled principle of law that
a confess1Gi1 of a co-accused person cannot be treated E
as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service
only when the court is inclined to accept other evidence
and feels the necessity of seeking for an assurance in
support of t~e conclusion deducible therefrom. [Se·e
Haricharan 'Kurrni etc. v. State of Bihar AIR 1964 SC F
... '\- I
1184; Haroom Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1968 SCC 832; and Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat
(2001) 4 sec 266].
16. We may, however, notice that recently in Francis
Stanly @ Stalin v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control F
Bureau, Thiruvanthapuram (2006) 13 SCC 210, this Court
has emphasized that confession on,ly if found to be
voluntary and free from pressure, can be· accepted. A

..."'
, confession purported to have been made· before an
authority would require a closure scrutiny. It is furthermore H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A now well-settled that the court must seek corroboration of
the purported confession from independent sources."
39. Th~re is another aspect of the matter which cannot be
lost sight of. The allegations made in the show cause notice
form the foundation of the case. Appellant was asked to show
B cause inter alia alleging that he instead of utilizing the foreign
exchange acquired on the basis of forged documents, for
import of rough diamonds, got the same, after remitting abroad,
credited in the foreign bank account Nos. 564-000-4888-5 and
96300-1254-9 in Standard Chartered Bank, Asian House VI
c Branch and American E Bank, Central Branch at Hongkong,
being maintained by foreign nationals. Apart from the fact that
no enquiry in that behalf had been directed, the Tribunal itself
held:
"14. On the basis of above discussion it established that
D the appellant was the brain working behind the subject
import transactions where non-existent firms were
established under his guidan~e. for which foreign
exchange was acquired and remitted without
corresponding import of goods particularly when the name
of his co-brother, Harshad Godalia was disclosed by the
E appellant himself during his statement along with bank
accounts of foreign nationals to whom the foreign
exchange was remitted to Hongkong."
i
The finding that he was the brain behind and not involved
in the actual transaction, therefore, does not meet the
F requirements of law.
40. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore vs.
Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. & Ors. [(2007) 5 SCC 388], this
Court held as under:

G "12. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondents
submitted that there is no material that the respondents had
ever been parties to the so called arrangement, even if it
is accepted for the sake of arguments but not conceded,
that such arrangement was in reality made. There was no
material brought on record to.show tbat the respondents
H
VINOD SOLANKI v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 1095
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

had any role to play in such matters as alleged. Even the A
show cause notice did not refer to any particular material
to come to such a conclusion. Therefore, the
Commissioner and the CEGAT were justified in holding
that the respondents were entitled to the benefits.
13. We find that in the show cause notice there was nothing 8
specific as to the role of the respondents, if any. The
arrangements as alleged have not been shown to be within
the knowledge or at the behest or with the connivance of
the respondents. Independent arrangements were entered
into by the respondents with the franchise holder (sic
franchiser). On a perusal of the show cause notice the C'
stand of the respondents clearly gets established.
14. There is no allegation of the respondents being parties
to any arrangement. In any event, no material in that regard
was placed on record. The show cause notice is the
foundation on which the department has ·to build up its D.
case. If the allegations in the show cause notice are not
specific and are on the contrary vague, lack details and/
or unintelligible that is sufficient to hold that the noticee was
not given proper opportunity to meet the allegations
indicated in the show cause notice. In the instant case,
what the appellant has tried to highlight is the alleged
E,
connection between the various concerns. That is not
sufficient to proceed against the respondents unless it is
shown that they were parties to the arrangements, if any.
As no sufficient material much less any material has been
placed on record to substantiate the stand of the appellant, F'
the conclusions of the Commissioner as affirmed by the
CEGAT cannot be faulted."
41. For the reasons aforementioned, the order of the
Tribunal and consequently the impugned judgment and order
cannot be sustained. They are set aside accordingly. This G
appeal is allowed. The amount of Rs. 2,65,000/- which is with
the Department shall be refunded to the appellant within four
weeks from date. In the facts and circumstances of the case,
there shall be no order as to costs.
D.G. Appeal allowed.
H'