Holding

A criminal judgment does not constitute res judicata and cannot be used to bar or dismiss a civil suit; the civil suit must be decided independently on its own evidence.

Summary

Vishnu Dutt Sharma sued Daya Sapra for recovery of a loan, while simultaneously filing a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for a dishonoured cheque. The criminal trial resulted in an acquittal of Sapra. Sapra then sought to have the civil suit dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, arguing that the criminal judgment barred the suit as an abuse of process and invoked res judicata. The Delhi Civil Judge rejected this, holding that a criminal judgment does not operate as res judicata in a civil suit. The Delhi High Court reversed that decision, applying res judicata and declaring the civil suit an abuse of process. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the principle of res judicata is not applicable; a criminal judgment has only limited relevance in a civil proceeding and cannot be used to dismiss the suit, which must be decided on its own merits. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

The effect of a criminal judgment on a pending civil suit
Whether Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC can be invoked to reject a civil plaint on the ground of an acquittal in a criminal case
Applicability of the principle of res judicata between criminal and civil proceedings
Whether the civil suit is barred as an abuse of process of law
The relevance of findings from a criminal trial under the Evidence Act in civil litigation

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 7 Rule 11(d), s. Section 11, s. Section 12, s. Section 9
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 300
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 40, s. Section 41, s. Section 42, s. Section 43
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. Section 118, s. Section 138, s. Section 139

Subjects

res judicataOrder 7 Rule 11(d)civil and criminal parallel proceedingsNegotiable Instruments ActSection 138standard of proofabuse of processEvidence Act

Judgment

[2009] 7 S.C'.R. 977

VISHNU .DUTT SHARMA A
V.
DAYA SAPRA
Civil Appeal No. 3238 of 2009

MAY 5, 2009
8
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- 0. 7, r. 11 (d) - Rejection
of plaint - Civil suit for recovery of money whereas criminal
.+ ' case alleging dishonour of cheque -Acquittal by criminal court
-Application ulo. 7 r. 11(d) on the ground that criminal case c
dismissed - Dismissal of, by civil judge holding that finding
of criminal court would not operate as res judicata in civil suit
- Set aside by High Court holding tbat principle of res judicata
applicable and civil suit by plaintiff was abuse of process of
law - Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable - Principle of. D
~
res judicata not applicable - Judgment of criminal court in
,. civil proceeding will only have limited application - It would
not be binding in civil proceeding - Civil suit must be
determined on its own, in view the evidence on record and not
in terms of evidence brought in criminal proceedings - Thus, E
order of High Court set aside.
The question which arose for consideration 'in this
appeal is with regard to the effect of a judgment passed
,~I in a criminal proceeding on a pending civil proceeding.
F
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, the cause of action for
institution of the civil suit was grant of loan whereas that
of the criminal case was return of a cheque inter alia on
the premise that the account of the accused was G.
"'-~ insufficient to honour it or that it exceeded the amount
arranged to be paid fro_m that account by an agreement
with the bank. [Para 13] [984-D~E]

977 H
978 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 7 S.C.R.

A 1.2 Order 7 Rule 11 (d) CPC provides for rejection of
~
a plaint inter alia on the premise the suit was barred by
any statute. Such an embargo in the maintainability of the
suit must be apparent from the averments made in the
plaint. A creditor can maintain a civil and criminal
B proceeding at the same time. Both the proceeding, thus,
can run parallely. The fact required to be proved for
obtaining a decree in the civil suit and a judgment of
conviction in the criminal proceedings may be
overlapping but the standard of proof in a criminal case
·~
vis-a-vis a civil suit, indisputably is different. Whereas in
c a criminal case the prosecution is bound to prove the
commission of the offence on the part of the accused

-
beyond any reasonable doubt, in a civil suit 'prepon-
derance of probability' would serve the purpose of
obtaining a decree. [Paras 10 and 11) [983-G-H; 984-A-C]
D 1.3 In a criminal proceeding, although upon discharge
of initial burden by the complaint, the burden of proof may
.t
shift on an accused, the court must apply the principles
of 'presumption of innocence as a human rjght'. The
statutory provisions containing the doctrine of reverse
E burden must therefore be construed strictly. Whereas a
provision containing reverse burden on an accused would
be construed strictly and subject to the strict proof of the
foundational fact by the complainant, in a civil proceeding
no such restriction can be imposed. Reverse burden or ,_
F evidentiary burden on an accused, thus, would require
strict interpretation and application. However, in a civil suit
such strict compliance may not be insisted upon. If that
be so, it cannot be said that a judgment rP.ndered in
criminal proceeding would make continuati..>n of a civil
proceeding an abuse of the process of court. [Paras 16
G and 19) [965-D-F; 989-B-C]

Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde 2008
~.) . .
( 1) SCALE 421; Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing
Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal (1999) 3 SCC 35 Noor Aga
H v. State of Punjab 2008 (9) SCALE 68 - referred to
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V. DAYA SAPRA 979

~
i 1.4 Any person may as of right have access to the A
courts of justice. Section 9 CPC enables him to file a suit
of civil nature excepting those, the cognizance whereof
is expressly or by necessary implication barred. Or. 7 r.
11 (d) is one of such provision which provides for rejection
of plaint, if it is barred by any law. Or. 7 r. 11 (d) being one B
of the exception, thus, must be strictly construed. Answer
to the question whether the civil suit was barred on the
day on which it was filed indisputably must be rendered
~
• in the negative. If as on the date of institution of the suit,
plaint could not be rejected in terms ofOr. 7 r. 11 (d) whether c
its continuation would attract the principles of abuse of
processes of court only because the accused was
• acquitted in the criminal proceeding is the question. [Paras
Ji~
20, 21 and 22) [989-D-G]

-;
1.5 Dismissal of a suit on the ground that it attracts D
the provisions of s. 12 CPC, keeping in view of the content
j.
of provisions of s. 11 thereof may now be considered. The
principle of res-judicata as contained in s. 11 CPC is not
attracted in this case. Even general principle of res-
judicata would also not be attracted. A suit cannot be held E
to be barred only because the principle of estoppel ·
subject to requisite pleading and proof may be applied.
The said principle may not be held to be applicable only
-{ at a later stage of the suit. This principle would, therefore,
be applicable, inter alia, if the suit is found to be barred by F
the principle of res judicata or by reason of the provisions
of any other statute. [Paras 23 and 24) [989-G-H; 990-A-D]
1.6 It does not lay down that a judgment of the
criminal court would be admissible in the civil court for

. ,.( ~
its relevance is limited. [Para 25] [990-E]
Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad 2009 (5) SCALE
G

527 - referred to
1.7 The judgment of a criminal court in a civil procee-
• ding will only have limited application, viz., inter alia, for H
980 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R. •,
~

)'
A the purpose as to who was the accused and what was the
result of the criminal proceedings. Any finding in a criminal
proceeding by no stretch of imagination would be binding
in a civil proceeding. [Paras 25 and 26] [990-E-F]
M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1954
B SC 397 - referred to

1.8 If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding,
indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own
~.

c
keeping in view the evidence which has been brought on
record before it and not in terms of the evidence brought .
'

in the criminal proceedings. [Para 27] [991-8]
K. G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police and anr. (2002) ..,_
.
8 SCC 87; Mis. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. Etc. v.
Union of India & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694-referred to
D ~

1.9 If judgment of a civil court is not binding on a
criminal court, it is incomprehensible that a judgment of a
criminal court will be binding on a civil court. Section 43
of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments,
orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in ss: 40,41
E and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such
a
judgment, order or decree, is fact in issue, or is relevant
in some other provisions of the Act. [Para 29] [993-8-0]
Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr.
F (2005) 4 SCC 370; P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @
Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884-referred to .
1.10 The principles of res judicata are not applicable
in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The
impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside.
G [Paras 32 and 33) [994-8-C]
' >- •
Case Law Reference
2008 (1) SCALE 421 Referred to. Para 16
tr
(1999) 3 sec 35 Referred to. Para 16
H
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V. DAYA SAPRA 981

2008 (9) SCALE 68 Referred to. Para 18 A
2009 (5) SCALE 527 Referred to. Para 25

- AIR 1954 SC 397
(2002) 8 sec 87
Referred to.
Referred to.
Para 26

Para 27
B
(1970) 3 sec 694 Referred to. Para 27

(2005) 4 sec 310 Referred to. Para 30

AIR 2008 SC 1884 Referred to. Para 31

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3238 c
of 2009
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2007 of the
•
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.M. (M) No. 1011 of 2007
J.M. Kalia (for Raj Singh Rana), for the Appellant(s). D
';
Kuldeep Kumar (for Sanjay Jain), for the Respondent(s).
• ·"

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J.
E
1. Leave granted.
2. The effect of a judgment passed in a criminal proceeding
on a pending civil proceeding is the question involved herein.
, '{ It arises in the following factual matrix. F
Respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees
One Lakh Fifty Thousand Only) from the appellant herein on or
1
about 10 h August, 1999. On a demand having been made in
that regard by the appellant, the respondent issued a cheque
. th
G

. -'- ~
for the aforementioned sum on or about 20 October, 1999.
The said cheque was presented by the appellant to the Oriental
Bank of Commerce, Shahdra, Delhi, but the cheque was
received back by the appellant with remarks 'insufficient funds'.
3. A complaint petition was filed by the appellant against
H
982 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 7 S.C.R.

A the respondent for alleged commission of offences under ~·
)-
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 420

B
of the Indian Penal Code on 29-01-2000. He also filed a suit for
recovery of a sum of Rs. 2,04,000/- on 19-10-2002 in the Court
of Senior Civil Judge at Delhi which was marked as Suit No.
253 of 2003.
-
Both in the criminal as also in the civil proceedings the
defence raised by the respondent was that she had not taken
any loan from the appellant as alleged or at all. It was furthermore
asserted that the cheque issued by her was not in respect of ....
c repayment of any loan, since no such loan had been taken.
Respondent urged that the appellant had met her husband
who was a property dealer in connection with some business
who made a representation that pertaining to the same deal
the police had to be bribed, whereafter on 10-08-1999 the
D appellant accompanied by one Ms. Malhotra, retired ACP and
his son came to the office of her husband and forcibly took the ~

cheque in question from her husband since the cheque book •
was with him.
4. By reason of the Judgment dated 26-09-2003, the
E
learned Sessions Judge recorded a judgment of acquittal in
favour of the respondent holding that he had successfully proved
that the cheque in question was not issued to the complainant
by way of repayment of any loan.

F 5. Respondent thereafter during the pendency of the trial
suit filed an application in the said civil suit purported to be under
' -
Order 7 Rule 11 (d) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the
criminal complaint had already been dismissed.
G The learned Civil Judge dismissed the said application
inter alia opining that the findings of a criminal court in the
proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
.'
.}_

Act would not operate as 'resjudicata' in the civil suit for recovery
of money as the nature of proceeding in both the cases was
H different.
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V DAYA SAPRA 983
-( [S.B. SINHA, J]
~
... 6. Respondent approached the High Court in a writ petition A
questioning the order of dismissal of the said application and

• praying inter alia for the following reliefs:
"(al To set aside and quash the impugned order dated
17.3.2007 passed by the Hon'ble Court of Shri
B
Shailender Malik, Civil Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 356/
06/02 titled as "Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra;
and
(

. ' (2) Pass such other further orders as this Hon'ble Court
deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances c
of the matter."
7. By reason of the impugned Judgment the High Court
allowed the said writ petition. The High Court in arriving at its
finding applied the principles of res-judicata. It also opined that D
'
" the suit filed by the appellant was nothing but an abuse of the
~ process of law.
8. Mr. J.M. Kalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant would contend that the High Court committed a
serious error in passing the impugned judgment in so far as it E
failed to take into consideration that the principle of res-judicata
is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, would urge that having regard to· F
the fact that both in the civil as also in the criminal proceeding,
the burden was on the defendant-accused and he having
successfully discharged the same, the appellant could not have
been allowed to continue the civil proceedings in view of the
judgment rendered by the criminal court. The plaint was, on the G
' ...... said premise, directed to be rejected.
10. Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (for short, "Code") provides for rejection of a plaint inter
alia on the premise the suit was barred by any statute. Such an
H
984 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A embargo in the maintainability of the suit must be apparent from •r
· the averments made in the plaint.
~
11. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that a creditor
can maintain a civil and criminal proceeding at the same time.
Both the proceeding, thus, can run parallely. The fact required
B to be proved for obtaining a decree in the civil suit and a
judgment of conviction in the criminal proceedings may be
overlapping but the standard of proof in a criminal case vis-a-
vis a civil suit, indisputably is different. Whereas in a criminal
~
case the prosecution is bound to prove the commission of the
c offence on the part of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt;
in a civil suit 'preponderance of probability' would serve the
purpose for obtaining a decree.
12. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides
that dishonour of a cheque subject to fulfillment of condition
D
precedent as laid down in the proviso .appended thereto is a .
cognizable offence. .l

13. The cause of action for institution of the civil suit was
grant of loan whereas that of the criminal case was return of a
E cheque inter alia on the premise that the account of the accused
was insufficient to honour it or that it exceeded the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement with the
bank.
14. Section 138 of the Act contains a non-obstante clause.
F
In terms of Section 139 of the Act, a presumption in favour
of the holder of the cheque may be raised that he had received
the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.
G Section 118 occurring in Chapter XIII of the Act provides
for special rules of evidence; clause (a) whereof reads as under: •. ..\._ 1

"118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.-
Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions
shall be made:-
H
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V DAYA SAPRA 985
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
,,,
1 "(a) of consideration.-that every negotiable instrument A-
was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed,
" negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed,
negotiated or transferred for consideration."

Proviso appended thereto reads as under: B

"Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained
from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody
J
.i thereof, by means of an offence. or fraud, or has been
obtained from the maker or acceptor therof by means of c
an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the
- burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course
lies upon him."

15. What would be the effect of a judgment passed in the
criminal proceedings in relation to the subject matter for which D
....
a civil proceedings has also been initiated is the question.
·~

16. In a criminal proceeding, although upon discharge of
initial burden by the complainant, the burden of proof may shift
on an accused, the court must apply the principles of
'presumption of innocence as a human right'. The statutory E
provisions containing the doctrine of reverse burden must
"""'
therefore be construed strictly. Whereas a provision containing
reverse burden on an accused would be construed strictly and
. .(
subject to the strict proof of the foundational fact by the
complainant, in a civil proceeding no such restriction can be F
imposed.
Application of Section 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act on the touchstone of the principles of
presumption of innocence fell for consideration before this Court
G
in Krishna Janardhan Bhat Vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde reported
"~
in [2008 (1) SCALE 421] wherein it was categorically held:
"19. Indisputably, a mandatory presumption is required to
be raised in terms df Section 118(b) and Section 139 of
the Act. Section 13(1) of the Act defines 'negotiable H
986 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A instrument' to mean "a promissory note, bill of exchange "'t'
or cheque payable either to order or to bearer".
Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients, viz.:
(i) that there is a legally enforceable debt;
B (ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account of bank
for discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability
which presupposes a legally enforceable debt; and
(iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned due to '~
c insufficiency of funds.
20. The proviso appended to the said section provides
for compliance of legal requirements before a complaint
petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139
of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the
D second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally
recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under '
Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in ~.

favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been
issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.

-
E 21. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded
on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in
regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in
our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on
the basis that for proving the defence the accused is 'r
F required to step into the witness box and unless he does
so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an
approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.
22. An accused for discharging the burden of proof placed
upon him under a statute need not examine himself. He
G
may discharge his burden on the basis of the materials
already brought on records. An accused has a .... -';

constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof
on the part of an accused and that of the prosecution in a
criminal case is different."
H
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V. DAYA SAPRA 987
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
~ Noticing the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Orum A
·1
Manufacturing Company Vs. Amin Chand Payrelal reported
in [(1999) 3 SCC 35], this Court held:-
"24. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the
guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the
standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of B
an accused is 'preponderance of probabilities'. Inference
of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only
1
from the materials brought on records by the parties but
J also by reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies. c
25. A statutory presumption has an evidentiary value. The
question as to whether the presumption whether stood
rebutted or not, must, therefore, be determined keeping in
view the other evidences on record. For the said purpose,
D
... stepping into the witness box by the appellant is not
imperative. In a case of this nature, where the chances of
~
false implication cannot be ruled out, the background fact
and the conduct of the parties together with their legal
requirements are required to be taken into consideration."
< E
17. As regards the purpose of introduction of reverse
burden in Section 139 of the Act, this court observed :

f "33. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision
-1 has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade,
commerce and industrial activities of the country and the F
strict liability to promote greater vigilance in financial
matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the
drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic
life of a developing country like India. This, however, shall
not mean that the courts shall put a blind eye to the ground G
....., . realities. Statute mandates raising of presumption but it
stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should
.. be held to have rebutted. Other important principles of
legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of innocence as
human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S. C.R.

A by Section 139 should be delicately balanced. Such
balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon
the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on
record and having regard to legal principles governing the
same."
B
18. The said dicta was followed by this Court in Noor Aga
Vs. State of Punjab reported in [2008 (9) SCALE 68] wherein it
was noticed:

"58. In Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd
'
c Edn.) page 56, it is stated: +
Harking back to Woolmington, it will be remembere.d that
Viscount Sankey said that "it is the duty of the prosecution
to prove the prisoner's guilt, subject to the defence of
insanity and subject also to any statutory exception" ....
D Many statutes shift the persuasive burden. It has become
a matter of routine for Parliament, in respect of the most
trivial offences as well as some serious ones, to enact
that the onus of proving a particular fact shall rest on the
defendant, so that he can be convicted "unless he proves"
E it.
59. But then the decisions rendered in different jurisdictions
are replete with cases where validity of the provisions
raising a presumption against an accused, has been
upheld."
F
Noticing the provisions of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as also International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and consequent change
G in the approach in some of the courts, it was opined that limited
inroads on presumption would be justified. Noticing that even
applicability of doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be applicable >- _.
in a criminal proceeding, it was held that the trial must be fair
and the accused must be provided with opportunities to
H effectively defend himself.
.. VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V DAYA SAPRA
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
989
~

-1
The court held : A
"88. Placing persuasive burden on the accused persons
must justify the loss of protection which will be suffered by
the accused. Fairness and reasonableness of trial as also
maintenance of the individual dignity of the accused must
be uppermost in the court's mind." B

19. Reverse burden or evidentiary burden on an accused,
(
thus, would require strict interpretation and application. However,
1
~
'• in a civil suit such strict compliance may not be insisted upon.

If that be so, it may not be correct to contend that a c
judgment rendered in criminal proceeding would make
continuation of a civil proceeding an abuse of the process of
court.
20. Any person may as of right have access to the courts
D
. -j.
of justice. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables
him to file a suit of civil nature excepting those, the cognizance
whereof is expressly or by necessary implication barred.
21. Order 7 Rule 11 (d) is one of such provision which
provides for rejection of plaint, if it is barred by any law. E
Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code being one of the
exceptions, thus, must be strictly construed.
. -(
22. This leads us to another question namely whether the
civil suit was barred on the day on which it was filed. Answer to F
the said question indisputably must be rendered in the negative.
If as on the date of institution of the suit, the plaint could not be
rejected in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure; whether its continuation would attract the principles·
of abuse of processes of court only because the accused was
.: .;ti..'
G
acquitted in the criminal proceeding is the question.
23. Dismissal of a suit on the ground that it attracts the
provisions of Section 12 of the Code, keeping in view of the
content of provisions of Section 11 thereof may now be
considered. The principle of res-judicata as contained in Section H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 7 S.C.R

A 11 of the Code is not attracted in this case. Even general
..
~

principle of res-judicata would also not be attracted. A suit cannot
be held to be barred only because the principle of estoppel
subject to requisite pleading and proof may be applied. The
said principle may not be held to be applicable only at a later
B stage of the suit.

It brings us to the question as to whether previous judgment
of a criminal proceeding would be relevant in a suit.
1
24. Section 40 of the Evidence Act reads as under: i

c "Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.
•
- The existence of any judgment, order or decree which
by law prevents any Courts from taking Cognizance of a
suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question
is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such
D suit or to hold such trial."

This principle would, therefore, be applicable, inter alia, if ,
the suit is found to be barred by the principle of res judicata or
by reason of the provisions of any other statute.

E 25. It does not lay down that a judgment of the criminal
court would be admissible in the civil court for its relevance is
limited. {See Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad [2009 (5)
SCALE 527}.
)
The judgment of a criminal court in a civil proceeding will
F only have limited application, viz., inter alia, for the purpose as
to who was the accused and what was the result of the criminal
proceedings.
26. Any finding in a criminal proceeding by no stretch of

/
G imagination would be binding in a civil proceeding.

In M. S. Sheriff & Anr. vs. State of Madras & Ors. [Al R 1954
SC 397], a Constitution Bench of this Court was seized with a
, ..... -
question as to whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be
stayed in the event both are pending. It was opined that the
H criminal matter should be given precedence.
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V DAYA SAPRA 991
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
... In regard to the possibility of conflict in decisions, it was A
1
held that the law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly
refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the
other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such
as sentence or damages. It was held that the only relevant
consideration was the likelihood of embarrassment. B
27. If a primacy is given to a criminal proceeding, indisput-
ably, the civil suit must be determined on its own keeping in view
the evidence which has been brought on record before it and
j_ ' not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceeding.
c
The question came· up for consideration in K.G.
Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC
87], wherein this Court inter alia held:
"30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is -
(1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon D
"I
as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
~
(2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res
judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300
CrPC makes provision that once a person is convicted or
acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence E
if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the
criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same
cause, judgment of the civil court would be relevant if
conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it
-<
cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except F
as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which
judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated
therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a
previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under G
Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence
Act then in each case, the court has to decide to what
extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s)
decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged
trespass by A on B's property, B filed a suit for declaration H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A of its title and to recover possession from A and suit is ...
~
decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by 8 against
A for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in
civil proceedings would be relevant and the court may
hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as
B possession of 8 over the property. In such case, A may be
convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which
'.
l

is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each
and every case, the first question which would require
consideration is - whether judgment, order or decree is \
~'
c relevant, if relevant ..,.... its effect. It may be relevant for a
limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This
would depend upon the facts of each case.
It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court
in M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. vs. Union of
D India & Ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically
held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the •
criminal courts but the converse is not true, was overruled therein,
stating:
•
"33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M.
E Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court ·
stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil
court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general
observations. made in Karam Chand case are in context
of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not )' '
F required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution
Bench in M. S. Sheriff case as well as Sections 40 to 43
of the Evidence Act."
28. Sections 42 & 43 of the Evidence Act providing for the
relevance of other decrees, order and judgment read as under:
G
"42. Relevancy and effect of judgment, order or
decrees, other than those mentioned in Section 41.
. ..
A

- Judgments, orders or decrees other than those
mentioned in Section 41, are relevant if they relate to
H matters of a public nature relevant to the inquiry; nut such
VISHNU DUTT SHARMA V. DAYA SAPRA 993
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
Ir
judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of A
1
that which they state.

43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in
Sections 40, 41 and 42, when relevant - Judgments,
orders or decrees other then those mentioned in Sections
40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such B
judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant,
under some other provision of this Act."
l
29. If judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal
J
court, it is incomprehensible that a judgment of a criminal court c
will be binding on a civil court. We have noticed hereinbefore
that Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that
judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in
sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of
such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant
D
... in some other provisions of the Act, no other provisions of the
Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute had been brought
A
to our notice.

30. Another Constitution B~nch of this Court had the
occasion to consider the question in Iqbal Singh Marwah & E
Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr. [(2005) 4 SCC 370]. Relying
on M. S. Sheriff (supra) as also various other decisions, it was
'
categorically held:

"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be
made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and F
criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard
of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely
different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of
preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the
entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond G

-· . reasonable doubt has to be given."
31. The question yet again came up for consideration in
P Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu [AIR
2008 SC 1884], wherein it was categorically held:
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 7 S.C.R.

A "13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil ~

;.

-
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case."
B 32. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, we have
no doubt in our mind that principles of res judicata are not
applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.
33. The impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set •
-l.
c aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts
,
and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to
costs.

N.J. Appeal allowed.

'
}