WILLIAMSversusLOURDUSAMY & ANR.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 524
- Decided
- 24 April 2008
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S B SINHA
Holding
The principle of res judicata is not attracted; the subsequent suit for declaration of title is not barred.
Summary
The appellant, Williams, claimed title to a parcel of land based on a registered deed of sale from respondent No.2. Respondent No.1 sued for a permanent injunction, asserting ownership through an oral agreement of sale with respondent No.2, but respondent No.2 was not impleaded. The trial court limited the issue to possession and granted the injunction. Williams later filed a suit for declaration of title and possession, impleading both respondents, and respondent No.1 also filed a suit for specific performance. The High Court held that the later suit was barred by res judicata, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the earlier injunction suit did not adjudicate the oral‑agreement issue and that respondent No.2’s absence precluded a binding determination, so res judicata did not apply. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court judgment set aside.
Issues considered
- Whether the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies to the subsequent suit for declaration of title when the earlier injunction suit did not decide the issue of an oral agreement of sale and did not involve respondent No.2.
- Whether the earlier suit, limited to the question of possession, can be said to have adjudicated the title of the land.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
[2008] 6 S.C.R. 929
WILLIAMS A
v.
LOURDUSAMY & ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2894-2895 of 2008)
APRIL 24, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s. 11 -Res-judicata -
Suit for permanent injunction - On the ground that the plaintiff
was in possession of suit land by virtue of oral agreement of c
sale - Vendor not made party to the suit - Suit decreed -
Subsequent suit by judgment debtor for declaration of title,
decreed- Upheld in first appeal- High Court in second appeal
holding the subsequent appeal by the judgment debtor barred
by res-judicata - Suit for specific performance of contract by
D
decree holder also dismissed upto High Court - On appeal
... held: Principle of res judicata not attracted to the facts of the
present case - Owner of the property from whom the parties
claiming their title and interest was not made party in previous
suit - Issues framed in subsequent suits were not subject of
adjudication in the former suit - High Court posed unto itself E
a wrong question.
In respect of the suit property, respondent No. 1 filed
a suit for permanent injunction against the appellant
claiming himself to be the owner of the land, by virtue of F
. oral agreement of sale by and between himself and
respondent No.2. However respondent No. 2 was not
impleaded as party. Appellant contested the suit on the
ground that he had got the right, title and interest by
reason of a registered sale deed from respondent No. 2. G
Trial judge framed the issues which was only in respect
of first respondent's possession of the land. On that issue
_, the suit was decreed.
Thereafter appellant filed a suit for declaration of title
929 H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 6 S.C.R.
A and recovery of possession impleading both the
respondents as parties. First respondent also filed suit
for specific performance of contract against the appellant
as also against respondent No. 2. Trial Court decreed the
suit of the appellant while dismissing that filed by the
B respondent No.1 . Appeals against both the judgments
were dismissed by first appellate court. In second appeal,
High Court held that as the possession of the property
had been delivered on the basis of purported oral
agreement, the subsequent suit was barred by
c applicability of principle of res-judicata. Hence the present
appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The principle of res-judicata is not attracted
to the facts of the present case. The principles of res-
0
judicata although provide for a salutary principle that no
person shall be harassed again and again, have its own
limitations. In the previous suit, the respondent No. 2 was
not impleaded as a party. In his absence therefore, the
issue as to whether respondent No. 2 had entered into an
E oral agreement of sale or not could not have been
adjudicated upon. The said Court had no jurisdiction in
that behalf. If that was decided in the said suit, the findings
would have been nullities. Such an issue was not framed.
[Paras 11, 12 and 14] [935-A, B, C; 937-D, E]
F
Sajjadanashin Sayed MD. 8.E. EDR. (D) by LRs. vs. •
Musa Dadabhai Ummer and Ors. 2000 (3) SCC 350 - relied
on.
Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and Anr etc. vs. L. V.A.
G Oikshitulu and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 193; Hasham Abbas Sayyad
vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad and Ors. 2007 (2) SCC 355 -
referred to.
2.1 In a suit for permanent injunction, the Court had
H rightly proceeded on the basis that on the date of the
WILLIAMS v. LOURDUSAMY & ANR. 931
• institution of the suit, the first respondent was in A
possession of the disputed land or not. It was not required
to enter into any other question. The question as to
whether the respondent had been put in possession in
terms of an oral agreement of sale was not in issue.
,, Respondent No. 2 was not impleaded as a party. A decree B
for specific performance of contract was not prayed for
in the said suit. Neither any averment was made, nor in
law the same could be made that he had been put in
possession by way of a part performance of contract as
envisaged under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property c
Act. [Paras 5 and 12] [935-D; 933-A, B]
2.2 It is one thing to say that a person is in possession
of the land in suit and it is another thing to say that he has
a right to possess pursuant to or in furtherance of an
agreement for sale which would not only bind the vendor D
;.. but also bind the subsequent predecessor. Had such an
issue been framed, the appellant or the respondent No. 2
could have contended that Section 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act had no application. For application of Section
53A an agreement has to be entered into in writing. The E
said Section provides for application of an equitable
doctrine of part performance. Requisite ingredients
therefor must be pleaded and proved. [Para 13] (935-E, F,
G]
3. A competent Court of law has dismissed the suit F
for specific performance of contract filed by the first
respondent opining that the respondent had failed to
prove the existence of an oral agreement. If the suit for
specific performance of contract had not been decreed
in favour of the first respondent, the question of his G
continuing to remain in possession in part performance
, of contract would not arise. [Para 14] [935-G, H; 936-A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
2894-2895 of 2008.
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 6 S.C.R.
•
A From the final Judgment and Order dated 19.8.2002 of
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No. 1759-1760
of 1991.
V. Prabhakar, Ramjee Prasad and M.K.D. Namboodiri for
the Appellant.
B ,.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Whether principle of res-judicata is applicable to the
c facts and circumstances of this case, is the question involved
herein.
The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. Second
respondent was the owner of the properties. He by reason of a
registered Deed of Sale dated 25.11.1987 transferred his right,
D title and interest in favour of the appellant.
3. First respondent, however, filed a suit against the
appellant herein in the Court of District Munsif, Thiruvaiyaru
praying for a decree for permanent injunction alleging that the
land in suit admeasuring 3 cents was the subject matter of an
E oral agreement of sale by and between himself and the second
respondent herein. It was contended that the second respondent
had been in possession of the said land in terms of a patta
executed under the Kudiyiruppu Act being Act 40 of 1971.
F The contention of the appellant, on the other hand, was
that he had been put in possession of the suit land by the second
re1pondent in terms of the aforementioned deed of sale dated
25.11.1987.
4. The learned Trial Judge in the said suit, inter alia framed
G the following issues.
"i) Whether on the date of the suit the plaintiff was in
possession of the suit property? •
ii) Whethtr the plaintiff i§ entitled to the relief of
ptrm1nent injunction I i prayed for?
WILLIAMS v. LOURDUSAMY & ANR. 933
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
iii) To what else (sic) relief, the plaintiff is entitled to?" A
5. The question as to whether the respondent had been
put in possession in terms of an oral agreement of sale was not
in issue. Respondent No. 2 as noticed hereinbefore was not
impleaded as a party. A decree for specific performance of
., contract was not prayed for in the said suit. Neither any averment B
was made nor in law the same could be made that he had been
put in possession by way of a part performance of contract as
envisaged under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act.
6. The learned Trial Judge, however, held that the first c
respondent was in possession of the land in suit as on the date
of the institution of the suit and thus granted a decree for
permanent injunction.
7. Appellant thereafter filed a suit for declaration of title
and recovery of possession, which was marked as O.S. No. D
182 of 1989. Both the respondents herein were impleaded as
parties therein. First respondent herein also filed a suit for
specific performance of contract against the appellant as also
the respondent No. 2. The said suit was registered as O.S. No.
93 of 1990. . E
Both O.S. No. 1826f1989 and O.S. No. 93of1990 were
consolidated. By a judgment and order dated 7.11.1990, the
learned Trial Judge while dismissing the aforementioned suit
for specific performance of contract filed by the first respondent
allowed the suit of the appellant for declaration of his title and F
confirmation of possession.
8. Two appeals were preferred thereagainst by the first
respondent which by reason of a judgment and order dated
28.8.1991 were dismissed by District Judge, Thanjavur (West). G
First respondent preferred two second appeals before the High
Court.
The High Court opined that the only substantial question
of law raised by the appellant before it (respondent No. 1 herein)
was the applicability of the principles of Res-Judicata. H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 6 S.C.R.
f
A Relying upon some stray observations made by the
learned Trial Judge in the said O.S. No. 402 of 1987, it was
held that as possession of the property had been delivered on
the basis of a purported oral agreement of sale, the principles
of res-judicata would be attracted.
B 9. Mr. V. Prabhakar, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant would submit that as no issue was framed
in regard to the purported oral agreement of sale by and
between respondent No. 1 and 2 nor any specific finding having
been arrived at by the learned Trial Judge in the said O.S. No.
C 402of1987, the impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable.
10. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that the Court will have no jurisdiction to try a suit or issue in
which the matter directly and substantially in issue had been in
issue in a former suit between the same parties.
0
Explanation 8 appended thereto reads as under:
"Section 11. Res judicata - No Court shall try any suit or
issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue
has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit
E between the same parties, or between parties under whom
they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title,
in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the
suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised,
and has been heard and finally decided by such Court."
F
Explanation I. ***** ***** *****
Explanation II ***** ***** *****
*******************************
G Explanation VIII. -An issue heard and finally decided by
a court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such
issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, ..
notwithstanding that such court of limited jurisdiction was
not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in
H which such issue has been subsequently raised."
WILLIAMS v. LOURDUSAMY & ANR. 935
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
.
11. The principles of res-judicata although provide for a A
salutary principle that no person shall be harassed again and
again, have its own limitations. In O.S. No. 402 of 1987, the
respondent No. 2 was not impleaded as a party. In his absence
therefore, the issue as to whether respondent No. 2 had entered
... into an oral agreement of sale or not could not have been B
adjudicated upon. The said Court had no jurisdiction in that
behalf. If that was decided in the said suit, the findings would
have been nullities.
[See Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh and another etc.
Vs. L. V.A. Dikshitulu and others AIR 1979 SC 193 at 198 and c
Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad and Ors.
(2001) 2 sec 355]
12. As a matter of fact even such an issue was notfr.amed.
The High Court, therefore, in our opinion posed unto itself a
D
wrong question. In a suit for permanent injunction, th.e Court had
rightly proceeded on the basis that on the date of the institution
of the suit, the first respondent was in possession of the disputed
land or not. It was not required to enter into any other question.
It, in fact, did not.
E
13. It is one thing to say that a person is in possession of
the land in suit and it is another thing to say that he has a right to
possess pursuant to or in furtherance of an agreement for sale
which would not only bind the vendor but also bind the
subsequent predecessor. Had such an issue been framed, the F
appellant or the respondent No. 2 could have contended that
Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act had no application.
For application of Section 53A of the Act, an agreement has to
be entered into in writing. The said section provides for
applicatior:i of an equitable doctrine of part performance.
G
Requisite ingredients therefor must be pleaded and proved.
. 14. A competent Court of law has dismissed the suit for
specific performance of contract filed by the first respondent
opinir:ig that the respondent had failed to prove the existence of
ari oral agreement. If the suit for specific performance of contract H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 6 S.C.R.
A had not been decreed in favour of the first respondent, the
question of his continuing to remain in possession in part
performance of contract would not arise.
Appellant herein filed a suit for declaration of title and
recovery of possession. He proceeded on the basis that the
B first respondent was in possession.
The learned Trial Judge and the first Appellate Court, in
our opinion, have rightly held that the principle of res-judicata
was not attracted in this case.
C In Sajjadanashin Sayed MD. B.E. EDR. (D) by LRs. Vs.
Musa Dadabhai Ummer and Others [(2000) 3 SCC 350] this
Court considered the cases where in spite of specific issue
and an adverse finding in an earlier suit, the same was not
treated as res-judicata being purely incidental or auxiliary or
D collateral to the main issue stating :
"24. Before parting with this point, we would like to refer
to two more rulings. In Sulochana Amma v. Narayanan
Nair this Court held that a finding as to title given in an
earlier injunction suit would be res judicata in a subsequent
E suit on title. On the other hand, the Madras High Court, in
Vanagiri Sri Selliamman Ayyanar
Uthirasomasundareswarar Temple v. Rajanga Asari held
(see para 8 therein) that the previous suit was only for
injunction relating to the crops. Maybe, the question of title
F was decided, though not raised in the plaint. In the latter
suit on title, the finding in the earlier suit on title would not
be res judicata as the earlier suit was concerned only with
a possessory right. These two decisions, in our opinion,
cannot be treated as being contrary to each other but
G should be understood in the context of the tests referred
to above. Each of them can perhaps be treated as correct
if they are understood in the light of the tests stated above.
In the first case decided by this Court, it is to be assumed
that the tests above-referred to were satisfied for holding
H that the finding as to possession was substantially rested
WILLIAMS v. LOURDUSAMY & ANR. 937
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
on title upon which a finding was felt necessary and in the A
latter case decided by the Madras High Court, it mu.st be
assumed that the tests were not satisfied. As stated in
Mui/a, it all depends on the facts of each case and whether
the finding as to title was treated as necessary for grant
of an injunction in the earlier suit and was also the B
substantive basis for grant of injunction. In this context, we
may refer to Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 50, para 735,
p. 229) where a similar aspect in regard to findings on
possession and incidental findings on title were dealt with.
It is stated:
c
"Where title to property is the basis of the right of
possession, a.decision on the question of possession is
res judicata on the question of title to the extent that
adjudication of title was essential to the judgment; but
where the question of the right to possession was the only D
issue actually or necessarily involved, the judgment is not
conclusive on the question of ownership or title."
Following the principle of law as enunciated in the
aforementioned decision, we are of the opinion that the principle
of res-judicata is not attracted to the facts of the case. E
15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly.
Appeal is allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeals allowed F
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.