YADVENDRA ARYA AND ANR.versusMUKESH KUMAR GUPTA

                YADVENDRA ARYA AND ANR.                              A
                                v.
                   MUKESH KUMAR GUPTA

                     NOVEMBER 28, 2007
                                                                     B
                [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND
              LOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.]


     Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation ofLetting, Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972:                                                 c
     s. 21 (1 )(a)-Applicationfor release ofshop-On ground ofbona
fide need oflandlord to start his independent business-Other shops
 being rented accommodations in possession of tenants-HELD:
 Prescribed Authority and High Court rightly allowed application of D
 landlord-Tenants would vacate the premises as directed in the
judgment.
     Respondents-landlord filed an application for release of his
shop under Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, on the ground E
that he being an unemployed educated and married youngman, in
order to earn his livelihood, bona fide needs to start his independent
business and there was no possibility of his being employed in the
business of his father. It was also stated that the other shops were
rented accommodations in occupation of the tenants. The Prescribed p
Authority allowed the application, but the appellate authority
allowed the appeal of the tenants. However, the High Court allowed
the writ petition of the landlord.

     In the instant appeal filed by the tenants it was contended for
the appellants that parameters relating to bona fide needs and G
comparative hardship were not considered in proper perspective and
the matter should have been remanded to the authorities for
consideration.

                               615                                   H
    616           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A         Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: Considering the factual background in the light of
  principles as stated by this Court*, the inevitable conclusion is that
  the application of the landlord has rightly been allowed by the High
  Court. In such matters practice of remanding the case to the
8 authorities for further consideration has been deprecated by this
  Court in a large number of cases.** Considering the fact that the
  tenants are carrying on business in the premises, time is granted to
  them to vacate the premises in question as directed in the judgment.
                                            [Para 16 and 17) [624-E, FJ
c
        *Akhileshwar Kumar and Ors. v. Mustaqim and Ors., AIR 2003
  SC 532; Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., [2000)
  1 SCC 679; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, [2002) 5 SCC 397;
  G. C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR (2002) SC 200 and Mst.
D Bega Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khand (d) by Lrs. & Ors., [1979]
  1 sec 273, relied on.
          **R. VE. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and
    VP. Temple and Anr., (2003] 8 SCC 752, relied on.
E         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5483 of
    2007.
        From the Judgment and final Order dated 23.8.2006 of the High
    Court ofUttamachal at Nainital in W.P. No. 247/2002 MIS.
F       Yunus Malik, Abhishek Vikas and Prashant Chaudhary for the
    Appellants.
        N.D.B. Raju, C.M. Angadi and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the             ,.
    Respondent.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
          DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
       2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
  Judge of the Uttranchal High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the·
H respondent. Said respondent undisputedly is the landlord of the premises
      YADVENDRAARYAv. MUKESHKUMARGUPTA                                 617
                 [PASAYAT,J.]
which were let out to the present appellants.                                  A
      3. An application under Section 2l(l)(a) ofU.P. (Urban Building
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (Act No.13 of 1972)
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was filed by the respondent against
the appellants praying for the release of the Shop situated at Mahalia Bazar
Ganj (Park Road), Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar, which was B
under tenancy on the ground that the respondent has passed High School
Certificate Examination and is unemployed and he has no independent
business to earn his livelihood and, therefore, he wants to do the business
of Electrical Goods, T.V., V.C.R., Music System, Cooking Range etc. in
the said Shop.                                                               C
      4. It was, further, stated by the landlord in his release application
that his father Sri Mithilesh Kumar Gupta is doing the independent business
in the name ofMithilesh Kumar and Brothers of which his father is the
sole owner and there is no possibility of employing any other person, as D
the shop in possession of his father is not so elaborate 'so as to
accommodate the respondent also. It was also stated that he also does
not want to join the business along with his father, as he wants to do the
independent business. It has further been stated in the release application
that he has already been married in 1994 and is separate from his father E
and as such, the shop in dispute is required for his own use and occupation
for settling himself in the independent business.
      5. A written statement was filed by the present appellants in which
it was stated that the landlord can be accommodated in the business of
the father.                                                               F
     6. An affidavit was filed by the respondent who has deposed that
he wants to run the independent business and he cannot settle himself along
with his father. So far as the availability of the other shops are concerned,
it was specifically stated that all other shops are rented accommodation G
and the tenants are occupying the same.
     7. The prescribed authority, Kashipur District Udham Singh Nagar
allowed the application of the respondent directing the appellants to vacate
the shop within a period of 30 days.
                                                                               H
    618            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A         8. Being aggrieved the appellants preferred an appeal which was
    allowed by the appellate authority. The respondent filed Writ Petition under
    Article 227 of the Constitution ofindia, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution').
    The High Court as noted above allowed the writ petition of the respondent
    and directed the appellants to vacate the premises.
B
         9. In support of the appeal, it was contented by learned counsel for
    the appellants that the parameters relating to bona fide needs and
    comparative hardship have not been considered in the proper perspective.
        10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported
C the judgment of the High Court stating that the High Court has kept in
  view the factual scenario and applied the appropriate and applicable
  principles and, therefore, no interference is called for.
        11. So far as the basic need concept is concerned in Akhileshwar
  Kumar and Ors. v. Mustaqim and Ors., AIR (2003) SC 532 it was
D inter alia held as follows:
           "In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot
           be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice.
           Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiff No.
E           1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available
           to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and his
           father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff
           No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it
           does not mean that he should never start his own independent
F          business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to
           the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of
           plaintiff No. 4, i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting
           the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the
           three sons.
G          4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation,
           as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which
           a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2.
           The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The
           shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet
H          another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is
    YADVENDRAARYAv.MUKESHKUMARGUPTA                                  619
               [PASAYAT,J.]
      situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible A
      inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is
      why it is lying vacant and unutilized. Once it has been proved by
      a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by
      him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test
      of objective assessment by the Court of facts then choosing of the B
      accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such
      requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy.
      The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of
      course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not
      whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed C
      with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No. 1
       or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The
       approach of the High Court that an accommodation got vacated
       to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated
       unemployed should be diverted or can be considered as relevant D
       alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of plaintiffNo.
       1, another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced.
       So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and
       inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence
       lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit E
       shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible
      and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of
      one of them."
     12. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.,
[2000] 1 SCC 679 it was held as follows :                                    F
      "It is settled position oflaw that the landlord is best judge of his
      requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got
      complete freedom in the matter. See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. TV
      Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC 353. In the case in hand the plaintiff-
      landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for G
      starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
      13. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, [2002] 5 SCC 397
it was held as follows:
                                                                             H
                                                                                     }

    620             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A               "In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. v. State of
            Maharashtra and Anr., (1998) 2 SCC I this Court emphasized
            the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a
            balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. "The law
           ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit
B          or protection to another section of the society". While the shortage
           of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save
           them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect
           tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are
           not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one
c          needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic
          perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to
          legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a
          responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation
          impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section,
D         at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section,
          not only entails miscarriage ofjustice but may also in constitutional
          invalidity.
              xxx                          xxx                      xxx
E              The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations
           was emphasized by this Court in Bega. Begum v. Abdul Ahad
           Khan, (l 979) AIR SC 273. Speaking in the context of reasonable
           requirement oflandlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded
           against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of
F          language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the
           landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such
           a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords
          the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain
          specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti, (1980) l SCC
G         290 this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has
          given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed
          so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the
          landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which
          is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is
H
          the question of landlord's bona fide personal necessity. The
YADVENDRAARYAv.MUKESHKUMARGUPTA                                   621
           [PASAYAT,J.]
 concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed A
 so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical.
 Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr Mahesh Chand Gupta,
 [1999] 6 SCC 222 the Court has he!d that the concept of bona
fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach
 instructed by the realities oflife. An approach either too liberal or B
too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against.
 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the
tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring
legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices
of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by C
the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable
to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean
only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go
to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair
to the tenants and to the landlords - both. The courts have to adopt D
a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control
legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has
been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the
overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such
of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the E
court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such
provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of
those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and
feel humble.
                                                                          F
     xxx                       xxx                          xxx
   In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the
context in which it is set has significance. Color and content
emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere
meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is G
sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the
expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an
expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that
what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would
persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, H
    622           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 12 S.C.R.

A         to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use
          as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given
          facts and circumstances of a case the Court too would hold it to
          be so in contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The       )


          legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the
B         protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the
          accommodation to such use as he intends, away from leasing it out.
              xxx                      xxx                          xxx
          32. lfwe do not meaningly construe the concept ofrequirement
C         the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as
          unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable
          restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property.
          We cannot place a construction on the expression 'for his own use'
          in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant
D         when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself
          well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression
          and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words,
          which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian
          society, its customs and requirements and the context where the
E         provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance
          of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words 'for
          his own use' in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.
             33(1 )In the present case, the requirement oflandlord of the suit
          premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the
F         requirement oflandlord 'for his own use' within the meaning of
          Section l 3(3)(a)(ii)."
        14. Again in G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, AIR (2002)
    SC 200 it was noted as follows:
G         "It is settled position of law that bonafide requirement means that
          requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive
          and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattatraya Laxman Kamble
          v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Anr., [1999] 4SCC 1 this
          Court while considering the bonafide need of the landlord was of
H         the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for
     YADVENDRAARYAv.MUKESHKUMARGUPTA                                623
                [PASAYAT,J.]
      his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrant for A
      'presuming that his need is not bona fide'. It was also held that
      while deciding this question. Court would look into the broad
      aspects and if the Courts feels any doubt about bona fide
      requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt.
      10. In Raghunath G. Panhale G. Panhale (DJ By Lrs. v. B
      Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., [1999] 8 SCC 1 his Court inter
      alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he
      had money to invest in the new business contemplated nor that he
      had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of
      bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-residential purpose, C
      as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to
      improve his livelihood."

      15. In Mst. Begam Begum & Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan (d) by
Lrs & Ors., [1979] 1 SCC 273 this court had occasion to deal in detail D
with the comparative hardship's aspect as follows:
       "Moreover Section 1l(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable
       requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an
      element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The
      distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in E
      mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but
      a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us
      that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not
      be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or
      strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one F
      landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat
      the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction
      of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This
      appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control
      Acts, prevalent in other State in the country. This Court has G
      considered the import of the word requirement and pointed out
      that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need.
          In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led
      by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel
                                                                            H
    624             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2007] 12 S.C.R.


A          business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown
           out they are likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High
           Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but
           does not appear to have considered the natural consequences,
           which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and
B          disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction
           follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted
           from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event
           would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was
           fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section l l(l)(h) of
c          the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid
           ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction.
           Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative
           advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems
           to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The
D          inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree
           for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the eviction from
           that point of view."
        16. It is to be noted that learned counsel for the appellants submitted
E that the matter should have been remanded to the authorities for further
  consideration. Such a practice has been deprecated by this court in a
  large number of cases. [See: R. V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu
  Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Anr., [2003] 8 SCC 752.
        17. Considering the factual background in the light of the principles
F as stated above, the inevitable conclusion is that this appeal is without
  merit. Considering the fact that the appellants are carrying on the business
  in the premises, time is granted to them to vacate the premises in question
  by the end of June, 2008 subject to filing the usual undertaking with the
  prescribed authority within a period of four weeks from today.
G
        18. Appeal is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
    RP.                                                      Appeal dismissed.