YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGHversusSAVITRI PANDEY & ANR.

                        [2014] 12 S.C.R. 26


A                  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH
                                  v.
                      SAVITRI PANDEY & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 605 of 2012)
                      SEPTEMBER 19, 2014
B
           [R.M. LODHA, CJI, KURIAN JOSEPH AND
                     R.F. NARIMAN, JJ.]

          Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - ss. 138 and 142 -
C   Dishonour of cheque - Complaint filed before the expiry of
    the period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be
    seNed on the drawer of the cheque - Maintainability of -
    Held: Complaint is not maintainable - It is no complaint at
    all in the eyes of law - No cognizance of an offence can be
D   taken on basis of such complaint because there is no
    commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for
    filing of complaint u/s. 138 - Remedy is to file a fresh
    complaint within one month of the date on which cause of
    action arose and if not, the recourse is to seek the benefit of
E   the proviso to s. 142 (b), satisfying the court of sufficient
    cause.

        Answering the questions referred, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal
F Procedure defines 'complaint', according to which
  complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing
  to a Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a
  person who has committed an offence. Commission of
  an offence is a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for
G taking cognizan'ce of such offence. A bare reading of the
  provision contained in clause (c) of the proviso to Section
  138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 makes it clear
  that no complaint can be filed for an offence uls. 138
  unless the period of 15 days has elapsed. Any complaint
H                             26
 YOGENDRA PRATAP SfNGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY              27


before the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the A
notice has been served on the drawer/accused is no
complaint at all in the eyes of law. No cognizance of an
offence can be taken on the basis of such complaint. It
is not the question of prematurity of the complaint where
it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which B
notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all
under law. Merely because at the time of taking
cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has
expired from the date on which notice has been served
on the drawer/accused, the Court is not clothed with the c
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence u/s. 138 on
a complaint filed before ·the expiry of 15 days from the
date of receipt of notice by the drawer of the cheque.
[Para 36] [49-F-H; 50-A-E]
     1.2. A complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from D
the date on which notice has been served on drawer/
accused cannot be said to disclose the cause of action
in terms of clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 and
upon such complaint which does not disclose the cause
of action the Court is not competent to take cognizance. E
A conjoint reading of Section 138, which defines as to
when and under what circumstances an offence can be
said to have been committed, with Section 142(b) of the .
NI Act, that reiterat~s the position of the point of time
when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner F
of doubt that no offence can be said to have been
committed unless and until the period of 15 days, as
prescribed under clause (c) ·Of the proviso to Section 138, ·
has, in fact, elapsed. Therefore, a Court is barred in law
from taking cognizance of such complaint. It is not open G
to the Court to take cognizance of such a complaint
merely because on the date of consideration or taking
cognizance thereof a period of 15 days from the date on
which the notice has been served on the drawer/accused
                                                           H
    28      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2014) 12 S.C.R.


A has elapsed. No complaint can be maintained against the
  drawer of the cheque before the expiry of 15 days from
  the date of receipt of notice because the drawer/accused
  cannot be said to have .committed any offence until then.
  There is no doubt that all the five essential features of
B Section 138 of the NI Act must be satisfied for a complaint
  to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in
  clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 has not expired,
  there is no commission of an offence nor accrual of cause
  of action for filing of complaint u/s. 138 of the NI Act. [Para
c 37, 39] [50-F-H; 51-A-B, G-H; 52-A]
       1.3. Section 142 prescribes the mode and so also the
  time within which a complaint for an offence u/s. 138 can
  be filed. A complaint made uls. 138 by the payee or the
  holder in due course of the cheque has to be in writing
D and needs to be made within one month from the date
  on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c)
  of the proviso to Section 138. The period of one month
  under Section 142(b) begins from the date on which the
  cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso
E to Section 138. However, if the complainant satisfies the
  Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a
  complaint within the prescribed period of one month, a
  complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed
  period. Since the complaint filed before the expiry of 15
F days notice period is not maintainable, the payee or the
  holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh
  complaint within one month from the date of decision in
  the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the
  complaint would be treated as having been condoned
G under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI
  Act. (Para 42] [52-D-G]

         Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy Private
    Limited and Anr. v. L/yods Register of Shipping Indian Office
H
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                  29

Staff Provident Fund and Anr. 2007 (10) SCR 1110 : (2007) A
14 sec 753 - approved.
    Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani and
Anr. 2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 171 :(2000) 7 SCC 183 -
disapproved.                                                      B

     Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar
and Anr. 1993 Cri.L.J. 680; Ashok Verma v. Ritesh Agro Pvt.
Ltd. and Anr. (1995) 1 Bank CLR 103; N. Venkata Sivaram
Prasad v. Mis Rajeswari Constructions 1996 Cri. L.J. 3409;
Ashok Hegde v. Jathin v. Attawan 1997 Cril. L.J. 3691; Sri        C
Niranjan Sahoo v. Mis Utkal Sanitary, BBSR 1998 (3) Crimes
188; Mis Harpreet Hosiery Rehari v. Nitu Mahajan 2000
Cri.L.J. 3625; Arun Hegde and Anr. v. M.J. Sheffy ILR 2001
Kar. 3295; Smt. Hem Lata Gupta v. State of U.P. and Anr.
2002 Cri. L.J. 1522; Mahendra Agarwal v. Gopi Ram Mahajan         D
RLW2003 (1) Raj. 673; Bapulal B. Kacchi v. Krupachand Jain
2004 Cri. L.J. 1140; Yunus Khan v. Mazhar Khan 2004 (1)
GLT 652; Zenith Fashion Makers (P) Ltd. v. Ultimate Fashion
Makers Ltd. and Arir. 121 (2005) DLT 297; Ganga Ram Singh
v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2005 Cri. L.J. 3681; S. Janak Singh     E
v. Pritpal Singh 2007 (2) JKJ 91; Sandip Guha v. Saktipada
Ghosh and Anr. 2008 (3) CHN 214; Rattan Chand v. Kanwar
Ram Kripal and Anr. 2010 Cri. L.J. 706; Mis. Kusum Ingots
& Alloys Ltd. v. Mis. Pennar Peterson Securities. Ltd. and ors.
etc. etc. 2000 (1) SCR 1120: (2000) 2 SCC 745; K.R. Indira        F
v. Dr. G. Adinarayana 2003 (4) Suppl. SCR 535 : (2003) 8
sec 300 - referred to.
                     Case Law Reference:
  ,, 1993 Cri.L.J. 680            Refened to        Para 10       G
    (1995) 1 Bank CLR 103         Referred to       Para 11
     1996 Cri. L.J. 3409          Referred to       Para 11
     1997 Cril. L.J. 3691         Referred to       Para 11
                                                                  H
    30       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014) 12 S.C.R.


A        1998 (3) Crimes 188          Referred to     Para 11
         2000 Cri.L.J. 3625           Referred to     Para 11
         ILR 2001 Kar. 3295           Referred to     Para 20

B        2002 Cri. L.J. 1522          Referred to     Para 21
         RLW 2003 (1) Raj. 673        Referred to     Para 22
         2004 Cri. L.J. 1140          Referred to     Para 23
         2004 (1) GLT 652             Referred to     Para 24
c
         121 (2005) DLT 297           Referred to     Para 25
         2005 Cri. L.J. 3681          Referred to     Para 26
         2007 (2) JKJ 91              Referred to     Para 28
D        2008 (3) CHN 214             Referred to     Para 30
         2010 Cri. L.J. 706           Referred to     Para 30
         2000 (1) SCR 1120            Referred to     Para 32

E        2003 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 535 Referred to         Para 34
         2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 171      Disapproved     Para 38
         2007 (10) SCR 1110         Approved          Para 39
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
F
    No. 605 of 2012.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 21.05.2010 of the High
    Court of Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.
    773 of 2009.
G
                               WITH

    Criminal Appeal Nos. 1924 & 1925 of 2014.

         Shakil Ahmed Syed, Mohd. Parvez Dabas, Uzmi Jameel
H
 YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                    31


Husain, Daanish Ahmad Syed, Sureshan P., Sanjay Singh,            A
Ugra Shankar Prasad for the Appellant.

      J.N. Dubey, Anurag Dubey, Meenesh Dubey, S.R. Setia
Subhasish Bhowmick, Nitin S. Tambwekar, B.S. Sai, K. Rajeev
for the Respondents.
                                                                  B
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     R.M. LODHA, CJI. 1. In the order of 03.04.2012, a two-
Judge Bench of this Court granted leave in SLP (Crl.) No.5761
of 2010. The Court formulated the following two questions for     c
consideration:

    (i) Can cognizance of an offence punishable under Section
    138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 be taken on
    the basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the
    period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required to be     D
    served upon the drawer of the cheque in terms of Section
    138 (c) of the Act aforementioned? And,

    (ii) If answer to question No.1 is in the negative, can the
    complainant be permitted to present the complaint again       E
    notwithstanding the fact that the period of one month
    stipulated under Section 142 (b) for the filing of such a
    complaint has expired?

     2. The two-Judge Bench in that order noticed Section 138 F
and Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ("NI
Act") and also referred to the two decisions of this Court,
namely, (1) Narsingh Das Tapadia' and (2) Sarav Investment
& Financial Consultancy2 • The Bench also noticed the
judgments of High Courts of Calcutta, Orissa, Bombay, Punjab G
and Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad, Gauhati, Rajasthan,
Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madras, Jammu
and Kashmir and Karnataka and observed that judicial opinion
on the first question was split among the High Courts in the
country and so also the two decisions of this Court in Narsingh
                                                                H
    32           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   Oas Tapadia' and Sarav Investment & Financial
    Consultancy2 • Even amongst the two High Courts, namely,
    Jammu and Kashmir and Karnataka, the Bench noticed that the
    decisions on the first question were not uniform. It was felt by
    the two-Judge Bench that the conflict in the judicial
B   pronouncements needed to be resolved authoritatively and,
    accordingly, referred the above two questions for consideration
    by a three-Judge Bench .of this Court.

          3. This is how the matter has been placed before us.
c         4. It is not necessary to narrate the facts in detail. Suffice
    it to refer to factual matrix noted in the referral order which is
    as follows:

          The appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the
D         Negotiable Instruments Act against respondent No.1 Smt.
          Savitri Pandey in the Court of Additional Civil Judge (J.0.)1
          Magistrate, Sonbhadra in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The
          respondent's case was that four cheques issued by the
          accused-respondent in his favour were dishonoured, when
E         presented for encashment. A notice calling upon the
          respondent-drawer of the cheque to pay the amount
          covered by the cheques was issued and duly served upon
          the respondent as required under Section '138 (c) of The
          Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. No payment was,
          however, made by the accused till 7th October, 2008 when
F
          a complaint under Section 138 of the Act aforementioned
          was filed before the Magistrate. Significantly enough the
          notice in question having been served on 23rd September,
          2008, the complaintpresented on 7th October, 2008 was

G
    1.   Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani and Anr.; [(2000) 7 SCC
         183].
    2.   Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy Private Limited and Anr. v. Llyods
         Register of Shipping Indian Office Staff Provident Fund and Anr.; [(2007)
         14 sec 753].                  ·
H
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                     33
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
    filed before expiry of the stipulated period of 15 days. The    A
    Magistrate all the same took cognizance of the offence on
    14th October, 2008 and issued summons to the accused,
    who then assailed the said order in a petition under
    Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before the High Court of
    Judicature at Allahabad. The High Court took the view that      B
    since the complaint had been filed within 15 days of the
    service of the notice the same was clearly premature and
    the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of
    the offence on the basis of such a complaint is legally bad.
    The High Court accordingly quashed the complaint and the        c
    entire proceedings relating thereto in terms of its order
     impugned in the present appeal.

      5. Before we advert to the two decisions of this Court in
Narsingh Das Tapadia' and Sarav Investment & Financial
Consultancy2, and few decisions of the High Courts, we think        D
it proper to.refer to Sections 138 and 142 of the NI Act. Section
138 of the NI Act, as it stands today after amendment by Act
55 of 2002, defines the ingredients of the offence and the
punishment that would follow in the event of such an offence
having been committed and the proviso appended thereto              E
makes certain eventualities/conditions precedent for the
commission of offence. It reads as under:

    138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds
    in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on         F
    an account maintained by him with a banker for payment
    of any amount of money to another person from out of that
    account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt
    or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either
    because of the amount of money standing to the credit of        G
    that account is insufficient to honor the cheque or that it
    exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account
    by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall
    be deemed to have committed an offence and shall
    without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be       H
    34       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A        punished with imprisonment for a term which may be
         extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to
         twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

         Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
B        unless-

               (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within
         a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn
         or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

c               (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the
         cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for fhe
         payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice
         in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of
         the receipt of information by him from.the bank regarding
D        the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

               (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the
         payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as
         the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque,
         within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
E
         Explanation: For the purposes of this section, "debt or other
         liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

       6. Section 142 deals with cognizance of offences. The said
F provision, after amendment by Act 55 of 2002, is as under:

         142. Cognizance of offences.-Notwithstanding anything
         contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
         1974) -

G               (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence
         punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in
         writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the
         holder in due course of the cheque;

               (b) such complaint is made within one month of the
H
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                      35
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.)
    date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c)        A
    of the proviso to section 138:

          Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be
    taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the
    complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause
                                                                     8
    for not making a complaint within such period.

          (c) no court .inferior to that of a Metropolitan
    Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall
    try any offence punishable under section 138.
                                                                     c
     7. It may not be out of place to mention here that entire
Chapter XVII of the NI Act was brought in the statute by Act 66
of 1988 w.e.f. 01.04.1989. This Chapter comprises of Sections
138 to 147:
    8. The other two provisions which deserve mention are            D
Sections 2(d) and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
("Code"). Section 2(d) defines complaint in the context of the
Code as follows:

    2(d)"complaint" means any allegation made orally or in           E
    writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action
    under this Code, that some person, whether known or
    unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include
    a police report.
                                                                     F
     9. Chapter XIV of the Code bears the title 'Conditions
Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings'. This chapter has only
one provision namely, Section 190. Section 190 makes
provision for cognizance of offences by Magistrates. It reads
as under:
                                                                     G
    190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. - (1) Subject
    to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first
    class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially
    empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take
    cognizance of any offence-                                       H
    36            SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A           (a)     upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute
                         such offence;

            (b)     upon a police report of such facts;

            (c)     upon information received from any person other
B                   than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge,
                    that such offence has been committed.

               (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any
          Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under
c         sup-section (1) of such offences as are within his
          competence to inquire into or try.

       10. Before the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das
  Tapadia', six High Courts had occasion to consider the
  question whether the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act
D was maintainable when the stipulated period of 15 days of the
  receipt of the notice as provided in clause (c) of the proviso
  appended to Section 138 had not expired. The first of such
  decisions, decided as early as on 29.07.1992 is of the Bombay
  High Court in Rakesh Nemkumar PorwaP. The Division Bench
E of the Bombay High Court held that as the complaint was
  presented within the period of 15 days of the service of notice
  effected on the accused, the complaint was not maintainable
  for commission of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act as
  no offence can be said to have been committed on the date of
F lodgment of the complaint. Reading Section 138(c) and Section
  142 (b) together, the Division Bench of the Bomba·y High Court
  held that no offence can be said to have been committed until
  and unless the period of 15 days as prescribed under clause
  138(c) has in fact elapsed.
G
       11 . The above view taken by the Division Bench of the
  Bombay High Court is echoed by the High Courts of Punjab


    3.   Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal v. Narayan Dhondu Joglekar and Anr.; [1993
H        Cri.L.J. 680].
     YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                               37
                [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
and Haryana (Ashok Venna)4, Andhra Pradesh (N. Venkata A
Sivaram Prasad)", Karnataka (Ashok Hegde) 6 , Orissa (Sri
Niranjan Sahoo) 7 and Jammu and Kashmir (Mis Harpreet
Hosiery Rehan)".

      12. In the case of Ashok Venna•, the argument of the
                                                                  8
petitioner accused before the Punjab and Haryana High Court
was that Section 138 of the NI Act envisaged a clear 15 days
notice to the drawer of the cheque and the time was to be
computed from the date of the receipt of the notice, but the
impugned complaint had been filed before the expiry of 15 days C
and the complaint was liable to be quashed on this ground.
Dealing with the argument, the Punjab and Haryana High Court
referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rakesh
Nemkumar Porwa/3 and on going through the provisions of
Section 138 held as under:
                                                                  D
      A perusal of the above section shows that while the
      section defines the necessary ingredients of the offence
      and punishment that can be awarded for the commission
      of the offence, the proviso to the section lays down the
      conditions precedent for the commission of the offence. E
      According to this proviso the necessary ingredients of the
      offence are that the cheque was presented to the bank
      within a period of six months from the date on which it was
      drawn or the period of its validity, that the cheque is
      returned unpaid because of insufficiency of funds or that F
      the amount of the cheque exceeded the amount arranged
      to be paid from the bank and the payee gave a notice to
      the drawer claiming the amount within 15 days of the

4.    Ashok Verma v. Ritesh Agro Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.; [(1995) 1 Bank CLR 103].     G
5.    N. Venkata Sivaram Prasad v. Mis Rajeswari Constructions; [1996 Cri. L.J.
      3409].
6.    Ashok Hegde v. Jathin v. Attawan; [1997 Cril. L.J. 3691].
7.    Sri Niranjan Sahoo v. Mis Utkal Sanitary, BBSR; [1998 (3) Crimes 188].
8.    Mis Harpreet Hosiery Rehari v. Nitu Mahajan; [2000 Cri.L.J. 3625].          H
    38       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A        receipt of the information from the bank regarding the
         return of the cheque and the drawer failed to make
         payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. Under
         Sub-clause (c) of the proviso a 15 days time is granted to
         the drawer of the cheque to make payment and unless this
B        period elapsed and no payment was made, the drawer
         was not liable for any offence under Section 138 of the Act.

         13. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
    in N. Venkata Sivaram Prasad5 was confronted with the
    question as to whether the Magistrate can take cognizance of
c   the complaint given in the case under consideration and .
    proceed with the trial of the complaint after the expiry of 15
    days as prescribed under Section 138(c) of the NI Act. The
    question that fell for consideration before the Andhra Pradesh
    High Court involved the aspect whether the offence under
D   Section 138 can be said to be complete only if the drawer fails
    to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice
    as contemplated in proviso (c) to Section 138. The Division
    Bench took into consideration the provisions contained in
    Section 138 and Section 142 of the NI Act and so also Section
E   2(d), Section 2(n) and Section 190 of the Code and held that
    until and unless the criteria laid down in Section 138 are
    complied with, it would not constitute an offence. The Division
    Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held:

         Proviso (c) clearly stipulates that the Section does not
F
         apply unless the drawer of the cheques fails to make the
         payment to the payee within 15 days of the receipt of the
         said notice. Thus, the payee has been given liberty to
         make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the
         notice even though the cheque was returned by the Bank
G        unpaid. Hence, the reading of Proviso (c) to
         Section 138 clearly denotes that it would not be an offence
         if the drawer pays the amount within a period of 15 days
         as a specified therein. In such circumstances, there could
         not have been any complaint alleging the violation of
H        Section 138. The pre-offence period granted to the payee
 YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                      39
            [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
   should be construed strictly, otherwise the very purpose of      A
   Section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act would be
   frustrated. The complain.ant should be able to point out to
   the offence under Section 138 when the complaint was
   filed. When the complaint is filed even before the offence
   is completed, it cannot be said that the offence is made         B
   out and, therefore, such complaint is invalid in the eye of
   law. As already noticed, under Section 142 of the Act, no
   Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
   under Section 138, except upon a complaint in writing
   made by the payee. Therefore, the necessary ingredient           c
   enabling the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence
    is that there should be a complaint in writing by the payee
   and the said complaint should disclose an offence under
    Section 138. In the complaint made by the respondent
    before the Magistrate, no offence could have been
                                                                    0
   disclosed as the time prescribed under Section 138,
    Proviso (c) was not exhausted by the time the complaint
   was presented to the Magistrate. Even by the date of
    service of summons, there was no further complaint in
   writing to the effect that even after the expiry of 15 days
    period as mentioned in proviso (c), the drawer failed to pay    E
   the amount.

     14. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Venkata
Sivaram Prasad5 also considered the question in light of
Section 190 of the Code and held as under:                          F

    The matter may also be viewed from the provisions of
    Section 190, Cr.P.C., where the Magistrate is empowered
    to take cognizance of any offence upon rec;eiving a
    complaint of facts which constitute such an offence. We         G
    have already referred to the definition of the 'complaint' in
    Cr.P.C. Therefore, for taking cognizance of the offence,
    there should have been a complaint containing the facts
    which constitute an offence. Unless the offence is ex facie
    disclosed in the complaint, the Magistrate cannot have any      H
    competence to take cognizance of the offence and
    40       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A        proceed further. In the present case, on the facts stated in
         the complaint, there could not be any offence. As the
         complaint on the basis of which the Magistrate proceeded
         to take cognizance is not a complaint at all in the eye of
         law, the question of proceeding with the case on the basis
B        of such complaint does not arise. In the instant case, the
         Magistrate had no means of knowing whether the offence
         was completed subsequent to the date of the complaint
         because, as already stated, there was no further written
         complaint as required by Section 142(a). The subsequent
c        events on completion of the offence can only come to the
         knowledge of the Court by way of complaint in writing.
         Apart from the original complaint which does not disclose
         any offence, there is no further complaint. As rightly pointed
         out by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, when the
D        special law specifies not only the ingredients of the offence
         but also the procedure, the requirements have to be strictly
         complied with. Hence, we are of the opinion that the Court
         cannot proceed with the case even after the lapse of time
         as prescribed by Section 138(c) of Negotiate Instruments
         Act.
E
        It was, thus, held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that
    the Magistrate should not have acted upon a premature
    complaint which was not a complaint at all in the eye of law.

F       15. In Ashok Hegde6 , the single Judge of the Karnataka
  High Court while dealing with the contention raised by the
  petitioner therein that the complainant has not given 15 days'
  time to the petitioner as contemplated under Section 138(b) of
  the NI Act and the complaint was premature and should not
G have been entertained, the single Judge held, " ..... from the
  above, it is clear that he received the notice back on
  21.09.1989. Even accepting that the petitioner refused the
  notice on 20.09.1989, the respondent ought to have filed this
  complaint after the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt
  of the notice. The date of issuance of notice cannot be taken
H
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                       41
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
into account.. ...... Therefore, the cause of action had not arisen   A
to file the complaint against the petitioner and the complaint
was premature ....... "

     16. The Orissa High Court in Sri Niranjan Sahoo7 also
took the view that if the complaint case is filed before expiry of    8
15 days as provided in clause (c) to the proviso of Section 138,
then cognizance of the offence cannot be taken in view of the
provision in clause (b) of Section 142 and consequentially the
complaint was liable to be quashed.

     17. The view of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Mis.             C
Harpreet Hosiery Rehart' is to the effect that under the law
drawer has got 15 days to make the payment from the receipt
of notice of dishonour of the cheque. It is only thereafter that
an action under Section 138 of the NI Act can be initiated
against the defaulting party.                                         D

     18. It was after the above decisions of the various High
Courts that the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia'
came. In Narsingh Das Tapadia', which was decided on
06.09.2000, the two-Judge Bench of this Court noted the facts         E
as follows:

   · ...... that the respondent borrowed a sum of Rs.2,30,000
     from the appellant and issued a post-dated cheque in his
     favour. When the cheque was presented for demand on
     3-10-1994, the same was dishonoured by the bank on 6- F
     10-1994 due to "insufficient funds". The appellant
     demanded the accused to repay the amount vide his
     telegrams sent on 7-10-1994 and 17-10-1994. A notice
     was also issued to the respondent on 19-10-1994
     demanding to repay the amount. Despite receipt of the G
     notice on 26-10-1994 the respondent neither paid the
     amount nor gave any reply. To prove his case, the
     appellant-complainant examined three witnesses and
     proved documents, Exhibits P-1 to P-6. In his statement
     under Section 313 CrPC the respondent denied the H
    42       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A        allegations but refused to lead any defence evidence. On
         analysis of the evidence and after hearing the counsel for
         the parties, the trial court concluded as under:

                "The complainant established that the accused
                borrowed Rs.2,30,000 from him and the accused
B
                issued Ext. P-3, cheque and the cheque was
                returned due to insufficiency of funds and the
                accused did not repay the amount in spite of
                receipt of notice from the complainant and hence
                the accused is liable for punishment under Section
c               138 of the NI Act."

         As noticed earlier, the appeal filed by the respondent was
         dismissed on 19-4-1997. The High Court found that as the
         notice intimating the dishonourment of cheque was served
D        upon the accused on 26-10-1994, the appellant-
         complainant could not file the complaint unless the expiry
         of 15 days' period. It was found on facts that the complaint
         filed on 8-11-1994 was returned after finding some defect
         in it. However, when refiled, the Court took the cognizance
E        on 17-11-1994. The High Court held that the original
         complaint having·been filed on 8-11-1994 was premature
         and liable to be dismissed.

         19. This Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia' considered the
    provisions contained in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138
F   and Section 142 of the NI Act and also considered the
    expression "taking cognizance of an offence" and held that mere
    presentation of the complaint on 08.11.1994 when it was
    returned to the complainant on the ground that the verification
    was not signed by the counsel, could not be termed to be an
G   action of the Magistrate taking cognizance within the meaning
    of Section 142 of the NI Act. The two-Judge Bench did not
    approve the view of the High Court and held that the High Court
    erroneously held the complaint as premature. Consequently, the
    judgment of the High Court was set aside and the conviction
H   of the respondent under Section 138 of the NI Act was upheld.
     YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                               43
                [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]

     20. After the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das                       A
Tapadia', the Karnataka High Court in Arun Hegde" did not
accept the contention of the accused that the complaint filed
under Section 138 on 15th day of service of notice of demand
was premature and as such not maintainable. Relying upon
Narsingh Das Tapadia 1 , the single Judge of the Karnataka                      B
High Court in Arun Hegde" held that if the complaint was found
to be premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the
complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an
earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to
be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve                    C
himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed.

     21. In Hem Lata Gupta 10 , the Allahabad High Court while
dealing with the complaint filed before expiry of 15 days, after
relying upon the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das
Tapadia' held that the bar of expiry of 15 days from the date of D
service of notice is for taking cognizance and not for filing
complaint.

     22. In Mahendra Agarwa/11 , the Rajasthan High Court
adopted the reasoning that was made by this Court in Narsingh                   E
Das Tapadia' and held that mere presentation of the complaint
in the court cannot be held to mean, that its cognizance had
been taken by the Magistrate. If the complaint is found to be
premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the
complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an                    F
earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to
be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve
himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed.

      23. In Bapu/al 8. Kacchi12 , the Madhya Pradesh High                      G


9.    Arun Hegde and Anr. v. M.J. Shelly; [ILR 2001 Kar. 32951.
10.    Smt. Hem Lata Gupta v. State of U.P. and Anr.; [2002 Cri. L.J. 1522].
11. Mahendra Agarwal v. Gopi Ram Mahajan; [RLW 2003 (1) Raj. 673].
12. Bapulal B. Kacchi v. Krupachand Jain; [2004 Cri. L.J. 1140].                H
    44        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   Court considered the matter against the order passed by the
    Sess(ons Judge setting aside the order passed by the Chief
    Judicial Magistrate, Shajapur whereby he refused to register
    the comp·laint under Section 138 of the NI Act against the
    accused as it was found to be premature since 15 days from
B   the date of receipt of the notice by the accused had not elapsed.
    The Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Chief Judicial
    Magistrate dealing with criminal revision filed by the accused.
    Madhya Pradesh High Court followed the decision of this Court
    in Narsingh Oas Tapadia' and held that the order of the Chief
c   Judicial Magistrate in dismissing the complaint was wrong and
    that order was rightly set aside by the revisional court.

         24. The Gauhati High Court in Yunus Khan' 3 relying upon
    Narsingh Das Tapadia' took the view that mere presentation
    of a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate does not
D   mean that Magistrate has taken cognizance of the same.
    Though the complaint was filed under Section 138 of the NI Act
    in the Court of Judicial Magistrate when only 13 days had
    elapsed from the date of receipt of the notice and the requisite
    period of 15 days was not yet completed but when the
E   Magistrate took cognizance, 15 days had elapsed from the
    date of the receipt of the notice and thus the complaint already
    stood validly instituted and the prosecution launched against the
    accused on the basis of such a complaint could not be held
    bad in law.
F
         25. A single Judge of Delhi High Court in Zenith Fashion
    Makers 14 was concerned with the case arising from the
    following facts:

          The complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument
G         Act was filed by the respondent for dishonour of two
          cheques No. 615385 dated 20.7.2003 of Rs. 8,00,000/-

    13.   Yunus Khan v. Mazhar Khan; [2004 (1) GLT 652].
    14. Zenith Fashion Makers (P) Ltd. v. Ultimate Fashion Makers Ltd. and Anr.;
H       [121 (2005) DLT 297].
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                               45
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]

    and No.615387 dated 20.9.2003 of Rs.3,00,000/-. Both                     A
    the cheques were dishonoured on account of insufficiency
    of funds. The return memo of the bank is dated 20.9.2003.
    The legal notice under Section 138 of Negotiable
    Instruments Act was issued on 15.10.2003 through Regd.
    Post as well as through speed post. The postal                           B
    acknowledgment card shows service on 18.10.2003. The
    complainant pleaded that the notices were duly received
    but no payment in respect of the dishonoured cheques was
    made within 15 days of the notice as was required by the
    law as well as by the notice. The complaint is presented                 c
    on 31.10.2003. The Magistrate took cognizance on
    31.10.2003 itself and directed issue of process on the
    same day. What is contended in this petition under
    Section 482 Cr.P.C. is that the notice of demand being of
     15.10.2003, dispatched on 17.10.2003 and received on                    D
     18.10.2003, the complaint was filed within 15 days after
    service of notice and hence was pre-mature as the cause
    of action could accrue only after 15 days of the notice, i.e.,
     on 3.11.2003.

Despite the fact that the complaint was presented before the                 E
expiry of 15 days of service of notice and the Magistrate took
cognizance also before the expiry of 15 days, the High Court
strangely held that a premature complaint under Section 138
of the NI Act cannot be quashed on the ground of pre-maturity
since there was no plea on the side of the accused that he would             F
have paid the cheque amount had the complainant given it the
required time. The Delhi High Court while doing so relied upon
the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia' and also
invoked the maxim 'Actus curiae neminem gravabif, an act
of the Court shall prejudice no man.                                         G

     26. The Allahabad High Court in Ganga Ram Singh' 5 took
the view that if the complaint was filed under Section 138 of

15. Ganga Ram Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors.; (2005 Cri. L.J. 3681].        H
    46        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        (2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   the NI Act before expiry of 15 days of statutory notice, the
    concerned court should have waited and allowed the
    complainant to establish its case or cognizance should have
    been taken after the expiry of the stipulated period instead of
    dismissing the complaint outright as premature.
B
         27. A single Judge of the Madras High Court, following
    Narsingh Das Tapadia' held that though the complaint was
    preferred three days short of the time to be availed by the
    accused to settle the dues but since the Magistrate had taken
C   cognizance of the complaint presented by the complainant after
    the 15 days time granted under the statutory notice to settle the
    amount due to complainant, the complaint cannot be quashed
    on the ground that it was filed prematurely.

       28. In S. Janak Singh 16, the Jammu and Kashmir High
D Court took the view with regard to presentation of complaint
  before the accrual of cause of action that though the complaint
  under Section 138 of the NI Act having been filed before the
  accrual of cause of action, the same could not be legally
  entertained by the trial court. Relying upon Narsingh Das
E Tapadia'. it was held that if the complaint was found to be
  premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the
  complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an
  earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable
  to be dismissed or confer any right upon accused to absolve
F himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. The
  view of the single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court
  is founded on the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das
  Tapadia'.

       29. For about 7 years since the decision was given by this
G Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia', the various High Courts, as
  indicated above, continued to take the view that presentation
  of a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act before the
  accrual of the cause of action does not render it not

H 16.    S. Janak Singh v. Pritpal Singh; [2007 (2) JKJ 91].
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                               47
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
maintainable if cognizance had been taken by the Magistrate                  A
after expiry of 15 days of the period of notice. In such matters,
no illegality or impropriety found to have been committed by the
Magistrate in taking cognizance upon such complaint. This legal
position, however, was not accepted by a two-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Sarav Investment & Financial                       B
Consultancy"'-. Dealing with the provision under Section 138 of
the NI Act, this Court held that Section 138 contained a penal
p_rovision; it was a special statute. Having regard to the purport
of the said provision as also in view of the fact that it provides
for a severe penalty, the provision warrant a strict construction.           C
This Court emphasized that clause (c) of the proviso to Section
138 provides that the holder of the cheque must be given an
opportunity to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of
the .notice. Complaint, thus, can be filed for commission of an
offence by drawee of the cheque only 15 days after service of                D
the notice. In Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy"'-, this
Court, thus, held that service of notice in terms of Section 138
proviso (b) of the NI Act was a part of cause of action for lodging
the complaint and communication to the accused about the fact
of dishonouring of the cheques and calling upon him to pay the
amount within 15 days was imperative in character. It is true                E
that in Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy2 , there is
no reference of the decision of this Court in Narsingh Das
Tapadia'.

     30. Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy"'- led to the F
view being taken by the High Courts that a complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act filed before expiry of 15 days of
service of notice was premature and such complaint could not
be treated as complaint in the eye of law and criminal
proceedings initiated are liable to be quashed. This is seen G
from the view of the Calcutta High Court in Sandip Guha 17 and
the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Rattan
Chand18 •
17.   Sandip Guha v. Saktipada Ghosh and Anr.; [2008 (3) CHN 214].
18. Rattan Chand v. Kanwar Ram Kripal and Anr.; [2010 Cri. L.J. 706].        H
    48          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A         31. Section 138 of the NI Act comprises of the main
    provision which defines the ingredients of the offence and the
    punishment that would follow in the event of such an offence
    having been committed. Appended to this Section is also a
    proviso which has three clauses, viz., (a), (b) and (c). The
B   offence under Section 138 is made effective only on fulfillment
    of the eventualities contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the
    proviso. For completion of an offence under Section 138 of the
    NI Act not only the satisfaction of the ingredients of offence set
    out in the main part of the provision is necessary but it is also
C   imperative that all the three eventualities mentioned in clauses
    (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are satisfied. Mere issuance of a
    cheque and dishonour thereof would not constitute an offence
    by itself under Section 138.

         32. Section 138 of the NI Act has been analysed by this
D   Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. 19 wherein this Court said
    that the following ingredients are required to be satisfied for
    making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act:

           (i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account
E          maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain
           amount of money to another person from out of that account
           for the discharge of any debt or other liability;

           (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a
           period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or
F          within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

           (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either
           because the amount of money standing to the credit of the
           account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it
G          exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account
           by an agreement made with the bank;

           (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque

    19.    Mis. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Lid. v. Mis. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd.
H         and ors. etc. etc.; [AIR 2000 SC 954 : (2000) 2 sec 745].
                                                                 ...,.~   .




  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                                     49
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.)
      makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of                         A
      money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the
      cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of- information by him
      from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
      unpaid;.
                                                                                   B
      (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of
      the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in
      due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of
      the said notice.

      33. We are in agreement with the above analysis.                             C

    34. In K.R. lndira, 20 a two-Judge Bench of this Court
observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act could
be completed if all the above components are satisfied.

     35. Insofar as the present reference is concerned, the                        D
debate broadly centers around clause (c) of the proviso to
Section 138 of the NI Act. The requirement of clause (c) of the
proviso is that the drawer of the cheque must have failed to
make the payment of the cheque amount to the payee within
15 days of the receipt of the notice. Clause (c) of the proviso                    E
offers a total period of 15 days to the drawer from the date of
receipt of the. notice to make payment of the cheque amount
on its-dishonour.

     36. Can an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act be · F
said to have been committed when the period provided in
clause (c) of the proviso has not expired? Section 2(d) of the
Code defines 'complaint'. According to this definition,·
complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a
Magistrate with a view to taking his action against a person. G
who has committed an offence. Commission of an offence is
a sine qua non for filing a complaint and for taking cognizance ·
of such offence. A bare reading of the provision contained in
20.     K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana; [AIR 2003 SC 4789 : (2003) 8 SCC
      300)].                                                                       H
    50       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that no complaint can
    be filed for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act unless
    the period of .15 days has elapsed. Any complaint before the
    expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been
    served on the drawer/accused is no complaint at all in the eye
B   of law. It is not the question of prematurity of the complaint
    where it is filed before expiry of 15 days from the date on which
    notice has been served on him, it is no complaint at all under
    law. As a matter of fact, Section 142 of the NI Act, inter alia,
    creates a legal bar on the Court from taking cognizance of an
C   offence under Section 138 except upon a written complaint.
    Since a complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act before
    the expiry of 15 days from the date on which the notice has been
    served on the drawer/<1ccused is no complaint in the eye of law,
    obviously, no cognizance of an offence can be taken on the
    basis of such complaint. Merely because at the time of taking
0
    cognizance by the Court, the period of 15 days has expired from
    the date on which notice has been served on the drawer/
    accused, the Court is not clothed with the jurisdiction to take
    cognizance of an offence under Section 138 on a complaint
    filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of
E   notice by the drawer of the cheque.

         37. A complaint filed before expiry of 15 days from the date
    on which notice has been served on drawer/accused cannot
   be said to disclose the cause of action in terms of clause (c)
F of the proviso to Section 138 and upon such complaint which
    does not disclose the cause of action the Court is not
    competent to take cognizance. A conjoint reading of Section
    138, which defines as to when and under what circumstances
    an offence can be said to have been committed, with Section
G · 142(b) of. the NI Act, that r~iterates the position of the point of
    time when the cause of action has arisen, leaves no manner
    of doubt that no offence can be said to have been committed
    unless and until the period of 15 days, as prescribed under
    clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, has, in fact, elapsed.
H Therefore, a Court is barred in law from taking cognizance of
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                     51
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
such complaint. It is not open to the Court to take cognizance . A
of such a complaint merely because on the date of
consideration or taking cognizance thereof a period of 15 days
from the date on which the notice has been served on the
drawer/accused has elapsed. We have no doubt that all the
five essential features of Section 138 of the NI Act, as noted B
in the judgment of this Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. 19
and which we have approved, must be satisfied for a complaint
to be filed under Section 138. If the period prescribed in clause
(c) of the proviso to S_ection 138 has not expired, there is no
commission of an offence nor accrual of cause of action for C
filing of complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.

     38. We, therefore, do not approve the view taken by this
Court in Narsingh Das Tapadia' and so also the judgments of
various High Courts following Narsingh Das Tapadia' that if
the complaint under Section 138 is filed before expiry of 15        D
days from the date on which notice _has been served on the
drawer/accused the same is premature and if on the date of
taking cognizance a period of 15 days from the date of service
of notice on the drawer/accused has expired, such complaint
was legally maint<!inable and, hence, the same is overruled.        E

      39. Rather, the view taken by this Court in Sarav
Investment & Financial Consultancy2 wherein this Court held
that service of notice in terms of Section 138 proviso (b) of the
NI Act was a part of the cause of action for lodging the
                                                                    F
complaint and communication to the accused about the. fact
of dishonouring of the cheque and calling upon to pay the
amount within 15 days was imperative in character, commends
itself to us. As noticed by us earlier, no complaint can be
maintained against the drawer of the cheque before the expiry       G
of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice because the
drawer/accused cannot be said to have committed any offence
until then. We approve the decision of this Court in Sarav
Investment & Financial Consultancy2 and also the judgments
of the High Courts which have taken the view following this
                                                                    H
    52       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 12 S.C.R.


A   judgment that the complaint under Section 138 of the Nl Act filed
    before the expiry of 15 days of service of notice could not be
    treated as a complaint in the eye of law and criminal
    proceedings initiated on such complaint are liable to be
    quashed.
B
         40. Our answer to question (i} is, therefore, in th,e negative.

          41. The other question is that if the answer to question (i)
    is in the negative, can the complainant be permitted to present
    the complaint again notwithstanding the-fact that the period of
C · one month stipulated under Section 142(b) for the filing of such
    a complaint has expired.

         42. Section 142 of the NI Act prescribes the mode and so
    also the time within which a complaint for an offence under
0   Section 138 of the NI Act can be filed. A complaint made under
    Section 138 by the payee or the holder in due course of the
    cheque has to be in writing and needs to be made within one
    month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen
    under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. The period of
E   one month under Section 142(b) begins from the date on which
    the cause of action has arisen under clause· (c) of the proviso
    to Section 138. However, if the complainant satisfies the Court
    that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within
    the prescribed period of one month, a complaint may be taken
    by the Court after the prescribed period. Now, since our answer
F   to question (i) is in the negative, we observe that the payee or
    the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh
    complaint within one month from the date of decision in the
    criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will
    be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to
G   clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act. This direction shall be
    deemed to be applicable to all such pending cases where the
    complaint does not proceed further in view of our answer to
    question (i). As we have already held that a complaint filed
    before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of notice
H   issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 is not
  YOGENDRA PRATAP SINGH v. SAVITRI PANDEY                         53
             [R.M. LODHA, CJI.]
maintainable, the complainant cannot be permitted to present            A
the very same complaint at any later stage. His remedy is only
to file a fresh complaint; and if the same could not be filed
within the time prescribed under Section 142(b), his recourse
is to seek the benefit of the proviso, satisfying the Court of
sufficient cause. Question (ii) is answered accordingly.                B

     43. Criminal appeals may now be listed for consideration
by the regular Bench.

Nidhi Jain             Appeals to be listed before the Regular Bench.




                .·