ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVESversusJOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS.

                        • [2012] 2 S.C.R. 258


A        ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES
                                v.
                JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS.
                 (Civil Appeal No. 1544 of 2012)
                         FEBRUARY 03, 2012
B
              [R.M. LODHA AND H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.]

          Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 - s.10(f) - Disqualification
     from membership of panchayat - Appellant is a Panch
.c   member in a Village Panchayat in the State of Goa -
     Respondent no.2-village panchayat awarded contract to
     appellant's husband(respondent no.4) - Whether appellant
     can be said to have any indirect share or monetary interest
     in the contract of her husband with the Village Panchayat and
D    she incurred disqualification as a Panch member from (he
      Village Panchayat u/s. 1O(f) of the 1994 Act - Held:
     Respondent no. 4 and appellant are husband and wife and are
     governed by the Portuguese Code - By virtue of Article 1098
     and Article 1108 thereof, in absence of any contract, marriage
E    between appellant and respondent no.4 is governed by the
     system 'Communiao Dos Bens' i.e. community of property
     whereunder, each spouse is entitled to one-half income of the
     other spouse unless contracted otherwise - On facts, no
     evidence of exclusion of appellant from her husband's assets
     and income - Money acquired by appellant's husband from
F    the contract with the Village Panchayat is 'community property'
     - Provisions contained in Articles 1098 and 1108 of the
     Portuguese Code and s. 5A of the Income Tax Act give
     appellant a participation in the profits of the contract and
     advantages like apportionment of income from that contract
G    - Appellant's participation in the profits of the contract
     constitute an "indirect monetary interest" in the contract
     awarded to her husband - Consequently, appellant incurred
     disqualification u/s.10(f) of the 1994 Act - Portuguese Civil

H                                 258
 ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v.                     259
          JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS.
Code, 1860 - Arts. 1098 and 1108 - Income Tax Act, 1961               A
- s.5A.
     Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 - s. 1O(f) - Disqualification
of member from panchayat in terms of s.10(f) - Purpose and
interpretation of - Held: The purpose and object of providing
for disqualification for membership of the Panchayat in clause        B
(f) of s. 10 is to ensure that there is no conflict between the
private interest of the member and his duty as a member of
the Panchayat - It is based on general principle of conflict
between duty and 'interest - Prohibition in s. 1O(f) should not
receive unduly narrow or restricted construction.                     C
     Words and Phrases - "Interest" - Meaning of- Held: The
word 'interest' has a basic meaning of participation in
advantage, profit and responsibility - 'Interest' is a right, title
or share in a thing.
                                                                      D
     The appellant was a Panch member in Raia Village
Panchayat of Salcete Taluka, State of Goa. Respondent
no. 2-Village Panchayat of Raia invited bids for collection
of market fee within its jurisdiction. The bid of appellant's
husband (respondent no.4) was accepted as his bid was                 E
the highest and the contract for collection of market fee
was awarded to him. Respondent no.1 filed election
petition under Section 11 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act,
1994 before the State Election Commission for
disqualification of appellant on ground that she had                  F
directly or indirectly a share or monetary interest in the
contract given by respondent no.2 to her husband. The
Commission ordered that the appellant was disqualified
as a Panch Member of Village Panchayat of Raia in
Salcete Taluka in terms of clause (f) of Section 10 of the            G
Act. The appellant filed writ petition before the High Court
which dismissed the same.
   In the instant appeal, the question which arose for
consideration was whether the appellant can be said to
                                                                      H
    260      SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A have any indirect share or monetary interest in the
  contract of her husband with the Village Panchayat of
  Raia and if the answer is in the affirmative whether she
  incurred disqualification as a Panch member from Raia
  Village Panchayat of Salcete Taluka in South Goa District,
B State of Goa under Section 10(f) of the 1994 Act.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court
         HELD: 1. The purpose and object of providing for
    disqualification for membership of the Panchayat in
c   clause (f) of Section 10 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act,
    1994 is to ensure that there is no conflict between the
    private interest of the member and his duty as a member
    of the Panchayat. It is based on general principle of
    conflict between duty and interest. [Para 11] [265-E-F]
D      2.1. Respondent no.4 and the appellant are husband
  and wife and are governed by the provisions of the
  Portuguese Civil Code, 1860. By virtue of Article 1098 and
  Article 1108 thereof, in the absence of any contract, the
  marriage between the appellant and the respondent no.4
E is governed by the system 'Communiao Dos Bens' i.e.
  community of property. Accordingly, on marriage, the
  property of the spouses gets merged. Each spouse, by
  operation of law, unless contracted otherwise, becomes
  50% shareholder in all their properties, present and future
F and each spouse is entitled to a one-half income of the
  other spouse. [Para 17] [269-H; 270-A-B]
       2.2. Section 5A(1) of the Income Tax Act provides that
  where the husband and wife are governed by the system
  of "Communiao Dos Bens" in force in the State of Goa
G the income of the husband and the wife under any head
  of income shall not be assessed as that of such
  community of property but such income of the husband
  and the wife from all sources, except from salary, shall
  be apportioned equally between the husband and the
H wife and the income so apportioned shall be included
 ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v.                   261
          JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS.
separately in the total income of the husband and of the            A
wife respectively and the remaining provisions of the
Income Tax Actshall apply accordingly. Sub-section (2)
of Section SA provides that where the husband or the
wife governed by system of community of property has
any income under the head 'salaries', such income shall             B
be included in the total income of the spouse who has
actually earned it. [Para 18] [270-C-E]
    Gu/am Yasin Khan v. Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar
and another AIR 1966 SC 1339 - distinguished.
     3. The word 'interest' has a basic meaning of
                                                                    c
participation in advantage, profit and responsibility.
'Interest' is a right, title or share in a thing. [Para 20] [271-
D]
     P. ·Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition             D
(reprint 1999) - referred to.
     4.1. Section 1O(f) of the 1994 Act speaks of monetary
interest. The general rule that the wife's interest is not
necessarily the husband's interest has no application
where the husband and the wife are governed by the                  E
system 'community of property' because under that
system, on marriage, each spouse is entitled to a one-half
income of the other spouse unless contracted otherwise.
During the subsistence of marriage, the husband and the
wife each have a share in the corpus as well as the                 F
income of communion property. [Para 21] [271-E-F]
    4.2. Section 10(f) contemplates that share or
monetary interest (direct or indirect) has to be in the
contract itself. The expression 'in any contract' means in
regard to any contract. It cannot be said that the appellant        G
had no indirect share or monetary interest in regard to
her husband's contract with the Village Panchayat Raia
when, by operation of law, she is entitled to the profits
of that contract. Money acquired by the appellant's
husband from the contract with the Village Panchayat                H
    262       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A Raia is 'community property' and, therefore, the
  conclusion is inescapable that the appellant has ind~rect
  share, or, in any case, monetary interest in the contract
  awarded to her husband by the Village Panchayat Raia
  as the profits from the contract shall be apportioned
8 equally between her and her husband. There is no
  evidence of exclusion of the appellant from her husband's
  assets and income. The provisions contained in Articles
  1098 and 1108 of the 1860 Code and Section 5A of th!'!
  Income Tax Act give the appellant a participation in the
C profits of the contract and advantages like the
  apportionment of income from that contract. The
  appellant, by operation of law, becomes entitled to share
  in the profits of the contract awarded to her husband by
  the Village Panchayat. From whatever way it is seen, the
  appellant's participation in the profits of the contract does
0
  constitute an "indirect monetary interest" in the contract
  for collection of market fee awarded to her husband
  within Section 10(f) prohibiting the member of the Village
  Panchayat from having such an interest. [Para 22] [271-
  G~H; · 272-A-D]
E
       5. The prohibition in Section 10(f) should not receive
  unduly narrow or restricted construction. The answer to
  the first question must be in the affirmative and it must
  consequently be held that the appellant has incurred
F disqualification under Section 10(f) of the 1994 Act. [Para
  23] [272-F-G]
        Gu/am Yasin Khan v. Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar
    and another AIR 1966 SC 1339 - followed.
                       Case Law Reference:
G
          AIR 1966 SC 1339      distinguished        Para 14
          AIR 1966 SC 1339      followed             Para 23
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1544 of 2012.
H
 ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v.                  263
          JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS.
    From the Judgment & Order dated 22.07.2009 of the High         A
Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No. 437 of 2009.
    R. Sundaravardhan, Vipin Nair, P.B. Suresh, (for Temple
Law Firm) for the Appellant.
    Arun Francis (for Dua Associates) for the Respondets.          B
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
    R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
     2. The question which we have to consider is whether the
appellant can be said to have any indirect share or monetary       C
interest in the contract of her husband with the Village
Panchayat of Raia and if the answer is in the affirmative
whether she has incurred disqualification as a Panch member
from Raia Village Panchayat of Salcete Taluka in South Goa
District, State of Goa under Section 1O(f) of the Goa Panchayat    D
Raj Act, 1994 (for short, '1994 Act').
     3. The appellant was declared as a· returned candidate
from Ward No. 9 of Raia Village Panchayat of Salcete Taluka,
State of Goa at the election held in May 2007 for a period 2007-
2012.                                                              E
     4. On or about March 18, 2008, the respondent no. 2-
Village Panchayat of Raia - invited bids for the collection of
market fee within its jurisdiction for 2008-09. Mrs. Joana
Rodrigues (respondent no. 1), Xavier Fernandes (appellant's F
husband) and one Bernard Mario Fernandes submitted their
bids. On March 28, 2008, the tender forms were opened in the
office of the respondent no. 2 and the bid of the appellant's
husband was accepted as his bid was the highest. Her
husband, on acceptance of his bid, paid the first installment of · G
1/4th part of the bidding amount collection.
     5. On March 31, 2008, the respondent no. 1 made a
representation to the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Madgaon,
Goa bringing to his notice that the appellant was liable for
disqualification under Section 1O(f) of the 1994 Act. It appears   H
    264        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012) 3 S.C.R.


A that the respondent no. 1 also made an application to the State
  Election Commission (for short, 'Commission}, State of Goa,
  on which th.e Commission directed the respondent no. 1 to file
  a formal election petition seeking disqualification of the
  appellant. Accordingly, the respondent no. 1 filed an election
8 petition under Section 11 before the Commission for
  disqualification of the appellant on the ground that she has
  directly or indirectly a share or monetary interest in the above
  contract given by the respondent no. 2 to her husband.
       6. The Commission, on hearing the parties, vide its order
C dated July 3, 2009 held that the present appellant had indirectly
  a share or monetary interest in the contract executed by the
  Village Panchayat of Raia with her husband and ordered that
  the appellant was disqualified as a Panch Member of Village
  Panchayat of Raia in Salcete Taluka in terms of clause (f) of
D Section 10.
      7. The appellant, aggrieved by the above order of the
  Commission, filed a writ petition before the High Court of
  Bombay at Goa. The Single Judge of that Court on July 22,
  2009 dismissed the writ petition. It is from this order of the High
E Court that this appeal, by special leave, has arisen.
        8. We have heard Mr. R. Sundaravardhan, learned senior
  counsel for the appellant and Mr. Arun Francis, learned counsel
  for the respondent no. 1. The contention of Mr. Sundaravardhan,
F learned senior counsel for the appellant is that mere relationship
  of husband and wife will not create that type of interest which
  is contemplated by Section 1O(f). He heavily relied upon the
  decision of this Court in the case of Gu/am Yasin Khan vs.
  Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Wa/askar and another1• Mr. Arun
G Francis stoutly supported the view of the High Court.
         9. Gram Sabha - Constitution of Panchayats - is dealt
    with in Chapter 11 of the 1994 Act. Section 7, inter alia, provides
    that all the members of panchayat shall be elected. Section 9
    provides for qualification for membership while Section 10
H   1.   AIR 1966 SC 1339
 ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v. 265
  JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
makes a provision for disqualification for membership. We are           A
concerned with Section 1O(f) and the said provision reads as
follows: ·                                          ·

     "S. 10. Disqualification for membership.- A person shall
     be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a
                                                                        B
     member of the Panchayat if,-
           )()()()()()()()()(


     (f) he has directly or indirectly any share or monetary
     interest in any work done by or to the Panchayat or any
     contract or employment with, under or by or on behalf of,          C
     the Panchayat;
           xxxxxxxxx"
     10. Section 11 provides that if any question arises as to
whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any               D
disqualification referred to in Section 10, it shall be referred to
the State Election Commission for decision and its decision
thereon shall be final.
     11. The purpose and object of providing for disqualification
for membership of the Panchayat in clause (f) of Section 10 is          E
to ensure that there is no conflict between the private interest
of the member and his duty as a member of the Panchayat. It
is based on general principle of conflict between duty and
interest.
                                                                        F
 · 12. Insofar as the present matter is concerned, we have
to consider the applicability of clause (f) of Section 10 to the
extent, "he has ..... indirectly any share or monetary interest in
..... any contract .... by or on behalf of the Panchayat" in the fact
situation noticed above. A similar provision came up for                G
consideration before a 5-Judge Bench of this Court in the case
of Gu/am Yasin Khan1. That was a case where the appellant
and the respondent No. 1 therein, namely, Gulam Yasin Khan
and Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar respectively were
candidates for election as members to the ML~nicipal
Committee, Malkapur. They had filed their nomination papers.            H
    266.      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 3 S.C.R.

A At the stage of scrutiny, Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar
  objected to the validity of the candidature of Gulam Yasin Khan
  on the ground that Gulam Yasin Khan's son Khalildad Khan was
  a Moharir on Octroi Naka employed by the Committee and on
  account of the employment of Gulam Yasin Khan's son by the
B Municipal Committee, Gulam Yasin Khan had an interest in the
  Municipal Committee and so he was disqualified from standing
  for election under clause (I) of Section 15 of the Central
  Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (for short, 'CP
  Municipalities Act'). Gulam Yasin Khan disputed the validity of
c the objection and he stated that his son was not staying with
  him and had no connection whatsoever. The SupeNising Officer
  overruled the objection raised by Sahebrao Yeshwantrao
  Walaskar. The order of SupeNising Officer was challenged by
  Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar in the writ petition before the
  High Court. The High Court allowed his writ petition and set
0
  aside the order of the Supervising Officer and declared -
  Sahebrao Yeshwantrao Walaskar elected to the Municipal
  Committee. It iS from this controversy that the matter reached
  this Court. This Court in the backdrop of the above facts
E considered the question whether by virtue of his relationship with
  Khalildad Khan, Gulam Yasin Khan could be said to have any
  indirect share or interest in the employment of Khalildad Khan
  with the Municipal Committee. The provision under
  consideration read, "no person shall be eligible for election,
  selection or nomination as a member of a committee, if such
F person has directly or indirectly any share or interest in any
  contract with, by or on behalf of the committee, while owning
  such share or interest".
      13. In light of the above factual and legal position, this Court
G in Gu/am Yasin Khan 1 (Pgs. 1341-1342) held as under:
        "7 .......... We are assuming for the purpose of dealing with
        this point that the contract to which clause (I) refers,
        includes employment, though unlike other similar statutes,
        the word "employment" is not specifically mentioned in the
H       said clause. In order to incur disqualification, what the
ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v.                      267
 JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
  clause requires is "interest or share in any contract"; it may       A
  either be a share or an interest; and if it is an interest, the
  interest may be direct or indirect. But it is plain that the
  interest to which the clause refers, cannot mean mere
  sentimental or friendly interest; it must mean interest which
  is pecuniary, or material, or of a similar nature. If the            B
  interest is of this latter category, it would suffice to incur
  disqualification even if it is indirect. But it is noticeable that
  the clause also requires that the person who incurs
  disqualification by such interest must "own such share or
  interest". It is not easy to determine the scope of the              C
  limitation introduced by this last sub-clause. Mr. Gauba for
  respondent No. 1 urged that the clause "owning such share
  or interest" is tautologous when it refers to direct interest
  or share, and is meaningless when it refers to indirect
  share or interest. Prima facie, there is some force in this
  contention; but whatever may be the exact denotation of              D
  this clause, it does serve the purpose of limiting the
  character of the share or interest which incurs
  disqualification prescribed by the clause and it would not
  be easy to ignore the existence of the last portion of the
  clause altogether.                                                   E
   8. It is quite true that the purpose and the object of
   prescribing the several disqualifications enumerated in
   clauses (a) to (I) of s. 15 of the Act is to ensure the purity
   of the administration of Municipal Committees, and in that          F
   sense, it may be permissible to hold that the different
   clauses enumerated in S.15 should not receive an unduly
   narrow or restricted construction. But even if we were to
   adopt a liberal construction of S. 15(1), we cannot escape
   the conclusion that the interest or share has to be in the          G
   contract itself. When we are enquiring as to whether the
   appellant is interested directly or indirectly in the
   employment of his son, we cannot overlook the fact that
   the enquiry is not as to whether the appellant is interested
   in the son, but the enquiry is whether the appellant is
                                                                       H
    268        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 3 S.C.R.


A         interested in the employment of the son. The distinction
          between the two enquiries may appear to be subtle, but,
          nevertheless, for the purpose of construing the clause, it
          is very relevant. Considered from this point of view, on the
          facts proved in this case, we find it difficult to hold that by
B         mere relationship with his son, the appellant can be said
          to be either directly or indirectly interested in his
          employment.
                xxx xxx xxx xxx
        12. It would, we think, be unreasonable to hold that mere
c     ' relationship of a person with an employee of the Municipal
        Committee justifies the inference that such a person has
        interest, direct or indirect, in the employment under the
        Municipal Committee. In the circumstances of this case,
        what is proved is the mere relationship between the
D       appellant and his son who is the employee of the Municipal
        Committee; and on that relationship the High Court has
        based its conclusion that the appellant is disqualified under
        S. 15(1) of the Act. We are satisfied that this conclusion is
        erroneous in law."
E
        14. In Gu/am Yasin Khan 1 while construing Section 15 (I)
  of the CP Municipalities Act, this Court held that the interest or
  share has to be in the contract itself; mere relationship of a
  person with an employee of the Municipal Committee shall not
F justify the inference that such a person has interest, direct or
  indirect. Ordinarily, there would not have been any difficulty in
  applying Section 1O(f) in the same manner but we think Gu/am
   Yasin Khan 1 is clearly distinguishable and cannot be applied
  to the present fact situation which concerns money affairs of
G husband and wife governed by the provisions contained in
  Articles 1098 and 1108 of Portuguese Civil Code, 1860 ('1860
  Code') and Section SA of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961
  {'Income Tax Act').
         15. Articles 1098 and 1108 of the 1860 Code which is
H · applicable in the State of Goa read as under :
ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v. 269
 JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]

  1098. - In the absence of any contract, it is deemed that     A
  the marriage is done as per the custom of the country,
  except when it is solemnized in contravention of the
  provisions of Article 1058 clause 1 and 2; because in such
  a case it is deemed that the spouses are married under
  the simple communion of acquired properties.                  B
  xxxxxx                      xxx
  1108. - The marriage as per the custom of the country
  consists in the communion between the spouses of all their
  properties, present and future, not excluded by law.          c
  16. Section 5A of the Income Tax Act is as follows :
  5A. Apportionment of income between spouses
  governed by Portuguese Civil Code. - (1) Where the
  husband and wife are governed by the system of                D
  community of property (known under the Portugese Civil
  Code of 1860 as "COMMUNIAO DOS BENS") in force in
  the State of Goa and in the Union territories of Dadra and
  Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, the income of the
  husband and of the wife under any head of income shall        E
  not be assessed as that of such community of property
  (whether treated as an association of persons or a body
  of individuals), but such income of the husband and of the
  wife under each head of income (other than under the head
  "Salaries") shall be apportioned equally between the
  husband and the wife and the income so apportioned shall      F
  be included separately in the total income of the husband
  and of the wife respectively, and the remaining provisions
  of this Act shall apply accordingly.
  (2) Where the husband or, as the case may be, the wife        G
  governed by the aforesaid system of community of property
  has any income under the head "Salaries", such income
  shall be included in the total income of the spouse who has
  actually earned it.
  17. There is no dispute that the respondent no. 4 and the     H
    270        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 3 S.C.R.

A appellant are husband and wife and are governed by the
  provisions of the 1860 Code. By virtue of Article 1098 and_
  Article 1108 thereof, in the absence of any contract, the
  marriage between the appellant and the respondent no. 4 is
  governed by the system 'Communiao Dos Bens' i.e. community
B of property. Accordingly, on marriage, the property of the
  spouses gets merged. Each spouse,, by operation of law,
  unless contracted otherwise, becomes 50% shareholder in all
  their properties, present and future and each spouse is entitled
  to a one-half income of the other spouse.
C      18. Section 5A(1) of the Income Tax Act provides that
  where the husband and wife are governed by the system of
  "Communiao Dos Bens" in force in the State of Goa the income
  of the husband and the wife under any head of income shall
  not be assessed as that of such community of property but such
D income of the husband and the wife from all sources, except
  from salary, shall be apportioned equally between the husband
  and the wife and the income so apportioned shall be included
  separately in the total income of the husband and of the wife
  respectively and the remaining provisions of the Income Tax Act
E shall apply accordingly. Sub-section (2) of Section SA provides
  that where the husband or the wife governed by system of
  community of property has any income under the head
  'salaries', such income shall be included in the total income of
  the spouse who has actually earned it.
F        19. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition
    (reprint 1999) the term 'interest' is explained thus:
          "Interest. Legal concern, right, pecuniary stake the legal
          concern of a person in the thing or property or in the right
          to some of the benefits or use from which the property is
G         inseparable ; such a right in or to a thing capable of being
          possessed or enjoyed as property which can be enforced
          by judicial proceedings. The word is capable of different
          meanings, according to the context in which it is used or
          the subject-matter to which it is applied. It may have even
H         the same meaning as the phrase "right title and interest"
 ZELIA M. XAVIER FERNANDES E. GONSALVES v.                     271
  JOANA RODRIGUES AND ORS. [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     but it has been said also to mean any right in the nature         A
     of property, but less than title. The word is sometimes
     employed synonymous with estate, or property.
     Interest means concern, advantage, good ; share, portion,
     part, or participation.
                                                                       B
     A person interested is one having an interest ; i.e. a right
     of property or in the nature of property, less than title.
     The word 'interest' is the broadest term applicable to
     claims in or upon real estate in its ordinary signification
     among men of all classes. It is broad enough to include           C
     any right, title, or estate in or lien upon real estate. One
     who holds a mortgage upon a piece of land for half its value
     is commonly and truly said to be interested in it.
           )()()(                  )()()(             xx.X'.
                                                                       D
     20. The word 'interest' has a basic meaning of
participation in advantage, profit and responsibility. 'Interest' is
a right, title or share in a thing.
     21. Section 1O(f) speaks of monetary interest. The general
rule that the wife's interest is not necessarily the husband's         E
interest has no application where the husband and the wife are
governed by the system 'community of property' because under
that system, on marriage, each spouse is entitled to a one-half
income of the other spouse unless contracted otherwise. During
the subsistence of marriage, the husband and the wife each             F
have a share in the corpus as well as the income of communion
property.
     22. There is no doubt that Section 1O(f) contemplates that
share or monetary interest (direct or indirect) has to be in the
contract itself. The expression 'in any contract' means in regard      G
to any contract. Could it be said that the appellant had no
indirect share or monetary interest in regard to her husband's
contract with the Village Panchayat Raia when, by operation
of law, she is entitled to the profits of that contract? The answer
has to be in the negative. Money acquired by the appellant's           H
    272       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 3 S.C.R.

A husband from the contract with the Village Panchayat Raia is
  'community property' and, therefore, the conclusion is
  inescapable that the appellant has indirect share, or, in any
  case, monetary interest in the contract awarded to her husband
  by the Village Panchayat Raia as the profits from the contract
  shall be apportioned equally between her and her husband.
8
  There is no evidence of exclusion of the appellant from her
  husband's assets and income. The provisions contained in
  Articles 1098 and 1108 of the 1860 Code and Section SA of
  the Income Tax Act give the appellant a participation in the
  profits of the contract and advantages like the apportionment
C of income from that contract. The appellant, by operation of law,
  becomes entitled to share in the profits of the contract awarded
  to her husband by the Village Panchayat. From whatever way
  it is seen, the appellant's participation in the profits of the
  contract does constitute an "indirect monetary interest" in the
D contract for collection of market fee awarded to her husband
  within Section 1O(f) prohibiting the member of the Village
  Panchayat from having such an interest.
       23. While considering Section 15(1) of the CP
E Municipalities Act which provided for the disqualifications to the
  elections of the Municipal Committees, this Court in Gu/am
   Yasin Khan 1 held that the purpose and the object of prescribing
  several disqualifications in that provision is to ensure the purity
  of the administration of the Municipal Committees and in that
  sense the different clauses of disqualifications should not
F receive unduly narrow or restricted construction. We also hold
  the view that the prohibition in Section 10(f) should not receive
  unduly narrow or restricted construction. In what we have
  considered above, the answer to the first question must be in
  the affirmativ17 and it must consequently be held that the
G appellant has incurred disqualification under Section 10(f) of
  the 1994 Act. We hold accordingly.
          24. Civil Appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
    B.B.B.                                      Appeal dismissed.
H