Patna High Court

Chhathu Sah Gond @ Chhathu SahversusThe State Of Bihar and Ors

Decided: 10 February 2026
Disposal: ALLOWED
Bench: RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA

Holding

The High Court held that the trial court's refusal to allow the petitioner to deposit the cost after the stipulated period, solely on the ground of delay and laches, constituted a material irregularity and jurisdictional error, and therefore set aside the order.

Summary

The petitioner sought to deposit a cost of Rs.5,000 that was conditionally ordered by the trial court when restoring his Title Appeal No.12 of 2013. He missed the three‑week deadline and filed a petition on 6 July 2017 for permission to pay the cost, which the trial court rejected on the ground of delay and laches. The petitioner appealed by way of a civil revision under Section 115 of the CPC, arguing that the trial court’s refusal was a material irregularity and that the delay was not willful. The High Court examined the scope of revisional jurisdiction and cited several Supreme Court decisions emphasizing a liberal, justice‑oriented approach to procedural delays. Finding that the trial court had adopted a hyper‑technical stance without considering the petitioner’s diligent prosecution of the appeal, the Court held that the order was a material irregularity and set it aside, allowing the petitioner to deposit the cost within four weeks.

Issues considered

Whether the trial court committed a jurisdictional error or material irregularity by rejecting the petition to permit deposit of cost solely on the ground of delay and laches.
Whether a conditional order for payment of cost can be enforced strictly without condoning delay when substantial justice is at stake.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 115, 151

Subjects

Civil revision
Section 115 CPC
Delay
Laches
Cost deposit
Procedural law
Substantive justice
Material irregularity
Restoration of appeal

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CIVIL REVISION No. 150 of 2017
======================================================
Chhathu Sah Gond @ Chhathu Sah Son of Late Bhoj Sah Gor, Resident of
Mohalla- Baswaria Bettiah Town, P.O and P.S- Bettiah Town, District- West
Champaran.

... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Collector West Champaran at Bettiah P.O &
P.S-Bettiah, District- West Champaran
2. The District Fishery Officer, West Champaran at Bettiah, P.O. and P.S.-
Bettiah, District- West Cha
3. The Anchal Adhikari Bettiah, P.O. and P.S.- Bettiah, District- West
Champaran.

... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Md. Anis Akhtar, Advocate
Mr. Noumaan Ahmad, Advocate
Mr. Daula Siddiqui, Advocate
Mr. Mahtab Alam, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Vinay Kirti Singh, GA -2
For the State : Mr. Ranjan Prakash, AC to GA-2
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND
MALVIYA
CAV ORDER

9 10-02-2026 Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as

learned Counsel for the respondent.

2. This present civil revision has been filed by the

petitioner under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) assailing the order dated

06.07.2017 passed in Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 2016 by the

learned Additional District and Sessions Judge-V, Bettiah,

District West Champaran (hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial

Court’), whereby the petition dated 06.07.2017 filed by the
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plaintiff/appellant/petitioner for permitting deposit of cost of

Rs.5,000/-, as directed earlier by order dated 21.01.2017 while

restoring Title Appeal No. 12 of 2013, has been rejected solely

on the ground of delay and laches.

3. The genesis of the case giving rise to the present

civil revision, in brief, are that the petitioner instituted Title Suit

No. 7 of 2005 before the Court of Sub-Judge, Bettiah, District-

West Champaran seeking declaration of title, confirmation of

possession and permanent injunction with respect to the suit

land, which came to be dismissed on contest by judgment and

decree dated 31.01.2013. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner

preferred Title Appeal No. 12 of 2013, which was admitted and

later transferred to the learned Trial Court. However, the appeal

was dismissed for default on 22.09.2016 due to non-

prosecution. Subsequently, on an application filed under Order

XLI Rule 19 read with Section 151 of the CPC, registered as

Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 2016, the appeal was restored by

order dated 21.01.2017 subject to payment of cost of Rs.5,000/-

within three weeks. Since the said cost could not be deposited

within the stipulated time, the petitioner filed a petition dated

06.07.2017 seeking permission to deposit the cost, which was

rejected by the learned Trial Court on the same date vide the
Patna High Court C.R. No. 150 of 2017(9) dt.10-02-2026
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impugned order solely on the ground of delay and laches in

depositing the cost of Rs.5000/-.

4. Aggrieved by the impugned order dated 06.07.2017

whereby the learned Trial Court rejected the prayer of the

petitioner herein for permitting deposit of the aforementioned

cost amount solely on the ground of delay and laches, the

petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court

under Section 115 of the CPC, seeking setting aside of the

impugned order.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that

the impugned order dated 06.07.2017 is manifestly illegal,

arbitrary and suffers from material irregularity in exercise of

jurisdiction, inasmuch as the learned Trial Court failed to

appreciate both the factual matrix and the settled principles of

law governing restoration of proceedings. It is submitted that the

Title Appeal No. 12 of 2013 had already been restored by a

reasoned order dated 21.01.2017 passed in Miscellaneous Case

No. 11 of 2016, and the direction to deposit cost of Rs.5,000/-

within three weeks was merely a conditional order, non-

compliance whereof was neither willful nor deliberate.

5.i. Learned counsel for the petitioner further

submitted that despite the inadvertent delay in deposit of cost,
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the petitioner was diligently prosecuting the appeal and

necessary pairvi was continuously made, which is evident from

the order sheets of the learned Trial Court. It is further submitted

that the learned Trial Court, instead of adopting a liberal and

justice-oriented approach, rejected the petitioner’s prayer on a

hyper-technical ground of delay and laches, ignoring that

procedural prescriptions are handmaids of justice and not meant

to defeat substantive rights.

5.ii. Moreover, learned counsel for petitioner

submitted that position of law is well settled that courts should

ordinarily lean in favour of adjudication on merits rather than

dismissal on technicalities. He lastly submitted that the

impugned order resulted to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested

in the learned Trial Court and has resulted in serious prejudice

to the petitioner, warranting interference by this Court in

exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the

CPC.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the State supported

the impugned order and submitted that the impugned order does

not call for any interference by this Court in revisional

jurisdiction. It is submitted that the order dated 21.01.2017

restoring the appeal was conditional in nature and the petitioner
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having failed to comply with the condition of depositing the cost

of Rs.5,000/- within the stipulated period, the learned Trial

Court was justified in rejecting the subsequent petition on the

ground of delay and laches. Learned counsel further submitted

that no sufficient or cogent explanation was offered by the

petitioner for non-compliance of the said order within time and,

therefore, no jurisdictional error or material irregularity can be

said to have been committed by the learned Trial Court in

passing the impugned order. Hence, the interference of this

Court is not warranted.

7. Having considered the rival submissions advanced

on behalf of the parties and have perused the materials available

on record, including the impugned order and the order sheets of

the learned Trial Court. The issue that arises for consideration in

the present revision is “whether the learned Trial Court

committed a jurisdictional error or material irregularity in

rejecting the petitioner’s prayer for permitting deposit of cost

solely on the ground of delay and laches, despite the fact that

the appeal had already been restored and was being diligently

pursued by the petitioner?”

8. At this stage, before adverting to the merits of the

rival submissions, it would be apposite to notice the scope of
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interference by this Court under Section 115 of the CPC. The

revisional jurisdiction of this Court is confined to examining

whether the Trial Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in

it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has

acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material

irregularity. In the present case, this Court is not called upon to

re-appreciate the facts or substitute its own discretion for that of

the learned Trial Court, but to examine whether the learned Trial

Court, while rejecting the prayer of the petitioner for permitting

deposit of cost, has adopted an unduly technical approach

resulting in failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and

thereby caused miscarriage of justice. Where an order is passed

ignoring relevant facts, settled principles of law and the object

of adjudication on merits, such order falls within the ambit of

“material irregularity” warranting interference under Section

115 CPC.

9. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Inder Singh v. The

State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339

has settled the position with respect to limitation and has

observed as under:

“There can be no quarrel on the
settled principle of law that delay cannot be
condoned without sufficient cause, but a
major aspect which has to be kept in mind is
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that, if in a particular case, the merits have
to be examined, it should not be scuttled
merely on the basis of limitation.”
10. It is also pertinent to note the legal principle laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Anvita Auto Tech

Works Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Aroush Motors, reported in 2025 INSC

1202, which is as under:

“The object of the procedural rules is
to advance the cause of justice and not to
thwart it and when the rigid adherence to
technicalities of procedure causes injustice,
courts have to come to the rescue by
adopting a liberal approach. The courts
cannot countenance a situation where
substantial justice is sacrificed at the altar of
procedural rigidity. Where substantial
justice is at stake, technicalities must give
way to ensure that the litigant is afforded
sufficient opportunity to defend. The present
controversy must be tested on the said
principle.”

11. Adverting now to the facts of the present case, it is

evident from the record that Title Appeal No. 12 of 2013 had

already been restored to its original file and number by a

reasoned order dated 21.01.2017 passed in Miscellaneous Case

No. 11 of 2016, subject to deposit of cost of Rs.5,000/- within

three weeks. The restoration of the appeal itself shows that the

learned Trial Court was satisfied with the explanation offered by
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the petitioner for earlier non-prosecution. The direction for

payment of cost was intended to balance equities and

compensate the opposite party, and not to non-suit the petitioner

on a technical lapse. The materials on record further disclose

that despite non-deposit of cost within the stipulated period, the

petitioner continued to pursue the matter and regular pairvi was

made, which is reflected from the order sheets. In such

circumstances, rejection of the subsequent prayer of the

petitioner for permission to deposit the cost solely on the ground

of delay and laches, without examining whether the lapse was

willful or whether any prejudice was caused to the opposite

party, amounts to a mechanical exercise of jurisdiction and

defeats the very object of restoration of the appeal.

12. Notably, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sushil

Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 774 has

observed as under:

“The procedural law so
dominates in certain systems as to
overpower substantive rights and
substantial justice. The humanist rule
that procedure should be the
handmaid, not the mistress, of legal
justice compels consideration of
vesting a residuary power in Judges to
act ex debito justiciae where the tragic
sequel otherwise would be wholly
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inequitable………..”

13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector, Land

Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors.,

reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 has laid down general principles

with respect to adoption of liberal approach by the courts while

adjudicating matters including substantial rights of the parties. It

is held as under:

“3. …………The expression “sufficient
cause” employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply
the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice — that being the
life-purpose for the existence of the institution
of courts. It is common knowledge that this
Court has been making a justifiably liberal
approach in matters instituted in this Court. But
the message does not appear to have percolated
down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on
principle as it is realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit
by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the
very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that
a cause would be decided on merits after
hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does
not mean that a pedantic approach should
be made. Why not every hour's delay, every
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second's delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected
not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it
is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so……………”

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court, based on Sushil Kumar

Sen (supra) has further laid down similar principle in Kailash

v. Nanhku and Ors., reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480, as

hereinunder:

“28. All the rules of procedure
are the handmaid of justice. The
language employed by the draftsman
of procedural law may be liberal or
stringent, but the fact remains that the
object of prescribing procedure is to
advance the cause of justice. In an
adversarial system, no party should
ordinarily be denied the opportunity
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of participating in the process of
justice dispensation. Unless compelled
by express and specific language of
the statute, the provisions of CPC or
any other procedural enactment ought
not to be construed in a manner which
would leave the court helpless to meet
extraordinary situations in the ends of
justice………...”

15. Moreover, the Hon’ble Apex Court has

consistently held that procedural laws are intended to advance

justice and not to thwart it. The Hon’ble Apex Court in N.

Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, reported in (1998) 7 SCC

123, has held as under:

“13. It must be remembered
that in every case of delay, there can
be some lapse on the part of the
litigant concerned. That alone is not
enough to turn down his plea and to
shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala
fides or it is not put forth as part of a
dilatory strategy, the court must show
utmost consideration to the suitor. But
when there is reasonable ground to
think that the delay was occasioned by
the party deliberately to gain time,
then the court should lean against
acceptance of the explanation. While
condoning the delay, the court should
not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind
that he is a loser and he too would
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have incurred quite large litigation
expenses. It would be a salutary
guideline that when courts condone
the delay due to laches on the part of
the applicant, the court shall
compensate the opposite party for his
loss.”

16. Now, it is well settled that procedural laws are

meant to advance the cause of justice and not to frustrate it, and

that courts should ordinarily lean in favour of deciding matters

on merits rather than shutting the doors of justice on technical

grounds. In the present case, the learned Trial Court, having

once exercised its discretion in restoring the appeal, was

required to adopt a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach

while considering the prayer of the petitioner for deposit of cost

beyond the stipulated period. The impugned order, however,

reflects a rigid and hyper-technical approach, wherein the

learned Trial Court failed to consider that the delay in deposit of

cost was neither contumacious nor intentional and that the

petitioner stood ready to comply with the condition imposed.

Such an approach, in the opinion of this Court, results in failure

to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law.

17. In view of the aforesaid discussions and principle

laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the
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considered opinion that the impugned order dated 06.07.2017

cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The learned Trial Court

failed to take into account the relevant facts, the conduct of the

petitioner in diligently pursuing the appeal and the settled legal

position that conditional orders relating to costs should not be

enforced in a manner so as to defeat substantive rights. The

impugned order, therefore, suffers from material irregularity in

exercise of jurisdiction and has resulted in grave prejudice to the

petitioner.

18. Accordingly, the Civil Revision application is

allowed. The impugned order dated 06.07.2017 passed in

Miscellaneous Case No. 11 of 2016 by the learned Trial Court is

hereby set aside. The petition dated 06.07.2017 filed by the

petitioner is allowed and the petitioner is permitted to deposit

the cost of Rs.10,000/- within a period of four weeks from the

date of this order before the learned Trial Court.

(Ramesh Chand Malviya, J)
Mayank/-

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