Patna High Court
Prashidh Narain Kishore Singh,versusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- ALLOWED
- Bench
- RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA
Holding
The appellate court erred in condoning the 22‑year delay as the State failed to demonstrate sufficient cause, and the revision court set aside the order.
Summary
The petitioner challenged a district court order that had, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, condoned a 22‑year delay by the State in filing an appeal against a 1991 title decree. The State claimed it only learned of the decree in 2013, citing the death of the Government Pleader as a reason for the delay. The petitioner argued that the State’s counsel had been present at the original decree and that earlier communications, including a 1992 application to the Circle Officer, proved the State’s knowledge. The High Court examined precedents on condonation of delay, emphasizing that ‘sufficient cause’ must explain the entire period of delay and that gross negligence or lack of bona‑fide cannot be excused. Finding the State’s explanation inadequate and its conduct negligent, the Court held the appellate court’s discretion was exercised improperly. Consequently, the revision was allowed, the condonation order set aside, and the appeal dismissed as barred by limitation.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellate court was justified in condoning a 22‑year delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Whether the State’s claim of lack of knowledge of the decree constitutes sufficient cause for condonation.
- Whether the appellate court erred in exercising its discretion without a proper appreciation of the facts and evidence.
- Whether the revision court can set aside the appellate order under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 115
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 5
Subjects
- Limitation Act
- Section 5
- Civil Revision
- Condonation of delay
- State as litigant
- Finality of decree
- Judicial discretion
- CPC Section 115
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CIVIL REVISION No.225 of 2019
======================================================
Prashidh Narain Kishore Singh, Son of Late Chandradeo Singh, Resident of
Village-Dharupur, Police Station-Bikramganj, District-Rohtas.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Collector, Rohtas, Post Office and Police
Station-Sasaram, District-Rohtas.
2. The Circle Officer, Bikramganj, Police Station-Bikramganj, District-Rohtas.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Binod Bihari Singh, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Uday Shankar Sharan Singh, GP-19
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAMESH CHAND MALVIYA
CAV ORDER
12 06-05-2026 Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the Opposite Parties.
2. The present Civil Revision application has been
preferred under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) challenging the legality
and propriety of the order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the
learned District Judge, Rohtas, Sasaram (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Appellate Court’) in Title Appeal No. 82 of 2013 whereby
and whereunder, the learned Appellate Court allowed the
application filed by the State under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act,1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) and condoned an
extraordinary delay of about 22 years in filing the appeal,
thereby admitting the same for hearing on merits. The petitioner,
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being aggrieved, has approached this Court seeking interference
in revisional jurisdiction.
3. The facts of the case in brief is that the Title Suit
No. 96 of 1982/147of 1990 was instituted by the father of the
present petitioner seeking declaration of title and confirmation
of possession along with permanent injunction in respect of the
suit property. The said suit was contested and ultimately decreed
in favour of the plaintiff by judgment and decree dated
02.05.1991, which forms part of the record as Annexure-1. It is
not disputed that the judgment was delivered in the presence of
the Government Pleader representing the State authorities.
Despite the decree having attained finality, the State did not
prefer any appeal within the prescribed period of limitation.
After a lapse of more than two decades, the State filed Title
Appeal No. 82 of 2013 along with an application under Section
5 of the Act, which is available as Annexure-2, seeking
condonation of delay of about 22 years. The explanation
furnished therein was that the State had no knowledge of the
judgment and decree until 03.09.2013, when a copy of the writ
petition was received by the Circle Officer.
4. The petitioner entered appearance in the appeal and
filed objection dated 09.06.2014, brought on record as
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Annexure-3, specifically disputing the correctness of the
grounds taken for condonation. It was asserted that the State had
full knowledge of the judgment since the Government Pleader
was present at the time of its pronouncement and that the plea of
lack of knowledge was wholly false and untenable. Initially, the
Appellate Court, by order dated 23.06.2015 (Annexure-4),
admitted the appeal subject to consideration of limitation at the
stage of final hearing. The said order was challenged before this
Court in C.W.J.C. No. 11843 of 2015, which was disposed of on
09.04.2019 (Annexure-5) by setting aside the order of admission
and remitting the matter back to the Appellate Court for fresh
consideration on the question of limitation.
5. Pursuant to the remand, the Appellate Court reheard
the matter and by the impugned order dated 14.08.2019,
condoned the delay and admitted the appeal, leading to the
present revision.
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner had meticulously submitted that the impugned order
suffers from grave illegality, perversity, and non-application of
judicial mind. It is submitted that the delay of approximately 22
years in filing the appeal is not only inordinate but is wholly
unexplained and lacks bona-fides. According to the counsel for
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the petitioner, the entire foundation of the State’s application
under Section 5 of the Act rests on a false and misleading plea
that the authorities had no knowledge of the judgment and
decree dated 02.05.1991 until 03.09.2013. It is submitted that
this contention stands completely demolished from the records
themselves.
6.i. Learned counsel for the petitioner further
submitted that the judgment in the original suit was delivered in
the presence of the Government Pleader representing the State.
In such circumstances, the knowledge of the Government
Pleader must be imputed to the State authorities in law. It is
urged that a litigant, particularly the State, cannot disown the
knowledge of its own counsel and thereafter take advantage of
its internal lapses or administrative inefficiencies. The plea of
lack of knowledge, therefore, is not only legally untenable but
also factually incorrect. It is further contended that the petitioner
has brought on record cogent documentary evidence which
conclusively establishes prior knowledge of the decree on the
part of the State authorities. Specific reference has been made to
the application dated 04.09.1992 filed by the petitioner’s father
before the Circle Officer, which forms part of Annexure-7,
wherein a copy of the judgment and decree was enclosed and a
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request was made for issuance of rent receipts. According to the
counsel for the petitioner, this document clearly demonstrates
that the concerned revenue authorities were duly informed about
the decree soon after its pronouncement. It is contented that this
vital piece of evidence has neither been denied specifically by
the State nor has it been properly considered by the appellate
court.
6.ii. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that the explanation sought to be furnished by the
State, namely the death of the conducting Government Pleader,
is wholly misconceived and insufficient. It is pointed out that
the said Government Pleader is stated to have died in the year
2005, which is nearly 14 years after the passing of the judgment.
Therefore, even if such plea is accepted, it does not explain the
inaction of the State during the period from 1991 to 2005, nor
does it justify the delay thereafter. The explanation, thus, fails to
cover the entire period of delay and cannot be regarded as
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. It
is also contented that the conduct of the State clearly reflects
gross negligence, lack of due diligence, and absence of bona-
fides. According to the learned counsel for petitioner the delay
appears to be a calculated attempt to reopen a matter which had
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attained finality decades ago, only after the petitioner initiated
proceedings for enforcement of his rights. It is also submitted
such conduct ought not to be encouraged by the Courts.
6.iii. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649. Learned
counsel has contended that while a liberal approach may be
adopted in certain cases, the same cannot be extended to
condone inordinate delay caused by negligence or lack of bona-
fides. It is further urged that in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of
Kerala(1997) 7 SCC 556, the Hon’ble Apex Court has
categorically held that the law of limitation cannot be diluted on
equitable considerations and must be applied with its full rigor.
7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Opposite Parties has supported the impugned order and
submitted that the learned Appellate Court has exercised its
discretion judiciously and in accordance with settled principles
of law. It is contended that the delay, though substantial, was
neither deliberate nor intentional but occurred due to
administrative lapses and lack of proper communication within
the governmental machinery. Further, it is also submitted that
the State came to know about the judgment and decree only on
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03.09.2013 when a copy of the writ petition filed by the
petitioner was received in the office of the Circle Officer.
Immediately thereafter, the State took prompt steps to obtain
certified copies of the judgment and decree and filed the appeal
without any further delay. It is thus contended that there was no
willful negligence or deliberate inaction on the part of the State.
7.i. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties has also
emphasized that the delay was occasioned due to the death of
the appearing Government Pleader, who was handling the case
at the trial stage. It is submitted that due to his demise, the
outcome of the suit could not be communicated to the concerned
authorities, resulting in the delay and such circumstances
constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act. It has further been submitted that courts should adopt a
pragmatic and justice-oriented approach while dealing with
applications for condonation of delay, particularly when the
State is a party. Learned counsel for the Opposite Party placed
reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Collector
Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, wherein it
has been held that substantial justice should prevail over
technical considerations and that a litigant should not be denied
an opportunity of hearing on merits merely on account of delay.
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7.ii. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties has also
submitted that certain amount of discretion is permissible in
cases involving the State, having regard to the impersonal nature
of its functioning and the procedural complexities involved in
decision-making. It is contended that refusal to condone the
delay in the present case would result in grave injustice, as the
State would be deprived of an opportunity to contest the matter
on merits. It is further submitted that the revisional jurisdiction
of this Court is limited in scope and does not permit re-
appreciation of facts or substitution of discretion exercised by
the appellate court, unless the impugned order is shown to be
perverse or without jurisdiction. Learned counsel for the
opposite parties lastly submitted that, the order under challenge
does not suffer from such infirmities and, therefore, does not
warrant interference.
8. The core issue that arises for determination in this
revision is whether the learned appellate court was justified in
condoning an inordinate delay of 22 years in filing the appeal
by the State in absence of sufficient and satisfactory
explanation?
9. This Court has carefully considered the
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, perused the
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materials available on record, and examined the impugned order
in the light of the settled principles governing condonation of
delay. At the outset, it must be observed that the delay in the
present case is not of a routine or marginal nature but extends to
an extraordinary period of approximately 22 years. Such an
inordinate delay, by its very nature, attracts a stricter degree of
judicial scrutiny. The law of limitation, though procedural, is
founded upon sound public policy, ensuring finality in litigation
and preventing stale claims from being resurrected after long
lapses of time. Therefore, while courts may adopt a liberal
approach in appropriate cases, such discretion cannot be
extended to condone gross negligence, inaction, or lack of bona
fides.
10. In Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC 81, the Hon’ble Apex Court
held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the
Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack
of bona-fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though
limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be
applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the
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courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they
have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that
law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The Court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from
its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice
but to enforce it giving full effect to the
same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex
which means “the law is hard but it is the
law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It
has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.”
“15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the “sufficient cause”
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party
is found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
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delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.”
11. Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing
Board & Ors. (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.
10704 of 2019 dated 12.09.2025. The two-Judge Bench
comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan
observed,
“… as is manifest from the entire discussion
above, for the purpose of condonation of
delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, the delay has to be explained by
establishing the existence of “sufficient
cause” for the entirety of the period from
when the limitation began till the actual
date of filing. In other words, if the period
of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is
filed belatedly on the 100th day, then
explanation has to be given for the entire
100-days.”
“As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation
of delay in filing of an appeal or
application, as the case may be, beyond the
stipulated period of limitation, the delay in
the filing has to be explained by
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demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient
cause” that resulted in such delay for both
the prescribed period of limitation as-well
as the period after the expiry of limitation,
up to actual date of filing of such appeal or
application, as the case may be, or to put it
simply, explanation has to be given for the
entire duration from the date when the
clock of limitation began to tick, up until
the date of actual filing, for seeking
condonation of delay by recourse to Section
5 of the Limitation Act.”
12. The principal ground taken by the opposite parties
for condonation of delay is that it had no knowledge of the
judgment and decree dated 02.05.1991 until 03.09.2013. This
plea, upon close examination, does not withstand judicial
scrutiny. The records clearly indicate that the judgment in the
original title suit was delivered in the presence of the
Government Pleader representing the State. It is a well-settled
principle of law that the knowledge of an advocate engaged by a
party is deemed to be the knowledge of the party itself. The
State, being a litigant represented through its counsel, cannot be
permitted to disown such knowledge and subsequently plead
ignorance as a ground for condonation of delay. Acceptance of
such a plea would not only undermine the sanctity of judicial
proceedings but also set a dangerous precedent.
13. Moreover, the materials brought on record by the
petitioner lends further credence to the fact that the State
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authorities were aware of the decree long prior to the year 2013.
The application dated 04.09.1992, which forms part of
Annexure-7 series, demonstrates that the petitioner’s father had
approached the Circle Officer by enclosing a copy of the
judgment and decree and seeking issuance of rent receipts. This
document assumes significant evidentiary value, as it establishes
communication of the decree to the concerned authorities within
a reasonable time after its pronouncement. Notably, this
assertion has not been specifically denied by the State in its
counter affidavit, thereby attracting an adverse inference.
14. The explanation sought to be furnished by the
State regarding the death of the conducting Government Pleader
also fails to inspire confidence. It is an admitted position that the
said Government Pleader died in the year 2005, which is nearly
14 years after the judgment was delivered. Even if such
circumstance is taken into account, it does not explain the
inaction on the part of the State during the substantial period
between 1991 and 2005. Furthermore, there is no satisfactory
explanation for the delay even after the year 2005 until the filing
of the appeal in 2013. The explanation, thus, neither covers the
entire period of delay nor establishes sufficient cause as required
under law.
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15. This Court is also constrained to observe that the
conduct of the State reflects a lack of due diligence and
institutional accountability. The State, as a litigant, is expected
to act with a higher degree of responsibility and cannot take
shelter under bureaucratic delays or administrative
inefficiencies. The plea that the matter could not be pursued due
to internal lapses does not constitute a legally acceptable ground
for condonation of such prolonged delay.
16. The learned appellate court, while allowing the
application under Section 5 of the Act, appears to have been
swayed by general observations made in certain decisions of the
Hon’ble Apex Court emphasizing a liberal approach. However,
the learned Appellate Court has failed to apply those principles
to the specific facts of the present case. The discretion vested in
a court under Section 5 of the Act is to be exercised judiciously
and not arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the court to record a
finding that sufficient cause has been shown for the entire
period of delay. In the present case, the reasoning assigned by
the learned Appellate Court is cursory and does not reflect a
proper appreciation of the material facts and evidence on record.
17. In this context, the principles laid down in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
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Nafar Academy (supra) assume significance, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has cautioned that liberal approach cannot
be equated with a license to condone delay in a routine manner,
particularly when there is absence of bona-fides. Similarly, in
P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala (supra), it has been held
that courts cannot extend the period of limitation merely on
equitable grounds in the absence of sufficient cause. Though
reliance has been placed by the State on Collector Land
Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji (supra), it must be noted that the said
judgment does not lay down an absolute proposition that delay
must invariably be condoned in all cases involving the State.
The liberal approach advocated therein is conditioned upon the
existence of a bona-fide explanation and absence of gross
negligence. In the present case, both these elements are
conspicuously absent.
18. Another aspect which cannot be lost sight of is
that the decree in question had attained finality long back and
rights had accrued in favour of the petitioner. Permitting the
State to reopen such a matter after more than two decades would
seriously prejudice the petitioner and defeat the very purpose of
limitation law. The concept of finality in litigation is an essential
facet of the rule of law and cannot be lightly disturbed.
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19. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is
of the considered view that the State has failed to establish
sufficient cause for condonation of the inordinate delay. The
impugned order, therefore, suffers from material irregularity and
illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and warrants interference
under Section 115 of the CPC.
20. Accordingly, the present Civil Revision No. 225
of 2019 is allowed. The order dated 14.08.2019 passed by the
learned District Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram in Title Appeal No. 82
of 2013 is hereby set aside. The application filed by the State
under Section 5 of the Act stands dismissed and as a
consequence, the Title Appeal No. 82 of 2013 is dismissed as
barred by limitation.
21. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Ramesh Chand Malviya, J)
Harshita/-
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