Patna High Court

Kumar JaiversusThe Union of India

Decided: 18 March 2026
Disposal: ALLOWED

Holding

The High Court set aside the earlier order, condoned the delay in filing OA No. 158 of 2024, and directed the Central Administrative Tribunal to decide the petition on its merits.

Summary

The petitioner, a 40% disabled candidate with a diploma in cinematography, applied for a Cameraman Grade‑II post under a 2015 disability recruitment drive and was provisionally accepted pending verification of his diploma’s equivalence to a degree. The recruiting authority later rejected his candidature on the ground that he did not possess a degree, prompting the petitioner to file multiple applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), some of which were withdrawn with liberty to file fresh applications. The CAT dismissed his latest application (OA No. 158 of 2024) on the basis of a six‑year delay, invoking the limitation provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The petitioner contended that the delay was condonable because he had continuously pursued his remedy and had been granted liberty to re‑file, arguing that the bar of limitation should not defeat a litigant honestly seeking adjudication. The Patna High Court, on review, held that the CAT erred in a hyper‑technical approach, that sufficient cause for the delay was shown, and that the limitation bar should not apply where the cause of action remained alive. Consequently, the Court set aside the earlier judgment, condoned the delay, and directed the CAT to decide the petition on its merits. The review application was therefore disposed in favour of the petitioner.

Issues considered

Whether the Central Administrative Tribunal can condone delay under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 for an application filed beyond the statutory period.
Whether the limitation bar under the Act should be inapplicable to a petition filed under Section 19 when the petitioner has been diligently pursuing his remedy.
Whether sufficient cause for delay, as shown by the petitioner, warrants condonation despite the six‑year lapse.

Legislation cited

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 — s. 21
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — s. 114
Constitution of India — s. 226
Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 29

Subjects

limitation
condonation of delay
Administrative Tribunal
review jurisdiction
Article 226
disability recruitment
qualification equivalence
civil procedure
equity
appointment

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
CIVIL REVIEW No.110 of 2025
In
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.14112 of 2024
======================================================
Kumar Jai son of Sri Paras Nath Prasad, resident of Quarter No.C-11, Phase-
02, Akashwani Colony, Chhajubagh, Police Station-Gandhi Maidan, District-
Patna-800001.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Govt. of India, Shastri Bhawan, Rajendra Prasad Path, New
Delhi-110001.
2. The Chief Executive Officer, Prasar Bharti (Broadcasting Corporation of
India), Tower-C, Mandi House, Copernicus Marg, New Delhi-110001.
3. The Additional Director General (E.TRG) Examination
Controller/Competent Authority, National Academy of Broadcasting and
Multi Media, Kingsway Rosary School Road, Radio Colony, New Delhi,
Delhi-110009.
... ... Opposite Party/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Jitendra Prasad Singh, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. Venkatesh Kaushik, Advocate.
For the Opposite Party/s : Ms. Dr. Iti Suman, C.G.C.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL DUTTA MISHRA

ORAL JUDGMENT

(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH)

Date : 18-03-2026

Heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner and

learned C.G.C. for the Union of India.
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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2. The present review application has been filed for

review of the judgment dated 06.02.2025 passed by a Co-

ordinate Bench of this Court in C.W.J.C. No.14112 of 2024 by

which the writ petition preferred by the petitioner against the

order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench was dismissed on the ground of

limitation.

FACTS OF THE CASE

3. The brief facts of the case are that pursuant to

Advertisement No. 01 of 2015 dated 27.11.2015 issued under a

Special Recruitment Drive for Persons with Disabilities for

appointment to the post of Cameraman Grade-II, the petitioner,

being a 40% disabled candidate and possessing a Diploma in

Cinematography from a recognized institute, applied within the

prescribed time and was issued admit card and permitted to

appear in the examination provisionally subject to production of

a graduation certificate. Although the essential qualification in

the advertisement provided for degree or diploma in

cinematography from a recognized institute along with

experience, the Opposite Parties, by letter dated 02.02.2016,

required the petitioner to produce proof of equivalence of his

diploma with a degree. Aggrieved, the petitioner initially
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approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench in

O.A. No. 524 of 2016, which was disposed of on 21.07.2016

with liberty to the Opposite parties to verify the genuineness of

his qualification. Thereafter, the Opposite parties rejected his

candidature vide order dated 05.10.2016 on the ground of non-

fulfillment of the requirement of possessing a degree. The

petitioner immediately challenged the said rejection by filing

O.A., which was registered as O.A. No. 7 of 2017 within

limitation; however, due to non-availability of the Division

Bench at Patna, the matter was transferred to the Principal

Bench, New Delhi on 12.10.2018 and re-registered as O.A. No.

3923 of 2018, which was subsequently permitted to be

withdrawn on 20.09.2023 with liberty to file a fresh application.

Pursuant thereto, the petitioner filed O.A. No. 158 of 2024,

which was dismissed by the Tribunal on 29.05.2024 on the

ground of limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative

Tribunals Act, 1985. The said order was challenged by the

petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 14112 of 2024, which also came to be

dismissed by judgment dated 06.02.2025 primarily on the

ground that the challenge to the rejection order dated

05.10.2016 was barred by limitation. It is the case of the

petitioner that he had, in fact, challenged the rejection order
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promptly within time and had been continuously prosecuting his

remedy before the Tribunal, but such material facts, though

available on record and even reflected in the pleadings of the

respondents, could not be brought to the notice of this Court at

the time of hearing, resulting in an error apparent on the face of

the record. It is further the case of the petitioner that he fulfills

the requisite qualification as per the advertisement, there being

no degree course in cinematography in India, and despite having

been declared successful, his candidature was illegally rejected,

causing serious prejudice to him.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

4. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

petitioner reiterating the facts and events enumerated herein

above submitted that the petitioner holds an appropriate degree

of Diploma in Cinematography and had appeared in the

examination held on 24.01.2016 for the post of Cameraman

Grade-II pursuant to the Advertisement No. 01 of 2015. It is

submitted that on 02.02.2016 he was called to furnish

documentary proof that his diploma in Cinematography is

equivalent to the degree sought in the aforesaid advertisement.

Learned senior counsel submitted that aggrieved by the same,

the petitioner approached Central Administrative Tribunal by
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filing O.A. No. 524 of 2016, which was disposed of vide order

dated 21.07.2016 with an observation directing the Opposite

Parties to verify the qualification furnished by the petitioner. It

is further submitted that upon verification, the claim of the

petitioner was rejected on the ground of non-fulfillment of the

essential qualification.

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further

submitted that pursuant to the advertisement related to Special

Recruitment Drive for appointment of Persons With Disabilities,

the petitioner applied for the same and after scrutiny of his

application form, admit card was issued to the petitioner bearing

Roll No. 403001. It is submitted that the petitioner had appeared

at Kolkata Centre on 24.01.2016 and succeeded in the said

examination whereafter his candidature was provisionally

accepted. It is however, submitted that the vide letter dated

02.02.2016, it has been communicated to the petitioner that the

acceptance of provisional candidature was subject to production

of documentary proof that the 3-year diploma in

Cinematography, which is possessed by the petitioner, is

equivalent to the degree in Cinematography as required in the

aforesaid advertisement. It is next submitted that the rejection of

candidature of the petitioner vide order dated 05.10.2016 issued
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by the Additional Director General (E. Trg.) is not in accordance

with law, as the petitioner had earlier filed O.A. No.

050/524/2016 challenging the communication letter dated

02.02.2016, which was disposed of by the learned Central

Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, vide order dated

21.07.2016, and thereafter, the petitioner again approached the

learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench by filing

O.A. No. 07 of 2017, challenging the rejection order dated

05.10.2016 and seeking appropriate relief in continuation of his

grievance.

6. Learned senior counsel in the above background

submitted that the petitioner was pursuing remedy all through.

It is submitted that the petitioner had filed O.A. No.524 of 2016

within time against the order of rejection communicated to him

vide letter dated 02.02.2016 which fact has not been considered

by this Court while dismissing the writ petition vide order dated

06.02.2025.

7. Learned senior counsel, moreover, submitted that

petitioner cannot be said to be indolent and to have deliberately

not availed the remedy before the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench within time in view of the above

admitted facts. He submitted that the petitioner being conscious
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of his right had availed remedy all through the Patna Bench and

before the Principal Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal at

New Delhi and upon dismissal of the O.A. petition, upon

withdrawal with liberty to file fresh O.A., no order could have

been passed on the ground of statutory limitation. It is submitted

that the petitioner has rightly pointed out that O.A. No.158 of

2024 cannot be said to be filed beyond the period of limitation

as the same has been filed as per the direction of the learned

Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi

having jurisdiction. Learned senior counsel further asserts that

dismissal of the O.A. on technical grounds has resulted in grave

miscarriage of justice by defeating the substantive right of the

petitioner of consideration for appointment despite possessing

requisite qualifications, and hence, seeks review of the said

order with a prayer for restoration of his claim and

consequential liberty to pursue the matter on merits in

accordance with law.

ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the Union of India

submitted that both the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna

Bench and the Division Bench of this Court are correct in

rejecting the petition of the petitioner having challenged the
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order/communication dated 05.10.2016 in filing O.A. No.158 of

2024 after delay of about six years and rejected the claim in the

light of the law down in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State

of Tamil Nadu reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 and Ashok

Kumar v. State of Bihar reported in (2017) 4 SCC 357. Learned

counsel further submitted that the subject matter of the

advertisement issued in the year 2015 for the post of Grade-II

has lost its force in the year 2016 itself. Therefore, it was not

appropriate to entertain the grievance of the petitioner in the

year 2024.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

9. Having heard the rival submissions of both the

parties and upon perusal of the materials available on record, it

transpires that the petitioner had applied for the post of

Cameraman Grade-II pursuant to Advertisement Notice No. 01

of 2015 dated 27.11.2015 issued under a Special Recruitment

Drive for Persons with Disabilities, and being duly qualified

with a Diploma in Cinematography from a recognized institute,

had appeared in the examination conducted on 24.01.2016,

whereafter his candidature was provisionally accepted subject to

verification of equivalence of the diploma qualification. It

further appears that the same came to be rejected vide order
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dated 05.10.2016 on the ground of non-fulfillment of eligibility

criteria. Aggrieved by the said order of rejection, the petitioner

filed O.A. No. 07 of 2017 before the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench which became defunct for non-

availability of the member. The entire records allowing the

transfer petition was transferred to the Principal Bench at New

Delhi. The Principal Bench had granted liberty to the petitioner

to withdraw the earlier proceedings with permission to file a de

novo, better constituted, Original Application (O.A.) pursuant

thereto, the petitioner filed fresh O.A. which was registered as

O.A. No. 158 of 2024 before the Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench challenging, inter alia, the vires of the

Recruitment Rules governing the aforesaid advertisement of

2015. The same was dismissed solely on the ground of

limitation without properly appreciating that the cause of action

had been continuously agitated and remained sub-judice in

earlier proceedings and that liberty had been expressly granted

to institute a fresh application. The petitioner, therefore, has

claimed that the dismissal of the O.A. on technical grounds has

resulted in grave miscarriage of justice by defeating his

substantive right of consideration for appointment despite

possessing requisite qualifications, and hence seeks review of
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the said order with a prayer for restoration of his claim and

consequential liberty to pursue the matter on merits in

accordance with law.

10. At this stage, it is apposite to reproduce paragraph

nos. 2 and 3 of the judgment dated 06.02.2025 passed in CWJC

No. 14112 of 2024, which under review are as herein under:

"2. Petitioner is a candidate for recruitment to
the post of Cameraman Group-II pursuant to the
Advertisement No. 01/2015 dated 27.11.2015. Earlier he
had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. No. 3923 of 2018 along
with M.A. No. 807 of 2023 and it was dismissed as
withdrawn with liberty as prayed for. Resultantly, petitioner
has presented O.A. No. 158 of 2024 before the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. It is to be
noted that in O.A. No. 3923 of 2018 along with M.A. No.
807/2023 petitioner grievance is in respect of
communication dated 02.02.2016 in the light of Notification
dated 27.11.2015. If the O.A. No. 524 of 2016 filed prior to
05.10.2016 in that event petitioner had every right to file
miscellaneous application before CAT in assailing the
communication/order dated 05.10.2016 which is the subject
matter of O.A. No. 158 of 2024. Petitioner unnecessarily
waited till disposal of O.A. No. 3923 of 2018 along with
M.A. No. 807/2023 and it has been withdrawn at his
instance. No doubt liberty has been granted. Such liberty is
required to be taken note of in accordance with law. Insofar
as challenge to communication/order dated 05.10.2016 in
O.A. No. 158 of 2024 has been filed. According to
Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 aggrieved person is
required to approach CAT within one year from the date of
cause of action accrued to the aggrieved person. If there is
a delay in filing O.A. there is a provision to condone the
delay under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act,
1985. Be that as it may, there is a delay of about six years
insofar challenge to order/communication dated 05.10.2016
in the light of the fact that O.A. No. 158 of 2024 has been
filed. CAT has taken note of delay in para 13 of its order
dated 29.05.2024 passed in O.A. No. 158 of 2024.
3. Courts/Tribunals time and again held that in
respect of selection, appointment, promotion and seniority
aggrieved person must knock door of the judicial forum
within a reasonable period of time. Hon'ble Supreme Court
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has also held the same in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy
vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in AIR 1974 SC 2271 and
Ashok Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in (2017) 4 SCC
357 delay would be hurdle. Having regard to the fact that
subject matter of advertisement issued in the year, 2015 for
the post of Cameraman Group-II has spent its force in the
year 2016 itself. Therefore, it is not appropriate to entertain
the petitioner's grievance in the year, 2024 when he had a
cause of action accrued in the year, 2017 with reference to
communication/order dated 05.10.2016 if one year period
of limitation is taken into consideration."

SCOPE OF REVIEW

11. It is well settled principle of law that review is

permissible only when:

(i) new and important evidence is discovered and that

could not have been produced earlier with due diligence,

(ii) there is a mistake or error apparent on the face of

the record or any other sufficient reason.

12. A review by its very nature contemplates

reconsideration of the same subject by the same Judge or Judges

while an intra court Appeal is heard by another Division Bench

of this Court. Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code creates a

right to make an application for review under certain conditions

and Order 47 provides for mode, manner and circumstances

under which review petition can be made, heard and

determined. No doubt procedure is meant to advance justice and

as such cannot be treated as mandatory procedure, however, the
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same should be followed as far as possible, keeping in view the

cause of justice.

13. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India is exercised by the High Court in its equity jurisdiction

and thus it has to do equity to the parties and to do complete

justice to them and its power of review cannot be limited only in

terms of Section 114 or Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. By parity of reasoning, Order 47 and Rule 5 ipso

facto would not be attracted in the writ proceeding, whereas a

Civil Court trying a suit (or the High Court in exercise of

original jurisdiction) is bound by the provision of Order 47 Rule

5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to review is taken

recourse to guide the High Court in exercise of its inherent

jurisdiction.

14. The reason, as to why, the provision of Code of

Civil Procedure is not applicable in the writ proceeding has been

explained by the Apex Court in the case of Puran Singh & Ors.

v. State Of Punjab & Ors., reported in AIR 1996 SC 1092. The

Hon’ble Apex Court in Puran Singh (supra) held that the

provisions of Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable even

before coming into force of Civil Procedure code (Amendment)

Act 1976. It is further held that because of the explanation,
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proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has

been excluded and as such, there is no question of making

applicable the procedure of Code as far as it can be made

applicable to such proceeding. The procedures prescribed in

respect of suit in the Code if are made applicable to the writ

proceedings then in many cases, it may frustrate the exercise of

extra-ordinary powers by the High Court under Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution of India. High Court Rules is silent

whether, the Code of Civil Procedure is to apply mutatis

mitandis, as far as, they are not inconsistent with the said Rules.

It is well settled that when abuse of process of law comes into

play and exercise of power is in total disregard of all canons of

justice and violative of acceptable norms and manifestly

exposes clear abuse of the process of law, a writ Court cannot

ignore it. The basic concept of Rule of Law by which the

democracy is governed and the action which is likely to create

an atmosphere of anarchy and curtails the right of a person,

paves the path towards the darkest hour in a democracy and

fossilizes the basic tenet of Rule of Law.

QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED

15. The main questions, which arise for consideration

in the present Civil Review Application is as to:
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(i) whether the Central Administrative Tribunal has

the power to condone the delay under Section 21 of the

Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 in filing an appeal beyond

the period prescribed in the Statute?

(ii) Secondly, would the bar of limitation, which is

intended not to affect a person honestly doing his best to have

his case adjudicated on merits but failing due to the court’s

inability to provide such adjudication be inapplicable to an

application filed under Section 19 of the Act of 1985?

(iii) Thirdly, can delay be condoned in case where

sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for condoning

the delay?

16. For better appreciation of the case, Section 21 of

the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and Sub-Clause 2 of

Section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are reproduced

hereinafter:

"Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act,
1985 - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,-
(a) in a case where a final order such as is
mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has
been made in connection with the grievance unless the
application is made, within one year from the date on which
such final order has been made;
(b) in a case where an appeal or representation
such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of
section 20 has been made and a period of six months had
expired thereafter without such final order having been
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made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said
period of six months.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), where-
(a) the grievance in respect of which an
application is made had arisen by reason of any order made
at any time during the period of three years immediately
preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and
authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this
Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and
(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such
grievance had been commenced before the said date before
any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the
Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause
(a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or
within a period of six months from the said date, whichever
period expires later.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be
admitted after the period of one year specified in clause
(a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be,
the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the
applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient
cause for not making the application within such period.
Section 29(2) in The Limitation Act, 1963

(2)Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
(Emphasis supplied)

17. For the purpose of determining the applicability of

the Limitation Act, 1963 to the present dispute, it is pertinent to

note:

(i) That Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals
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Act expressly deals with limitation wherein there is bar

regarding the limitation period regarding filing of an

Application in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court

in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy (supra) and Ashok Kumar

(supra).

(ii) Now, this Court refers to Section 29(2) of the

Limitation Act, 1963 that there is an important departure made

by the Limitation Act, 1963 insofar as the provision contained in

Section 29 sub-section (2), is concerned. Under the Limitation

Act, 1908, clause (b) to sub-section (2) of Section 29 provided

that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation

prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or

local law the application of Section 5 was in clear and specific

terms excluded. But under Section 29(2) of Act, the provisions

of Section 5 shall apply in case of special or local law to the

extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special

or local law. Since under the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is

specifically made applicable by Section 29(2), it is only if the

special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of

Section 5 that it would stand displaced.

18. The Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the

provision of statutory bar of limitation contained in Section 35-
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H of the Central Excise Act, in the case of Commissioner of

Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Ltd. And

Anr., reported in (2009) 5 SCC 791 has explained the

expression “expressly excluded” appearing in section 29(2) of

the Limitation Act, 1963 which is as under:

“34. Though, an argument was raised
based on Section 29 of the Limitation Act, even
assuming that Section 29(2) would be attracted,
what we have to determine is whether the provisions
of this section are expressly excluded in the case of
reference to the High Court.
35. It was contended before us that the
words “expressly excluded” would mean that there
must be an express reference made in the special or
local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation
Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In this
regard, we have to see the scheme of the special law
which here in this case is the Central Excise Act.
The nature of the remedy provided therein is such
that the legislature intended it to be a complete code
by itself which alone should govern the several
matters provided by it. If, on an examination of the
relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of
the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the
benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our
considered view, that even in a case where the
special law does not exclude the provisions of
Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express
reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court
to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of
those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter
and scheme of the special law exclude their
operation. In other words, the applicability of the
provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be
judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but
by the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating
to filing of reference application to the High Court.”

19. This Court proceeds to consider the second

question, it is settled that the bar of limitation should not affect a
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person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but

failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial,

would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 19

of the 1985 Act. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a

case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that

is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he

brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in

consequence of bonafide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of

procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this

Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section

14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken

diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be

excluded.

20. In this regard, a reference can be drawn from the

judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated

Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation

Department and Ors., reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169, in which

the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the provision of

statutory bar of limitation contained in Section 34(3) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has held as under:

“22. The policy of the section is to afford
protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he
institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical
defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While
considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
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Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the
provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the
cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be
well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent
in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is
intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in
cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On
reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the
legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain
period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the
words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the
interpretation that the principle underlying the said section,
namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person
honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but
failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial,
would not be applicable to an application filed under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly
applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his
application in the court, that is, a court having no
jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit
or the application in the wrong court in consequence of
bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of procedure.
Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court
is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14
should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken
diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be
excluded.”

21. It would appear from following facts and

information that the petitioner has all along pursuing his

remedy:

(i) On 27.11.2015, Advertisement Notice No. 01/2015

was published by the respondent authorities for appointments on

several posts under the Special Recruitment Drive for Persons

with Disabilities (PWDs).

(ii) On 24.01.2016: The petitioner appeared in the

examination for the post of Cameraman Grade-II in Kolkata,

and his candidature was provisionally accepted pending
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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documentary proof of diploma equivalence to a degree.

(iii) On 02.02.2016: The petitioner received a letter

from the Examination Controller reiterating the need for

documentary proof that his diploma was equivalent to a degree

and requesting submission of his PWD certificate.

(iv) On 21.07.2016: The Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench, disposed of the petitioner's first

OA/050/524/2016, stating that the verification of the

educational qualification was the responsibility of the

respondent authorities.

(v) On 05.10.2016: The petitioner's candidature was

rejected by the respondent authorities due to non-fulfillment of

the eligibility requisites as per the recruitment rules.

(vi) In the year 2017: The petitioner challenged the

rejection of his candidature by filing OA/050/07/2017 before the

Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench.

(vii) On 19.07.2018: A fresh circular (F.No. N-

10/001(2)/2017-PBRB) was published by the respondent

department, revising the Recruitment Rules for Cameraman Gr-

II to include Degree/three years' diploma in cinematography as

eligible criteria.
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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(viii) On 20.09.2023: The Central Administrative

Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, allowed the petitioner to

withdraw his OA/3923/2018 and granted liberty to file a better-

worded Original Application.

(ix) On 29.05.2024: The Central Administrative

Tribunal, Patna Bench, dismissed the petitioner's OA/158/2024

on the ground of delay in filing, despite the petitioner explaining

the continuous sub-judice status of the matter and the liberty

granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal

Bench, New Delhi.

22. In the present case, the petitioner’s continuous

pursuit of legal remedies, coupled with the liberty granted by

the Tribunal to file a fresh application, clearly constituted a

justifiable ground for condonation of delay, and the rejection

thereof has resulted in manifest miscarriage of justice.

23. Adverting to the third question, it emerges from

the backdrop of the settled legal position governing condonation

of delay, the impugned order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the

learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench,

dismissing O.A. No. 158 of 2024 solely on the ground of

limitation, cannot be sustained in law. The material on record

would indicate that the petitioner had been diligently pursuing
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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his remedies before the appropriate fora, including the Principal

Bench at New Delhi, and had withdrawn the earlier proceedings

only upon liberty being expressly granted to institute a fresh and

better constituted Original Application. In such circumstances,

the delay, if any, stood sufficiently explained and constituted a

“sufficient cause” within the meaning of law, particularly when

the cause of action had remained alive and under continuous

adjudication. The Tribunal, however, fell into error in adopting a

hyper-technical approach by emphasizing the period of delay

rather than examining the sufficiency and bona fides of the

explanation offered, and further erred in failing to appreciate

that the petitioner’s substantive right to be considered for

appointment pursuant to Advertisement Notice No. 01 of 2015

was being defeated on procedural grounds. It is equally well

settled that while considering an application for condonation of

delay, the court or tribunal ought not to delve into the merits of

the case but must confine itself to the question as to whether

sufficient cause has been shown.

24. Law in this regard is settled by the Hon’ble Apex

Court in the case of Mool Chandra v. Union of India and Anr.

reported in (2025) 1 SCC 625, and I find it apt to reproduce

paragraph nos. 20 to 25 of the said judgment which inter alia
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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are as follows:

"20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty
having been granted to the appellant to pursue his remedy
in accordance with law, yet another OA No. 2066 of 2020
along with an application for condonation of delay came to
be filed. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal on the
ground that it was filed more than one year after the
impugned order came to be passed. No litigant stands to
benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the
length of delay that would be required to be considered
while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the
cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be
examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four
corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of
delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause
shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay,
same would not be condoned.
21. In this background when we turn our
attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the
records that the appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal
of OA No. 2066 of 2020 on the ground of delay had
approached the Delhi High Court challenging the same.
The High Court on the ground of penalty imposed being a
minor penalty, refused to entertain the writ petition or in
other words confirmed the order impugned before the
Tribunal on merits.
22. This Court in Commr. v. Labour Commr.
[Commr. v. Labour Commr., (2009) 3 SCC 525 has taken a
view that while deciding an application for condonation of
delay the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits
of the case. It has been further held :
“5. While deciding an application for
condonation of delay, it is well settled that the High Court
ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and
would have only seen whether sufficient cause had been
shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in filing the
appeal before it. We ourselves have also examined the
application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
before the High Court and, in our opinion, the delay of 178
days has been properly explained by the appellant. That
being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the
High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed before the High
Court is restored to its original file. The High Court is
requested to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with
law after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a
reasoned order.”
23. If negligence can be attributed to the
appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court
deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at
the doors of the appellant and cause shown is sufficient
then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal
and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal
approach or justice-oriented approach to condone the
delay. This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah
Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48] has held :
“6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches
was also raised before the High Court and on this score the
High Court relying upon the decision in Abhyankar case
[N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom
574 observed that it is not an inflexible rule that whenever
there is delay, the Court must and necessarily refuse to
entertain the petition filed after a period of three years or
more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a
suit. The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case [N.L.
Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574
stated that the question is one of discretion to be followed in
the facts and circumstances of each case and further
stated :
‘22. … The real test for sound exercise of
discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the
physical running of time as such but the test is whether by
reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the
petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or
whether before the petitioner has moved the writ court, the
rights of the third parties have come into being which
should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is
reasonable explanation for the delay.’ ”
24. Applying the aforesaid principles which we
are in complete agreement to the facts on hand and test the
same it would not detain us for too long to set aside the
impugned orders [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2023
SCC OnLine Del 8673] , [Mool Chandra v. Union of India,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] , inasmuch as the delay of 425
days in filing fresh OA No. 2066 of 2020 has been
succinctly explained by the appellant before the Tribunal,
namely, it has been contended that there was no intimation
of withdrawal of the earlier OA by his counsel and the
order of withdrawal dated 10-8-2018 [Mool Chandra v.
Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] does not
reflect that such withdrawal was based on any memo duly
signed by the appellant. Further, the High Court has
proceeded to confirm the order of the Tribunal on the
footing that penalty imposed on the appellant is only a
minor penalty, namely, withholding of one increment
without cumulative effect, by completely ignoring the fact
that in the earlier round of litigation it had been clearly
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
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held that punishment of dismissal imposed on the appellant
was totally disproportionate to the alleged act.
25. In the normal circumstances we would have
remitted the matter back to the Tribunal or the High Court
or to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration of the
matter but we desist from doing so for reasons more than
one firstly, the age of the appellant is 68 years (as on date);
and, secondly, there being no evidence whatsoever
available on record to arrive at a conclusion that the
appellant is guilty of the charge; thirdly, the complainant
herself had withdrawn the complaint made and she was not
even examined on behalf of the employer to prove the
charge. Thus, the findings of the enquiry officer cannot be
sustained by any stretch of imagination as it is contrary to
the facts and records on hand. There cannot be judicial
review of nature of penalty to be imposed by disciplinary
authority. Hence, we set aside the impugned orders [Mool
Chandra v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8673] ,
[Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine Del
8674] and hold that the appellant is entitled for all
consequential benefits flowing from the setting aside of the
orders of penalty and the respondents are directed to take
steps in this regard expeditiously and at any rate within 3
months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
Accordingly the appeals stand allowed with no order as to
costs.”
25. We find that the present is the one case in which

exercise of power to review the judgment dated 06.02.2025 in

view of the recorded facts, reason given on behalf of the

petitioner and information as having brought to the notice of this

Court having been considered by us, the order dated 06.02.2025

requires to be rectified to the extent that the fact that petitioner

was honestly doing his best to get his case adjudicated and has

shown his sufficient cause to hold the said period to be

exempted and his application filed on 28.01.2024 before the

learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench is

required to be adjudicated. We accordingly quash and set aside
Patna High Court C. REV. No.110 of 2025 dt.18-03-2026
26/26

the order dated 06.02.2025. The delay is condoned in filing the

O.A. No. 158 of 2024.

26. Accordingly, we direct the learned Central

Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna to decide the O.A.

No. 158 of 2024 on merits in accordance with law.

27. With the above observation/direction, the present

review application stands disposed off.

(Purnendu Singh, J)

(Sunil Dutta Mishra, J)
Ritik/-Rakhi/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 03.04.2026
Transmission Date NA

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