Patna High Court
India through Senior Divisional Engineer,versusM/s Mahnar Infratech Pvt. Ltd.
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISMISSED
Holding
The application under Section 34 is time‑barred because the earlier Section 33 application was not filed within the statutory limitation, so the limitation period starts from receipt of the award and the appeal is dismissed.
Summary
The Union of India appealed against a district judge’s order rejecting its application under Section 34(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an arbitral award on the ground of limitation. The dispute turned on whether the limitation period for a Section 34 application begins from the receipt of the award or from the disposal of a prior Section 33 application for correction, and whether the Section 33 application was filed within its statutory 30‑day (or contractually agreed 60‑day) period. The High Court examined the relevant statutory provisions and Supreme Court precedents, concluding that the Section 33 application was filed after the permissible period, so the benefit of a delayed limitation could not arise. Consequently, the Section 34 application was deemed time‑barred and the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The appropriate commencement date for the limitation period under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 when a Section 33 application has been filed
- Whether the Section 33 application filed on 01‑08‑2022 complied with the statutory limitation period
- Whether the court may condone delay beyond the 30‑day period prescribed in the proviso to Section 34(3) and Section 29 of the Limitation Act
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — s. 33, 34
- Limitation Act, 1963 — s. 29
Subjects
- Arbitration
- Section 33
- Section 34
- Limitation period
- Setting aside award
- Correction of award
- Condonation of delay
- Supreme Court precedent
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
COMMERCIAL APPEAL No.12 of 2024
======================================================
Union of India through Senior Divisional Engineer, East Central Railway,
Sonpur, District- Saran.
... ... Appellant
Versus
M/s Mahnar Infratech Pvt. Ltd. having its office at House No. 275, Road No.
5, Rajput Nagar, Hajipur, Vaishali.
... ... Respondent
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant : Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, CGSC
Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Manish Sahay, Advocate
Mr. Anil Kumar Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Siddarth Aditya, Advocate
Mr. Amrit Kirti, Advocate
Mr. Aman Raj, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILENDRA SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD)
Date : 06-01-2026
Heard Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Manish Sahay, learned counsel for the claimant-
respondent.
2. The present appeal has been preferred for setting
aside the order dated 04.07.2024 passed by learned District Judge,
Saran at Chapra (hereinafter ‘the learned court’) in Miscellaneous
Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2022 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘impugned order’).
3. By the impugned order, the learned court has been
pleased to reject the application preferred by the appellant under
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
2/20
Section 34 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1996’ or ‘1996 Act’)
challenging the part of the arbitral award dated 12.05.2022 and
additional award dated 08.08.2022. The dismissal of the
application is solely based on the ground of limitation.
4. The learned court took a view that as per Section 34
(3) of the Act of 1996, the maximum period of limitation for filing
an application for setting aside an award is three months, delay
may be condoned only for a period of 30 days, but not thereafter.
The learned court found that the arbitral award was passed on
12.05.2022 but the application for setting aside the award was filed
on 05.11.2022 i.e. after more than 160 days of the passing of the
award.
5. On perusal of the records, it is found that the plea of
the appellant before the learned court that the appellant had filed
an application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 on 01.08.2022
before the learned Arbitral Tribunal which came to be disposed of
on 08.08.2022, therefore, the limitation may start running only
from 08.08.2022, has been rejected by the learned court.
Submissions on behalf of the appellant
6. Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the
appellant has assailed the impugned order on the ground that the
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
3/20
learned court could not appreciate the scheme of Sections 33 and
34 of the Act of 1996. According to him, in this case, the award
was passed on 12.05.2022 but it was delivered on 24.05.2022,
therefore, at first instance, the period of limitation of three months
as prescribed under proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the
Act of 1996 would start running from the date of delivery/receipt
of the award and not from the date of passing of the award.
7. It is his further contention that after the arbitral award
was received by the appellant, the appellant was advised to file an
application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 for carrying out
certain corrections. This application was filed on 01.08.2022
which came to be disposed of only on 08.08.2022. Referring to the
provision of Section 33 of the Act of 1996, Mr. Agrawal, learned
counsel would submit that the date of disposal of the application
under Section 33 being 08.08.2022, the period of limitation may
be reckoned with only with effect from the said date and not
before that. If the limitation is counted from 08.08.2022, the
application under Section 34 (1) of the Act of 1996 would come
within the period of three months and in such circumstance, there
would be no reason to dismiss the application on the ground of the
same being barred by limitation. Learned counsel relies upon a
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of North
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
4/20
Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs. S.A. Builders Ltd. reported in
AIR 2024 SC (Supp) 486.
Submissions on behalf of the respondent
8. Mr. Manish Sahay, learned counsel for the claimant-
respondent has put a strong contest to the submissions of learned
counsel for the appellant. It is submitted that a bare perusal of
Section 33 of the Act of 1996 would show that there is a period of
limitation fixed for filing of an application by a party before the
learned Arbitral Tribunal requesting the Tribunal to correct any
computation errors, any clerical or typographical errors or any
other errors of similar nature occurring in the award. Sub-section
(1) of Section 33 provides that such application should be filed
within a period of 30 days from the receipt of the arbitral award,
unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties.
In this case, it is not the case of the appellant that the parties had
agreed for another period of time, hence, in this case, the period of
limitation for filing of an application for correction of errors would
be only 30 days. The appellants did not avail this opportunity
within the prescribed period of limitation. They filed application
for correction only on 01.08.2022 which was after about 2 months
8 days from the date of receipt of the arbitral award.
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
5/20
9. It is his submission that the learned Arbitral Tribunal
has not been conferred with any power to extend the period of
limitation or to condone the delay in filing of the application. By
virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, the
provisions of Sections 5 to 24 of the Limitation Act would not
apply where the legislatures have by bringing a provision in the
special statute specifically excluded their application.
10. Learned counsel further submits that in the facts of
this case, if the period of limitation would start from 08.08.2022, it
would amount to extending the period of limitation for filing an
application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996, even as there is no
provision for the same in the statute and the order dated
08.08.2022 has attained finality. It is pointed out that the learned
Arbitral Tribunal refused to entertain the application under Section
33 with a clear averment in its order dated 08.08.2022 that the time
limit specified in the Act of 1996 and the conditions of contract
(GCC) are over. The learned Tribunal treated the application of the
appellant under Section 33 of the Act of 1996 as time barred.
According to learned counsel, the observation of the learned
Tribunal in its order dated 08.08.2022 that the decision of the
learned Arbitral Tribunal shall form part of the original arbitral
award shall not take away the effect of the statute. In such
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
6/20
circumstance, the learned District Judge, Saran at Chapra has not
committed any error in taking a view that the application for
setting aside of the award was barred by limitation. Learned
counsel relies upon the judgments in the case of Ved Prakash
Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of India reported in 2018 SCC
OnLine SC 3181 and Geojit Financial Services Ltd. Vs.
Sandeep Gurav reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1811.
Consideration
11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
length and perused the records.
12. The solitary question which arises for consideration
in the present case is as to whether the application filed under
Section 33 of the Act of 1996 on 01.08.2022, disposed of on
08.08.2022 may be taken to have been filed in accordance with
Section 33 of the Act of 1996. If it is held that the application filed
on 01.08.2022 was satisfying the essential condition of Section 33
of the Act of 1996, then in that case, the date of disposal of the
said application being 08.08.2022, the appellant would succeed in
his plea that the application under Section 34 (1) of the Act of
1996 was preferred within a period of three months from the date
of disposal of the application under Section 33 of the Act of 1996.
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
7/20
13. To appreciate the submissions of learned counsel for
the appellant, this Court would first extract the relevant provisions
of the statute which are under consideration in the present case.
Section 33 and Section 34 of the Act of 1996 read as under:-
“33. Correction and interpretation of
award; additional award.-1) Within thirty
days from the receipt of the arbitral award,
unless another period of time has been
agreed upon by the parties—
(a) a party, with notice to the other party,
may request the arbitral tribunal to correct
any computation errors, any clerical or
typographical errors or any other errors of a
similar nature occurring in the award;
(b) if so agreed by the parties, a party, with
notice to the other party, may request the
arbitral tribunal to give an interpretation of a
specific point or part of the award.
(2) If the arbitral tribunal considers the
request made under sub-section (1) to be
justified, it shall make the correction or give
the interpretation within thirty days from the
receipt of the request and the interpretation
shall form part of the arbitral award.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may correct any
error of the type referred to in clause (a) of
sub-section (1), on its own initiative, within
thirty days from the date of the arbitral
award.
(4) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a
party with notice to the other party, may
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
8/20
request, within thirty days from the receipt
of the arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal to
make an additional arbitral award as to
claims presented in the arbitral proceedings
but omitted from the arbitral award.
(5) If the arbitral tribunal considers the
request made under sub-section (4) to be
justified, it shall make the additional arbitral
award within sixty days from the receipt of
such request.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may extend, if
necessary, the period of time within which it
shall make a correction, give an
interpretation or make an additional arbitral
award under sub-section (2) or sub-section
(5).
(7) Section 31 shall apply to a correction or
interpretation of the arbitral award or to an
additional arbitral award made under this
section.
34. Application for setting aside arbitral
award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an
arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award in
accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-
section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the
Court only if -
(a) the party making the application
1[establishes on the basis of the record of the
arbitral tribunal that]-
1. Substituted by Act 33 of 2019, S. 7, for “furnishes proof that” (w.e.f. 30-8-2019).
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
9/20
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have
subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute
not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it
contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration:
Provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, only that part of
the arbitral award which contains decisions
on matters not submitted to arbitration may
be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, unless such
agreement was in conflict with a provision of
this Part from which the parties cannot
derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not
in accordance with this Part; or
(b) the Court finds that-
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law for the time being in force, or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
10/20
1[Explanation 1.-For the avoidance of any
doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict
with the public policy of India, only if,-
(i) the making of the award was induced or
affected by fraud or corruption or was in
violation of section 75 or section 81; or
(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental
policy of Indian law; or
(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions
of morality or justice.
Explanation 2.-For the avoidance of doubt, the
test as to whether there is a contravention with
the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not
entail a review on the merits of the dispute.]
2[(2A) An arbitral award arising out of
arbitrations other than international
commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside
by the Court, if the Court finds that the award
is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the
face of the award:
Provided that an award shall not be set aside
merely on the ground of an erroneous
application of the law or by reappreciation of
evidence.]
(3) An application for setting aside may not
be made after three months have elapsed
from the date on which the party making that
application had received the arbitral award
or, if a request had been made under section
33, from the date on which that request had
been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:
1. Substituted by Act 3 of 2016, S.18, for the Explanation (w.r.e.f. 23-10-2015).
2. Inserted by Act 3 of 2016, S.18 (w.e.r.f. 23-10-2015).
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
11/20
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the
applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said
period of three months it may entertain the
application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter.
(4) On receipt of an application under sub-
section (1), the Court may, where it is
appropriate and it is so requested by a party,
adjourn the proceedings for a period of time
determined by it in order to give the arbitral
tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral
proceedings or to take such other action as in
the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate
the grounds for setting aside the arbitral
award.
1[(5) An application under this section shall
be filed by a party only after issuing a prior
notice to the other party and such application
shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the
applicant endorsing compliance with the said
requirement.
(6) An application under this section shall be
disposed of expeditiously, and in any event,
within a period of one year from the date on
which the notice referred to in sub-section
(5) is served upon the other party.]”
14. On going through the aforementioned provisions, it
is crystal clear that an application for carrying out any correction
in the award is required to be filed within 30 days from the date of
receipt of the arbitral award, unless another period of time has
1. Inserted by Act 3 of 2016, S. 18 (w.r.e.f 23-10-2015).
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
12/20
been agreed upon by the parties. As per clause 64.(3)(b)(ii) of the
Standard GCC-July 2014 - “A party may apply for corrections of
any computational errors, any typographical or clerical errors or
any other error of similar nature occurring in the award of a
Tribunal and interpretation of a specific point of award to Tribunal
within 60 days of receipt of the award”. Therefore, the admitted
position is that in view of sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Act
of 1996, the application was required to be filed within 60 days
from the date of receipt of the award i.e. 24.05.2022. The period of
sixty days expired on 23.07.2022. Thus, the application under
Section 33 was filed belatedly only on 01.08.2022.
15. Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996
provides for filing of an application for setting aside the award but
such an application, according to the provision of the statute, may
not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on
which the party making that application had received the arbitral
award or if a request had been made under Section 33, from the
date on which that request had been disposed of by the learned
Arbitral Tribunal. The word ‘disposed of’ has come up for
consideration in various judicial pronouncements on the subject,
some of them are: Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons Vs. Union of
India reported in 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3181 and Geojit
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
13/20
Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Sandeep Gurav reported in 2025
SCC OnLine SC 1811.
16. It has been the consistent view of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that whether an application under Section 33 of the
Act of 1996 is allowed or dismissed is not the determinative factor.
What is determinative is the date on which the said application
stood disposed of. A harmonious construction of Section 34(3) and
Section 33 of the Act of 1996 has been given by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash Mithal and Sons
(supra).
17. The proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 makes
clear the legislative intentment with regard to strict adherence to
the period of limitation. The proviso clearly states that if the Court
is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the period of three months, it
may entertain the application within a further period of 30 days,
but not thereafter. The cluster of words “but not thereafter” are
words of significance and it shows the legislative intention. At this
stage comes into play sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the
Limitation Act. We reproduce sub-section (2) of Section 29
hereunder for a ready reference:-
“29. Savings.- (2) Where any special or local
law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
14/20
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule,
the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if
such period were the period prescribed by
the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by any special or local law, the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only in so far as, and to the extent to
which, they are not expressly excluded by
such special or local law.”
18. Proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act of
1996 specifically excludes the provisions of the Limitation Act in
the matter of condonation of delay.
19. In the case of Geojit Financial Services Ltd.
(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had occasion to consider
Section 33 and Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Their Lordships of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court having considered the interplay of the
two provisions of the Act of 1996 took a view that the limitation
period for preferring an application for setting aside, where a
request was made by either party under Section 33 of the 1996
Act, commences from the date when such request made under
Section 33 was ‘disposed’ of by the Arbitral Tribunal. While
concluding its judgment in the case of Geojit Financial Services
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
15/20
Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held in paragraph ‘35’ of
its judgment as under:-
“35. We summarize our conclusion as
under:-
(i) Where an application under Section 33 of
the 1996 Act has not been filed, the
legislature was conscious enough to state
that it would be the date of the receipt of the
award which would earmark the
commencement of limitation for an
application for setting aside of an award in
terms of Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
Whereas, in the case where an application
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act has been
filed, the legislature was conscious enough
to lay down that it would be the date of
disposal of such request or application, that
would be the starting point for calculation of
limitation.
(ii) Where such an application under Section
33 of the 1996 Act is filed, irrespective of
whether the arbitral tribunal upon
considering such application, either makes or
does not make any correction or
modification or choose to render or to not
render an additional award in terms of
Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the starting
point for the period of limitation for
challenging the same under Section 34 as per
sub-section (3) would be the date of disposal
of such application under Section 33 by the
arbitral tribunal, as long as the application
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
16/20
under Section 33 of the 1996 Act had been
filed within the prescribed period of
limitation under sub-section (1) thereto AND
with notice to the other party. Any other
interpretation to the contrary, would do
violence to plain and unambiguous language
used in Section 34 sub-section (3) of the Act,
1996.
(iii) In the aforesaid scenario, neither the
date of passing of the original award or date
of receipt of the same by the party nor the
date of receipt of the corrected award or date
of receipt of the decision of the arbitrator
disposing the application under Section 33 of
the 1996 Act is of any significance. What is
of significance, under Section 34 sub-section
(3) of the Act, 1996 is the date on which the
application or request under Section 33 came
to be disposed by the arbitral tribunal.
(iv) In the same breath, where a request is
made under Section 33 of the 1996 Act, it is
immaterial for the purpose of computation of
limitation under Section 34 sub-section (3)
whether such request fell within the purview
of the said provision or not. What is material
is only that such request was made in the
manner delineated under Section 33 i.e., it
fulfilled the twin conditions of being made;
(I) “within thirty days from the receipt of the
arbitral award” and (II) “with notice to the
other party” stipulated therein.”
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
17/20
20. It is evident from clause (ii) of paragraph ‘35’ as
quoted hereinabove that the starting point for challenging the same
under Section 34 as per sub-section (3), the date of disposal of the
application under Section 33 by the Arbitral Tribunal would be
significant as long as the application under Section 33 of 1996 Act
had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation under sub-
section (1) thereto. (emphasis supplied)
21. Again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made it clear in
clause (iv) under paragraph ‘35’ of its judgment that what is
material is only that such request was made in the manner
delineated under Section 33. The twin conditions under Section 33
have been noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as “(I) within 30
days from the receipt of the arbitral award, and (II) with notice to
the other party stipulated therein”.
22. In the present case since the application under
Section 33 of the Act of 1996 was beyond the period mentioned
under the said section, the appellant would not get the benefit of
the period from 24.05.2022 till 08.08.2022 for purpose of counting
of Limitation in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act
of 1996.
23. Mr. Alok Kumar Agrawal, learned counsel for the
appellant has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
18/20
Court in the case of North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs.
S.A. Builders Ltd. reported in AIR 2024 SC (Supp) 486.
24. We have carefully gone through the said judgment.
The said case arose out of an application under Section 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 in which a question arose with respect to
award of interest for the post award period. The aggrieved party
had preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the 1996 Act before
the Hon’ble Division Bench assailing the order passed by learned
Single Judge where the award was challenged, however, the
Hon’ble Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay had
dismissed the appeal whereafter the matter went to the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the
Special Leave Petition. In the execution case, an issue was framed
by the learned Single Judge with respect to post award interest
under Section 31(7) of the Act of 1996. Considering that a large
volume of litigation on this point were before the Court, the
learned Single Judge referred the matter to the Division Bench to
clarify the position in this regard. This is how the matter travelled
to the Hon’ble Division Bench where the respondent sought leave
to approach the learned Arbitrator for seeking the clarification as
to whether the interest awarded in the award was under Section
31(7)(a) of the 1996 Act or not? The Hon’ble Division Bench vide
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
19/20
the order dated 03.01.2005 granted such permission to the
respondent with clarification that the permission so granted should
not be understood to contain any expression of opinion of the
Hon’ble Division Bench about payment of interest under Section
31(7)(a) or Section 31(7)(b) of the 1996 Act.
25. In the facts of the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court was considering the scope and ambit of Section 33 of the
Act of 1996 and it was ultimately held that on a cumulative
assessment of the attendant facts and circumstances, the
clarification sought for and issued by the learned Arbitrator would
be covered by the expression “unless another period of time has
been agreed upon by the parties as appearing in Section 33(1) of
the 1996 Act.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that this is a
case where Court had permitted the respondent to seek
clarification from the learned Arbitrator beyond the initial period
of 30 days whereafter the appellant had fully participated in the
clarificatory proceeding.
26. We understand that the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of North Delhi Municipal
Corporation (supra) has been rendered in a completely different
fact situation. In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. and
Another Vs. N.R. Vairamani and Another reported in (2004) 8
Patna High Court COMMERCIAL APP No.12 of 2024 dt.06-01-2026
20/20
SCC 579, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the
judgment of this Court be not cited like an Euclid’s theorem as a
slight change in the facts of the case would make a sea difference
in the opinion of the Court. We find that the observations of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as occurring in paragraph ‘9’ of the
judgment would be fully applicable to distinguish the present case
from that of the case of the North Delhi Municipal Corporation
(supra).
27. In the entire facts and circumstances as also the law
on the subject duly discussed in the judicial pronouncements as
referred hereinabove, the learned District Judge, Saran at Chapra
has not committed any error in rejecting the application for setting
aside of the award on the ground of its being barred by limitation.
28. This appeal has no merit. It is dismissed accordingly.
(Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J)
(Shailendra Singh, J)
lekhi/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE
Uploading Date 08.01.2026
Transmission Date
Checking your session…