Patna High Court

Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan KhatoonversusThe State of Bihar

Decided: 7 January 2026
Disposal: ALLOWED
Bench: RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD SHAILENDRA SINGH

Holding

The High Court affirmed the convictions for murder but commuted the death sentence to 20 years rigorous imprisonment and acquitted the mother on the basis of insufficient evidence of participation.

Summary

The State of Bihar convicted Md. Tahir and his mother Hadizan Khatoon for the murder of Tahir's wife Rina Khatoon and her two daughters by setting the house on fire, invoking Sections 302, 34 and 201, 34 of the IPC. The trial court sentenced Tahir to death and Hadizan to life imprisonment, relying on circumstantial evidence, including the presence of the accused inside the locked house and the lack of alternative explanations. The appellants challenged the convictions and the death sentence, arguing that the evidence was purely circumstantial, that there was no direct proof of homicide, and that mitigating factors warranted a lesser punishment. The High Court examined the evidentiary burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, considered precedents on "rarest of the rare" cases, and evaluated mitigating factors such as the appellant's age and lack of criminal antecedents. It upheld Tahir's conviction but modified the death sentence to 20 years rigorous imprisonment without remission, and acquitted Hadizan Khatoon due to insufficient proof of her participation. The court also set aside the death reference and partially allowed the appeals.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain convictions under Sections 302 and 201 IPC.
Whether the death sentence imposed on Md. Tahir satisfies the "rarest of the rare" doctrine.
Whether Hadizan Khatoon can be held liable under Section 34 IPC for assisting the murder.
The applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to impose an adverse inference on the accused.
The appropriate quantum of punishment in lieu of death, considering mitigating circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure — s. 313, 366(1), 428, 432, 433
Dowry Prohibition Act — s. 3, 4
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 — s. 106, 8
Indian Penal Code — s. 120B, 201, 302, 34, 498A

Subjects

murder
dowry harassment
circumstantial evidence
death penalty
commutation of sentence
Section 34 IPC
Section 201 IPC
rarest of the rare doctrine
life imprisonment
sentencing guidelines

Judgment

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
DEATH REFERENCE No.1 of 2025
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-51 Year-2021 Thana- PRANPUR District- Katihar
======================================================
The State of Bihar
... ... Petitioner
Versus
Md. Tahir S/o- Late Md. Alim Village- Makhdumpur PS Muffasil Dist-
Katihar
... ... Respondent
======================================================
with
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No. 627 of 2025
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-51 Year-2021 Thana- PRANPUR District- Katihar
======================================================
Md. Tahir S/o Late Md. Alim R/o Village- Labha, P.S.- Pranpur, District-
Katihar
... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar ... ... Respondent
=====================================================
with
CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No. 639 of 2025
Arising Out of PS. Case No.-51 Year-2021 Thana- PRANPUR District- Katihar
======================================================
Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan Khatoon W/O Late Md. Alim R/O Village-
Labha, P.S.- Pranpur, District- Katihar
... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Bihar ... ... Respondent

======================================================
Appearance :
(In DEATH REFERENCE No. 1 of 2025)
For the Petitioner : Mr. Xxxxx
For the Respondent : Ms. Surya Nilambari, Amicus Curiae
Mr. Pratik Mishra, Advocate
(In CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No. 627 of 2025)
For the Appellant : Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, Advocate
Mr. Sunil Prasad Singh, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Parmeshwar Mehta, Addl.PP
(In CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No. 639 of 2025)
For the Appellant : Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, Advocate
Mr. Makardhwaj Upadhyay, Advocate
Mrs. Vaishnavi Singh, Advocate
Ms. Sushmita Mishra, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Parmeshwar Mehta, Addl.PP
======================================================
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILENDRA SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD)

Date : 07-01-2026

The Death Reference 1 of 2025 has been registered

under Section 366 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short

‘CrPC’) and the Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 627 of 2025 and

Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 639 of 2025 have been preferred for

setting aside of the judgment of conviction dated 15.04.2025

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned judgment’) and the order

of sentence dated 19.04.2025 (hereinafter referred to as the

‘impugned order’) passed by learned Sessions Judge, Katihar

(hereinafter called as ‘the learned trial court’) in Sessions Trial No.

132 of 2022, G.R. No. 1143 of 2021 arising out of Pranpur

(Roshna) P.S. Case No. 51 of 2021.

2. By the impugned judgment and order, the appellants

have been convicted for the offences punishable under Sections

302/34 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’). Md.

Tahir (Appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 627 of 2025) has been

sentenced to death and fine to the tune of Rs.50,000/- under

Section 302 IPC. In default of payment of fine, he shall further

undergo simple imprisonment for six months. He has further been

ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under
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Section 201 IPC and fine to the tune of Rs.50,000/-. In default of

payment of fine, he shall further undergo simple imprisonment for

six months.

Appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 639 of 2025, namely,

Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan Khatoon has been ordered to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for life with a fine of Rs.25,000/-

under Section 302 IPC. In default of payment of fine, she shall

further undergo simple imprisonment for six months. She has also

been ordered to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment with a

fine of Rs.25,000/- under Section 201 IPC. In default of payment

of fine, she shall further undergo simple imprisonment for six

months. Both the sentences are to run concurrently.

Prosecution Case

3. The prosecution case is based on the written

application of the informant (PW-9). The informant alleged in his

written application (Exhibit ‘P7/PW-9) that his sister Rina

Khatoon was married to Md. Taheer about ten years before the

occurrence. After marriage, the victim’s husband Md. Taheer,

brother-in-law Md. Jumrati, mother-in-law Hadizan Khatoon,

sister-in-law Mairun Khatoon were torturing her to fulfill the

demand of Rs.2 lakhs as dowry from her father. Several times, the

matter was resolved by panchayati where the accused persons
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ascertained that no further occurrence would happen. On

25.03.2021 at about 08:00 AM in the morning, the named accused

persons along with Nazbin Khatoon, Md. Kunia, Md. Azmer under

a conspiracy burnt the informant’s sister and her two daughters

alive in the house.

4. On the basis of the written application of the

informant, the FIR being Pranpur P.S. Case No. 51 of 2021 dated

25.03.2021 was registered under Sections 302, 201, 120B,

498A/34 of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act

against accused persons, namely, (1) Md. Tahir, (2) Md. Jumrati,

(3) Hadisan Khatoon, (4) Mairun Khatoon, (5) Najbin Khatoon,

(6) Md. Kuniya and (7) Md. Azmer.

5. After investigation, police submitted first chargesheet

bearing Chargesheet No. 28 of 2021 dated 15.06.2021 against the

accused persons, namely, (1) Md. Tahir, (2) Hadisan Khatoon, (3)

Md. Azmer showing two accused persons, namely, (1) Md. Kuniya

and (2) Najbin Khatoon innocent and keeping further

investigation pending against (1) Md. Jumrati, (2) Mairun Khatoon

and Md. Bakrid and his wife. Learned trial court vide order dated

26.07.2021 took cognizance under Section 302, 201, 120B,

498A/34 of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
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6. In the meantime, supplementary chargesheet being

Chargesheet No. 58 of 2021 dated 05.09.2021 was submitted

against Md. Jumrati keeping investigation pending against Mairun

Khatoon, Md. Bakrid and his wife. Accordingly, vide order dated

24.02.2022, records of Md. Jumrati has been merged with the

original record and the records of other accused were split off.

7. Charges were read over and explained to the accused

persons in Hindi to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to

be tried. Accordingly, on 09.03.2022, charges were framed for the

offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 201/34, 302/120B,

498A/34 of the IPC and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

8. On behalf of the prosecution, altogether Eleven

witnesses were examined. The list of witnesses and the documents

exhibited in course of trial are as under:-

List of Prosecution Witnesses

P.W. 1 Md. Inteyaz @ Patto
P.W. 2 Md. Quddus @ Md. Quddus Alam
P.W. 3 Maitun Nisa
P.W. 4 Dr. Shailendra Mohan Thakur
P.W. 5 Dr. Amarendra Kumar
P.W. 6 Dr. Dayanand Rai
P.W. 7 Ekhlaqur Rahman
P.W. 8 Md. Afsar
P.W. 9 Abdul Matin
P.W. 10 Prem Kumar Bharti
P.W. 11 Md. Taiyab
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List of Exhibits on behalf of Prosecution

Exhibit-P1/PW4 Postmortem report of Rina Khatoon
Exhibit-P1(1)/PW4 Signature of Dr. Shailendra Mohan Thakur on
Postmortem report of Rina Khatoon
Exhibit-P1(2)/PW5 Signature of Dr. Amarendra Kumar on
postmortem
report of Rina Khatoon
Exhibit-P2/PW4 Postmortem report of Ayarat
Exhibit-P2(1)/PW4 Signature of Dr. Shailendra Mohan Thakur on
postmortem report of Ayarat
Exhibit-P2(2)/PW4 Signature of Dr. Amarendra Kumar on
postmortem report of Ayarat
Exhibit-P3/PW4 Postmortem report of Bilkis Khatoon
Exhibit-P3(1)/PW4 Signature of Dr. Shailendra Mohan Thakur on
postmortem report of Bilkis Khatoon
Exhibit-P3(2)/PW4 Signature of Dr. Amarendra Kumar on
postmortem report of Bilkis Khatoon
Exhibit-P4/PW10 Carbon copy of Inquest Reporl of Ayarat
Exhibit-P4(1)/PW7 Signature of Ekhlaqur Rahman on Inquest
Report
Exhibit-P4(2)/PW8 Signature of Md. Afsar on Inquest Report
Exhibit-P5/PW10 Carbon copy of Inquest Report of Bilkis
Khatoon
Exhibit-P5(1)/PW7 Signature of Ekhlaqur Rahman on Inquest
Report
Exhibit-P5(2)/PW8 Signature of Md. Afsar on Inquest Report
Exhibit-P6/PW10 Carbon copy of Inquest Report of Rina
Khatoon
Exhibit-P6(1)/PW7 Signature of Ekhlaqur Rahman on Inquest
Report
Exhibit-P6(2)/PW8 Signaturc of Md. Afsar on Inquest Report
Exhibit-P7/PW9 Written application
Exhibit-P8/PW10 Forwarding on written application
Exhibit-P9/PW10 Endorsement on written application
Exhibit-P10/PW10 Formal FIR
Exhibit-P11 Certified copy of order dated 21.07.2022
passed in Matrimonial Case No, 43 of 2020
Exhibit-P12 Certified copy of original application filed in
Matrimonial Case No. 43 of 2020
Exhibit-P13 Certified copy of compromise petition filed in
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Matrimonial Case No. 43 of 2020
Exhibit-P14 Certified copy of order dated 15.03.2022
passed in Complaint Case No. 505 of 2020
Exhibit-P15 Certified copy of complaint petition of Casc
No. 505 of 2020

9. The statement of the accused were recorded under

Section 313 CrPC. In the 313 CrPC statement, Md. Tahir took

plea of his innocence and stated that he had not committed any

offence and has been falsely implicated. Appellant Hadisan

Khatoon took plea of her innocence and stated that she was at

her Naihar at the time of occurrence.

10. The defence has adduced four witnesses which are

in tabular form hereinbelow:-

DW-1 Mohsin
DW-2 Md. Anwar
DW-3 Md. Mustafa
DW-4 Md. Ashique

Findings of the Learned Trial Court

11. Learned trial court after examining the evidences

available on the record found that the case against the appellants is

distinguishable from the other accused facing trial in view of the

direct testimony, strong circumstantial evidence and absence of

any plausible explanation for the deaths occurred within their

residence. Learned trial court found that the presence of Md. Tahir
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and Hadisan Khatoon (the appellants) inside the house at the time

of the incident, the medical evidence of deliberated burning, the

lack of a plausible alternative explanation and the background of

harassment collectively lead to the irresistible conclusion that both

accused acted in furtherance of a common intention to commit the

murder of Rina Khatoon and her daughters.

The learned trial court found from the evidences available on

the record that Md. Tahir (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 627 of

2025) attempted to flee from the scene but was restrained by the

villagers, renders the probability of his involvement in the alleged

crime. His presence inside the locked house during the fire,

coupled with his attempt to escape, forms a vital link in the chain

of circumstantial evidence. Further, from the evidence, learned

trial court found that the appellant Hadisan Khatoon had assisted

her son (Md. Tahir) in the commission of the crime and was

present in the house at that time. Their action also resulted in

destruction of evidence by setting the bodies of the victims on fire.

12. Accordingly, the learned trial court held them guilty

for the charges under Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC.

13. The learned trial court has, however, acquitted the

appellants of the charges under Sections 302/120B, 498A/34 IPC

and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The co-accused
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Md. Ajmer and Md. Jumrati, who were facing trial, have been

acquitted of all the charges levelled against them.

14. Learned trial court after having considered the facts

and circumstances of the case, the manner in which the offence

was committed and the extreme brutal grotesque diabolical nature

of the crime found the case of the appellant Md. Tahir within the

category of "rarest of the rare case" and accordingly, sentenced

him to death.

15. Learned trial court found that the appellant Hadisan

Khatoon has only assisted her son Md. Tahir in commission of the

crime and has sentenced her to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

life with fine.

Submissions by the Amicus Curiae

16. Ms. Surya Nilamabari, learned Amicus Curiae has

submitted that this case exemplifies the extreme cruelty women

endure in society, where a woman was brutally burned alive along

with her two young daughters in the morning hours. Learned

Amicus Curiae contended that the written application, witness

depositions, and documentary evidences conclusively prove the

prosecution case, warranting the trial court's righteous conviction

of the accused Md. Tahir for the murder of his wife and two girl

children before they could even comprehend the world. The case
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stems from dowry demands, evidenced by multiple mediation

rounds and family interventions due to the acrimonious marital

relationship, with the appellant previously engaged in matrimonial

litigation against his wife.

17. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the

prosecution witnesses (PWs) have fully supported the case of the

State, with reliable ocular evidence duly corroborated by

unimpeachable medical evidence; the medical examiners deposed

that burn injuries exceeding 90% constituted the cause of death in

all three victims.

18. Learned Amicus Curiae placed reliance on the

informant's deposition, wherein PW stated about receiving a

rescue call from his sister the night before the occurrence, which

completes the chain of circumstances, defence was not able to

contradict on this point.

19. Learned Amicus Curiae referring to the deposition of

the Investigating Officer has submitted that the IO's statement

confirm no smell of kerosene at the place of occurrence nor

seizure of any burnt objects or article used for burning,

demonstrating meticulous planning and preparation by the

accused, who with planned preparation executed this brutal

incident with the aid of other accused persons.
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20. Learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the

appellant's unexplained silence on crucial facts within his

exclusive knowledge viz., time of house departure, DW's sighting

of bodies inside, bodies' relocation to terrace, fire causation, and

whereabouts before 7:00 a.m.—severely narrows scope for his

innocence, attracting adverse inference under Section 106

Evidence Act.

21. Learned Amicus Curiae have submitted that in this

case no fault may be found with the judgment of conviction,

however, on the point of sentence their submission is that keeping

in view some of the mitigating circumstances, this Court may

consider modifying the death sentence of the appellant Md. Tahir

and in place special sentence may be awarded. Reliance in this

regard has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Navas @ Mulanavas vs. State of Kerala

reported in (2024) 14 SCC 82 (paragraph ‘77’ to ‘82’). According

to learned Amicus some of the mitigating circumstances pointed

out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navas (supra) is

provided in paragraph ‘79’ are present here such as the age of the

convict and that he is not a professional killer and there is no

material on the record of the trial court to show that there is no

probability of his reformation.
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22. Learned Amicus Curiae has confined her

submissions to the death reference awarded to Md. Tahir.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellants

23. Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the

appellants has submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove

the case beyond all reasonable doubts, the whole case of

prosecution is based on mere presumption that the incident to be a

case of murder without any direct evidence, relying exclusively on

circumstantial evidence, which fails to form a complete unbroken

chain irresistibly pointing to the appellants' guilt, thereby entitling

them to acquittal under the golden principle that circumstantial

evidence must exclude every hypothesis except the guilt of the

accused.

24. Learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the

learned trial court has failed to appreciate the evidences brought by

the prosecution. The prosecution failed to prove as to whether the

deaths in this case are homicidal, suicidal or accidental. The

postmortem reports (Exhibits ‘P1/PW-4’, P2/PW-4 and P3/PW-4)

show no violence on the bodies.

25. It is further submitted that the postmortem reports

categorically state that there were no signs or marks of violence

whatsoever such as struggle marks, or ante-mortem injuries, apart
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from the burn injuries, which strongly suggests accidental burns or

suicide rather than a homicidal assault followed by burning, as

absence of such forcible indicators vitiates the prosecution theory.

Moreover, the house was found locked from the inside at the time

of occurrence with no outsider or third-party presence, making

external intervention impossible and reinforcing the plea of

accidental fire during Shab-e-Barat celebrations or self-inflicted

act, with the appellant's mere custodianship insufficient to bridge

the evidentiary gap in a purely circumstantial case warranting his

discharge.

26. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that

there is absolutely no direct evidence against the appellant Md.

Tahir or Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan Khatoon with the

prosecution case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence which

fails to constitute a complete and unbroken chain unerringly

pointing to his guilt to the exclusion of all other hypotheses,

thereby warranting acquittal.

27. It is further submitted that there exist major

contradictions amongst prosecution witnesses regarding the place

of occurrence, some claiming the incident occurred in the kitchen

while others state inside the house and the manner of occurrence

remains wholly unproved, with no reliable depiction of sequence
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or mechanism, rendering the evidence unreliable, with such

material contradictions vitiate the prosecution version beyond

salvage. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to adduce any

evidence on how the burns were caused, as there was no kerosene

oil recovered or smell thereof detected, nothing was seized from

place of occurrence, negating any homicidal burning theory,

additionally, conflicting witness versions one claiming appellant's

arrest from elsewhere post-incident while others assert his

presence at place of occurrence when the gate was broken, expose

fatal inconsistencies demolishing credibility and entitling appellant

to benefit of doubt in this case.

28. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that

the appellant Md. Tahir had instituted proceedings for restitution

of conjugal rights, and crucially, a day prior to the alleged incident,

the parties had jointly filed a compromise petition before the

Family Court to amicably close the said proceedings, thereby

demonstrating the appellant's genuine presence, commitment, and

reconciliation efforts towards preserving his marriage and family

life, which completely negates any motive for him to commit the

extreme act of murdering his own family members. It is further

submitted that the night preceding the incident was Shab-e-Barat,

during which the widespread use of candles and diyas creates a
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strong possibility of accidental fire outbreak, raising a reasonable

doubt whether the incident was a tragic accident rather than a

deliberate murder. Moreover, the prosecution's own medical

evidence establishes burn injuries as the sole/antecedent cause of

death without any ante-mortem injuries, or other homicidal

indicators, which, coupled with the above circumstances, entitles

the appellant to acquittal or at worst a benefit of doubt under the

principle that where two views are possible, the one favouring the

accused must prevail.

29. Learned counsel further submits that in this case, the

provision of Section 106 of the Evidence Act would not be

attracted. As regards PW-2, on which the learned trial court has

placed reliance, learned counsel submits that he is a co-villager

and has been examined by the Investigating Officer (I.O.) after six

months of the occurrence. He is a wholly unreliable witness. It is

submitted that the I.O. of this case has tried to help the accused

and it would appear from the testimony of the I.O. that he has not

given complete description of the place of occurrence, his

evidence is not even throwing much light on the immediate

circumstances present at the place of occurrence when he reached

there. It is submitted that in this case, the wife (since deceased) of

the appellant Md. Tahir had filed a complaint case in the court of
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learned jurisdiction Magistrate alleging that she was being

subjected to cruelty for the alleged demand of dowry but later on,

the said complaint was abandoned and when no one was appearing

in the complaint case to adduce evidence before cognizance, the

complaint case was disposed of in want of prosecution.

30. It is further submitted that there is suppression of the

earlier version of the prosecution case. The prosecution case must

stand on its own leg and it cannot take benefit of the weaknesses

of the defence.

31. It is lastly submitted that the appellant is a young

man who comes from an economically weaker section and there

are chances of his reformation, therefore, the death sentence

awarded by the learned trial court is not satisfying the principle of

proportionality in sentencing. The learned trial court has not taken

into consideration the mitigating circumstances. His submission is

that in any case, the death sentence awarded to the appellant Md.

Tahir in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 627 of 2025 is not fit to be

confirmed. Reliance has been placed in this regard upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachan

Singh versus State of Punjab reported in (1980) 2 SCC 684.

32. As regards the consequences of the delay in

recording of the statement of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC,
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learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Jagjit Singh @ Jagga vs. State of Punjab

reported in (2005) 3 SCC 689 and Ganesh Bhavan Patel vs.

State of Maharashtra reported in (1978) 4 SCC 371. To

strengthen his submission that Section 106 of the Evidence Act

would not be attracted in this case, learned counsel has relied upon

the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhal

Singh Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2016) 16

SCC 701. Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand

Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116

(paragraph ‘159’) and Ramanand vs. State of U.P. reported in

AIR 2022 SC 5273.

Submissions on behalf of the State

33. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the

State has submitted that the deceased were in the custody of the

appellant at the time when the incident occurred and in the said

incident, three members of the family were burnt alive and lost

their lives, therefore, the accused Md. Tahir has been rightly

awarded the sentence of hanging till death.

34. It is further submitted that the appellants have not

furnished any satisfactory explanation as to the incriminating
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evidence that they were not present at the place of occurrence at

the crucial time and, significantly, they did not inform any person,

neighbour, or the police about the said incident, which is wholly

unnatural conduct and inconsistent with normal human behaviour

in such a grave situation. From this abnormal and incriminating

post-occurrence conduct of the appellants, an adverse inference

can legitimately be drawn under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence

Act, as their subsequent conduct, influenced by the fact in issue, is

a relevant circumstance pointing towards their guilt and

consciousness thereof.

Consideration

35. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants,

learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and learned

Amicus Curiae Ms. Surya Nilambri and Mr. Pratik Mishra who

have assisted this Court, this Court has perused the trial court

records.

36. The prosecution case is based on a written

information submitted by Md. Abdul Matim (PW-9) who is the

brother-in-law of the appellant Md. Tahir. According to the written

information (Exhibit ‘P7/PW-9’), his sister Rina Khatoon aged

about 30 years was married to Md. Tahir aged 35 years about 10

years ago. It is alleged that after the marriage, the husband,
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bhaisur, mother-in-law and gotni were asking the victim Rina

Khatoon to bring a sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs as dowry. They were

beating her and she was being subjected to torture, for this several

times panchayati had taken place. The informant has stated that

the sasural people of his sister assured that now no occurrence

shall take place and they requested the family members of the

informant to do the bidai of the victim Rina Khatoon. It is stated

that on 25.03.2021 at about 8:00 AM, all the aforesaid four persons

together with their other relatives namely Nazbin Khatoon, Md.

Kunia and Md. Ajmer conspired and in furtherance of the said

conspiracy, they locked Rina Khatoon and her two minor

daughters namely Arsi Khatoon aged 7 years and Taniya Khatoon

aged 5 years inside the house and killed all of them.

37. The informant (PW-9) has supported the prosecution

case in course of trial. In paragraph ‘3’ he has stated that his sister

Rina Khatoon had two daughters and at the time of occurrence, she

was carrying a five months pregnancy. The two daughters were

Aayat Praveen @ Arsi aged 8 years and Taniya @ Bilkish aged 5

years.

38. On 25.03.2021, PW-9 got information over mobile

phone that his sister Rina Khatoon and her two children have been

burnt to death by their sasural people and the occurrence has been
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committed by Md. Tahir, Md. Jumrati, Md. Kunia, Hadizan

Khatoon, Mairun Khatoon, Naznin Khatoon and Md. Ajmer. PW-9

has stated that the accused were demanding a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs as

dowry but his family could not provide the said dowry as a result

whereof this occurrence has been committed. This witness has

further informed that prior to the occurrence on 2-3 occasions

panchayati had taken place at the society level and one month

prior to the occurrence, the accused persons had taken away his

sister and her two minor daughters on bidai with an assurance that

henceforth they would not indulge in any beating or quarrel. PW-9

has stated that even after taking away his daughter in bidai, the

accused persons continued to indulge in beating her. In paragraph

‘5’ of his examination-in-chief, he has stated that police had

arrived and had taken his statement and after preparing the inquest

report of his sister and her children, police had taken them for

postmortem.

39. In paragraph ‘6’ of his examination-in-chief, PW-9

has stated that on telephonic information when he reached at the

sasural of his sister, he found that the three dead bodies were lying

on the roof of the house of her sasural and the accused persons

were fleeing away from there but the co-villagers had caught hold

of them and on arrival of police, they were handed over to police.
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One day prior to the occurrence, his sister deceased Rina Khatoon

had given him a phone call and she had disclosed him that all the

seven named accused persons were hatching conspiracy to kill her

and they are questioning as to what her maike people will do. This

witness states that only on the next day in the morning, he got the

information of the occurrence. In his cross-examination, PW-9 has

stated that Hadizan Khatoon, who is mother of Md. Tahir, is aged

about 65 years and in paragraph ‘14’ he has stated that Md. Tahir

and Md. Jumrati were separate in mess and business. Md. Jumrati,

who is another accused in this case, is the brother of Md. Tahir. In

paragraph ‘16’ of his cross-examination, PW-9 has stated that a

demand of Rs. 2 Lakhs was made in dowry but he did not

remember the day and date of the demand, further, he did not

remember that in whose presence and when the demand was made.

His house is at Makhdumpur from where the distance of Labha is

30 kilometres. In paragraph ‘20’ of his deposition, he has stated

that his statement was taken by police on the date of occurrence

itself. He did not remember whether he had stated before police

that one day prior to the occurrence, his sister deceased Rina

Khatoon had told her over telephone that all the seven named

accused persons were conspiring to kill her. He has stated that he

had got written in the application that one day prior to the
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occurrence, his sister deceased Rina Khatoon had told over

telephone that the seven named accused persons were conspiring

to kill her. Md. Israil had read it and he heard the same. He did not

remember the telephone number of his sister from which he had

received the phone call. In paragraph ‘24’, he has stated that he

was knowing all the accused persons from before the occurrence

and save and except the case lodged by his sister against the

accused, there was no other case against them. In paragraph ‘26’,

he has stated that his sister was more beautiful than Md. Tahir but

he denied the suggestion of the defence that because she was more

beautiful, she did not want to live with Md. Tahir and for that

reason, Tahir had to file a case for bidai. In paragraph ‘27’ of his

deposition, this witness has stated that one day prior to the

occurrence, Md. Tahir and Rina had come in the court and Rina

had gone to her sasural by order of the Family Court. The defence

suggested this witness that Rina had committed suicide with her

children and taking advantage of her suicide, the informant had

lodged a false case against the accused persons. This suggestion of

the defence has been denied by the informant (PW-9).

40. In support of the prosecution case, although the

prosecution brought 11 witnesses but Md. Inteyaz @ Patto (PW-1)

was declared hostile after he made a statement that he had no
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information about the occurrence and he had not given any

statement before police. He was suggested by the prosecution that

he had been concealing the truth in collusion with the accused

persons, the witness denied this suggestion.

41. Md. Quddus @ Md.Quddus Alam (PW-2) is an

independent witness of this case. He is a co-villager and works as

a labourer. PW-2 has stated that he was in his house and on hearing

the hulla, he reached the house of Tahir where smokes were

coming out from the roof area. On hulla, the other villagers had

also assembled. This witness has stated that they had asked Tahir

to open the door but he did not open the door. PW-2 has

categorically stated that Tahir was inside his house and he tried to

flee away but they had caught hold of him. They went to the roof

of the house where they saw that the dead body of Rina Khatoon

and her two daughters Ayat and Taniya were burning. All the three

had died. He has stated that the mother of Tahir namely Hadizan

Khatoon had rendered assistance to Tahir in commission of the

alleged crime. At the place of occurrence, except Tahir and his

mother, no one from the family was present. Tahir was on the roof

and his mother was in the house. PW-2 has stated that Tahir had

committed the crime due to non-fulfillment of the demand of

dowry of Rs. 2 Lakhs. This witness has affirmed that for the
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panchayati in the matter, twice panchayat was held but they did

not agree and they were regularly indulging in beating Rina. One

day prior to the occurrence also, a quarrel had taken place. Rina

Khatoon had lodged a case against the demand of dowry.

42. PW-2 identified Tahir and Hadizan Khatoon, who

were present in the court, but he did not identify the other two

accused, namely Md. Jumrati and Md. Ajmer. It is for this reason

he was declared hostile on the point of non-identification of the

two accused persons.

43. In his cross-examination, PW-2 has stated in

paragraph ‘8’ that he was deposing the same facts in the court

which he had stated before Darogaji. The house of Tahir is situated

at a distance of 20–25 feet from his house and there is a road in

between. This witness has given the description of the place of

occurrence in paragraph ‘11’ and has further stated in paragraph

‘12’ that he had gone there after hearing the hulla of the co-

villagers. 30–35 villagers had assembled and were raising hulla as

to why smokes were coming out. He did not know the name of the

co-villagers. This witness has affirmed in paragraph ‘13’ of his

cross-examination that all the persons had reached at the house of

Tahir and he was asked to open the door but he did not open it

whereafter people assembled outside his house and when Tahir
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tried to flee away, he was caught hold of. This witness stated that

Tahir had not demanded any dowry in his presence and he cannot

say that when the dowry case was lodged and who had lodged the

case. He had not gone in the panchayati but had heard about it. As

regards the evidence of PW-2, the learned trial court has while

placing reliance held that this witness has stated about the presence

of Md. Tahir inside the locked house during the fire. He was trying

to flee away from the scene and was restrained by the villagers so,

according to the learned trial court, these facts form a vital link in

the chain of circumstantial evidence.

44. As regards the appellant Hadizan Khatoon, the trial

court disbelieved the defence claim that she was at her maternal

home at the time of occurrence. The learned trial court took a view

that there is no substantial and credible evidence regarding her

absence from the place of occurrence and her arrest from the place

of occurrence also renders her participation in the alleged

occurrence probable. We have noticed that so far as the

participation of Hadizan Khatoon in the alleged killing of her

daughter-in-law and two minor granddaughters are concerned, the

same has been inferred by the learned trial court on the ground that

she was present in the house and was arrested by police from

there. The trial court has in fact said that her arrest from the place
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of occurrence renders her participation in the alleged occurrence

probable. We are of the opinion that the inference drawn by the

learned trial court as regards Hadizan Khatoon may not be taken as

a correct appreciation of the evidence on the record. A probable

participation of Hadizan has to be taken as a proof of guilt against

her in the impugned judgment. So far as the presence of Md. Tahir

inside the house is concerned, it is proved by PW-2, who is an

independent witness, having no enmity or any other reason to

depose against Md. Tahir. The fact that he was examined by the

I.O. at a belated stage would not take away his credibility as the

defence did not question the I.O. on this point at the time of his

deposition.

45. Maitun Nisa (PW-3) is the mother of the deceased

Rina Khatoon who has stated that her daughter went to sasural

where her sasural people were torturing her and they were asking

her to bring a sum of Rs.2 lakhs in dowry. PW-3 has stated that on

three occasions, Panchayat had taken place because of demand of

dowry and panchayat people had convinced the accused persons to

keep her daughter and not to commit torture upon her. She has

stated that when after Panchayat, the accused persons did not agree

then her daughter Rina Khatoon had lodged a case against the

accused persons for the alleged demand of dowry in which the
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accused persons tried to enter into a compromise and then they

took away her daughter after convincing her that now this kind of

occurrence will not take place again. They made PW-3 to believe

and do the bidae of her daughter whereafter PW-3 became assured

and did the bidae of her daughter with sasural people. In paragraph

‘7’ of her examination-in-chief, PW-3 has stated that the sasural

people of her daughter asked her daughter to take back the case

which could not be taken back during lockdown period. She has

stated that the accused persons were torturing her daughter and her

daughter had given a phone call to the son of PW-3 and had told

him that accused persons were brutally beating her. In her cross-

examination, she has stated in paragraph ‘11’ that her samdhan

Hadizan Khatoon is old aged and she must be more than 80 years

old. Her daughter stayed well in her sasural for about two years

after her marriage but thereafter she never stayed well. During this

period, she had given birth to two daughters. This witness has

stated that the accused persons were demanding dowry for two

years before the occurrence, they had not demanded dowry for

eight years. She has stated that the accused persons were asking

for dowry from her daughter.

46. The learned trial court has dealt with the evidence of

PW-3 and has taken a view that a potential motive for the crime is
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reflecting in the testimony of PW-3. The learned trial court has

found that PW-3 has described prolonged history of dowry related

harassment by both Md. Tahir and Hadizan Khatoon. The learned

trial court, however, found that this evidence was insufficient to

sustain a conviction under Section 498A of the IPC or Section 3/4

of the Dowry Prohibition Act due to lack of direct proof of a recent

demand but the learned trial court took a view that it provides

relevant context for the strained and bad relation between the

deceased and her marital family. The learned trial court held that

this history cannot be ignored while assessing motive for

commission of crime. We agree with the views expressed by the

learned trial court that even as the evidence of PW-3 alone may not

be proving a recent demand of dowry which is an essential

condition to prove the charge under Section 498A or Section 3/4 of

the Dowry Prohibition Act, the bad matrimonial relationship

between the deceased and her husband is evident from the

undisputed materials on the record in form of the certified copies

of the orders passed in Matrimonial Case No. 43 of 2020 (Exhibit

‘P/11’, Exhibit ‘P/12’ and Exhibit ‘P/13’) as also from the certified

copy of the order dated 15.03.2022 passed in Complaint Case No.

505 of 2020 (Exhibit ‘P/14’) and certified copy of complaint

petition of Case No. 505 of 2020 (Exhibit ‘P/15’). The
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matrimonial discord between the appellant Md. Tahir and Rina

Khatoon is evident from the materials available on the record.

47. Dr. Shailendra Mohan Thakur (PW-4), Dr. Amrendra

Kumar (PW-5) and Dr. Dayanand Rai (PW-6) are the Medical

Officers of the Sadar Hospital, Katihar. PW-4 and PW-5 were the

observers of the post-mortem report which was prepared by Dr.

Dayanand Rai (PW-6) who had conducted the post-mortem on the

dead bodies of Rina Khatoon and the two minor daughters. The

post-mortem report of the deceased Rina Khatoon and her two

minor daughters have been marked Exhibit ‘P1/PW-4’ and

‘P1(1)/PW-4’, P2/PW-4 and P2(1)/PW-4 and P3/PW-4 and

P3(1)/PW-4 respectively. All the three post-mortem reports have

been duly proved by PW-4. PW-5 and PW-6 have admitted their

signature on these exhibits as members of the Medical Board.

48. PW-6 has deposed that in course of postmortem, he

noticed the following external postmortem appearances:-

PM report of Deceased Reena Khatoon
“Rigor mortis was present in all four limbs. Tongue
was protruded. Burn ulcers spread over about 96% of
the body surface area with singeing of hairs and
peeling of skin was found.
Dissection of head – Meninges and brain was
congested
Dissection of neck – Wind pipe was normally placed
and intact. Thyroid, hyoid and cricoid bones were
intact.
Dissection of Thorax – Both lungs were congested and
intact. Heart-intact and right side full and left side
empty.
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Dissection of abdomen – Stomach contains about 150
ml of mucoid fluid with nonspecific smell. Other
abdominal viscerae intact and congested. Uterus –
small and empty. External genitalia – Within normal
limits.”

P.M. report of Deceased Ayarat

“Rigor mortis was present in all four limbs. Tongue
was protruded. Burn ulcers were found spread over
about 92% of the body surface area with singeing of
hairs and peeling of skin.
Dissection of head – Meninges and brain were
congested
Dissection of neck – Wind pipe was normally placed
and intact. Thyroid, hyoid and cricoid bones were
intact.
Dissection of Thorax – Both lungs were congested and
intact. Heart-intact and right side full and left side
empty.
Dissection of abdomen – Stomach contains about 100
ml of mucoid fluid with nonspecific smell. Other
abdominal viscerae intact and congested. Uterus –
small and empty. External genitalia – Within normal
limits.”

P.M. report of Deceased Bilkis khatoon
“Rigor mortis was present in all four limbs. Tongue
was protruded. Burn ulcers were found spread over
about 94% of the body surface area with singeing of
hairs and peeling of skin.
Dissection of head – Meninges and brain were
congested.
Dissection of neck – Wind pipe was normally placed
and intact. Thyroid, hyoid and cricoid bones were
intact.
Dissection of Thorax – Both lungs were congested and
intact. Heart-intact and right side full and left side
empty.
Dissection of abdomen – Stomach contains about 50
ml of mucoid fluid with nonspecific smell. Other
abdominal viscerae intact and congested. Uterus –
small and empty. External genitalia – Within normal
limits."
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49. In his cross-examination, PW-6 has stated that he

found the wind pipe normally placed and intact. The thyroid, hyoid

and cricoid bones were intact. Both lungs were congested and

intact. Other abdominal visceras were intact and congested. The

external genitalia were within normal limits. All the organs were

affected by the heat of the fire but these internal organs were not

burnt. He denied the defence suggestion that the postmortem

reports are defective and not in accordance with the ethics of

medical jurisprudence.

50. Ekhlaqur Rahman (PW-7) is one of the witnesses to

the inquest report. He has stated to have signed on the inquest

report. He knew Rina Khatoon, who along with her two children

were burnt to death. He is resident of a place situated at a distance

of 30 kilometers from the place where the inquest report was

prepared.

51. The other witness of the inquest report is Md. Afsar

(PW-8), who also knew Rina Khatoon and her daughters. He had

also put his signature on the inquest report as a witness. He

happened to be a resident of a place situated at a distance of 15

kilometers from the place where the inquest report was prepared.

He has stated that the place where he had put his signature, there

are houses of 100-50 people.
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52. The evidence of the I.O. Prem Kumar Bharti (PW-

10) would show that he had received information from the

villagers on 25.03.2021, at 8:40 AM, that Md. Tahir had burnt his

wife and two children. On that information, he had recorded a

sanha being Diary No. 515/2021 dated 25.03.2021 and reached the

residential house of Md. Tahir, where hundreds of people had

assembled. PW-10 has stated that when he reached on the roof of

the house, then just in front of the stairs on the roof as per the map

which he had prepared, he found the dead bodies in burnt

condition. There was a room made of asbestos on the roof adjacent

to the stairs and the local people had poured water to put out the

fire. He had not found any sign of running of the deceased on the

roof. At the same and one place, the dead bodies seemed to have

burnt. He has proved the original photo of the deceased, taken at

the place of occurrence, which were present in the case diary, with

the objection of the defence, those have been marked ‘X’, ‘X/1’,

and ‘X/2’, respectively.

53. PW-10 had also proved the three inquest reports

which were prepared in presence of the relatives of Rina Khatoon.

At the instance of PW-10, the inquest reports have been marked

Exhibit ‘P/4’, Exhibit ‘P/5’ and Exhibit ‘P/6’, respectively. He had

sent the dead bodies for postmortem through the Chowkidar. He
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has given the description of the place of occurrence in paragraph

‘4’ of his deposition. On that day, he had recorded the statement of

Maitun Khatoon, who had supported the prosecution case. On the

same day, he arrested Md. Tahir, Hadizan Khatoon and Md. Ajmer

and they were brought to the outpost. On 26.03.2021, he had

recorded the confessional statement of Md. Tahir and the defence

version of Hadizan Khatoon and Md. Ajmer. On 27.03.2021, he

had recorded the statement of the witnesses, namely Saddam

Hussain, Md. Mahbub and Md. Paddo, who had supported the

prosecution case in its entirety. On 06.04.2021, he recorded the

statement of the witness, Md. Quddus (PW-2) who had supported

the prosecution case.

54. In his cross-examination, the I.O. (PW-10) has stated

in paragraph ‘22’ that near the dead bodies, he did not notice any

smell of kerosene oil or petrol. Water had fallen there, which is

mentioned in the case diary. He had not seized any burnt article

from the place of occurrence. In paragraph ‘24’, he has stated that

the witnesses have made statements regarding panchayati between

Md. Tahir and his wife, however, he had not done any

investigation with respect to the day, date and place of panchayati

and had not recorded statement of any witness as a panch. He had

not gathered any information from the Family Court with respect
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to the matrimonial dispute going on between Md. Tahir and his

wife. In paragraph ‘26’, he has stated that wife of Md. Tahir was

staying in her sasural and one day before the occurrence, she had

come from the Family Court, Katihar. In paragraph ‘27’, he has

stated that he had arrested Md. Tahir and Hadizan Khatoon from a

school situated in the village and not from their house. No article

used in the occurrence was recovered from the possession of the

accused. PW-10 was suggested by the defence that his

investigation was defective and he had wrongly submitted the

charge-sheet against the accused persons.

55. Md. Tayab (PW-11) took a stand that he did not

know anything about the occurrence, therefore he has been

declared hostile by the prosecution and has been cross-examined.

His attention was drawn towards his previous statements made

before police and he was suggested that he was deposing in

collusion with the accused persons.

The Defence Witnesses

56. Mohsin (DW-1) has stated that the occurrence is of

7:30-8:00 AM. He was going from his house to the shop when he

heard hulla that fire had broken out in the house of Md. Tahir. He

along with other persons ran and went there to the house of Md.

Tahir, they found smokes were coming out of the house and when
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they tried to enter inside the house, then they found that the door

was locked with kundi from inside then some persons entered into

the house with the help of stairs from the backside. This witness

has stated that he and some other persons broke open the door and

entered to find that wife and two daughters of Md. Tahir were in

burnt condition. The family members such as mother, brother and

others of Md. Tahir were not there. This witness has stated that

Md. Tahir had gone to his fruit shop in the morning at 5:00 AM at

Labha Chowk and Hadizan Khatoon, aged about 70 years, was in

her maike at the time of occurrence. DW-1 has stated that the day

of occurrence was the day of Shab-e-Barat, which they celebrate

as a festival by burning candles and crackers. In paragraph ‘7’, he

has stated that villagers informed Md. Tahir and Md. Jumrati then

they came after one and half hour of the occurrence.

57. In his cross-examination, DW-1 has stated that he

had no relationship with Md. Tahir. He is neighbour of Md. Tahir

and a villager. He did not know that litigations were going on

between Md. Tahir and his wife prior to occurrence. In paragraph

‘14’ of his deposition, this witness has stated that the place of

occurrence is the kitchen room where jalawans were kept. All the

jalawans were burnt and the house was also burnt. He did not

know how the fire caught. In paragraph ‘16’ of his deposition, this
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witness has stated that police had arrived but he had not informed

police regarding the occurrence of fire and death of the deceased.

He could not say that whose statements were recorded by the

police at the place of occurrence. He could not say that what were

seized by police from the place of occurrence. When he reached

the place of occurrence, he found that all the three deceased were

lying dead by burning. In paragraph ‘23’, he has stated that he was

brought for deposition by Md. Jumrati, who is an accused in this

case. This witness was suggested that he is friend of Md. Tahir and

related to his family, therefore to save the accused persons, he had

come to the court and falsely deposed. This witness denied the

suggestion.

58. Md. Anwar (DW-2) is another co-villager who has

stated that Md. Tahir used to leave his house in the morning at

5:00–6:00 AM for his fruit shop at Labha Chowk. His shop is also

there. The maika of Hadizan Khatoon is in the village itself. Tahir

had raised hulla at the shop that fire has broken out in his house

and on that information, this witness had reached the house of

Tahir within 5–10 minutes. On reaching there, he came to know

that the gate was closed from inside because there was no male

member in the house. In paragraph ‘13’ of his cross-examination,

this witness has stated that he had not gone to the place of
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occurrence, therefore he cannot say that how the occurrence had

taken place. In paragraph ‘14’, he has admitted to have knowledge

that case was going on between Tahir and his wife but he could not

say that for what the case was going on. He did not know that

Tahir had brought his wife and children on the basis of a

compromise in the Family Court. This witness admitted that he

had come to depose in the court on his own and he had not

received any summon from the court. In paragraph ‘17’, he has

stated that he had never gone to the house of Md. Tahir, Md.

Jumrati and Hadizan and he cannot say as to when and which

occurrence had taken place in the house of Md. Tahir.

59. On going through the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2,

this Court finds that while in his examination-in-chief, DW-1

claimed that he had entered into the house of Md. Tahir after

breaking open the door and found the dead bodies of his wife and

two daughters in burnt condition and that Md. Tahir had gone to

his shop in the morning at 5:00 AM, in his cross-examination, this

witness has stated that police had come but he had not informed

police regarding the occurrence, regarding the fire and regarding

the deceased. He could not say that whose statements were

recorded by police and what were seized by police. DW-1 was

brought for deposition by one of the accused. He is not a reliable
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witness and it is evident that he went to depose for the first time in

court at the instance of one of the accused. Similarly, DW-2 is not

a reliable witness as he has himself stated in paragraph ‘13’ of his

deposition that he had not gone to the place of occurrence. His

statement in the examination-in-chief that Tahir had raised hulla

that fire had broken out whereafter within 5–10 minutes he

reached the house of Tahir gets falsified from his own statement in

paragraph ‘13’. This witness had also come for the first time on his

own to depose in course of trial. He has reiterated in paragraph

‘17’ of his deposition that he had never gone to the house of the

accused and he could not say that when and what had happened in

the house of Tahir.

60. Md. Mustafa (DW-3) has stated that on the date of

occurrence he was in his house when smokes came out of the

house of Tahir then he reached the house of Tahir where a large

number of villagers had assembled. He found that the door was

closed from inside then the villagers went on the roof and found

that the wife and children of Tahir were lying in burnt condition.

He has stated that the place where the wife and children of Tahir

were lying burnt, there was his kitchen in which jalawan, cartons

were kept there which had burnt. The bamboos of the house were

also burnt. He was not aware as to why the house was closed from
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inside. He came to know that Tahir had gone to his shop in the

morning and mother of Tahir had gone to her maika. He did not

know whether family members of Tahir were asking for dowry.

This witness has stated that relationship between Md. Tahir and his

wife was good.

61. In paragraph ‘9’ of his deposition, DW-3 has stated

that when he reached the house of Tahir, his wife and children

were lying in dead condition and their dead bodies were covered

with cloth. He has stated that he had not seen Tahir or any other

member of his family at the place of occurrence and he was not

aware that where they had gone. From this part of his deposition

that he was not aware that where they had gone, this witness has in

fact falsified his own statement in the examination-in-chief that he

came to know that Tahir had left in the morning itself for his shop.

This witness has mostly shown his unawareness with regard to the

occurrence. In paragraph ‘14’ of his deposition, he has stated that

when he reached the place of occurrence, police had not arrived

but he was present at the place of occurrence till the police arrived.

His statement was not recorded by police and he had also not tried

to make statement before police. He has stated that he had not

received any notice from the court for deposition and he had come

on his own to depose. He has admitted that he was selling
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vegetable and Jumrati who is one of the accused and brother of

Md. Tahir, was also engaged in the business of vegetable. The

defence suggested that he was friend of Jumrati, so he had come to

save the accused persons.

62. Md. Ashique (DW-4) is a fruit seller near the Labha

station. He has only deposed with respect to his presence with one

of the accused, Ajmer, for the whole previous night of 25.03.2021.

This witness has not stated in his examination-in-chief with regard

to Md. Tahir or Hadizan. He is a resident of a village at a distance

of 30-32 kilometers and he has stated in paragraph ‘5’ of his

deposition that he had come to depose on behalf of Ajmer as he

and Ajmer have their shops adjacent to each other. In paragraph ‘9’

of his deposition, this witness has stated that the occurrence had

taken place in the house of Tahir but he cannot say the colour and

as to how many rooms are there in his house. He has stated that he

had reached the place of occurrence after the occurrence but he

cannot say that how many persons had died in the said occurrence.

He had not seen the dead bodies as he had not entered inside the

house.

63. From the deposition of DW-4, it is evident that he

has come to depose to save Ajmer, about whom he has stated in

paragraph ‘16’ of his deposition that he happened to be his brother-
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in-law. This witness has rather stated in paragraph ‘9’ that the

occurrence has taken place in the house of Tahir. To this Court, it

appears that the evidence of DW-3 and DW-4 are not creating any

dent in the prosecution story with regard to the presence of Md.

Tahir. The statement of DW-1 that villagers had informed Md.

Tahir about the occurrence then he reached after 1 – 1½ hour of

the occurrence would go to show that it was not a natural conduct

of Md. Tahir. The another defence witness has stated that he

reached within 5–10 minutes to the house of Md. Tahir but DW-1

says that Md. Tahir reached after 1 – 1½ hour. This creates doubt

over the defence version.

64. The defence witnesses, though claimed that Md.

Tahir used to leave his house for his fruit shop in the morning at

5:00-6:00 AM but when Md. Tahir came to record his statement

under Section 313 CrPC and his attention was drawn towards the

evidence that he had killed his wife and two daughters by burning

them in the room on the date, time and place of the occurrence, he

did not say that he was not present at the place of occurrence and

that he had already left the house and had gone to the fruit shop.

No explanation at all has been offered by Md. Tahir in his

statement under Section 313 CrPC.
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65. We also find from the pattern of cross-examination

of the prosecution witnesses that when PW-2 was cross-examined

by the defence on behalf of Md. Tahir, he was only suggested by

the defence that he had deposed against Md. Tahir because of

neighbourhood enmity. The defence did not suggest to either PW-9

or PW-10 that Md. Tahir was at his fruit shop at the time of

occurrence.

66. In the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of

Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court while dealing with a case based on circumstantial

evidence observed in paragraph ‘15’ as under:

“15. Where an offence like murder is committed in
secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish
the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution,
but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it
to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree
as is required in other cases of circumstantial
evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively
lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the
Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden
on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The
inmates of the house cannot get away by simply
keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the
supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty
at all on an accused to offer any explanation.”

67. In the case of Ganeshlal vs. State of Maharashtra

reported in (1992) 3 SCC 106, the appellant was being prosecuted

for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. The
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Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when the death had

occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give

a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement

under Section 313 CrPC. The mere denial of the prosecution case

coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be

inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with

the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the

commission of murder of his wife.

68. In State of U.P. vs. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal

reported in (1992) 3 SCC 300, the medical evidence disclosed that

the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early

morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene.

The defence of the husband was that the wife had committed

suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time.

The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the

husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further

the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the

night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete

and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by

strangulation and accordingly the Hon’ble Supreme Court reversed

the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and

convicted him under Section 302 IPC.
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69. In case of Babu @ Balasubramaniam and Anr. vs.

State of T.N. reported in (2013) 8 SCC 60, their Lordships

reiterated that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not

applicable in India. Even if evidence of a prosecution witness is

disbelieved, entire prosecution case cannot be discarded but can

still be proved on basis of other reliable evidence. In paragraph

‘21’ of its judgment, their Lordships held that it is for the husband

to explain how the death occurred. In a case where death occurred

inside the house where the deceased resides with her husband,

presence of the accused at 6:00 AM in the house would be natural.

It was not contended by the accused that he was not present in the

house when the incident occurred as has been found in the present

case. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:

“21. …. To this fact situation, Section 106 of the
Evidence Act is attracted. As to how the deceased
received injuries to her head and how she died must
be within the exclusive personal knowledge of A-1
Babu. It was for him to explain how the death
occurred. He has not given any plausible
explanation for the death of the deceased in such
suspicious circumstances in the house in which he
resided with her and when he was admittedly
present in the house at the material time. This
circumstance must be kept in mind while dealing
with this case. We are mindful of the fact that this
would not relieve the prosecution of its burden of
proving its case. But, it would apply to cases where
the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn
regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless
the accused by virtue of his special knowledge
regarding such facts, has offered an explanation
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which might drive the court to draw a different
inference. …”

70. In the case of State of A.P. vs. Gangula Satya

Murthy reported in (1997) 1 SCC 272, while dealing with the

case of circumstantial evidence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

in paragraph ‘21’ as under:

“21. The fact that the body of Satya Vani was found
on the cot inside the house of the respondent is a
very telling circumstance against him. The
respondent owed a duty to explain as to how a dead
body which was resultant of a homicide happened
to be in his house. In the absence of any such
explanation from him the implication of the said
circumstance is definitely adverse to the
respondent.”
71. Keeping in view the aforementioned judicial

pronouncements on the subject, when we examine the evidences

available on the record, it is found that in this case PW-2 is an

independent witness who resides at a distance of 20-25 feet from

the house of Tahir. His presence at the place of occurrence is

therefore natural. He had gone to the place of occurrence after

hearing hulla from the villagers who were saying as to why the

smokes were coming out from the house of Md. Tahir. He has

stated that Tahir was asked to open the door but he did not open.

There is a specific statement that Tahir was inside the house and

had tried to escape but he was caught. This witness has stated that

at the place of occurrence Tahir and his mother were present but

no one else from his family was there. This witness has also stated
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that Tahir had demanded a sum of Rs. 2 Lakhs in dowry and for

this twice panchayati had taken place but he was not agreeing and

was regularly assaulting Rina. Rina had filed a case also. His

statement was recorded by police.

72. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the

police had recorded statement of this witness after ten days,

therefore he cannot be taken as a wholly reliable witness. In this

regard, learned counsel relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Jagjit Singh (supra). We have gone

through the said judgment and find that the said judgment is not

laying down an absolute rule that some delay in recording of

statement of a witness in course of investigation would ipso facto

lead to disbelieve the testimony of that witness. A reading of

paragraph ‘29’ and ‘30’ of the judgment would show that in the

said case the conviction of the appellant depended solely on the

testimony of PW-6 Billo, who was a child aged about only seven

years at the time of occurrence. In course of investigation, she had

not claimed to have known the appellant since he was the son of

Amar Singh at whose tubewell her grandparents were residing. In

fact, in her earlier statements, Amar Singh’s name had not been

mentioned at all. In course of her deposition, after five years of the

occurrence, PW-6 had tried to furnish an explanation that the
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appellant happened to be the son of Amar Singh, who was the

owner of the tubewell where her maternal grandparents were

residing, she knew the appellant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court

found that her statement was recorded by the I.O. for the first time

three days after the occurrence and her statement was recorded by

the Judicial Magistrate six days after the occurrence. It was

contended by the appellant that this period was utilised by the

prosecution for tutoring the witness and therefore the delay of

three days in her examination under Section 161 CrPC was

significant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the facts of the

said case that the delay in examining her in course of occurrence

created a serious doubt in the absence of any explanation for her

late examination after three days, when admittedly she was the

sole eyewitness who was also injured in the course of occurrence.

73. The present case is based on circumstantial

evidence. We find that in the present case, when PW-2 came to

depose, the defence did not question the delay of ten days in

recording of his statement by the I.O. The defence did not bring

any material to show that PW-2 was an inimical witness, though a

suggestion was made that he was making false statement due to

neighbourhood enmity, but no material even by way of prima facie
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suggestions have been pointed out by the defence to show that

there was an enmity between PW-2 and Md. Tahir.

74. This Court further finds that apart from the evidence

of PW-2, there are other circumstantial evidences present on the

record. The I.O. (PW-10) has given the description of the place of

occurrence in his deposition which is the house of the deceased.

We find that there are some latches on the part of the Investigating

Officer, which is evident from the fact that he did not seize the

burnt articles from the place of occurrence and has stated that he

had arrested Md. Tahir and Hadizan Khatoon not from their house

but from the school situated in the village but the minor

discrepancies in the deposition of the I.O. (PW-10) would not

prove fatal to the prosecution case. The inquest reports of all the

deceased have been prepared on the roof of the house of Md. Tahir

in the presence of the inquest report witnesses who were known to

the deceased and had arrived at the place of occurrence. The

postmortem report of the deceased would show that they had died

due to hypovolemic shock as a result of the burnt injuries.

75. The evidences available on the record would not

allow us to take a different view as regards the guilt of the

appellant Md. Tahir in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 627 of 2025.
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76. As regards appellant Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan

Khatoon in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 639 of 2025, this Court

finds that even as PW-2 has stated about her presence inside the

house, in her statement under Section 313 CrPC, she has stated

that she was not present in the house at the time of occurrence and

that she was in her maike. One of the defence witnesses (DW-2)

has stated that her maike is in the same village. We find from the

evidence of the mother of the victim Rina, who has deposed as

PW-3, that this appellant Hadizan was more than 80 years old as

per her estimate. It has also come in evidence that Md. Tahir was

separate in mess and business with his brothers, namely Jumrati

and Md. Ajmer. Taking together the entire circumstances, we have

a doubt that this appellant would have been in a position to render

any kind of assistance to Md. Tahir in killing of his wife and two

minor daughters. It seems highly improbable that Hadizan

Khatoon, being grandmother, would have assisted Md. Tahir in

killing of her daughter-in-law as well as two minor grandchildren.

Unlike Md. Tahir, she has taken a plea in her statement under

Section 313 CrPC that she was not present in the house and the

I.O. has also said that he had arrested her from the school. To this

Court, therefore, it appears that this appellant has made out a case

for interference with respect to her conviction. Accordingly,
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Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 639 of 2025 is allowed. The judgment

of conviction dated 15.04.2025 and the order of sentence dated

19.04.2025 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Katihar in Sessions

Trial No. 132 of 2022, G.R. No. 1143 of 2021 arising out of

Pranpur (Roshna) P.S. Case No. 51 of 2021 in respect of appellant

Hadizan Khatoon @ Hadisan Khatoon is set aside and she is

acquitted of the charges giving her benefit of doubt. She shall be

released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.

77. We are aware that in this case charges were framed

under Sections 302/34, 201/34, 302/120B, 498A/34 of the IPC and

3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The appellants have been

acquitted of the charges under Sections 302/120B, 498A/34 IPC

and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act but have been

convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302/34 and

201/34 IPC. In the light of the discussions hereinabove, we are of

the considered opinion that the appellant Md. Tahir is guilty of

committing the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201

IPC. It is well settled that Section 34 IPC does not create a distinct

offence at all. In the case of Begu and Ors. vs. King Emperor

reported in 1925 Privy Council 130, the Hon'ble Privy Council

has dealt with this aspect of the matter. A detail discussion on this

may be found in the judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High
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Court in the case of Om Prakash vs. State reported in AIR 1956

Allahabad 241. It has been held as under:-

"Strictly speaking when a person is charged with a
substantive offence following the provisions of S.
34, I.P.C., the ingredients of the substantive offence
remain the same. The only difference is that instead
of a single person A having committed an offence,
the charge states that a number of other persons say
B and C also joined A in the commission of the same
offence with a common intention.
In such a situation, S. 34, I.P.C., lays down a special
principle of criminal liability and says that where a
number of persons join together in committing the
same offence with a common intention, each of them
becomes liable to an enhanced penalty which is
attachable in law to the result of the joint acts of all.
Where the case under S. 34, I.P.C., fails and the
prosecution is able to establish its case only against a
single offender, the prosecution cannot be said to
have failed to prove the ingredients of the offence,
but all that it can be said to have failed to prove is
the fact that some persons who are also alleged to
have joined the accused with a common intention
are not proved to have done so.
The effect, therefore, of mentioning S. 34, I.P.C., is
that the prosecution takes upon itself the
responsibility of proving some additional facts with
a view to make the accused liable for an enhanced
punishment. If, therefore, the charge in respect of S.
34, I.P.C., fails because the prosecution is unable to
prove those additional facts or particulars, there
should be no reason why the conviction of the
accused for the substantive offence should not be
recorded where the prosecution has been able to
prove all the facts needed to support the conviction
of a single individual for the substantive offence."

On the point of Sentence

78. The learned trial court has held in paragraph ‘3’ of

its order of sentence that the manner in which the offence has been
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committed with extreme brutality, this case would fall in the

category of “rarest of the rare” cases. Having found Md. Tahir

guilty of brutally murdering his wife and two minor daughters, the

learned trial court held that there is no mitigating circumstance

sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors present in the case.

Hence, according to the learned trial court, he deserves nothing

less than maximum penalty prescribed by law. Accordingly, Md.

Tahir has been ordered to undergo sentence to death and fine to the

tune of Rs. 50,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 302

IPC, subject to confirmation by the High Court as per Section 366

CrPC. In default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo

simple imprisonment for six months. He has been sentenced to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence

punishable under Section 201 of the IPC and fine to the tune of Rs.

50,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he shall further undergo

simple imprisonment for six months. He shall be hanged by neck

till his death. Both sentences shall run concurrently.

79. The learned trial court has discussed the judgments

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bachan Singh

(supra), wherein the Hon’ble Constitution Bench of the Supreme

Court of India held that capital punishment should be awarded

only in the rarest of the rare cases, when the alternative option of
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life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed. The Hon’ble

Supreme Court laid down that courts must balance aggravating

and mitigating circumstances relating to the crime and the

criminal.

80. In the case of Machhi Singh and Ors. vs. State of

Punjab reported in (1983) 3 SCC 470, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court provided a guideline whereunder (a) manner of commission

of murder, (b) motive, (c) anti-social or socially abhorrent nature

of the crime, (d) magnitude of the crime and (e) personality of

victim and status are required to be taken into consideration.

81. Learned Amicus Curiae has placed before this Court

a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Navas

@ Mulanavas (supra). This was a case based on circumstantial

evidence relating to killing of four persons at a place where the

appellant alone was the other person present. No explanation was

offered by the accused. He failed to discharge the burden put on

him under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The

motive shown was previous illicit relationship of accused with the

wife of the person ‘R’, the incident occurred when the wife of ‘R’

tried to distance herself from the accused. It resulted in killing of

the ‘R’, his wife, daughter and mother.
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82. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the

previous case laws on the subject, including the landmark

judgments in the case of Bachan Singh (supra) and Machhi

Singh (supra). It has been noted that the High Court had noticed

the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Swamy

Shraddananda (2) vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2008) 13

SCC 767 and held that to avoid a sentence to death, it is possible

for the courts to devise a graver form of sentence of imprisonment

for life beyond 14 years which would ensure that the society is

insulated from the criminal for such period as the court may

specify, including if the facts warranted, the entire rest of his life.

In paragraph ‘41’ to ‘47’ of the judgment in case of Navas @

Mulanavas (supra) would be important to take note of hereunder,

which we reproduce for a ready reference:-

“41. Thereafter, the High Court dealt with the
precedents laid down by this Court in Bachan Singh
v. State of Punjab11, Machhi Singh v. State of
Punjab12 to examine whether the litmus test, namely,
that the alternative option being unquestionably
foreclosed was fulfilled or not. Thereafter, the High
Court noticed the judgment of this Court in Swamy
Shraddananda10 and the holding thereon that to
avoid a sentence of death, it is possible for the
courts to devise a graver form of sentence of
imprisonment for life beyond fourteen

11. (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580
12. (1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 681
10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
113
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years which would ensure that the society is
insulated from the criminal for such period as the
Court may specify, including if the facts warranted,
the entire rest of his life.
42. Thereafter applying Swamy Shraddananda10, the
High Court observed as follows: (Navas case1, SCC
OnLine Ker paras 54 & 59)
“54. A question still remains whether the instant
case is one in which the graver alternatives of a
life sentence are also unquestionably foreclosed.
We have rendered our anxious consideration to
all the relevant inputs. We are unable to agree
that all the options now available can be said to
be unquestionably foreclosed in the given
circumstances. In every case of death sentence,
the court must consider the purpose of the
sentence. The theory of reformation will have no
place whatsoever in a case of imposition of
death sentence. In a case like the instant one, the
consideration of compensation/restoration
cannot also have any place, as all the members
of the family have been liquidated by the
conduct of the accused. The purpose of a death
sentence — of eliminating the menace to the
society in the form of a hardened criminal and to
save society from the activities of such criminal
may not also have much role, given the
alternative option of a life sentence which will
ensure that the accused does not come into
contact with the society thereafter. …
* * *
59. Let it not be assumed that this court does not
perceive the instant one to be a serious and
dastardly crime. We, to say the least, are
convinced that the offence committed calls for
societal abhorrence and disapproval. But, the
totality of circumstances instill in us the
satisfaction that this is not a case where the
range of further options available to the court
after Swamy Shraddananda10 are unquestionably

10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
1. State of Kerala v. Navas, 2010 SCC OnLine Ker 5224
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foreclosed. Placing fetter on the powers of the
Executive under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC for
a prescribed period (and with due caution
administered that the powers under Article 72
and Article 161 should not be lightly invoked to
get over the prescription of such period fixed by
this Court) a sentence of imprisonment for life
which shall ensure that the offender does not get
exposed to society for a period of 30 years can
be imposed. We are not prescribing the “entire
rest of the life” as the period, as fixed by their
Lordships in Swamy Shraddananda10,
considering the totality of circumstances and
because of the optimistic faith in the infinite
capacity of the human soul to repent and
reform.”
Holding so, the High Court modified the sentence of
death to that of imprisonment for life with the
further direction that the accused shall not be
released from prison for a period of 30 (thirty) years
including the period already undergone with set-off
under Section 428 CrPC alone.
43. The State is not in appeal, having accepted the
verdict of the High Court. It is only the appellant
who is in appeal. It is his submission that the
imposition of 30 (thirty) years' sentence without
remission is excessive and the counsel urges that a
suitable lesser sentence be imposed under the
Swamy Shraddananda10 principle. This is the
alternative submission advanced.
44. Swamy Shraddananda10, since affirmed
subsequently in Union of India v. V. Sriharan13,
resolved a Judge's dilemma. Often it happens that a
case that falls short of the rarest of the rare category
may also be one where a mere sentence of 14 years
(the normal benchmark for life imprisonment) may
be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. The
Court may find that while death penalty may not be
warranted keeping in mind the overall
circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to
fix the period between 14 years and for the
imprisonment till rest of the life without remission.

10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
13. (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695
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Addressing this issue felicitously in Swamy
Shraddananda10 Aftab Alam, J. speaking for the
Court, held as follows: (Swamy Shraddananda
case10, SCC pp. 804-805, para 92)
“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly
different angle. The issue of sentencing has two
aspects. A sentence may be excessive and
unduly harsh or it may be highly
disproportionately inadequate. When an
appellant comes to this Court carrying a death
sentence awarded by the trial court and
confirmed by the High Court, this Court may
find, as in the present appeal, that the case just
falls short of the rarest of the rare category and
may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the
death sentence. But at the same time, having
regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may
strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment
subject to remission normally works out to a
term of 14 years would be grossly
disproportionate and inadequate. What then
should the Court do? If the Court's option is
limited only to two punishments, one a sentence
of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of
not more than 14 years and the other death, the
Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged
into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course
would indeed be disastrous. A far more just,
reasonable and proper course would be to
expand the options and to take over what, as a
matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e.
the vast hiatus between 14 years' imprisonment
and death. It needs to be emphasised that the
Court would take recourse to the expanded
option primarily because in the facts of the case,
the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would
amount to no punishment at all.”
(emphasis supplied)
45. In V. Sriharan13, a Constitution Bench of this
Court affirmed the principle laid down in Swamy
Shraddananda10. It first affirmed the principle that
imprisonment for life meant imprisonment for rest
of the life, subject however, to the right to claim
10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
13. Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695
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remission, as provided in the Constitution and the
statutes. It was further held that the judgment in
Swamy Shraddananda10 did not violate any statutory
prescription. The Court went on to observe that all
that Swamy Shraddananda10 sought to declare was
that within the prescribed limit of the punishment of
life imprisonment, having regard to the nature of
offence committed by imposing life imprisonment
for a specified period would be proportionate to the
crime as well as the interest of the victim.
46. Thereafter, in the same judgment Ibrahim
Kalifulla, J., in a passage which repays study held
as under: (V. Sriharan case13, SCC p. 100, para 98)
“98. While that be so, it cannot also be lost sight
of that it will be next to impossible for even the
lawmakers to think of or prescribe in exactitude
all kinds of such criminal conduct to fit into any
appropriate pigeonhole for structured
punishments to run in between the minimum and
maximum period of imprisonment. Therefore,
the lawmakers thought it fit to prescribe the
minimum and the maximum sentence to be
imposed for such diabolic nature of crimes and
leave it for the adjudication authorities, namely,
the Institution of Judiciary which is fully and
appropriately equipped with the necessary
knowledge of law, experience, talent and
infrastructure to study the detailed parts of each
such case based on the legally acceptable
material evidence, apply the legal principles and
the law on the subject, apart from the guidance it
gets from the jurists and judicial
pronouncements revealed earlier, to determine
from the nature of such grave offences found
proved and depending upon the facts noted,
what kind of punishment within the prescribed
limits under the relevant provision would
appropriately fit in. In other words, while the
maximum extent of punishment of either death
or life imprisonment is provided for under the
relevant provisions noted above, it will be for
the courts to decide if in its conclusion, the
imposition of death may not be warranted, what
10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
13. Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
59/64

should be the number of years of imprisonment
that would be judiciously and judicially more
appropriate to keep the person under
incarceration, by taking into account, apart
from the crime itself, from the angle of the
commission of such crime or crimes, the interest
of the society at large or all other relevant
factors which cannot be put in any straitjacket
formulae.”
(emphasis supplied)
It will be clear from the paragraph above that the
question of fixing the number of years within the
maximum, in the case of life imprisonment, was to
be left to the courts. It was mandated that the courts
would with its experience, knowledge of law, the
talent and infrastructure after studying the detailed
parts of each case, with the guidance from the
jurists and judicial pronouncements revealed
earlier would decide judiciously about the period of
incarceration which the case warranted. It was also
indicated that for this, apart from the crime itself;
the angle of the commission of such crime or
crimes; the interest of society at large and all other
relevant facts which cannot be put in any
straitjacket formulae would be taken into account.
47. Once the court decides that the death penalty is
not to be imposed and also that the convict cannot
be released on the expiry of 14 years, the guidelines
set out in Swamy Shraddananda10, V. Sriharan13 and
the line of cases which have applied these
judgments will have to be considered and
principles, if any, set out therein have to be
applied.”

83. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed the various case

laws in order to come to a conclusion as to how much is too much

and how much is too little? This has been termed as a difficult area

to address. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that there can be no

straitjacket formulae and pegging the point up to which remission

10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
13. Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
60/64

powers cannot be invoked is an exercise that has to be carefully

undertaken and the discretion should be exercised on reasonable

grounds. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has noticed the catena of

judgments on this on this point such as, Haru Ghosh vs. State of

W.B. reported in (2009) 15 SCC 551, Mulla vs. State of U.P.

reported in (2010) 3 SCC 508, Ramraj vs. State of Chhattisgarh

reported in (2010) 1 SCC 573, Ramnaresh vs. State of

Chhattisgarh reported in (2012) 4 SCC 257, Neel Kumar vs.

State of Haryana reported in (2012) 5 SCC 766, Sandeep vs.

State of U.P. reported in (2012) 6 SCC 107, Shankar Kisanrao

Khade vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 5 SCC 546,

Sahib Hussain vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2013) 9 SCC

778, Gurvail Singh vs. State of Punjab reported in (2013) 2 SCC

713, Alber Oraon vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2014) 12

SCC 306, Rajkumar vs. State of M.P. reported in (2014) 5 SCC

353, Selvam vs. State reported in (2014) 12 SCC 274, Birju vs.

State of M.P. reported in (2014) 3 SCC 421, Tattu Lodhi vs.

State of M.P. reported in (2016) 9 SCC 675, Vijay Kumar vs.

State of J&K reported in (2019) 12 SCC 791, Parsuram vs.

State of M.P. reported in (2019) 8 SCC 382, Nand Kishore vs.

State of M.P. reported in (2019) 16 SCC 278, Swapan Kumar

Jha vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2019) 13 SCC 579, Raju
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
61/64

Jagdish Paswan vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 16

SCC 380, ‘X’ vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2019) 7 SCC

1, Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar vs. State of Karnataka

reported in (2022) 2 SCC 801, Shiva Kumar vs. State of

Karnataka reported in (2023) 9 SCC 817, Manoj vs. State of

M.P. reported in (2023) 2 SCC 353, Madan vs. State of U.P.

reported in (2023) 15 SCC 701, Sundar vs. State reported in

(2024) 12 SCC 764 and Ravinder Singh vs. State (NCT of

Delhi) reported in (2024) 2 SCC 323.

84. The Hon’ble Supreme Court found that keeping in

view the relevant circumstances applicable to respective cases,

courts have fixed the range between 20 years and 35 years and in

few cases have imposed imprisonment for the rest of the life.

Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court utilised the judgments

referred above to take a guidance in terms of discerning the

principle. Paragraph ‘78’, ‘79’ and ‘80’ of the judgment in case of

Navas @ Mulanavas are as under:-

“78. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove
shows that the fundamental underpinning is the
principle of proportionality. The aggravating and
mitigating circumstances which the Court considers
while deciding commutation of penalty from death
to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in
deciding the number of years of compulsory
imprisonment without remission, too. As a judicially
trained mind pores and ponders over the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and in cases where
they decide to commute the death penalty they
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
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would by then have a reasonable idea as to what
would be the appropriate period of sentence to be
imposed under the Swamy Shraddananda10 principle
too. Matters are not cut and dried and nicely
weighed here to formulate a uniform principle. That
is where the experience of the judicially trained
mind comes in as pointed out in V. Sriharan13.
79. Illustratively, in the process of arriving at the
number of years as the most appropriate for the case
at hand, which the convict will have to undergo
before which the remission powers could be
invoked, some of the relevant factors that the courts
bear in mind are:
(a) the number of deceased who are victims of that
crime and their age and gender;
(b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if
any;
(c) the motive for which the offence was committed;
(d) whether the offence was committed when the
convict was on bail in another case;
(e) the premeditated nature of the offence;
(f) the relationship between the offender and the
victim;
(g) the abuse of trust if any;
(h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the
convict, if released, would be a menace to the
society.
Some of the positive factors have been:
(1) age of the convict;
(2) the probability of reformation of convict;
(3) the convict not being a professional killer;
(4) the socio-economic condition of the accused;
(5) the composition of the family of the accused; and
(6) conduct expressing remorse.
80. These were some of the relevant factors that
were kept in mind in the cases noticed above while
weighing the pros and cons of the matter. The Court
would be additionally justified in considering the
conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already
undergone to arrive at the number of years which the
Court feels the convict should serve as part of the
sentence of life imprisonment and before which he
cannot apply for remission. These are not meant to
be exhaustive but illustrative and each case would
depend on the facts and circumstances therein.”
10. Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113
13. Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
63/64

85. Referring to the guidelines provided in paragraph ‘79’

of the judgment, the learned Amicus Curiae have pointed out that in

this case the aggravating circumstances are the number of deceased

who are victims of the crime and their age and gender. The nature of

injuries, the motive, the premeditated nature of offence, the

relationship and the abuse of trust. However, the appellant Md. Tahir

is comparatively young aged about 37 years, not having any criminal

antecedent and he is not a professional criminal. Some other positive

factors are the probability of reformation of convict and the socio-

economic condition of the convict. The appellant comes from a poor

strata of family. He was earning his livelihood by selling fruits near

railway station, no material has been brought by the State to show

that there is no probability of his reformation. It is pleaded that

instead of death sentence, the appellant Md. Tahir may be awarded a

special sentence. In the case of Navas @ Mulanavas (supra), the

Hon’ble Supreme Court finally took a view to modify the sentence

under Section 302 IPC imposed by the High Court from a period of

30 years imprisonment without remission to that of a period of 25

years of imprisonment without remission, including the period

already undergone.

86. Having gone through the case laws discussed

hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the sentence

awarded to the appellant is fit to be modified from that of a sentence
Patna High Court D. REF. No.1 of 2025 dt.07-01-2026
64/64

of death to a special sentence of 20 years rigorous imprisonment

without remission, including the period already served. Accordingly,

the reference made by the learned trial court would fail. The sentence

awarded to Md. Tahir under Section 302/34 by the learned trial court

is modified to the extent that he would undergo 20 years rigorous

imprisonment without remission, including the period already served

and shall pay the fine of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) for the

offence under Section 302 IPC.

87. Accordingly, the Death Reference No. 1 of 2025 fails.

Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 627 of 2025 is partly allowed and Criminal

Appeal (DB) No. 639 of 2025 is allowed as indicated above.

88. We acknowledge the assistance rendered by Ms. Surya

Nilambari and Mr. Pratik Mishra, the two learned Advocates as

Amicus Curiae during the hearing. In token of their assistance, we

direct that each of them shall be paid a consolidated sum of Rs.

15,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand) by the Patna High Court Legal

Services Committee within one month from the date of receipt of a

copy of this judgment.

(Rajeev Ranjan Prasad, J)

(Shailendra Singh, J)
SUSHMA2/-
AFR/NAFR
CAV DATE
Uploading Date 12.01.2026
Transmission Date 12.01.2026

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