Created by Fuzzy Cloud

Patna High Court

Naga Kahar @ Suraj Kumar PrasadversusThe State of Bihar

Decided
Disposal
BAIL GRANTED

Holding

The court held that the allegations do not meet the statutory requirements of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, and therefore the appellants are entitled to pre‑arrest bail.

Summary

The appellants, three brothers from Rohtas, were charged under several sections of the Bihar Penal Code and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 for allegedly assaulting and abusing an informant by using his caste name. They contended that the FIR was false, that they were at home when the informant arrived, that they merely recorded the incident, and that no caste‑based insult was made. The prosecution argued that the assault occurred in public view at the entrance of the appellants' house. The High Court examined the meaning of “any place within public view” as explained in the Supreme Court decisions in Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435 and Karuppudayar v. State (2025) INSC 132, and found that the FIR did not specifically allege that the act was visible to the general public. Consequently, the court held that the essential ingredients of the SC/ST Act offences were not prima facie established and, considering the appellants’ clean antecedents, granted them pre‑arrest bail, setting aside the lower court’s order.

Issues considered

  • Whether the alleged conduct satisfies the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
  • Whether the incident took place in "any place within public view" as required by the Act.
  • Whether the appellants are entitled to pre‑arrest bail under Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • pre‑arrest bail
  • SC/ST Act
  • public view
  • caste insult
  • assault
  • Section 438 CrPC
  • Swaran Singh test

Judgment

                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                                  CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.3340 of 2025
                       Arising Out of PS. Case No.-84 Year-2025 Thana- KACCHWA District- Rohtas
                 ======================================================
           1.     Naga Kahar @ Suraj Kumar Prasad S/o- Shyam Sundar Kahar @ Shyam
                  Sundar Prasad @ Saroj Kumar Prasad Resident of Village- Dhodhandih PS-
                  Kachhawa District- Rohtas
           2.    Teju Kahar @ Teju Kumar Prasad S/o- Shyam Sundar Kahar @ Shyam
                 Sundar Prasad @ Saroj Kumar Prasad Resident of Village- Dhodhandih PS-
                 Kachhawa District- Rohtas
           3.    Lavkush Kahar @ Lavkush Prasad S/o- Saroj Kumar Prasad @ Shyam
                 Sundar Kahar @ Shyam Sundar Prasad Resident of Village- Dhodhandih
                 PS- Kachhawa District- Rohtas

                                                                                  ... ... Appellant/s
                                                       Versus
           1.    The State of Bihar
           2.    Bhim Ram S/o- Shivdeni Ram Village- Dhodhandih Ps- Kachhawa Dist-
                 Rohtas

                                                           ... ... Respondent/s
                 ======================================================
                 Appearance :
                 For the Appellant/s     :        Mr.Siddharth Harsh, Advocate
                 For the Respondent/s    :        Mr.Binay Krishna, Spl.PP
                 For the O.P. No.2       :        Mr.Rabindra Prasad Singh, Advocate
                 ======================================================
                 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
                                       ORAL ORDER

3   23-02-2026                    Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

                   appellants; learned Spl.PP for the State and learned counsel for

                   the O.P. No.2.

                               2. The appellants seek pre-arrest bail in connection

                   with Kachhawa P.S. Case No. 84 of 2025 registered for the

                   offence(s) punishable under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 109, 352,

                   351(2) and 3(5) of the BNS; Sections 3(i)(r) and 3(i)(s) of the

                   SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989.

                               3. As per the allegations made in the FIR, the
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                             2/7




          appellants along with other accused assaulted the informant and

          and they also abused the informant by using his caste name.

                       4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

          appellants submitted that the appellants are innocent and they

          have been falsely implicated in the present case. Learned

          counsel submitted that the present case reflects a clear violation

          of the safeguards and protections envisaged under the provisions

          of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention

          of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of

          1989”). Learned counsel submitted that at the relevant time the

          appellants were present at their residence when the informant

          allegedly arrived there and started abusing them. The appellants,

          in order to protect themselves, video-recorded the incidence,

          which subsequently prompted the informant to lodge the FIR on

          false and fabricated allegations. Learned counsel further

          submitted that the alleged place of occurrence is situated near

          the residence of the appellants and the informant, with a mala

          fide intention, has meticulously concocted a false criminal case

          against them. The allegation that the appellants, along with co-

          accused Naga Kahar (appellant no.1), assaulted the informant

          with a lathi on his head in public view is wholly unsustainable.

          The injury alleged to have been caused on the head of the
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                             3/7




          informant which has been recorded by the learned District Court

          as a simple abrasion. Learned counsel submitted that no abusive

          words referring to the caste of the informant were never used by

          the appellants, therefore, in absence of the essential ingredients

          constituting an offence under the Act of 1989 are not made out.

          On these grounds, the appellants, who have clean antecedent,

          seek to be released on pre-arrest bail.

                       5. Per contra, Mr. Rabindra Prasad Singh has

          tendered his appearance on behalf of O.P. No.2 and vehemently

          opposed the prayer for grant of bail. Learned counsel submitted

          that the informant has suffered substantial injury and

          humiliation on account of the acts allegedly committed by the

          appellants. He further submitted that the occurrence took place

          on 30.03.2025 at about 7:00 p.m., near the entrance of the

          appellants’ residence, and the same was in a public view.

          According to the prosecution, all the accused persons actively

          participated in the commission of the alleged offence. In view of

          the nature of the allegations and the occurrence took place in

          public view, the appellants don’t deserve to be released on pre-

          arrest bail.

                       6. Mr. Binay Krishna, learned Spl.PP appearing on

          behalf of the State vehemently opposed the prayer for grant of
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                             4/7




          bail.

                       7. Having heard the rival submissions made on behalf

          of the parties, as well as, upon perusal of the allegations made in

          the FIR, this Court finds that the alleged occurrence took place

          near the house of the appellants. The FIR contains general and

          omnibus allegations against all the accused persons, who

          admittedly belong to the same family, alleging that they abused

          the informant by taking his caste name. However, in the absence

          of any specific overt act attributed to any of the appellants and

          in the absence of clear particulars supporting the essential

          ingredients of the offence, the allegations do not prima facie

          appear to satisfy the statutory requirements under the Act of

          1989. A reference of provision under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s)

          of the SC/ST Act has been made, which is, inter alia, as follows:

                                           “3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-
                                                         (1) (r) Intentionally insults or
                                           intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a
                                           Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place
                                           within public view;
                                                         (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled
                                           Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any
                                           place within public view.”

                       8. The term “any place within public view” initially

          came for consideration before the Apex Court                        in case of

          Swaran Singh & Ors. Vs. State through Standing Counsel &

          Anr. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 435. In the case of Hitesh Verms

          Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Anr. reported in (2008) 8 SCC 435,
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                             5/7




          the Apex Court had reiterated the legal position in paragraph

          no.14 which is as under :

                                               “14. Another key ingredient of the
                                   provision is insult or intimidation in “any place
                                   within public view”. What is to be regarded as
                                   “place in public view” had come up for
                                   consideration before this Court in the judgment
                                   reported as Swaran Singh v. State[Swaran Singh v.
                                   State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
                                   527] . The Court had drawn distinction between
                                   the expression “public place” and “in any place
                                   within public view”. It was held that if an offence
                                   is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
                                   outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
                                   someone from the road or lane outside the
                                   boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a
                                   place within the public view. On the contrary, if
                                   the remark is made inside a building, but some
                                   members of the public are there (not merely
                                   relatives or friends) then it would not be an
                                   offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed.:
                                   This sentence appears to be contrary to what is
                                   stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh,
                                   (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the
                                   application of this principle in para 15,
                                   below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a
                                   building, but some members of the public are there
                                   (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would
                                   be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The
                                   Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)
                                  “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod
                                  Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by
                                  Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”)
                                  when he stood near the car which was parked at
                                  the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was
                                  certainly a place within public view, since the gate
                                  of a house is certainly a place within public view. It
                                  could have been a different matter had the alleged
                                  offence been committed inside a building, and also
                                  was not in the public view. However, if the offence
                                  is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn
                                  outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by
                                  someone from the road or lane outside the
                                  boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place
                                  within the public view. Also, even if the remark is
                                  made inside a building, but some members of the
                                  public are there (not merely relatives or friends)
                                  then also it would be an offence since it is in the
                                  public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the
Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                             6/7




                                  expression “place within public view” with the
                                  expression “public place”. A place can be a
                                  private place but yet within the public view. On the
                                  other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a
                                  place which is owned or leased by the Government
                                  or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon
                                  sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by
                                  private persons or private bodies.”

                       9. A reference in this regard can also be taken to a

          recent judgment passed in the case of Karuppudayar Vs. State

          Rep. By the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Tricy &

          Ors. arising out of Special Leave Petition (criminal) No.8778-

          8779 of 2024), reported in 2025 INSC 132.

                       10. From the observation and explanations made by

          the Apex Court in the case of                  Swaran Singh (Supra), it

          transpires that the occurrence allegedly took place at the door of

          the appellants’ house. There is no specific assertion in the FIR

          that the said place was accessible to the general public or that

          any independent member of the public witnessed the

          occurrence. There is also no clear allegation that the veranda or

          entrance was visible to persons from a public road or lane so as

          to bring the alleged act within the ambit of “public view” as

          explained by the Apex Court. Considering the aforesaid facts

          and circumstances, in absence of specific and individual

          allegations satisfying the ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)

          (s) of the Act of 1989, and further taking into account that the

          appellants have clean antecedents, this Court is of the view that
           Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.3340 of 2025(3) dt.23-02-2026
                                                        7/7




                     the appellants have prima facie made out a case to be released

                     on pre-arrest bail.

                                  12. The appellants, above named, are directed to be

                     released on pre-arrest bail, in the event of their arrest or

                     surrender before the learned court below within a period of four

                     weeks, on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (Ten Thousand)

                     with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of

                     the learned District Court where the case is pending in

                     connection with Lalmania P.S. Case No. 66 of 2024, subject to

                     the conditions as laid down under Section 438(2) of the

                     Cr.P.C/482 of the BNSS.

                                  13. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and

                     the present appeal is allowed.



                                                (Purnendu Singh, J)
Ashishsingh/-

U      T


Continue reading with your account

Sign in to read the full judgment. It’s free.

Sign in to read

Checking your session…

For a signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's website.