Patna High Court
Dhanushdhar RoyversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The High Court held that where a land acquisition deprives a person of property, the authorities must provide a reasoned order and pay compensation at market value, and the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is appropriate despite alternative remedies due to violation of property rights and natural justice.
Summary
The petitioner, Dhanushdhar Roy, claimed ownership of Raiyati land that was acquired for the extension of NH‑31 and alleged that no compensation or interest had been paid despite a land acquisition case (No. 23 of 2010‑11) and notice. He filed a writ petition seeking compensation, a reasoned award, and an inquiry into alleged malafide conduct by officials. The State argued that the petitioner had delayed the process and that an alternative statutory remedy existed, rendering the writ non‑maintainable. The Court examined the principle that High Courts may entertain writs where fundamental rights or natural justice are infringed, even if alternative remedies exist, and emphasized the need for reasoned administrative decisions. Relying on Supreme Court precedents and Article 300A, the Court directed the Collector to obtain records, hold a hearing, pass a reasoned order within six weeks, and ensure compensation at market value, thereby disposing of the petition.
Issues considered
- Whether the petitioner is entitled to compensation and interest for land acquired for NH‑31 extension.
- Whether the writ petition is maintainable despite the existence of alternative statutory remedies.
- Whether the authorities are required to pass a reasoned order under principles of natural justice.
Subjects
- land acquisition
- compensation
- Article 300A
- writ jurisdiction
- reasoned order
- property rights
- NHAI
- Bihar
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1204 of 2026
======================================================
Dhanushdhar Roy Son of Late Radha Mohan Roy, Resident of Village-
Jamunia, P.O.- Jamunia, P.S.- Sahu Parbatta, District - Bhagalpur, Pin Code -
853202 (Bihar). ... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through The Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue
and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Collector, Bhagalpur.
3. The Competent Authority -Cum- District Land Acquisition Officer, District -
Bhagalpur.
4. The Competent Authority -Cum- Land Reforms Deputy Collector,
Bhagalpur, District- Bhagalpur.
5. The Union of India, through The Secretary, Ministry of Road and Highways,
Government of India, New Delhi.
6. The Director, National Highway Authority of India, New Delhi.
7. The Project Director, National Highway Authority of India, N.H. 31,
Khagaria- Purnea Section, Begusarai (Bihar). ... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Ujjwal Kumar Sinha, Advocate
For NHAI : Mr.Gaurav Govinda, Advocate
For the State : MR.Vivek Prasad, GP 7
Mr.Sanjay Kumar, AC to GP 7
Ms.Roona, AC to GP 7
Mrs.Manisha Singh, AC to GP 7
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 29-01-2026
Heard Mr. Ujjwal Kumar Sinha, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner; Mr. Gaurav Govinda,
learned counsel for NHAI and Mr. Vivek Prasad, learned GP 7
along with Mr. Sanjay Kumar, Ms. Roona and Mrs. Manisha
Singh, learned AC to GP 7 for the State.
2. The petitioner in paragraph no. 1 of the present writ
petition has sought, inter alia, following relief(s), which is
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
2/12
reproduced hereinafter:-
"(i) For directing the Respondent
Authorities to pay the amount of compensation
along with statutory interest with respect to the
Raiyati land of the petitioner which has been
acquired by the Respondent Authorities for
extension of NH 31 (Khagaria-Purnea Section)
for which the Land Acquisition case No.23 of
2010-11 was registered and notice was issued to
the petitioner but after submission of relevant
papers or evidence by the petitioner nothing has
been done as yet.
II. For directing the respondent
Authorities to take steps in accordance with the
law to decide the Representation of the petitioner
with respect to his claim for payment of amount
of compensation against the acquisition of his
Raiyati Land.
III. For directing the Respondent
Authorities to provide a details of the proceeding
of Land Acquisition Case No.23 of 2010-11 and
the Award prepared in the said case with respect
to the acquired land of the petitioner and further
to make payment to the petitioner in prevailing
market rent of the land with statutory interest.
IV. For directing the Collector,
Bhagalpur to make an inquiry over the matter
and further to initiate a proper proceeding
against the responsible person whose approach
towards the petitioner regarding the payment of
amount of compensation is malafide and is
harming the object of the law of Land
Acquisition.
V. For grant of any other relief or
reliefs as your Lordships may found entitled too.”
3. Brief facts of the case is that the petitioner claims
lawful ownership and peaceful possession overt the land bearing
Khata No.862, Plot No.315, P.S. No.46, measuring area 4 ½
Decimals of land situated at Mauza Jamunia, Anchal
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
3/12
Naugachiya (Bhagalpur). The grievance of the petitioner arose
when the land belonging to the petitioner was acquired for
extension of NH 31 (Khagaria-Purnea Section), however, no
payment of compensation along with the interest been made till
date. A Land Acquisition Case No.23 of 2010-11 has also been
instituted against the petitioner in this regard and the notice has
been issued to the petitioner and his brother.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioner informs that for the relief(s) as prayed for in the
present writ petition, the petitioner has already filed
representation before the District Magistrate-cum- Collector,
Bhagalpur on 10.12.2018, however, no action has been taken on
the same till date.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for
not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has not denied the
fact that other persons in the vicinity have not been paid the due
compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed and has directly
approached this Hon’ble Court. Accordingly, the writ petition is
not maintainable. He submitted that the petitioner has availed
alternative efficacious remedy before coming before this Court
by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
4/12
India.
6. Heard the parties.
7. Before going into the merits of the case of
respective parties I find that it is commonly seen that the
Officers having quasi judicial power in its administrative side
often delay in considering the representation filed by the
aggrieved person or they deliberately delay to even adjudicate
those cases where they exercise their adjudicatory power, while,
it is well settled principle of law that High Courts should not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India if an effective and efficacious remedy is
available. Taking into circumstances of the present case where
fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this
Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarizing the above
discussion, this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
5/12
administrative decisions, if such
decisions affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its
conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be
done it must also appear to be done as
well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates
as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and
quasi-judicial or even administrative
power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-
maker on relevant grounds and by
disregarding extraneous
considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a
decision-making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial,
quasi-judicial and even by
administrative bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour
of reasoned decisions based on
relevant facts. This is virtually the
lifeblood of judicial decision-making
justifying the principle that reason is
the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different
as the judges and authorities who
deliver them. All these decisions serve
one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
6/12
sustaining the litigants‟ faith in the
justice delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about
his/her decision-making process then it
is impossible to know whether the
person deciding is faithful to the
doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a
valid decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of
restraint on abuse of judicial powers.
Transparency in decision-making not
only makes the judges and decision-
makers less prone to errors but also
makes them subject to broader
scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad
doctrine of fairness in decision-
making, the said requirement is now
virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Strasbourg
Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija vs.
Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and
Anya v. University of Oxford34,
wherein the Court referred to Article 6
of the European Convention of Human
Rights which requires, “adequate and
intelligent reasons must be given for
judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore,
for development of law, requirement of
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
7/12
giving reasons for the decision is of the
essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.
9. The law in this regard has been reiterated by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
Paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“19. While a High Court would
normally not exercise its writ jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective and
efficacious alternate remedy is available, the
existence of an alternate remedy does not by itself
bar the High Court from exercising its
jurisdiction in certain contingencies. This
principle has been crystallized by this Court in
Whirpool Corporation v. Registrar of
Trademarks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahni v.
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh
& Ors a two judge Bench of this Court of which
one of us was a part of (Justice DY Chandrachud)
has summarized the principles governing the
exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in
the presence of an alternate remedy. This Court
has observed:
“28. The principles of law which
emerge are that: (i) The power under Article 226
of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised
not only for the enforcement of fundamental
rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii) The
High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the
power of the High Court is where an effective
alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved
person; (iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate
remedy arise where (a) the writ petition has been
filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
8/12
has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly
without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a
legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in
an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ
petition should not be entertained when an
efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which
itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for
enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had
to that particular statutory remedy before
invoking the discretionary remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion
of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion; and (vi) In cases
where there are disputed questions of fact, the
High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a
writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the
controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be
interfered with.”
10. The principle of alternative remedies and its
exceptions has also been clarified in Assistant Commissioner
of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited (Civil Appeal
No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement
Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499. The Apex Court has
held that a writ petition is maintainable before the High Court if
the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope of their
jurisdiction. It has observed as under:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation
of infringement of fundamental rights or when on
the undisputed facts the taxing authorities are
shown to have assumed jurisdiction which they do
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
9/12
not possess can be the grounds on which the writ
petitions can be entertained. But normally, the
High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in
a case, something going to the root of the
jurisdiction of the officer, something which would
show that it would be a case of palpable injustice
to the writ petitioner to force him to adopt the
remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2
SCC 355: AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court
had entertained a petition despite availability of
alternative remedy and heard the parties on
merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for the
High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of
non-exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the
High Court finds that factual disputes are
involved and it would not be desirable to deal with
them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A
of the Constitution of India, which tends to safeguard the
invaluable right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property
save by authority of law.”
12. The State cannot disposses a citizen of his
property except in accordance with law and procedure
prescribed. The obligation to pay compensation is not
expressively included in Article 300-A of the Constitution of
India can be inferred in that Article. The law in this regard is
well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya Devi Vs. The
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in 2020(2) SCC
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
10/12
569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and 12.2 of the said
judgment, which are inter alia reproduced hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly
expropriated of her property in 1967, when
the right to property was a fundamental
right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the
right to private property [State of W.B. v.
Subodh Gopal Bose, (1953) 2 SCC 688 ,
which could not be deprived without due
process of law and upon just and fair
compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution
(Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978,
however, it continued to be a human right
[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1
SCC 353 in a welfare State, and a
constitutional right under Article 300-A of
the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his
property save by authority of law. The State
cannot dispossess a citizen of his property
except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay
compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300-A, can be inferred
in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
“ 16. The right to property ceased to be
a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-
fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
11/12
continued to be a human right in a welfare State,
and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of
the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a
citizen of his property except in accordance with
the procedure established by law. The obligation
to pay compensation, though not expressly
included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that
Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. In such circumstances, when the question of right
to property as per the provision of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this
Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to
forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner
is redressed well within a period of three weeks in accordance
with law from the date of communication of this order.
15. The District Magistrate-cum-Collector, Bhagalpur
is directed to call for the entire records from the Circle Officer
concerned relating to the land in question and after affording
due opportunity of hearing to both the parties, pass a reasoned
order and dispose of the representation filed on behalf of the
petitioners well within a period of six weeks from the date of
communication of this order, otherwise, this Court will take
action against all the authorities.
16. In case, the land of the petitioners are acquired,
Patna High Court CWJC No.1204 of 2026 dt.29-01-2026
12/12
then in that case, the petitioners are required to be paid due
compensation as per MVR determined at the rate of commercial
value of the land.
17. Accordingly, the present application stands
disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
chn/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 05.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
Checking your session…