Patna High Court
Devnandan YadavversusThe State of Bihar
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISPOSED
- Bench
- PURNENDU SINGH
Holding
The Court held that the respondents acted without jurisdiction, violating the petitioners’ constitutional right to property, and directed verification of the land’s status and payment of compensation under the RFCTLARR Act.
Summary
The petitioners, a group of Yadav families, claim raiyati rights over 11.22 acres of land in Mauza Bhalua that were settled in their ancestors' favour in the 1930s and 1940s and for which they have continuously paid rent to the State. The Circle Officer, Ariyari, ordered the land to be used for constructing a Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 10+2 Scheduled Caste girls’ school without initiating any land‑acquisition proceeding, and dismissed the petitioners’ claim despite their submission of settlement documents. The petitioners filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the order, alleging violation of their constitutional right to property under Article 300A and lack of due process. The State argued the petition was not maintainable, claiming the petitioners delayed compensation. The Court held that the respondents acted without jurisdiction, that administrative orders must be reasoned, and that the petitioners’ fundamental right to property could not be infringed without law‑ful acquisition and compensation. Accordingly, the Court directed the District Collector‑Magistrate to verify the records, compare the land earmarked for the school, and, if confirmed, ensure compensation under the RFCTLARR Act, and disposed of the application.
Issues considered
- The Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain the writ despite the existence of alternative remedies.
- Whether the Circle Officer’s order to earmark the petitioners’ raiyati land for a school was made with jurisdiction and in compliance with the law.
- Whether the petitioners’ right to property under Article 300A was violated by the alleged unauthorized acquisition.
- Whether compensation is required under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
Subjects
- Article 226
- Article 300A
- right to property
- land acquisition
- rai-yati rights
- compensation
- quasi‑judicial authority
- natural justice
- writ jurisdiction
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1333 of 2026
======================================================
1. Devnandan Yadav Son of Pitambar Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S.
Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
2. Baleshwar Yadav, Son of Vasudeo Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S.
Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
3. Dhaneshwar Yadav, Son of Late Dashrath Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi,
P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
4. Vilan Yadav, Son of Bhuwan Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli,
District- Sheikhpura.
5. Prakash Yadav, Son of Jharkhandi Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S.
Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
6. Brahmdeo Yadav, Son of Late Lal Chand Yadav, Resident of Village- Sahdi,
P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
7. Ashok Yadav @ Aasho Yadav, Son of Late Munsi Das, Resident of Village-
Sahdi, P.S. Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
8. Baldeo Yadav, Son of Late Prasadi Das, Resident of Village- Sahdi, P.S.
Mahuli, District- Sheikhpura.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Patna.
2. The Principal Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Govt.
of Bihar, Patna.
3. The District Collector-cum-District Magistrate, at Sheikhpura.
4. The Addl. Collector, Sheikhpura, District- Sheikhpura.
5. The D.C.L.R., Sheikhpura.
6. The Circle Officer, Anchal Ariyari, District- Sheikhpura.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Hafiz Shahbaz Arif, Advocate
Mr. Abdul Mannan Khan, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : AC to Additional Advocate General (12)
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PURNENDU SINGH
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 31-01-2026
Heard Mr. Hafiz Shahbaz Arif, along with Mr. Abdul
Mannan Khan, learned counsels appearing on behalf of the
petitioners and learned AC to Additional Advocate General (12)
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for the State.
2. The petitioners in paragraph no. 1 of the present
writ petition have sought inter alia the following relief(s), which
is reproduced hereinafter:-
“1. That this is an application for
invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court for grant of the following relief or reliefs:-
(i) For issuance of an appropriate
writ, order or direction for quashing the order
dated 19.11.2025 passed in Misc. Case no.01 of
2025-26 by the respondent circle Officer, Ariyari
by which he has most arbitrarily and quite
malafidely dismissed the claim of the Petitioners
restraining the petitioners from obstructing the
obstruct upon construction of building of Dr.
B.R. Ambedkar 10+2 school Schedule Caste
residential school upon the petitioner's raiyati
land of Mauza Bhalue, Khata no.54, Khesra
no.83, Area 11 Acres 22 decimals without
acquisition of the same through the land
acquisition proceeding.”
3. The brief facts of the case are that the land bearing
Mauza Bhalua, Khata No. 54, Khesra No. 83, area 11 Acre 22
decimals is recorded as Parti Kadim/Gairmazarua Malik land, a
substantial portion of which was lawfully settled in favour of the
petitioners’ ancestors in the years 1936 and 1944 vide
Hukumnama settlements dated 15.03.1936, 16.03.1936 and
30.06.1944. After abolition of Zamindari, the land vested in the
State, but raiyati rights of the petitioners’ ancestors were duly
recognized, and rent has continuously been accepted by the
State Government. Subsequently, 8 Acres 75 decimals of land
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was settled in favour of the petitioners’ ancestors namely
Jharkhandi Das, Somar Das and Doman Das, and rent receipts
have been regularly issued. After the death of the ancestors, the
petitioners have remained in peaceful, continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the land for more than nine decades,
and are regularly paying rent to the State through the Anchal
Sarista. The Jamabandi/Register-II (Khata Pustika) continues to
exist in the names of the petitioners and their ancestors. The
Circle Officer, Ariyari, on the basis of a Nazri Naksha submitted
by the Anchal Amin, proposed construction of Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar 10+2 Residential Scheduled Caste Girls’ School over
3 acres of the said land without initiating any land acquisition
proceeding. Notices dated 28.04.2025 were issued to the
petitioners asking them to produce settlement documents. The
petitioners appeared on 03.05.2025 and again on 08.09.2025,
submitting all relevant documents including Hukumnama,
Zamindari receipts, and online rent receipts. Despite compliance
with the directions of the Hon’ble High Court in CWJC No.
12671 of 2025 (order dated 07.08.2025), the Circle Officer
illegally rejected the petitioners’ claim vide order dated
19.11.2025 in Misc. Case No. 01/2025-26, without properly
considering the documents on record. The petitioners later came
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to know that the respondents are attempting to forcibly
dispossess them and proceed with construction of the school on
the petitioners’ raiyati land, allegedly under political influence
and without any valid acquisition process. The petitioners have
also approached the District Magistrate, Sheikhpura, asserting
their long-standing possession and legal rights over the land;
however, the respondents are adamant in proceeding with
construction, ignoring existing revenue records and rent
receipts. The authorities have not disclosed any reason for not
selecting an alternative site for construction and are acting in an
arbitrary, unauthorized, and illegal manner, necessitating
intervention of this Hon’ble Court to restrain further
construction over the disputed land.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner
submitted that the respondents instead of having interfered with
the ongoing construction of building erected on the land of
dispute have interfered with the fundamental right of the
petitioners and the right under Article 300 A of the Constitution
of India. Learned counsel submitted that the petitioners were
served notice on 28.04.2025 contained letter no.410 by the
Circle Officer, Ariyari (Annexure P/5) without giving the details
of land in question over which the Government has earmarked
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for construction of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar 10+2 Schedule Caste
residential/Girls School. Learned counsel further submitted that
the very action of the Circle Officer to proceed to obstruct the
petitioners from their rightful possession over the land is
without jurisdiction and he seeks to file a fresh representation
before the District Collector- cum - Magistrate, Muzaffarpur
for redressal of the grievances of the petitioners as prayed for in
the present writ petition in accordance with law.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the State submitted that the petitioner himself is responsible for
not receiving due compensation. Petitioner has himself delayed
and has directly approached this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, the
writ petition is not maintainable.
6. Heard the parties.
7. It is commonly seen that the officers having quasi
judicial power on their administrative side often delay in
considering the representation filed by the aggrieved person or
they deliberately delay to even adjudicate those cases where
they exercise their adjudicatory power, while, it is well settled
principle of law that High Courts should not exercise its writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if an
effective and efficacious remedy is available. Taking into the
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circumstances of the present case where
fundamental/constitutional right of a citizen is infringed, this
Court must not fail to exercise its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
8. It is also well settled principle of law that every
administrative action in want of reason is not sustainable as has
been held by the Apex Court in the case of Kranti Associates
(P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496.
The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereinbelow:
“47. Summarising the above discussion,
this Court holds:
(a) In India the judicial trend has
always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions
affect anyone prejudicially.
(b) A quasi-judicial authority must
record reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c) Insistence on recording of reasons
is meant to serve the wider principle of
justice that justice must not only be done it
must also appear to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also
operates as a valid restraint on any possible
arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-
judicial or even administrative power.
(e) Reasons reassure that discretion
has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(f) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision-
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) Reasons facilitate the process of
judicial review by superior courts.
(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all
countries committed to rule of law and
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constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts.
This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial
decision-making justifying the principle that
reason is the soul of justice.
(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial
opinions these days can be as different as the
judges and authorities who deliver them. All
these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the
relevant factors have been objectively
considered. This is important for sustaining
the litigants‟ faith in the justice delivery
system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a
requirement for both judicial accountability
and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial
authority is not candid enough about his/her
decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is
faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to
principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions
must be cogent, clear and succinct. A
pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp
reasons” is not to be equated with a valid
decision-making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that
transparency is the sine qua non of restraint
on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges
and decision-makers less prone to errors but
also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.
(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor32).
(n) Since the requirement to record
reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said
requirement is now virtually a component of
human rights and was considered part of
Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija
vs. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya
v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court
referred to Article 6 of the European
Convention of Human Rights which requires,
“adequate and intelligent reasons must be
given for judicial decisions.”
(o) In all common law jurisdictions
judgments play a vital role in setting up
precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving
reasons for the decision is of the essence and is
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virtually a part of “due process”.
9. The law in this regard has been laid down by the
Apex Court in the Case of M/s Magadh Sugar & Energy Ltd.
Versus The State of Bihar & Ors. reported in LL 2021 SC 495,
paragraphs no. 19 and 28 would be relevant in this regard,
which is as under:-
“ 19. While a High Court would normally not
exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if an effective and efficacious alternate remedy
is available, the existence of an alternate remedy does not
by itself bar the High Court from exercising its jurisdiction
in certain contingencies. This principle has been
crystallized by this Court in Whirpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai19 and Harbanslal Sahni
v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd20. Recently, in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors21 a
two judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part
of (Justice DY Chandrachud) has summarized the
principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the
High Court in the presence of an alternate remedy. This
Court has observed:
“28. The principles of law which emerge are
that: (i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well; (ii)
The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ
petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the
High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is
available to the aggrieved person; (iii) Exceptions to the
rule of alternate remedy arise where (a) the writ petition
has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right
protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been
a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order
or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the
vires of a legislation is challenged; (iv) An alternate remedy
by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained
when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;
(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
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Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion; and (vi) In cases where there are disputed
questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline
jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy
requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.” (emphasis supplied)
10. Now question arises whether this Court can
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India in the facts of the present writ petition in case respondents
have acted without jurisdiction. Law in this regard is well
settled by the Apex Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of State Tax v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021). In State of HP v. Gujarat
Ambuja Cement Ltd & Anr., reported in (2005) SCC 6 499 this
Court has held that a writ petition is maintainable before the
High Court if the taxing authorities have acted beyond the scope
of their jurisdiction. This Court observed:
“23. Where under a statute there is an allegation of
infringement of fundamental rights or when on the
undisputed facts the taxing authorities are shown to have
assumed jurisdiction which they do not possess can be the
grounds on which the writ petitions can be entertained. But
normally, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions
unless it is shown that there is something more in a case,
something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer,
something which would show that it would be a case of
palpable injustice to the writ petitioner to force him to
adopt the remedies provided by the statute. It was noted by
this Court in L. Hirday Narain v. ITO [(1970) 2 SCC 355:
AIR 1971 SC 33] that if the High Court had entertained a
petition despite availability of alternative remedy and heard
the parties on merits it would be ordinarily unjustifiable for
the High Court to dismiss the same on the ground of non-
exhaustion of statutory remedies; unless the High Court
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finds that factual disputes are involved and it would not be
desirable to deal with them in a writ petition.”
11. It is also to be taken note of that Article 300A
of the Constitution of India tends to safeguard the invaluable
right to property.
“300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property
save by authority of law
No person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”
12. As per the constitutional mandate also, the State
cannot disposes a citizen of his property except in accordance
with law and procedure prescribed. The obligation to pay
compensation is not expressively included in Article 300-A of
the Constitution of India can be inferred in that Article. The law
in this regard is well settled by the Apex Court in case of Vidaya
Devi Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in
2020(2) SCC 569, I find it proper to quote the para-12.1 and
12.2 of the said judgment, which are inter alia reproduced
hereinafter;
“12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her
property in 1967, when the right to property was a
fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of
the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to
private property [State of W.B. v. Subodh Gopal Bose,
(1953) 2 SCC 688 , which could not be deprived without
due process of law and upon just and fair compensation.
12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental
right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978, however, it continued to be a human right
Patna High Court CWJC No.1333 of 2026 dt.31-01-2026
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[Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, (2013) 1 SCC 353 in a
welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article
300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of
his property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1”
13. The above proposition of law has again been
reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Dharnidhar Mishra
(D) and Another vs. State of Bihar and Others, in Civil Appeal
No. 6351 of 2024, reported in (2024) 10 Supreme Court Cases
605, is relevant. The paragraph is reproduced as under:–
“ 16. The right to property ceased to be a
fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human
right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under
Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides
that no person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his
property except in accordance with the procedure
established by law. The obligation to pay compensation,
though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be
inferred in that Article. [See: K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v.
State of Karnataka [K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1.”
14. In such circumstances, when the question of right
to property as per the provision of Article 300 A of the
Constitution of India comes to the knowledge of this Court, this
Court has no alternative than to direct the concerned authority to
forthwith take action and see that the grievance of the petitioner
is redressed well within a period of one week in accordance
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with law from the date of communication of this order.
15. Considering the aforesaid information, the District
Collector- cum - Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, is directed to call
the records from the Circle Officer and compare the same with
the land which has been earmarked for construction of Dr.
Bhimrao Ambedkar 10+2 Schedule Caste residential/Girls
School. In case the land of the petitioners have been notified for
construction of the said school then in that case the petitioners
must be duly compensated under the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (RFCTLARR).
16. Accordingly, the present application stands
disposed of.
17. Interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Purnendu Singh, J)
Ashishsingh/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 07.02.2026
Transmission Date NA
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