Patna High Court
Dharmendra Kumar PatelversusThe Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Ltd.
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISMISSED
Holding
The Court held that the corporation was contractually empowered to terminate the agreement, blacklist the petitioner and forfeit the security deposit, and that the action was not arbitrary or violative of natural‑justice principles, so the writ petition must be dismissed.
Summary
The petitioner, a transport agent for the Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation (BSFSC), was appointed to deliver food grains under the PDS and later had his contract cancelled, was blacklisted for three years, and his security deposit forfeited following a police seizure of grain bags alleged to be involved in black marketing. The petitioner challenged the cancellation, arguing no contractual clause justified the action and that the seized grains were not PDS stock. The corporation relied on Clauses 10.2, 11, 15.4 of the Notice Inviting Tender and Clause 17 of the agreement, asserting a breach of contractual obligations. The Court examined the contractual provisions, the procedural compliance of notice and hearing, and relevant Supreme Court precedents on blacklisting and judicial review. It held that the corporation acted within its contractual authority and that the procedural safeguards satisfied natural‑justice requirements, rendering the writ petition untenable. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether the corporation was justified in invoking Clauses 10.2, 11 and 15.4 of the Notice Inviting Tender read with Clause 17 of the agreement to terminate the contract, blacklist the petitioner and forfeit the security deposit and bank guarantee.
- Whether the corporation’s action was arbitrary, mala fide, or violative of principles of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- contract termination
- blacklisting
- forfeiture of security deposit
- Public Distribution System
- Essential Commodities Act
- administrative law
- judicial review
- Article 226
- natural justice
- show cause notice
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.15550 of 2018
======================================================
Dharmendra Kumar Patel Son of Late Hridya Nand Singh, Resident of
Village- Sion, P.S.- Bhabhua, District- Kaimur Bhabhua.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. Khadya Bhawan,
Daroga Rai Path, Patna- 800 001.
2. The Managing Director, Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation
Ltd., Khadya Bhawan, Daroga Rai Path, Patna- 800 001.
3. The Chief of Procurement, Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation
Ltd., Khadya Bhawan, Daroga Rai Path, Patna- 1.
4. The Chief of Transporting, Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation
Ltd., Khadya Bhawan, Daroga Rai Path, Patna.
5. The District Manager, Bihar State Food and Civil Supply Corporation Ltd.,
Kaimur, District- Kaimur.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Amrendra Narayan Rai, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Shailendra Kumar Singh, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RANJAN KUMAR JHA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH)
Date : 30-06-2026
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Following are the reliefs sought for in the present
writ application:
"I. For quashing the memo no 2261
dated 29.12.2017 (Annexure-6 series) issued by
District Manager, SFC, Kaimur by the order (memo
no. 13058 dated 23.12.2017) of Managing Director,
whereby and where under, agreement for Door step
delivery between petitioner and SFC, Kaimur has
been cancelled and petitioner has been declared
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black listed for three years and his security amount
along with Bank guaranty has been forfeited.
II. For directing the respondent
authorities to re-engage the petitioner immediately
as transporting agent for door step delivery of food
grains under Kaimur District because petitioner's
agreement has been illegally cancelled by the
respondent authorities.
III. For issuance of any other
appropriate writ/writs, order/orders,
direction/directions for grant of any other reliefs to
which the petitioner may be found entitled under the
facts & circumstances of the case."
3. The brief facts of the present case are that the
respondent-Corporation issued a Notice Inviting Tender dated
05.02.2016 inviting applications for appointment of
Transporting and Handling Agents for Door Step Delivery of
food grains under the Public Distribution System (PDS) in
various districts of the State of Bihar, including the district of
Kaimur. The petitioner participated in the tender process and,
upon being found eligible by the District Transport Committee
as well as the Head Office Transport Committee, was appointed
as a Transporting and Handling Agent for Kaimur.
Consequently, an agreement was executed between the parties
on 31.08.2016, whereunder the petitioner was entrusted with the
work of transportation and doorstep delivery of food grains for
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the prescribed contractual period.
4. While the petitioner was discharging his contractual
obligations, an alleged incident occurred on 15.09.2017,
pursuant to which Bhabhua P.S. Case No. 577 of 2017 was
instituted. The allegation in the FIR was that 26 bags of rice
meant for the Public Distribution System were being transported
for the purpose of black marketing in the petitioner's tractor
bearing Registration No. BR-45G-3141 and trailer bearing
Registration No. BR-45G-3143, which were intercepted and
seized by the police. It was further alleged that the said vehicle
was being used for facilitating the illegal diversion of food
grains meant for distribution under the Public Distribution
System.
5. Taking note of the aforesaid incident, the Managing
Director of the respondent-Corporation issued a show cause
notice dated 10.10.2017. The petitioner submitted his reply
dated 17.10.2017 denying the allegations. Thereupon, the
District Manager, vide Memo No. 2261 dated 29.12.2017,
acting upon the decision of the Managing Director
communicated vide Memo No. 13058 dated 23.12.2017,
cancelled the petitioner’s agreement, blacklisted him for a
period of three years, and forfeited his security deposit as well
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as the bank guarantee.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
entire action of the respondent-Corporation proceeds on the
alleged violation of Clause 10.2 of the agreement, whereas no
such clause exists either in the tender conditions or in the
agreement executed between the parties. It is further submitted
that there is no material on record to establish that the petitioner
was involved in any act of black marketing or diversion of food
grains under the Public Distribution System. The allegation is
founded merely on the seizure of certain food grains from the
petitioner’s vehicle, despite the fact that the PDS food grains
had already been delivered to the concerned dealer and the
seized bags were not PDS bags.
7. Learned counsel further submits that even the F.I.R.
does not attribute any overt act to the petitioner and, on the
contrary, records the stand of the concerned PDS dealer that the
seized food grains were his own agricultural produce. In such
circumstances, there was no justification for the respondents to
conclude that the petitioner had violated the terms of the
agreement.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the impugned
orders are liable to be quashed as being arbitrary, mala fide,
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unsupported by any legal or factual basis, and violative of
Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents submits that Bhabhua P.S. Case No. 577 of
2017 was instituted under Section 7 of the Essential
Commodities Act against the concerned PDS dealer, Shri
Anirudh Prasad, wherein it was alleged that the petitioner’s
tractor bearing Registration No. BR-45G-3141 and trailer
bearing Registration No. BR-45G-3143 were used in the
transportation of the food grains forming the subject matter of
the case.
10. Learned counsel further submits that the action of
cancellation of the agreement, blacklisting of the petitioner and
forfeiture of the security deposit and bank guarantee is fully
justified in terms of Clauses 10.2, 11 and 15.4 of the Notice
Inviting Tender read with Clause 17 of the agreement, which
govern the obligations of the transporter and empower the
Corporation to take appropriate action in the event of breach of
the contractual terms.
11. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned orders
have been passed after following due procedure and in
accordance with the contractual provisions, and as such, the writ
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petition is liable to be dismissed.
12. The following issue arises for consideration before
this Court:
1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the respondent-Corporation was justified in invoking Clauses
10.2, 11 and 15.4 of the Notice Inviting Tender read with
Clause 17 of the agreement for terminating the petitioner’s
contract, blacklisting him and forfeiting his security deposit
and bank guarantee?
2. Whether the impugned action suffers from any arbitrariness,
perversity or procedural infirmity so as to warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
Re Issue No. (i)
13. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would
be apposite to reproduce the relevant contractual clauses
governing the parties.
14. Clause 10.2 of the Notice Inviting Tender reads as
under:
"10.2. In case any default in course of transporting
work any loss cause to corporation by the
Transporter on account of strike or any other mode
such loss shall be recovered by forfeiting the Bank
guarantee/security deposit which will be utilized by
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the Corporation or/and the said loss shall be also
recovered from the immovable property by way of
attachment or sale of mortgaged Properties."
15. Clause 11 of the NIT stipulates:
"11. Transporter will be solely responsible for
transporting grains handed over by SFC, block
godown for delivery of food grains under Door
Step delivery for PDS dealers as per delivery
schedule and route chart as directed by the
concerned District Administration/District
Manager and obtained signature of the recipient
(FPS) on the document handed over to him by
block godown of SFC."
16. Clause 15.4 of the NIT provides:
"15.4. The agreement shall be remain in
operation for the period of one year from the
date of execution of the agreement or
allotment of work. This may be extended by
mutual consent for a further period of one
year on the recommendation of District
Transport Committee or may be terminated
earlier than the period mentioned above on
behalf of the BSFC in case of non delivery of
food grains. During the specified period if
there is any breach of the terms of agreement
by the Transport Handling-cum-Delivery
Agent, he will be terminated and blacklisted as
well as debar for further work."
17. Likewise, Clause 17 of the Agreement provides,
inter alia, that:
"17. The agreement shall remain in
operation for one year which may be
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extended by mutual consent for a
further period of one year on the
recommendation of District Transport
Committee or it can be terminated any
time by issuing 15 days prior notice.
This may be terminated earlier than
the period mentioned above on behalf
of the First Party in case of non-
lifting of grains, sugar, edible oil etc.
During the specified period if there is
any breach of any of the terms of the
agreement by the second party, the
agreement may be terminated and
blacklisted as well as debarred for
next five years from future
transportation work, security deposits
will be forfeited and Bank guarantee
of 10 laces (Ten lac only) will be
utilized and encashed at once by the
First Party. The responsibility of the
second party shall not cease with the
termination of the agreement unless
he has redelivered the grains, sugar,
edible oils and etc, entrusted to him
and rendered complete accounts
thereof to the satisfaction of the First
Party.”
18. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid clauses leaves
no room for doubt that the contractual scheme casts a
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heightened degree of responsibility upon the transporter
entrusted with the movement of food grains under the Public
Distribution System. Clause 11 unequivocally fastens the
responsibility of safe transportation and delivery of the food
grains upon the transporter, whereas Clauses 15.4 and 17
reserve to the Corporation the power to terminate the agreement,
blacklist the contractor and forfeit the security deposit in the
event of breach of the contractual obligations. Clause 10.2
further contemplates recovery of loss suffered by the
Corporation on account of any default committed during the
course of transportation work.
19. The record reveals that Bhabhua P.S. Case No.
577 of 2017 came to be registered under Section 7 of the
Essential Commodities Act against the concerned PDS dealer. It
is not in dispute that the FIR specifically mentions the
petitioner's tractor bearing Registration No. BR-45G-3141 and
trailer bearing Registration No. BR-45G-3143 as the vehicle
used in the alleged black marketing of the food grains. Acting
upon the said report, the respondent-Corporation issued a
detailed show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him to
explain his conduct. The petitioner submitted his reply, which
was duly considered by the competent authority before the
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impugned order came to be passed.
20. The principal contention of the petitioner is that
no loss has been caused to the Corporation and that Clause 10.2,
therefore, could not have been invoked. This submission, in the
considered opinion of this Court, cannot be accepted in
isolation. Clause 10.2 cannot be read in isolation from Clauses
11, 15.4 and Clause 17 of the agreement. The contractual
provisions have to be construed harmoniously. While Clause
10.2 deals with recovery of loss through forfeiture of the
security deposit and bank guarantee, Clauses 15.4 and 17
independently empower the Corporation to terminate the
agreement and blacklist the contractor upon breach of the
contractual obligations. Therefore, the absence of a quantified
pecuniary loss by itself does not denude the Corporation of its
contractual authority to terminate the contract if the conduct of
the transporter amounts to breach of the obligations undertaken
under the agreement.
21. The submission that the food grains seized were
not PDS food grains or that the concerned dealer claimed them
to be agricultural produce are matters which may have relevance
in the criminal proceedings. However, the Corporation was not
required to await the outcome of the criminal prosecution before
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taking an administrative decision regarding continuation of a
contractor entrusted with the transportation of essential
commodities under the Public Distribution System. The
contractual relationship is founded upon confidence, integrity
and accountability. Once the competent authority, after issuing
notice and considering the explanation, arrived at a bona fide
satisfaction that the petitioner’s conduct was inconsistent with
the standards expected of a transporter engaged under the PDS
scheme, it cannot be said that the action was dehors the contract.
22. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Patel Engineering
Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 257, has
held that the power of the State or its instrumentalities to
blacklist a contractor is an inherent facet of its executive power
to enter into contracts, subject only to the requirement that such
power must be exercised fairly and for a legitimate purpose. The
relevant part of the said order reads as follows:
15. It follows from the above judgment in Erusian
Equipment case that the decision of the State or
its instrumentalities not to deal with certain
persons or class of persons on account of the
undesirability of entering into the contractual
relationship with such persons is called
blacklisting. The State can decline to enter into a
contractual relationship with a person or a class
of persons for a legitimate purpose. The authority
of the State to blacklist a person is a necessary
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concomitant to the executive power of the State to
carry on the trade or the business and making of
contracts for any purpose, etc. There need not be
any statutory grant of such power. The only legal
limitation upon the exercise of such an authority
is that the State is to act fairly and rationally
without in any way being arbitrary—thereby such
a decision can be taken for some legitimate
purpose. What is the legitimate purpose that is
sought to be achieved by the State in a given case
can vary depending upon various factors.”
23. Likewise, in Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief
General Manager, Western Telecom Project, BSNL, reported
in (2014) 14 SCC 731, the Supreme Court reiterated that while
the power of blacklisting is inherent, its exercise must satisfy
the requirements of fairness, proportionality and observance of
natural justice. The relevant part of the said order reads as
follows:
17. That apart, the power to blacklist a
contractor whether the contract be for supply of
material or equipment or for the execution of any
other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent
in the party allotting the contract. There is no
need for any such power being specifically
conferred by statute or reserved by contractor.
That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a
business decision by which the party affected by
the breach decides not to enter into any
contractual relationship with the party
committing the breach. Between two private
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parties the right to take any such decision is
absolute and untrammelled by any constraints
whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to
contract is unqualified in the case of private
parties. But any such decision is subject to
judicial review when the same is taken by the
State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies
that any such decision will be open to scrutiny
not only on the touchstone of the principles of
natural justice but also on the doctrine of
proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being
blacklisted thus becomes an essential
precondition for a proper exercise of the power
and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant
thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair
and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is
similarly examinable by a writ court.”
24. In the present case, the records disclose that the
petitioner was served with a show cause notice specifically
proposing action against him, an opportunity of reply was
afforded, and the reply was considered before the competent
authority passed the impugned order. Thus, the procedural
safeguards recognised in the aforesaid decisions stand duly
complied with.
25. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view
that the respondent-Corporation acted within the four corners of
the contractual provisions while invoking Clauses 10.2, 11 and
15.4 of the Notice Inviting Tender read with Clause 17 of the
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agreement. The decision to terminate the agreement, blacklist
the petitioner and forfeit the security deposit and bank guarantee
cannot be said to be without contractual authority or
unsupported by the governing terms of the contract.
26. Accordingly, Issue No. 1 is answered in favour of
the respondent-Corporation and against the petitioner.
Re Issue No. (ii)
27. The scope of judicial review under Article 226 of
the Constitution in matters arising out of contractual
relationships is well settled. While this Court is not denuded of
its power to examine the decision-making process of a State
instrumentality, it is equally settled that judicial review is
concerned with the legality of the decision-making process and
not with the merits of the decision itself. Unless the impugned
action is shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, perverse, actuated by
extraneous considerations, or in violation of the principles of
natural justice or the statutory or contractual provisions, the writ
court would not substitute its own view for that of the
competent authority.
28. In Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, reported in
(1994) 6 SCC 651, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that judicial
review in contractual matters is confined to examining the
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decision-making process and not the correctness of the decision
itself. The Court observed that it is not the function of the writ
court to act as an appellate authority over administrative
decisions unless the action is vitiated by arbitrariness,
irrationality or mala fides. The relevant part of the said order
reads as follows:
“77. The duty of the court is to confine itself
to the question of legality. Its concern should
be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority
exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of natural
justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable
tribunal would have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine
whether a particular policy or particular
decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy
is fair. It is only concerned with the manner
in which those decisions have been taken.
The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary
from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds
upon which an administrative action is
subject to control by judicial review can be
classified as under:
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker
must understand correctly the law that
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regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
The above are only the broad grounds but it
does not rule out addition of further grounds
in course of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Department,
ex Brind [(1991) 1 AC 696] , Lord Diplock
refers specifically to one development,
namely, the possible recognition of the
principle of proportionality. In all these cases
the test to be adopted is that the court should,
“consider whether something has gone
wrong of a nature and degree which requires
its intervention”.
29. The said principle has been consistently reiterated
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd.
v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 216 , wherein
it was held that in matters concerning contracts entered into by
the State, interference under Article 226 is warranted only when
the process adopted or the decision made is mala fide, intended
to favour someone, or is so arbitrary and irrational that no
reasonable authority acting in accordance with law could have
arrived at such a decision. The relevant part of the said order
reads as follows:
“24. Therefore, a court before interfering in
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tender or contractual matters, in exercise of
power of judicial review, should pose to itself
the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision
made by the authority is mala fide or
intended to favour someone; or whether the
process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can
say: “the decision is such that no responsible
authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have
reached”? And
(ii) Whether the public interest is affected?
If the answers to the above questions are in
the negative, then there should be no
interference under Article 226.”
30. Similarly, in Silppi Constructions Contractors v.
Union of India, reported in (2020) 16 SCC 489, the Apex Court
cautioned that constitutional courts should exercise restraint in
interfering with contractual and commercial decisions of the
State unless the decision-making process is demonstrably
arbitrary or suffers from patent illegality. The relevant part of
the said order reads as follows:
“19. This Court being the guardian of
fundamental rights is duty-bound to interfere
when there is arbitrariness, irrationality,
mala fides and bias. However, this Court in
all the aforesaid decisions has cautioned time
and again that courts should exercise a lot of
restraint while exercising their powers of
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judicial review in contractual or commercial
matters. This Court is normally loathe to
interfere in contractual matters unless a
clear-cut case of arbitrariness or mala fides
or bias or irrationality is made out. One must
remember that today many public sector
undertakings compete with the private
industry. The contracts entered into between
private parties are not subject to scrutiny
under writ jurisdiction. No doubt, the bodies
which are State within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution are bound to act fairly
and are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of
superior courts but this discretionary power
must be exercised with a great deal of
restraint and caution. The courts must realise
their limitations and the havoc which
needless interference in commercial matters
can cause. In contracts involving technical
issues the courts should be even more
reluctant because most of us in Judges' robes
do not have the necessary expertise to
adjudicate upon technical issues beyond our
domain. As laid down in the judgments cited
above the courts should not use a magnifying
glass while scanning the tenders and make
every small mistake appear like a big
blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair
play in the joints” to the government and
public sector undertakings in matters of
contract. Courts must also not interfere
where such interference will cause
unnecessary loss to the public exchequer.”
31. Tested on the aforesaid principles, this Court finds
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no such infirmity in the present case. The records reveal that the
petitioner was served with a detailed show cause notice setting
out the allegations against him. The petitioner submitted his
explanation, which was duly considered by the competent
authority before passing the impugned orders. Thus, the
requirements of audi alteram partem stood substantially
complied with and the petitioner cannot legitimately contend
that the impugned action was taken in breach of the principles
of natural justice.
32. The contention that the respondent-Corporation
ought to have awaited the outcome of the criminal proceedings
is equally untenable. The impugned action is not founded upon
the petitioner's criminal liability but upon the contractual
obligations governing the relationship between the parties. The
standard applicable to administrative action under a contract is
distinct from that governing a criminal prosecution. The
respondent-Corporation was competent to assess whether the
petitioner’s conduct justified continuation of the contractual
relationship, independent of the result of the criminal case.
33. This Court also does not find any material to
indicate that the decision of the respondent-Corporation was
actuated by mala fides, extraneous considerations or colourable
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exercise of power. The petitioner has not placed any cogent
material on record to establish that the action was
discriminatory or that similarly situated contractors were treated
differently in comparable circumstances. On the contrary, the
records indicate that the Corporation acted upon the information
received, issued notices, considered the replies and thereafter
passed the impugned orders in exercise of powers traceable to
the contractual terms.
34. Once this Court has held under Issue No. 1 that
the respondent-Corporation possessed the contractual authority
to terminate the agreement, blacklist the petitioner and forfeit
the security deposit and bank guarantee, and that such action
was taken after following the prescribed procedure, the scope of
judicial review becomes considerably limited. This Court cannot
sit in appeal over the subjective satisfaction of the competent
authority merely because another view may also be possible.
35. In the absence of any demonstrated arbitrariness,
perversity, mala fides or procedural impropriety, no case is made
out for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
36. Accordingly, Issue No. 2 is answered in favour of
the respondent-Corporation and against the petitioner.
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37. In view of the findings recorded on the issues
framed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the impugned orders do not suffer from any illegality,
arbitrariness, perversity or procedural infirmity warranting
interference in exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The respondent-
Corporation has acted within the scope of the contractual
provisions after affording the petitioner due opportunity of
hearing. Consequently, no case for interference is made out.
38. Accordingly, the present writ petition stands
dismissed.
39. However, it is made clear that this Court has not
expressed any opinion on any other contractual or monetary
claims, if any, that may be available to the petitioner.
40. If so advised, the petitioner shall be at liberty to
invoke Clause 20 of the agreement and take recourse to the
dispute resolution mechanism provided therein by initiating
appropriate arbitration proceedings for redressal of his
grievances, in accordance with law. Clause 20 of the agreement
reads as follows:
“20. All disputes arising under or in
pursuance of this agreement between the
parties, except matters decision of which
herein expressly is otherwise provided, shall
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be referred to sole arbitration of the
C.M.D/Managing Director of the Bihar State
Food & Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.
Patna or a person nominated by the
C.M.D/Managing Director decision of such
arbitrator shall be final and binding on both
the parties. The provisions of the arbitration
and conciliation Act, 1996 and rules framed
there under and statuary modifications
thereof shall apply to the proceedings of
arbitration and all such disputes shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of courts at
Patna.”
41. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(Sudhir Singh, J)
( Ranjan Kumar Jha, J)
rishabh/rajesh
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 07.07.2026
Transmission Date
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