Patna High Court
Kumar Atish Ranjan @ Atish RanjanversusThe Union of India
- Decided
- Disposal
- DISMISSED
- Bench
- RITESH KUMAR
Holding
The writ petition is dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction.
Summary
Kumar Atish Ranjan, a Radio Operator in the Central Reserve Police Force, was compulsorily retired under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 and Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955. He filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court seeking quashing of the retirement order, the appellate and revision orders, and reinstatement with benefits. The Union of India and CRPF authorities contended that the petition was non‑maintainable because the disciplinary orders were passed in Kolkata and New Delhi, and only a communication of the FIR was sent to Bihar. The petitioner argued that the FIR lodged in Nalanda (Bihar) created a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. The Court examined precedents on territorial jurisdiction and cause of action, holding that mere receipt of communication in Bihar does not constitute a cause of action; the substantive acts occurred outside Bihar. Consequently, the petition was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction.
Issues considered
- The writ petition is maintainable before the Patna High Court under Article 226(2) if a cause of action arises wholly or in part within Bihar.
- Whether the FIR lodged in Nalanda creates a cause of action sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Patna High Court.
- Whether the orders of compulsory retirement, appeal, and revision passed in Kolkata and New Delhi can be challenged in the Patna High Court.
Legislation cited
- Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 — s. 11(1)
- Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 — s. 27, 28, 29
- Constitution of India — s. Article 226
Subjects
- territorial jurisdiction
- Article 226
- cause of action
- writ petition
- compulsory retirement
- CRPF
- disciplinary action
- certiorari
- mandamus
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.7184 of 2026
======================================================
Kumar Atish Ranjan @ Atish Ranjan Son of Ashok Prasad, Resident of
Village- Barara, P.S.- Noorsarai, District- Nalanda.
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi-110001.
2. The Central Reserve Police Force through the Director General, East Block-
7, Level-4 RK Puram, Sector-1, New Delhi-110066.
3. The Inspector General (Communication and IT), Directorate General,
Central Reserve Police Force, East Block-7, Level-4 RK Puram, Sector-1,
New Delhi-110066.
4. The Deputy Inspector General, Signal Range, Central Reserve Police Force,
Sector-5, Salt Lake, Kolkatta-700091.
5. The Commandant-5, Signal Battalion, Central Reserve Police Force-cum-
Inquiry Officer stationed in Hallomajra, Chandigarh.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Namrata Dubey, Adv
Mr. Kumar Kaushik, Adv
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Additional Solicitor General
For the Union of India : Mr. Sanjeev Kumar (C.G.C.)
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RITESH KUMAR
ORAL ORDER
3 17-06-2026 Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present writ petition has been filed for the
following reliefs:-
“i. For issuance of an order, direction or
a writ of certiorari for quashing and
setting aside the order dated 14.05.2024
issued under the signature of Respondent
No. 04 whereby and where under the
petitioner who was posted as Radio
Operator (five Signal Battalion at
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Hiranagar, Jammu and Kashmir) has been
inflicted with the punishment of
compulsory retirement from service in
exercise of powers conferred under Section
11 (1) of the Central Reserve Police Force
Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the Central
Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955.
ii. For issuance of an order, direction or a
writ of certiorari for quashing and setting
aside the order dated 20.12.2024
(communicated through letter dated
10.02.2025) issued under the signature of
Respondent No. 03 whereby and where
under the appeal filed by the petitioner on
12.06.2024 under rule 28 of the C.R.P.F.
Rules, 1955 has been rejected.
iii. For issuance of an order, direction or a
writ of certiorari for quashing and setting
aside the order dated 07.08.2025 issued by
the competent authority whereby and
where under the revision filed by the
petitioner under rule 29 of the CRPF
Rules, 1955 against the order of
punishment as well as the appellate order,
has been rejected.
iv. For issuance of an order, direction or a
writ of mandamus for reinstating the
petitioner in service with all consequential
benefit including the arrears of salary for
the period during which the petitioner has
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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been illegally kept out of employment.”
3. At the outset, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Union of India raises a preliminary objection with
regard to the maintainability of the writ petition and submits that
the entire cause of action has arisen outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court in as much as the order of
compulsory retirement has been passed at Kolkata and the same
has been communicated to the petitioner through the 5 signal
Battalion, CRPF at Chandigarh. Further, he submits that even
the appellate order has been passed in New Delhi and the
revisional order has also been passed at New Delhi.
4. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner has been
compulsorily retired from service on account of lodging of first
information report bearing Laheri P.S. Case No. 455 of 2021.
He submits that the entire investigation with regard to the
above-mentioned police case was conducted in Nalanda and
therefore, this Hon’ble Court has got jurisdiction to entertain the
writ petition.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support
of his contention refers to and relies upon a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2014 (9) SCC 329
(Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India and Ors.),
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wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph nos.
5, 8, 17 and 18 has held as follows:-
5. After hearing the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and considering
the entire materials on record, the learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court
dismissed the writ petition of the appellant
holding that no cause of action, not even a
fraction of cause of action, arose within
its territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the
present appeal by special leave.
8. While interpreting the aforesaid
provision, the Constitution Bench of this
Court in Election Commission v. Saka
Venkata Rao [(1953) 1 SCC 320 : AIR
1953 SC 210] , held that the writ court
would not run beyond the territories
subject to its jurisdiction and that the
person or the authority affected by the
writ must be amenable to court's
jurisdiction either by residence or location
within those territories. The rule that
cause of action attracts jurisdiction in
suits is based on statutory enactment and
cannot apply to writs issued under Article
226 of the Constitution which makes no
reference to any cause of action or where
it arises but insist on the presence of the
person or authority within the territories
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in relation to which the High Court
exercises jurisdiction. In another
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court
in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax
Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC
207] , this Court took the similar view and
held that the writ court cannot exercise its
power under Article 226 beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. The Court was of
the view that the exercise of power
conferred by Article 226 was subject to a
twofold limitation viz. firstly, the power is
to be exercised in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction and secondly, the
person or authority on whom the High
Court is empowered to issue writ must be
within those territories. These two
Constitution Bench judgments came for
consideration before a larger Bench of
seven Judges of this Court in Lt. Col.
Khajoor Singh v. Union of India [Lt. Col.
Khajoor Singh v. Union of India, AIR
1961 SC 532] . The Bench approved the
aforementioned two Constitution Bench
judgments and opined that unless there
are clear and compelling reasons, which
cannot be denied, writ court cannot
exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution beyond its territorial
jurisdiction.
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17. We have perused the facts pleaded in
the writ petition and the documents relied
upon by the appellant. Indisputably, the
appellant reported sickness on account of
various ailments including difficulty in
breathing. He was referred to hospital.
Consequently, he was signed off for
further medical treatment. Finally, the
respondent permanently declared the
appellant unfit for sea service due to
dilated cardiomyopathy (heart muscle
disease). As a result, the Shipping
Department of the Government of India
issued an Order on 12-4-2011 cancelling
the registration of the appellant as a
seaman. A copy of the letter was sent to
the appellant at his native place in Bihar
where he was staying after he was found
medically unfit. It further appears that the
appellant sent a representation from his
home in the State of Bihar to the
respondent claiming disability
compensation. The said representation
was replied by the respondent, which was
addressed to him on his home address in
Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim for
disability compensation. It is further
evident that when the appellant was
signed off and declared medically unfit, he
returned back to his home in the district of
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Gaya, Bihar and, thereafter, he made all
claims and filed representation from his
home address at Gaya and those letters
and representations were entertained by
the respondents and replied and a
decision on those representations were
communicated to him on his home address
in Bihar. Admittedly, the appellant was
suffering from serious heart muscle
disease (dilated cardiomyopathy) and
breathing problem which forced him to
stay in his native place, wherefrom he had
been making all correspondence with
regard to his disability compensation.
Prima facie, therefore, considering all the
facts together, a part or fraction of cause
of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court where he received a
letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation.
18. Apart from that, from the counter-
affidavit of the respondents and the
documents annexed therewith, it reveals
that after the writ petition was filed in the
Patna High Court, the same was
entertained and notices were issued.
Pursuant to the said notice, the
respondents appeared and participated in
the proceedings in the High Court. It
further reveals that after hearing the
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counsel appearing for both the parties, the
High Court passed an interim order on
18-9-2012 [Nawal Kishore Sharma v.
Union of India, CWJC No. 3160 of 2012,
order dated 18-9-2012 (Pat)] directing the
authorities of Shipping Corpn. of India to
pay at least a sum of Rs 2.75 lakhs, which
shall be subject to the result of the writ
petition. Pursuant to the interim order, the
respondent Shipping Corpn. of India
remitted Rs 2,67,270 (after deduction of
income tax) to the bank account of the
appellant. However, when the writ petition
was taken up for hearing, the High Court
took the view that no cause of action, not
even a fraction of cause of action, has
arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support
of his contention with regard to the maintainability of the writ
petition further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the
Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court reported in 2023 (5) BLJ
766 (Jagannath Mishra vs. United Insurance Company
Limited and Ors), wherein the Hon’ble Division Bench in
paragraph no. 18 has held as follows:-
“18. In the above circumstances, despite
the Inquiry having been Initiated while the
C.O. was working at Dhanbad, the
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allegations which he had to disprove, was
with respect to the facts that occurred in
Patna. On failing to disprove these
allegations and setting up a reasonable
explanation in his defence, the appellant
would be held guilty of the charges.
Hence, what occurred at Muzaffarpur has
an inextricable link to the lis and those
facts were brought out by the Presenting
Officer (PO) of the employer within the
jurisdiction of this Court, at Patna. We are
of the opinion that the learned Single
Judge erred in finding lack of jurisdiction
though the inquiry was commenced at
Dhanbad and the dismissal order was
communicated to the appellant at
Dhanbad. Since the entire allegations
were of facts that occurred within the
State of Bihar at Muzaffarpur and the
inquiry itself was proceeded with, in
Patna, within the State of Bihar; this
Court has the jurisdiction to consider the
question raised of the sustainability of the
order of dismissal.”
7. The learned for the petitioner in support of his
contention further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 2006 (6) SCC 207
(Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India and Anr.),
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wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph nos.
11 and 18 has held as follows:-
“11. It is settled law that “cause of
action” consists of a bundle of facts,
which give cause to enforce the legal
inquiry for redress in a court of law. In
other words, it is a bundle of facts, which
taken with the law applicable to them,
gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief
against the defendant. It must include
some act done by the defendant since in
the absence of such an act no cause of
action would possibly accrue or would
arise. [See South East Asia Shipping Co.
Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd.
[(1996) 3 SCC 443] ].
18. In the instant case the High Court has
not dealt with the question as to whether it
had jurisdiction to deal with the writ
petition. It only observed that the Delhi
High Court may have jurisdiction, but the
issues relating to conditions of prisoners
in the State of U.P. can be more effectively
dealt with by the Allahabad High Court.
As noted supra, there were two grievances
by the appellant. But only one of them i.e.
the alleged lack of medical facilities has
been referred to by the High Court. It was
open to the Delhi High Court to say that
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no part of the cause of action arose within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi
High Court. The High Court in the
impugned order does not say so. On the
contrary, it says that jurisdiction may be
there, but the Allahabad High Court can
deal with the matter more effectively. That
is certainly not a correct way to deal with
the writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside
the impugned order of the High Court and
remit the matter to it for fresh hearing on
merits. A prayer has been made for
release of the appellant on parole for the
reasons indicated in the application. We
are not inclined to pass any order on the
said application. The same is rejected.
8. Per Contra, the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Union of India refers to and relies upon a judgment
of a leaned Single Judge of this Hon’ble Court dated 27.04.2022
passed in C.W.J.C. No. 11139 of 2018 (Ashutosh Ranjan Vs.
The Union of India and Ors), wherein in paragraph nos. 11,
13, 14, 15 and 20 it has been held as follows:-
“11. Cause of action means a right to sue.
Therefore, the material facts which are
imperative for the suitor to allege and
prove constitute the cause of action. It is
known fact that cause of action is not
defined in any law or a statute. It has,
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however, been judicially interpreted inter
alia to mean that every fact which would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his/her right
to the judgment of the Court. Otherwise, it
would mean that everything which, if not
proved, gives the respondent - defendant
an immediate right to seek a judgment,
would be part of cause of action. Of
course, its importance is beyond any
doubt. Consequently, every action, there
has to be a cause of action, if not, the
plaint/petition, as the case may be, shall
be rejected summarily.
13. Article 226 of the Constitution as it
originally stood had two-fold limitations
on the jurisdiction of the High Courts with
regard to their territorial jurisdiction.
Firstly, the power could be exercised
“throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction”, that is to
say, the writs issued by the court cannot
run beyond the territories subject to its
jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or
authority to whom the High Court is
empowered to issue such writs must be
“within those territories”, which clearly
implied that they must be amenable to its
jurisdiction either by residence or location
within those territories.
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14. Statement of objects and reasons to
incorporate Article 226(1A) now (2) reads
as under:—
“Under the existing Article 226 of the
Constitution, the only High Court which
has jurisdiction with respect to the
Central Government is the Punjab High
Court. This involves considerable
hardship to litigants from distant places. It
is, therefore, proposed to amend Article
226 so that when any relief is sought
against any Government authority or
person for any action taken, the High
Court within whose jurisdiction the cause
of action arise may also have jurisdiction
to issue appropriate directions, orders or
writs. The other new proposals are of a
minor character”
15. Article 226 was amended while
incorporating Clause 2. Clause 2 reads as
under:—
“(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or writs to any
Government, authority or person may also
be exercised by any High Court exercising
jurisdiction in relation to the territories
within which the cause of action, wholly
or in part, arises for the exercise of such
power, notwithstanding that the sea of
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such Government or authority or the
residence of such person is not within
those territories.”
The effect of the amendment is that it
made the accrual cause of action an
additional ground to confer jurisdiction to
a High Court under Article 226. Clause
(2) would enable the High Court within
whose jurisdiction the cause of action
arises to issue directions, order or writs to
any Government, authority or person,
notwithstanding that the seat of such
Government or authority or the residence
of such person is outside territorial
jurisdiction of the High Court. Writ can be
issued by a High Court against a person,
Government or authority residing within
the jurisdiction of that High Court, or
within whose jurisdiction the cause of
action in whole or in part arises. Since
one of the contention is that partial cause
of action is accrued in Bihar State, it is
necessary to take note of what is the
meaning of cause of action. After the
insertion of clause (1-A), re-numbered as
“2” to Article 226 of Constitution, now
the jurisdiction of a High Court can be
invoked if the cause of action arises,
wholly or in part, within the territorial
jurisdiction of that High Court. However,
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the expression “cause of action” has
neither been defined in the Constitution
nor in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
But it may be described as “a bundle of
essential facts, which it is necessary for
the plaintiff to prove before he can
succeed”, or if not proved would give the
defendant a right to judgment in his
favour. It gives occasion for and forms the
foundation of the suit. “Cause of action”
means every fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment of the court as expressed in
the case of Cooke v. Gill, [L.R.] 8 C.P. 107
: 42 LJ PC 98. The petitioner has
contended that one of the essential fact
has arisen within the territorial
jurisdiction of this High Court to the
extent that he is resident of State of Bihar.
Thus, it was contended that cause of
action arose in State of Bihar in part since
clause (2) of Article 226 enables a High
Court to issue appropriate writs, orders or
directions if the cause of action wholly or
in part arises. Petitioner's grievance is
relating to penalty order and its
affirmation by higher authorites of the
State of Assam and State of West Bengal,
therefore, whole cause of action is at
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Assam/West Bengal except the fact that
the petitioner is a resident of State of
Bihar that does not mean that partial
cause of action has accrued in the State of
Bihar. Question of partial cause of action
is attracted only if there is any office of
the respondents are under the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court like Government
of India/Union of India having its offices
at different places. Therefore, the citation
referred by the petitioner in the case of
Naval Kishore Sharma's case is
distinguishable as in that case Naval
Kishore Sharma was working under the
Central Government Organization and it
was part and parcel of Union of India.
Therefore, any claim against Union of
India and its sister concern territorial
jurisdiction could be invoked all over
India.
20. In view of above facts and
circumstances and merely the fact that
petitioner is a resident of State of Bihar
and certain correspondences have been
made by him and that does not accrues
any partial cause of action to the
petitioner in the State of Bihar so as to
entertain writ petition. If this analogy is
accepted every aggrieved person sitting at
his/her home town invoke territorial
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jurisdiction of the respective State High
Court, even though contesting
respondent's office or residence is in a
different place - territorial jurisdiction.
For example employee of the respondents
if he is resident of Tamil Nadu and make
correspondence from Tamil Nadu and he
cannot invoke jurisdiction of Madras High
Court as employer and employee relation
would be only at Assam/West Bengal.
9. The learned counsel for the Union of India
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of this Court dated
06.04.2026 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 5041 of 2026 (Sandeyas
Kumar Singh Vs. The Union of India and Ors.), wherein, this
Court while relying upon a judgment of the learned Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court in paragraph no. 7 has held as follows:-
“7. Having heard the rival submissions
and after going through the judgment
relied upon by the learned counsel for the
Union of India, without going into the
merits of this case and without expressing
any opinion on the merits of this case, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the
writ petition is not maintainable before
this Court for want of territorial
jurisdiction.”
10. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
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Union of India further refers to and relies upon a judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in 1994 (4) SCC
711 (Oil and Natural Gas Commission Vs. Utpal Kumar
Basu and Ors.), wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,
in paragraph nos. 5, 6 and 8 has held as follows:-
5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a
non obstante clause — notwithstanding
anything in Article 32 — and provides
that every High Court shall have power
“throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction”, to issue
to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government,
“within those territories” directions,
orders or writs, for the enforcement of
any of the rights conferred by Part III or
for any other purpose. Under clause (2)
of Article 226 the High Court may
exercise its power conferred by clause (1)
if the cause of action, wholly or in part,
had arisen within the territory over which
it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person
is not within those territories. On a plain
reading of the aforesaid two clauses of
Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes
clear that a High Court can exercise the
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power to issue directions, orders or writs
for the enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution or for any other
purpose if the cause of action, wholly or
in part, had arisen within the territories
in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat
of the Government or authority or the
residence of the person against whom the
direction, order or writ is issued is not
within the said territories. In order to
confer jurisdiction on the High Court of
Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least
a part of the cause of action had arisen
within the territorial jurisdiction of that
Court. That is at best its case in the writ
petition.
6. It is well settled that the expression
“cause of action” means that bundle of
facts which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in
his favour by the Court. In Chand Kour v.
Partab Singh [ILR (1889) 16 Cal 98,
102 : 15 IA 156] Lord Watson said:
“… the cause of action has no relation
whatever to the defence which may be set
up by the defendant, nor does it depend
upon the character of the relief prayed for
by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the
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ground set forth in the plaint as the cause
of action, or, in other words, to the media
upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to
arrive at a conclusion in his favour.”
Therefore, in determining the objection of
lack of territorial jurisdiction the court
must take all the facts pleaded in support
of the cause of action into consideration
albeit without embarking upon an enquiry
as to the correctness or otherwise of the
said facts. In other words the question
whether a High Court has territorial
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
must be answered on the basis of the
averments made in the petition, the truth
or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
To put it differently, the question of
territorial jurisdiction must be decided on
the facts pleaded in the petition.
Therefore, the question whether in the
instant case the Calcutta High Court had
jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
writ petition in question even on the facts
alleged must depend upon whether the
averments made in paragraphs 5, 7, 18,
22, 26 and 43 are sufficient in law to
establish that a part of the cause of action
had arisen within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court.
“8. From the facts pleaded in the writ
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petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked
the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High
Court on the plea that a part of the cause
of action had arisen within its territorial
jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it
became aware of the contract proposed to
be given by ONGC on reading the
advertisement which appeared in the
Times of India at Calcutta. In response
thereto, it submitted its bid or tender from
its Calcutta office and revised the rates
subsequently. When it learnt that it was
considered ineligible it sent
representations, including fax messages,
to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi,
demanding justice. As stated earlier, the
Steering Committee finally rejected the
offer of NICCO and awarded the contract
to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993.
Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO
claims that a part of the cause of action
arose within the jurisdiction of the
Calcutta High Court because it became
aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it
submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta
and made representations demanding
justice from Calcutta on learning about
the rejection of its offer. The
advertisement itself mentioned that the
tenders should be submitted to EIL at
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New Delhi; that those would be
scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final
decision whether or not to award the
contract to the tenderer would be taken at
New Delhi. Of course, the execution of
the contract work was to be carried out at
Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely
because it read the advertisement at
Calcutta and submitted the offer from
Calcutta and made representations from
Calcutta would not, in our opinion,
constitute facts forming an integral part
of the cause of action. So also the mere
fact that it sent fax messages from
Calcutta and received a reply thereto at
Calcutta would not constitute an integral
part of the cause of action. Besides the
fax message of 15-1-1993, cannot be
construed as conveying rejection of the
offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that even
if the averments in the writ petition are
taken as true, it cannot be said that a part
of the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.”
11. The learned counsel for the Union of India
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Division Bench of this Court reported in 2009 (1) PLJR 533
(Amar Kumar Choubey Vs. The Union of India and Ors.),
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
23/36
wherein in paragraph nos. 14, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 21 it has been
held as follows:-
“14. In view of all these admitted facts, it
must be held that no part of cause of
action for filing of a writ applica tion,
claiming payment of disability pen sion
from the respondents had arisen within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.
As noted above, the appellant/writ
petitioner sustained injury at Gomnom in
Ukhrul dis trict, Manipur while being on
duty in As sam Rifles and thereafter,
remained posted at Jorhat in capacity of
Rifleman on gen eral duty from August,
1991 till 1st De cember, 2004. Thus any
and every part of his cause of action for
claiming grant of disability pension had
arisen beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court and the contention of the
learned Counsel for the appellant/writ
petitioner that as the com munication
refusing grant of disability pen sion was
made to his permanent village home
address the district of Saran of the State
of Bihar within the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court by itself given him a cause
of action to maintain his writ petition is
wholly misconceived and must be
rejected.
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
24/36
15. In this context, one must take note of
the relevant provisions of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, which reads as
follows:—
“226. Power of High Courts to issue
certain writs.— (1) Notwithstanding
anything in Article 32, every High Court
shall have powers, throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, to issue to any person or
authority, including in appropriate cases,
any Government, within those territories
directions, orders or writs, including
[writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto
and certiorari, or any of them, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by Part-III and for any other purpose].
(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to
issue directions, orders or writs to any
Goverment, authority or person may also
be exercised by any High Court
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the
territories within which the cause of
action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person
is not within those territories.
(3) ---------------
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
25/36
(4) -----------------
16. It would thus appear that the
touchstone for exercise of jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India squarely depends to the territories
in which the cause of action had arisen
either in whole or in part. This aspect of
the matter as to what would be the cause
of action within the meaning of Article
226(2) of the Constitution of India is no
longer res integra and reference in this
connection may only be made to the
following passage of the Apex Court in
the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd.
(supra):—
“6. Cause of action implies a right to sue.
The material facts which are imperative
for the suitor to allege and prove
constitute the cause of action. Cause of
action is not defined in any statute. It has,
however, been judicially interpreted inter
alia to mean that every fact which would
be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment of the Court. Negatively put,
it would mean that everything which, if
not proved, gives the defendant an
immediate right to judgment, would be
part of cause of action. Its importance is
beyond any doubt. For every action, there
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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has to be a cause of action, if not, the
plaint or the writ petition, as the case
may be, shall be rejected summarily.”
19. The submission advanced on behalf of
the learned Counsel for the appellant/writ
petitioner that as the order rejecting the
request of the petitioner for grant of
disability pension was served on the
appellant/writ petitioner within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court, a
part of cause of action had arisen within
the meaning of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India so as to maintain
writ application filed by the
appellant/writ petitioner is only to be
noticed for its being rejected. Mere
service of notice or a communication is
neither an integral fact much less
material fact forming part of cause of
action. In the present case, when the
appellant/writ petitioner had sustained
injuries in the State-of Manipur and was
subsequently retained in service for next
13 years in the State of Assam (at Jorhat),
his claim for disability pension in terms
of Rules arose and get extinguished
within a period of five years in terms of
Rule 6 of the Rules in the State of Assam
itself. That being so, if the appellant/writ
petitioner after he opted out of service
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
27/36
with his invalid pension as per his own
request w.e.f. 1.12.2004 in terms of Rule
38 of C.C.S. (Pension) Rules, his wholly
belated and impermissible request for
grant of disability pension in the year
2005 and its rejection by the Colonel,
Assam Rifles, the competent authority of
the Director General of Assam Rifles
having its Headquarter at Shillong in the
State of Meghalaya by his order dated
10.11.2005 did not furnish any part of
cause of action for maintaining a writ
application before this Court merely
because the said order dated 14.11.2005
rejecting his request for grant of
disability pension was communicated to
the appellant/writ petitioner at his
permanent village home address in the
district of Saran of the State of Bihar.
This aspect of the matter as to whether
communication itself would constitute a
cause of action for maintaining writ
application was also directly considered
by the Apex Court in the case of State of
Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties reported
in (1985) 3 SCC 217 wherein after
extracting the definition of expression
‘cause of action’ from Mulla's Code of
Civil Procedure, the Apex Court had held
as follows:—
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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“The mere service of notice under Section
52(2) of the Act on the respondents at
their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne
Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial
limits of the State of West Bengal, could
not give rise to a cause of action within
that territory unless the service of such
notice was an integral part of the cause of
action. The entire cause of action
culminating in the acquisition of the land
under Section 52(1) of the Act arose
within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within
the territorial jurisdiction of the
Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur
Bench.”
20. The place of residence or place of
communication in fact can never be by
itself a determinative factor for deciding
the cause of action in terms of Article
226(2) of the Constitution of India is a
well settled proposition in law. Reference
in this connection may also be made to
the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Aligarh Muslim University
(supra) wherein it was held that:—
“2. We are surprised, not a little, that the
High Court of Calcutta should have
exercised jurisdiction in a case where it
had absolutely no jurisdiction. The
contracts in question were executed at
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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Aligarh, the construction work was to be
carried out at Aligarh, even the contracts
provided that in the event of dispute the
Aligarh Court alone will have
jurisdiction. The Arbitrator was from
Aligarh and was to function there. Merely
because the respondent was a Calcutta
based firm, the High Court of Calcutta
seems to have exercised jurisdiction
where it had none by adopting a queer
line of reasoning. We are constrained to
say that this is a case of abuse of
jurisdiction and we feel that the
respondent deliberately moved the
Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact
that no part of the cause of action had
arisen within the jurisdiction of that
Court. It clearly shows that the litigation
filed in the Calcutta High Court was
thoroughly unsustainable.”
21. As a matter of fact, this aspect of the
matter was also considered in detail by
the Apex Court in the case of Oil and
Natural Gas Commission (supra) wherein
it was held that merely because the writ
petitioner submitted a tender and made
representation from Calcutta in response
to an advertisement inviting tenders
which were to be considered at New Delhi
and the work was to be performed at
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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Hazira (Gujarat) it could not have
maintained its writ application in
Calcutta High Court on the basis of its
representation made and reply received
through the FAX Message at Calcutta as
receipt of such communications did form
on an integral part of cause of action.
The Apex Court in fact in this regard
while deprecating entertaining of the writ
application by Calcutta High Court had
also put a note of caution in the following
words:—
“It must be remembered that the image
and prestige of a court depends on how
the members of that institution conduct
themselves. If an impression gains ground
that even in cases which fall outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the court,
certain members of the court would be
willing to exercise jurisdiction on the plea
that some event, however trivial and
unconnected with the cause of action had
occurred within the jurisdiction of the
said court, litigants would seek to abuse
the process by carrying the cause before
such members giving rise to avoidable
suspicion. That would lower the dignity of
the institution and put the entire system to
ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so
but if we do not strongly deprecate the
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
31/36
growing tendency we will, we are afraid,
be failing in our duty to the institution
and the system of administration of
justice. We do hope that we will not have
another occasion to deal with such a
situation.”
12. The learned counsel for the Union of India
further refers to and relies upon a judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India reported in 2008 (3) SCC 456 (Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. And Ors Vs. Kalayan Banerjee), wherein in
paragraph nos. 5,6,7, 8, 10 and 13 has held as follows:-
5. Mr Anip Sachthey, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant,
submitted that it is not a case where
sanction of the corporate office or head
office was required to be taken. The entire
cause of action having arisen within the
jurisdiction of the Jharkhand High Court,
the Calcutta High Court could not have
exercised any jurisdiction in the matter.
6. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in
the nature of mandamus is conferred upon
the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Article 226(2),
however, provides that if cause of action
had arisen in more than one court, any of
the courts where part of cause of action
arises will have jurisdiction to entertain
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
32/36
the writ petition.
7. “Cause of action”, for the purpose of
Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India,
for all intent and purport, must be
assigned the same meaning as envisaged
under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil
Procedure. It means a bundle of facts
which are required to be proved. The
entire bundle of facts pleaded, however,
need not constitute a cause of action as
what is necessary to be proved is material
facts whereupon a writ petition can be
allowed.
8. The question to some extent was
considered by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v.
Union of India [(2004) 6 SCC 254]
stating: (SCC p. 261, para 18)
“18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition
must have a nexus on the basis whereof a
prayer can be granted. Those facts which
have nothing to do with the prayer made
therein cannot be said to give rise to a
cause of action which would confer
jurisdiction on the Court.”
10.Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. [(2004) 6
SCC 254] has been followed by this Court
in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v.
Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. [(2006) 3 SCC
658 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 98] stating:
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
33/36
(SCC p. 669, para 26)
“26. In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v.
Union of India [(2004) 6 SCC 254] a
three-Judge Bench of this Court clearly
held that with a view to determine the
jurisdiction of one High Court vis-à-vis
the other the facts pleaded in the writ
petition must have a nexus on the basis
whereof a prayer can be made and the
facts which have nothing to do therewith
cannot give rise to a cause of action to
invoke the jurisdiction of a court. In that
case it was clearly held that only because
the High Court within whose jurisdiction
a legislation is passed, it would not have
the sole territorial jurisdiction but all the
High Courts where cause of action arises,
will have jurisdiction.”
13. In view of the decision of the Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the
entire cause of action arose in Mugma
area within the State of Jharkhand, we are
of the opinion that only because the head
office of the appellant Company was
situated in the State of West Bengal, the
same by itself will not confer any
jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High
Court, particularly when the head office
had nothing to do with the order of
punishment passed against the
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
34/36
respondent.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
and after going through the records, it appears that the petitioner
was compulsorily retired from service vide order dated
14.05.2025 passed by the DIG, signal Range, CRPF, Kolkata.
Further, the appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the
appellate authority i.e. the Inspector General (Communication &
IT) who is posted at New Delhi and vide order dated
20.12.2024, which was communicated to the petitioner through
letter dated 10.02.2025, his appeal has been dismissed. The said
order has also been passed at New Delhi. Further the revision
preferred by the petitioner has also been dismissed by the
Inspector General (Communication & IT) who is posted at New
Delhi. The entire departmental proceeding against the petitioner
was conducted either at Kolkata or at New Delhi and no cause
of action relating to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner
has arisen in the state of Bihar, except the lodging of the FIR, on
the basis of which, it is alleged that the petitioner has been
compulsorily retired from service.
14. It appears that the judgment relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable in the present
case since in that case the communication was made between
the petitioner of that case and the respondents from the State of
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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Bihar and reply was received in the State of Bihar. Further even
the High Court entertained the writ petition and passed an
interim order directing the authorities of the Shipping
Corporation of India to pay at least a sum of Rs. 2.7 lakh,
subject to result of the writ petition and later on dismissed the
writ petition on the ground of its maintainability. The present
case is not similar to the case relied upon by the petitioner.
Further the case of Jagannath Mishra (Supra) which has been
relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner does not cover
the case of the petitioner, since in that case the entire enquiry
with regard to the proceeding was conducted in Patna and
therefore, the Hon’ble Division Bench came to the conclusion
that since enquiry has been conducted in Patna, the Court at
Patna has the jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
15. In the present case, only the first information
report was lodged in Nalanda, which does not give any
jurisdiction to the petitioner to try and contest his case before
this Hon’ble Court. In the present case, the petitioner has
challenged the order passed by the disciplinary authority, who is
based at Kolkata and the entire departmental proceeding was
conducted in Kolkata, in which the petitioner duly participated
at Kolkata. The appellate order and the revisional order was
Patna High Court CWJC No.7184 of 2026(3) dt.17-06-2026
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passed by the authorities at Delhi. The entire exercise was
conducted outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble
Court and only a communication was sent to the residential
address of the petitioner, which does not give any cause of
action to this Hon’ble Court to try and decide the matter relating
to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner.
16. Accordingly from the consideration made above
and the judgment referred to in the present writ petition, without
going into the merit of this case and without expressing any
opinion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ
petition is not maintainable before this Hon’ble Court for want
of territorial jurisdiction.
17. The writ petition is dismissed for want of
territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner is at liberty to take
appropriate remedy, as available under law before appropriate
forum.
(Ritesh Kumar, J)
krishnakant/-
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