Patna High Court
M/s Tirupati Storage and Allied Pvt. Ltd.,versusUCO Bank Frazer Road Branch,
- Decided
- Disposal
- ALLOWED
Holding
The DRAT possessed jurisdiction under Section 22(2)(e) and (g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 to recall its dismissal order, and the non‑deposit dismissal is procedural, not final, thus the restoration order is valid.
Summary
The appellants, directors of M/s Tirupati Storage, defaulted on a term loan from UCO Bank, leading to recovery proceedings and a decree by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) in 2012. Subsequent appeals before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) were dismissed in 2015 for failure to make the statutory pre‑deposit under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, and the dismissal was upheld by the High Court in 2023. After depositing the required amount in June 2023, the DRAT restored the appeal on 29‑09‑2023, which the Bank challenged before the Patna High Court. The Single Judge set aside the restoration order, holding the DRAT lacked jurisdiction to recall its earlier order after finality. On intra‑court appeal, the Court examined the statutory powers under Section 22(2) of the Act and held that the DRAT could review and set aside its dismissal order, and that non‑deposit is a procedural bar, not an irreversible dismissal. Consequently, the Court affirmed the DRAT’s restoration order and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to recall or restore its earlier order dismissing an appeal for non‑compliance with the pre‑deposit requirement after the order had attained finality.
- Whether the pre‑deposit requirement under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993, when not complied with, results in an automatic and irrevocable dismissal of the appeal, precluding later restoration.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- Debt Recovery
- Pre‑deposit
- Jurisdiction
- Review Power
- Appellate Tribunal
- Procedural Default
- Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act
- Finality
- Restoration of Appeal
Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Letters Patent Appeal No.1093 of 2024
In
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1388 of 2024
======================================================
1. M/s Tirupati Storage and Allied Pvt. Ltd., Anandpur, Bihta, Patna, having its
registered office at M-52/22A, Road No. 25, Sri Krishna Nagar, Patna-
800001, through its Managing Director, Smt. Vijya Singh.
2. Smt. Vijya Singh Wife of Dr. Yashwant Singh Resident of M-52/22A, Road
No. 25, Sri Krishna Nagar, Patna-800001.
3. Dr. Satish Kumar Singh Son of Late Durga Prasad Singh Resident of M-
52/22A, Road No. 25, Sri Krishna Nagar, Patna-800001.
4. Dr. Yashwant Singh S/o Late Shakti Prasad Singh Resident of M-52/22A,
Road No. 25, Sri Krishna Nagar, Patna-800001.
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
1. UCO Bank Frazer Road Branch, Patna through its Branch Manager namely
Abhishek Sinha, S/o-Sri Ajit Sinha, UCO Bank, Frazer Road Branch, Patna
P.S.- Kotwali, District- Patna.
2. The Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department
of Financial Services, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
3. The Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad through the Registrar,
Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Deo Prakash Singh, Advocate
Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Advocate
Ms. Nishu Kumari, Advocate
For the Bank : Mr. Ranjeet Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For the UOI : Mrs. Radhika Kumari, CGC.
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL DUTTA MISHRA
ORAL JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR SINGH)
Date : 16-04-2026
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The present intra court appeal has been preferred
against the judgment dated 04.09.2024 passed by the learned
Single Judge in CWJC No. 1388 of 2024, whereby the writ
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petition preferred by the respondent- Bank was allowed and the
order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal, Allahabad (for brevity ‘DRAT’), restoring Appeal No.
R-99/2014, was set aside.
3. In the writ petition, the writ petitioner had sought
the following reliefs:
“(i) For issuance of writ/writs, order/orders or
direction/directions in the nature of certiorari for
setting aside order dated 29.09.2023 passed in Appeal
Dy. No.748/2023 passed by learned Chairperson, Debt
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad whereby and
whereunder restoration /recall application filed on
behalf of private respondents no. 3 to 6, after expiry of
more than 8 years for recall of order dated 23.03.2015
by which the appeal preferred by the private respondent
no. 3 to 6 was dismissed as not maintainable for want of
pre deposit, has been recalled and the main appeal has
been directed to be restored to its original number and
the private respondents were permitted to file waiver
application by the next date, although the waiver
application filed on behalf of the appellants was
disposed of on 13.02.2015 itself and the appeal was
dismissed as not maintainable for want of pre deposit as
per order dated 23.03.2015.
(ii) For a declaration that order dated 29.09.2023
passed in Appeal Dy. No. 748/2023 by learned
Chairperson, DRAT, Allahabad is without jurisdiction
as order dated 13.02.2015 passed in Appeal No. R-
99/2014 whereby waiver application of the private
respondents was disposed of and they were directed to
deposit 50% of the determined amount to maintain the
appeal and order dated 23.03.2015 has attained finality
and merged with the order passed by the Hon'ble High
Court whereby writ petition vide CWJC No. 4678/2015
preferred by private respondents against order dated
13.02.2015 and 23.03.2015 has been dismissed on
27.06.2023 and as such after dismissal of writ petition
by the Hon'ble High Court, learned Chairperson DRAT,
Allahabad has got no jurisdiction to recall the order
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dated 23.03.2015 which has already attained finality by
order of Hon'ble High Court.
(iii) For any other relief/reliefs for which the petitioner
may be found entitle in the eye of law and in the facts
and circumstances of the case may also be granted in
favour of the petitioner.”
4. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-
Bank had sanctioned a term loan to the appellants. Upon default
in repayment, the account was classified as NPA, and recovery
proceedings were initiated by filing O.A. No. 283 of 2011
before the DRT, Patna. The Tribunal, by judgment dated
17.09.2012, allowed the Bank’s claim and issued a recovery
certificate for Rs. 1,53,38,333/-, while rejecting the
counterclaim filed by the appellants.
5. Subsequently, appellants filed M.A. No. 406 of
2012 and M.A. No. 482 of 2012, both of which were dismissed.
Thereafter, Appeal No. R-99/2014 was preferred before the
DRAT, Allahabad against the order passed in M.A. No. 482 of
2012. By order dated 13.02.2015, the appellants were directed
to deposit 50% of the decretal amount under Section 21 of the
Act. Despite grant of further time vide order dated 23.03.2015,
the appellants failed to comply with the pre-deposit condition,
resulting in dismissal of the appeal as not maintainable.
6. The appellants challenged the pre-deposit condition
before this Court in CWJC No. 4678 of 2015, which was
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dismissed on 27.06.2023.
7. In the meantime, appellants had also filed a third
miscellaneous application, being M.A. no. 150 of 2014 before
the DRT, Patna, seeking settlement of the loan account. The
DRT passed an order dated 05.05.2014 allowing such
settlement.
8. The Bank challenged the said order before the
DRAT, Allahabad, which, by judgment dated 13.02.2018 in
Appeal No. R- 79 of 2014, set aside the DRT’s order. A review
application (M.A. No. 37 of 2018) filed by the appellants was
dismissed on 14.10.2019. The appellants further challenged
these orders before this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1178 of 2020,
which was dismissed on 09.08.2021 with costs. The LPA
therefrom was withdrawn on 05.04.2022, thereby affirming the
said orders.
9. Subsequently, the appellants claim to have
deposited approximately Rs. 76 lakhs in June 2023 and filed a
restoration application before the DRAT, Allahabad. The DRAT,
Allahabad, by order dated 29.09.2023, allowed the same and
revived Appeal No. R-99/2014.
10. The respondent-Bank challenged the said
restoration order in CWJC No. 1388 of 2024, which was
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allowed by the learned Single Judge on 04.09.2024, holding that
the DRAT lacked jurisdiction to recall its order after such lapse
of time and finality of proceedings. The relevant extract of the
said order is reproduced hereinbelow:
“6….Though the learned counsel for the Respondent
No. 3 has tried to argue the matter on merits of the
case, this Court is not inclined to go into the same as
the only issue before this Court is as to whether the
DRAT, Allahabad had the power or jurisdiction to
recall its own order which had attained finality after the
dimissal of the CWJC, that too after lapse of more than
eight years. Admittedly, there is no specific provision in
the Act for recalling or reviewing the orders passed by
the Tribunal. It is settled principles of law that unless
and until the statute confers the power of review/recall,
the Tribunal cannot exercise the power of review more
so, after the lapse of more than eight years. Further, it is
pertinent to mention that the orders of Tribunal dated
13.02.2015 & 23.03.2015 were already challenged
before this Court in CWJC No. 4678 of 2015. The said
CWJC was dismissed on 27.06.2023 confirming the
earlier orders passed. Once an order has been
challenged before a superior Forums/Court and the
same has been confirmed and become final, the
Tribunal/Forum which has passed the order cannot
review or recall its own orders. Further, it is pertinent
to note that in the impugned order, the Tribunal has not
given any reason for recalling its earlier order except
adverting to the judgement of the Allahabad High Court
passed in Writ-C No. 7439 of 2023 in the case of M/s
Sai Enterprises & 2 Ors. Vs. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal & Anr. decided on 17.03.2023 which is
distinguishable on the facts of this particular case. 7.
Having regard to the same, the present writ petition is
allowed, the impugned order passed by the DRAT,
Allahabad dated 29.09.2023 is set aside.”
11. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the
appellants had already complied with the requirement of pre-
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deposit by depositing more than 50% of the decretal amount on
07.06.2023, i.e., prior to dismissal of CWJC No. 4678 of 2015
on 27.06.2023. The proof of such compliance was also brought
on record. Therefore, the finding that the orders dated
13.02.2015 and 23.03.2015 attained finality or merged with the
judgment dated 27.06.2023, is erroneous and contrary to the
material on record. It is further submitted that Section 21 of the
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (for brevity the
‘Act’) does not prescribe any limitation for making pre-deposit,
nor does it contemplate dismissal of an appeal for non-deposit.
12. Learned counsel further submits that the
Tribunal/DRAT has the power to review/recall its own orders
under Section 22(2)(e) & (g) of the Act, and therefore, the order
dated 29.09.2023 restoring the appeal was well within
jurisdiction. Moreover, since the original DRT judgment was
under challenge, it could not have been said to have attained
finality. Thus, the impugned judgment suffers from errors of law
and deserves to be set aside.
13. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent
submits that the order dated 17.09.2012 passed by the DRT,
Patna had already attained finality after dismissal of earlier writ
proceedings, pursuant to which recovery was completed, the
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secured asset was auctioned, and possession was handed over.
The appellants cannot now reopen settled issues by seeking
restoration of an appeal dismissed more than eight years ago. It
is further submitted that the orders dated 13.02.2015 and
23.03.2015, passed by the DRAT, Allahabad attained finality
after dismissal of CWJC No. 4678 of 2015 on 27.06.2023, and
therefore, the DRAT had no jurisdiction to restore the appeal
thereafter. The restoration order dated 29.09.2023 was without
jurisdiction and has rightly been set aside by the learned Single
Judge.
14. In the backdrop of the facts and submissions
noticed hereinabove, the following issues arise for
consideration:
(i) Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in
law in setting aside the order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the
DRAT, Allahabad on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, by
holding that the Appellate Tribunal had no power to
recall/restore its earlier order dismissing the appeal for non-
compliance of pre-deposit?
(ii) Whether the requirement of pre-deposit under
Section 21 of the Act, and the expression “shall not be
entertained”, can be construed to result in automatic dismissal
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of the appeal for non-compliance, thereby rendering such
dismissal final and incapable of recall upon subsequent
compliance?
15. This Court has carefully considered the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and perused the
materials available on record. The controversy in the present
appeal centers around the interplay between the requirement of
pre-deposit under Section 21 and the scope of powers of
recall/review vested in the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
under Section 22(2) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy
Act, 1993.
Re. Issue No. (i)
16. At the outset, it would be apposite to refer to the
statutory scheme governing the powers of the Tribunal. Section
22(2) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993
provides as follows:
“22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the
Appellate Tribunal.-
(1) xx xx xx
(2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall
have, for the purposes of discharging their
functions under this Act, the same powers as are
vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in
respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) xx xx xx
(b) xx xx xx
(c) xx xx xx
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(d) xx xx xx
(e) Reviewing its decisions:
(f) xx xx xx
(g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any
application for default or any order passed by it ex
parte;
17. A plain and purposive reading of the aforesaid
provision makes it abundantly clear that the Tribunal and the
Appellate Tribunal are not mere adjudicatory bodies with
limited jurisdiction, but are vested with substantive powers akin
to those of a Civil Court, including the power to review their
own decisions and to set aside orders passed for default. The
legislative intent behind incorporating such provisions is to
ensure that procedural lapses do not result in irreparable
prejudice and that matters are, as far as possible, decided on
merits.
18. In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal & Ors reported in 1980 Supp SCC 420, has held that
where an order is passed due to a procedural defect or
inadvertent error, the Tribunal is empowered to recall the same
ex debito justitiae to prevent abuse of process. The relevant part
of the said order reads as follows:
“13…The expression 'review' is used in two distinct
senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either
inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a
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palpably erroneous order passed under a
misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when
the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is
apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter
sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held
that no review lies on merits unless a status specifically
provides for it. Obviously when a review is sought due
to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed
by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to
prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres
in every court or Tribunal.”
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kapra Mazdoor
Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd.
& Ors. reported in (2005) 13 SCC 777, has elaborately
explained the distinction between review on merits and
procedural recall, holding that where an order is vitiated on
account of a procedural illegality which goes to the root of the
matter, the Tribunal has the power to recall such order without
entering into the merits. It was further held that such power is
exercised to correct proceedings which stand vitiated due to
procedural defects, and the matter must be re-heard in
accordance with law. The relevant part of the said order reads as
follows:
19. Applying these principles it is apparent that where a
Court or quasi judicial authority having jurisdiction to
adjudicate on merit proceeds to do so, its judgment or
order can be reviewed on merit only if the Court or the
quasi judicial authority is vested with power of review
by express provision or by necessary implication. The
procedural review belongs to a different category. In
such a review, the Court or quasi judicial authority
having jurisdiction to adjudicate proceeds to do so, but
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in doing so commits a procedural illegality which goes
to the root of the matter and invalidates the proceeding
itself, and consequently the order passed therein. Cases
where a decision is rendered by the Court or quasi
judicial authority without notice to the opposite party or
under a mistaken impression that the notice had been
served upon the opposite party, or where a matter is
taken up for hearing and decision on a date other than
the date fixed for its hearing, are some illustrative cases
in which the power of procedural review may be
invoked. In such a case the party seeking review or
recall of the order does not have to substantiate the
ground that the order passed suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record or any other ground
which may justify a review. He has to establish that the
procedure followed by the Court or the quasi judicial
authority suffered from such illegality that it vitiated the
proceeding and invalidated the order made therein,
inasmuch the opposite party concerned was not heard
for no fault of his, or that the matter was heard and
decided on a date other than the one fixed for hearing
of the matter which he could not attend for no fault of
his. In such cases, therefore, the matter has to be re-
heard in accordance with law without going into the
merit of the order passed. The order passed is liable to
be recalled and reviewed not because it is found to be
erroneous, but because it was passed in a proceeding
which was itself vitiated by an error of procedure or
mistake which went to the root of the matter and
invalidated the entire proceeding. In Grindlays Bank
Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and
Ors. (supra), it was held that once it is established that
the respondents were prevented from appearing at the
hearing due to sufficient cause, it followed that the
matter must be re-heard and decided again.”
20. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of
the present case, it is evident that the dismissal of the appeal on
23.03.2015 was not an adjudication on merits, but was
occasioned solely on account of non-compliance of the pre-
deposit requirement. Such dismissal is, therefore, in the nature
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of a dismissal for default or non- compliance of a procedural
condition.
21. Once such dismissal falls within the category
contemplated under Section 22(2)(g), the Tribunal cannot be
said to be denuded of its jurisdiction to recall or set aside the
same. The reasoning adopted by the learned Single judge, that
there exists no provision for recall or that the Tribunal becomes
functus officio, overlooks this express statutory conferment of
power under Section 22(2). The doctrine of finality, though
significant, cannot be applied in a manner so as to render a
statutory provision otiose.
22. Accordingly, this Court holds that the DRAT,
Allahabad did possess the jurisdiction to recall/restore its earlier
order in exercise of powers under Section 22(2)(e) and (g) of the
Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,1993, and the learned
Single Judge was not justified in holding otherwise. Issue No.
(i) is answered in favour of appellants.
Re. Issue No. (ii)
23. Section 21 of the Act reads as follows:
“21. Deposit of amount of debt due, on filing appeal.—
Where an appeal is preferred by any person from whom
the amount of debt is due to a bank or a financial
institution or a consortium of banks or financial
institutions, such appeal shall not be entertained by the
Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited
with the Appellate Tribunal 3 [fifty per cent.] of the
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amount of debt so due from him as determined by the
Tribunal under section 19: Provided that the Appellate
Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, 4
[reduce the amount to be deposited by such amount
which shall not be less than twenty-five per cent. of the
amount of such debt so due] to be deposited under this
section.”
24. Section 21 of the Act provides that an appeal
“shall not be entertained” unless the appellant deposits the
prescribed percentage of the debt. The provision, however,
neither prescribes any limitation for making such deposit not
provides that failure to deposit within a particular time would
result in automatic dismissal of the appeal.
25. The expression “entertain” has been interpreted by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lakshmi Rattan Engineering
Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax, Kanpur &
Ors. reported in 1968 AIR 488, to mean “to admit to
consideration” (Para 10), and does not necessarily imply
dismissal. Thus, the embargo under Section 21 operates at the
threshold stage of consideration of the appeal and does not
amount to a final adjudication. The relevant part of the said
order reads as follows:
“10. The word 'entertain' is explained by a Divisional
Bench of the Allahabad High Court as denoting the
point of time at which an application to set aside the
sale is heard by the court. The expression 'entertain', it
is stated, does not mean the same thing as the filing of
the application or admission of the application by the
court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand
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Jain v. Chamanlal Gupta & Anr., in which the learned
Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the
same meaning to the expression 'entertain'. It is
observed by Dwivedi J. that the word 'entertain' in its
application bears the meaning 'admitting to
consideration'. and therefore when the court cannot
refuse to take an application which is backed by deposit
or security, it cannot refuse judicially to consider it. In a
single bench decision of the same court reported in
Bawan Ram & Anr. v. Kuni Beharilal A.I.R. 1961 All.
42, one of us (Bhargava, J.) had to consider the same
rule. There the deposit had not been made within the
period of limitation and the question had arisen
whether the court could entertain the application or
not. It was decided that the application could not be
entertained because proviso (b) debarred the court from
entertaining an objection unless the requirement of
depositing the amount or furnishing security was
complied with within the time prescribed. In that case of
the word 'entertain' is not interpreted but it is held that
the court cannot proceed to consider the application in
the absence of deposit made within the time allowed by
law. This case turned on the fact that the deposit was
made out of time. In yet another case of the Allahabad
High Court reported in Haji Rahim Bux & Sons and
Ors. v. Firm Samiullah & Sons A.I.R. 1963 All. 326, a
division bench consisting of Chief Justice Desai and Mr.
Justice S. D. Singh interpreted the words of O. 21, r. 90,
by saying that the word 'entertain' meant not 'receive' or
'accept' but proceed to consider on merits' or
'adjudicate upon'.”
26. Therefore, non-compliance with the requirement
of pre- deposit may justify the Tribunal in declining to proceed
with the appeal at that stage; however, such non-compliance
cannot be construed as leading to an irrevocable dismissal so as
to extinguish the statutory right of appeal. The dismissal of the
appeal on 23.03.2015 must, therefore, be understood as a
procedural order, amenable to recall upon subsequent
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compliance.
27. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v.
Punnu Sahu reported in (1971) 3 SCC 124, wherein it was held
that the expression “entertain” has been consistently understood
to mean “adjudicate upon” or “proceed to consider on merits”,
and not the initiation of proceedings. The said interpretation, as
adopted in earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court, was
expressly approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The relevant
part of the said order reads as follows:
“4…It is the contention of the appellant that the
expression. "entertain" found in the proviso refers to the
initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when
the court takes up, the application for consideration.
This; contention was rejected by the High Court relying
on the decision of that court in Kundan Lal v. Jagan
Nath Sharma .The same view had been taken by the
said High Court in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chamanlal
Gupta and Haji Rahim Bux and Sons v. Firm Samiullah
and Sons and again in Mahavir Singh v. Gauri
Shankar. These decisions have interpreted the
expression "entertain" as meaning 'adjudicate upon' or
'proceed to consider on merits'. This view of the High
Court has been accepted as correct by this Court in
Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst Commr.,
Sales Tax, Kanpur. We are bound by that decision and
as such we are unable to accept the contention of the
appellant that Clause (b) of the proviso did not apply to
the present proceedings.”
28. In such circumstances, once the appellants
complied with the requirement of pre-deposit and approached
the Tribunal, the DRAT was well within its jurisdiction to
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consider the application for restoration. To hold otherwise
would result in an unduly rigid interpretation, defeating the very
purpose of providing a statutory remedy of appeal.
29. Accordingly, it is held that in light of Section 21 of
the Act, dismissal of an appeal for non-compliance of pre-
deposit is procedural in nature, and is amenable to recall subject
to compliance of the statutory requirements.
30. Issue No. (ii) is also answered in favour of the
appellants.
31. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the
appellants, though belatedly, have complied with the
requirement of pre-deposit and approached the Tribunal for
restoration of the appeal. The DRAT, while passing the order
dated 29.09.2023, exercised the jurisdiction vested in it under
the Act. The absence of elaborate reasoning in the order, by
itself, would not render the exercise of jurisdiction non est, if
the power to pass such an order otherwise exists in law.
32. Another aspect which merits consideration is that
the powers under Section 22(2) are intended to advance the
cause of justice and to ensure that adjudication is not thwarted
solely on technical grounds. The legislative intent underlying
such provision is to strike a balance between procedural
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discipline and substantive justice. To hold that the Tribunal
becomes completely powerless to recall its order, even in a
situation where the statute expressly provides for review and
setting aside of dismissal orders, would lead to an unduly
restrictive interpretation, contrary to the object of the enactment.
33. In view of the aforesaid, the judgment dated
04.09.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No.
1388 of 2024 is hereby set aside.
34. Consequently, the order dated 29.09.2023 passed
by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad in Appeal
Dy. No. 748/2023, restoring Appeal No. R-99/2014, is affirmed.
35. Accordingly, the present intra court appeal stands
allowed.
36. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
(Sudhir Singh, J)
(Sunil Dutta Mishra, J)
Sujit/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 21.04.2026
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