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High Court of Gujarat

MOHAMMED IMTIYAZ HARUN PARTNER OF VENUS VALVES INDUSTRIESversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

Disposal
97-DISPOSED AS TRANSFER TO DISTRICT/SESSION COURT N.I. ACT.

Holding

A complainant who is also a victim in a Section 138 NI Act case must file the appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS) before the Sessions Court, not before the High Court.

Summary

Mohammed Imtiyaz Harun, partner of Venus Valves Industries, appealed to the Gujarat High Court against the trial court's acquittal on a charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The appellant argued that, as a complainant, he could file an appeal under Section 378 of the CrPC (or Section 413 of the BNSS). The Court referred to its earlier decision in Shivsinh Ganpatsinh Solanki v. State of Gujarat, which, following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Celestium Financial v. A. Gyanasekaran, held that a complainant who is also a victim must invoke the victim’s right under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC (Section 413 BNSS) and appeal to the Sessions Court. Consequently, the High Court declined to entertain the appeal itself and ordered the transfer of the appeal to the appropriate Sessions Court. The matter was disposed without a substantive examination of the merits, leaving the parties free to raise their grievances before the Sessions Court.

Issues considered

  • The appropriate statutory provision for filing an appeal against an acquittal in a Section 138 NI Act case when the complainant is also a victim
  • Whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed under Section 378 CrPC/Section 413 BNSS

Legislation cited

Subjects

Section 138 NI ActVictim's right to appealSection 372 CrPCSection 378 CrPCBharatiya Nagarik Suraksha SanhitaHigh Court jurisdictionCriminal procedure

Judgment

       R/CR.A/1192/2024                                ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




              IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

      R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1192 of 2024

                                        With
                          R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1896 of 2024
==========================================================
        MOHAMMED IMTIYAZ HARUN PARTNER OF VENUS VALVES
                          INDUSTRIES
                             Versus
                   STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR MEET D PANSURIA(10170) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
BAILABLE WARRANT SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. NITESH G JAIN(7178) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MS DHWANI TRIPATHI, APP for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

     CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER

                                   Date : 09/02/2026

                                    ORAL ORDER


1.     These Criminal Appeals are filed under Section 378 of the Code of
       Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code or CrPC”) / Section 419 of the
       Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (`BNSS’ for short) by the
       Complainant against the impugned judgment and order whereby the
       learned trial Court had acquitted the respondent/s/accused of the
       charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
       (hereinafter referred to as the `NI Act’ for short).

2.     Heard learned advocates for the parties.

3.     Before entering into the merits of this case, this Court deems it
       proper to refer to the latest decision rendered by this Court in the
       case of Shivsinh Ganpatsinh Solanki V/s State of Gujarat & Anr.
       being Criminal Miscellaneous Application Nos. 12753 of 2019
       with 12908 of 2019, wherein, after considering the various

                                       Page 1 of 6
R/CR.A/1192/2024                              ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more particularly, the
judgment in the matter of M/s Celestium Financial V/s
A.Gyanasekaran. reported in 2025 INSC 804, has held (in
Paragraph Nos.11, 19 to 23, 31, 32, 34 43, 56, 78 to 80) as under:

   “      xxxxx

   11. Upon a perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it becomes
       evident that in paragraph 7.7 the Apex Court has, in clear
       terms, recognized that a Complainant under Section 138 of
       the NI Act, having suffered financial loss and injury arising
       from the dishonour of a cheque, is an “aggrieved party”
       and, therefore, falls within the definition of a “Victim” under
       Section 2(wa) of the Code.

          xxxxx

   19. Having dealt with the first limb of the argument, the only
       other argument which can possibly be made is that the
       Victim has the option to choose the hat that he wishes to
       wear (i.e., that of a Victim or of a Complainant). It can be
       argued that if the Victim chooses to appeal as a Victim,
       he/she can go under Section 372 of the Code and if as a
       Complainant, then under Section 378 of the Code.

   20. It is clear that the Code provides for two remedies. First,
       under Section 372 for a Victim. Second, under Section
       378(4) for a Complainant. There is no confusion if a person
       is either a Victim or a Complainant. There is some
       divergence of thought when the Victim is also the
       Complainant.

   21. While trying to approach this issue, at a bare glance, the
       statutory framework appears to offer a Complainant (who is
       a Victim in given case) two parallel avenues of appeal (i.e.,
       Section 372 and Section 378). Therefore, one may well argue
       that it is for the person to choose the hat that he wishes to
       wear to file the Appeal.



                            Page 2 of 6
R/CR.A/1192/2024                                     ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




   22. This argument, undoubtedly, seems attractive at first blush.
       However, venturing a little deeper, it turns out to be wanting.
       This is for several reasons which are as follows.

   23. First, a Victim was given a right to file an Appeal under the
       Code pursuant to some object and keeping in mind some
       reasons thereof. Relevant extract of the Statement of Objects
       and Reasons of the Criminal Amendment Act, 2009 [Act 5 of
       2009] by way of which the proviso to Section 372 of the
       Code was introduced, is extracted hereinbelow:

                   At present, the Victims are the worst sufferers in
                   a crime and they don't have much role in the
                   court proceedings. They need to be given
                   certain rights and compensation, so that there
                   is no distortion of the criminal justice system.
                   (emphasis supplied).
          xxxxx

   31. Bare perusal of the language of the provision, along with the
       law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Celestium,
       Mahabir (supra) and Joseph (supra) would show in certain
       terms that the right of a Victim to file an Appeal against an
       Order of acquittal is on a higher footing than that of a
       Complainant. This is for the simple reason, that the Victim,
       in essence is a sufferer/aggrieved party of the alleged
       offence, who has been conferred with this right by the
       legislature, which is not the case for a Complainant.
   32. Hence, to contend that a Victim may simply proceed as a
       Complainant under Section 378 of the Code would then
       render illusory, the very purpose for which an independent
       and substantive right of appeal was conferred upon a Victim.
       Such an interpretation would dilute the legislative intent
       behind introducing a distinct, unqualified appellate remedy
       under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code and would fail
       to give meaningful effect to that statutory right.
          xxxxx
   34. Second, as regards the question of “choice” or “election,”


                                  Page 3 of 6
R/CR.A/1192/2024                                ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




          this Court is not persuaded to readily accept (neither would
          it be possible for anyone to readily infer) that a person who
          is aware of the statutory right to appeal as a Victim (as an
          absolute right) would voluntarily subject himself to the more
          taxing requirements of Section 378(4) of the Code by
          appealing as a Complainant, i.e., to seek special leave of the
          Court for filing the Appeal.
          xxxxx
   43. A harmonious reading of the provisions therefore requires
       that, for the purpose of appellate remedy, a Victim, though a
       Complainant in a given case, must proceed under Section
       372 of the Code rather than invoking Section 378(4) of the
       Code.
          xxxxx

   56. In the present case, in Section 372 of the Code, the said
       Appeal has to be filed before the Sessions Court. The Apex
       Court, in the said judgment, has also taken into
       consideration that the acquittal would be challenged at the
       stage of first appeal before the Sessions Court. The Appeal
       would not lie to the High Court.
          xxxxx

   78. For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that where an
       order of acquittal is rendered by a Magistrate, the statutory
       remedy available to the Victim is to institute an appeal
       before the Sessions Court in terms of the proviso to Section
       372 of the Code, which mandates that such an appeal shall
       lie to the court that would ordinarily entertain an appeal
       against an order of conviction passed by that Court.
   79. In view of the above, it transpires that the Complainant, in a
       complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, being a Victim,
       has a specific right to appeal under proviso of Section 372 of
       the Code to the Court which is immediately superior in
       hierarchy i.e., the Sessions Court.
   80. In view of the above, the applications/appeals which are
       pending before this Court can be disposed of with a direction


                              Page 4 of 6
     R/CR.A/1192/2024                                ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




               to transfer the said application/appeal to the concerned
               Sessions Court. After it is transferred to the concerned
               Sessions Court, it has to be treated as an Appeal under the
               proviso under Section 372 of the Code and numbered
               accordingly.
               xxxxx”


4.   Therefore, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that the
     Complainant, in a Complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act,
     being a Victim, has a specific right to appeal under proviso of
     Section 372 of the Code (Section 413 of BNSS) to the Court which
     is immediately superior in hierarchy i.e., the Sessions Court. The
     applications for leave to appeal/appeals which are pending before
     this Court can be disposed of with a direction to transfer the said
     application/appeal to the concerned Sessions Court.

5.   In the present case also, given the position of law as now settled and
     since the Complainant in the present case is also a Victim, there is no
     reason for this Court to take any view different from that taken in
     Shivsinh Ganpatsinh (supra).

6.   In view of the above, these Appeals are disposed of with a direction
     to the Registry to transfer the appeals to the concerned Sessions
     Court. After they are transferred to the concerned Sessions Court,
     they have to be treated as Appeals under the proviso under Section
     372 of the Code (Section 413 of BNSS) and numbered accordingly.
     The Registry is directed to transfer the entire record of the case,
     including the certified copies of the order impugned and Record and
     Proceedings, if lying with this Court, to the concerned lower
     Appellate Court, forthwith. It is open for the parties to agitate all the

                                  Page 5 of 6
            R/CR.A/1192/2024                                                                 ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026




            grievances before the concerned Court afresh. It is clarified that this
            Court has not gone into the merits of the matters at this stage.


                                                                                          (SANJEEV J.THAKER,J)
   SRILATHA



Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SRILATHA VENKATARAO UPADHYAYULA(HC00185), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 09/02/2026 18:06:41




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