BHARATBHAI GORDHANBHAI DHOLARIYAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Disposal
- 97-DISPOSED AS TRANSFER TO DISTRICT/SESSION COURT N.I. ACT.
- Bench
- SANJEEV THAKER
Holding
A victim who is also the complainant must file the appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC (Section 413 of the BNSS) before the Sessions Court, and the High Court must transfer the appeal accordingly.
Summary
The appellant filed an appeal under Section 378 of the CrPC and Section 419 of the BNSS against the trial court's acquittal on a charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The court examined the recent decision in Shivsinh Ganpatsinh Solanki v. State of Gujarat, which, relying on Supreme Court judgments, held that a complainant who is also a victim must appeal under the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC (Section 413 of the BNSS) before the Sessions Court, not under Section 378. The High Court affirmed that the victim's right to appeal lies with the Sessions Court and that the present appeal should be transferred accordingly. No merits of the underlying criminal charge were considered. The appeal was therefore disposed of with a direction to transfer the entire record to the appropriate Sessions Court for a Section 372/413 appeal.
Issues considered
- The appropriate statutory provision for a victim‑complainant to appeal an acquittal under Section 138 of the NI Act – whether Section 378 CrPC or the proviso to Section 372 CrPC (Section 413 BNSS).
- The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain such an appeal versus the Sessions Court.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 372, s. 378
- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 138
Subjects
Judgment
R/CR.A/752/2024 ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 752 of 2024
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BHARATBHAI GORDHANBHAI DHOLARIYA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR A A ZABUAWALA(6823) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
BAILABLE WARRANT SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MS DHWANI TRIPATHI, APP for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
SURESH M CHAUDHARY(9938) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE SANJEEV J.THAKER
Date : 09/02/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. This appeal is filed under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (“Code or CrPC”)/ 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Surakhsha Sanhita Act. 2023, (“BNSS”) against the impugned
judgment and order, whereby the learned trial Court had acquitted
the respondent/s/accused of the charge under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the `NI
Act’ for short).
2. Heard learned advocates for the parties. Learned APP has
submitted that this matter is required to be transferred in view of the
recent decision of this Court passed in Criminal Misc. Application
No.12753 of 2019 with Criminal Misc. Application No.12908 of
2019.
3. Before entering into the merits of this case, this Court deems it
proper to refer to the latest decision rendered by this Court in the
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case of Shivsinh Ganpatsinh Solanki V/s State of Gujarat & Anr.
being Criminal Miscellaneous Application Nos. 12753 of 2019
with 12908 of 2019, wherein, after considering the various
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, more particularly, the
judgment in the matter of M/s Celestium Financial V/s
A.Gyanasekaran. reported in 2025 INSC 804, has held (in
Paragraph Nos.11, 19 to 23, 31, 32, 34 43, 56, 78 to 80) as under:
“11. Upon a perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it becomes
evident that in paragraph 7.7 the Apex Court has, in clear
terms, recognized that a Complainant under Section 138 of
the NI Act, having suffered financial loss and injury arising
from the dishonour of a cheque, is an “aggrieved party”
and, therefore, falls within the definition of a “Victim” under
Section 2(wa) of the Code.
19. Having dealt with the first limb of the argument, the only
other argument which can possibly be made is that the
Victim has the option to choose the hat that he wishes to
wear (i.e., that of a Victim or of a Complainant). It can be
argued that if the Victim chooses to appeal as a Victim,
he/she can go under Section 372 of the Code and if as a
Complainant, then under Section 378 of the Code.
20. It is clear that the Code provides for two remedies. First,
under Section 372 for a Victim. Second, under Section
378(4) for a Complainant. There is no confusion if a person
is either a Victim or a Complainant. There is some
divergence of thought when the Victim is also the
Complainant.
21. While trying to approach this issue, at a bare glance, the
statutory framework appears to offer a Complainant (who is
a Victim in given case) two parallel avenues of appeal (i.e.,
Section 372 and Section 378). Therefore, one may well argue
that it is for the person to choose the hat that he wishes to
wear to file the Appeal.
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R/CR.A/752/2024 ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026
22. This argument, undoubtedly, seems attractive at first blush.
However, venturing a little deeper, it turns out to be wanting.
This is for several reasons which are as follows.
23. First, a Victim was given a right to file an Appeal under the
Code pursuant to some object and keeping in mind some
reasons thereof. Relevant extract of the Statement of Objects
and Reasons of the Criminal Amendment Act, 2009 [Act 5 of
2009] by way of which the proviso to Section 372 of the
Code was introduced, is extracted hereinbelow:
At present, the Victims are the worst sufferers in
a crime and they don't have much role in the
court proceedings. They need to be given
certain rights and compensation, so that there
is no distortion of the criminal justice system.
(emphasis supplied).
31. Bare perusal of the language of the provision, along with the
law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Celestium,
Mahabir (supra) and Joseph (supra) would show in certain
terms that the right of a Victim to file an Appeal against an
Order of acquittal is on a higher footing than that of a
Complainant. This is for the simple reason, that the Victim,
in essence is a sufferer/aggrieved party of the alleged
offence, who has been conferred with this right by the
legislature, which is not the case for a Complainant.
32. Hence, to contend that a Victim may simply proceed as a
Complainant under Section 378 of the Code would then
render illusory, the very purpose for which an independent
and substantive right of appeal was conferred upon a Victim.
Such an interpretation would dilute the legislative intent
behind introducing a distinct, unqualified appellate remedy
under the proviso to Section 372 of the Code and would fail
to give meaningful effect to that statutory right.
34. Second, as regards the question of “choice” or “election,”
this Court is not persuaded to readily accept (neither would
it be possible for anyone to readily infer) that a person who
is aware of the statutory right to appeal as a Victim (as an
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R/CR.A/752/2024 ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026
absolute right) would voluntarily subject himself to the more
taxing requirements of Section 378(4) of the Code by
appealing as a Complainant, i.e., to seek special leave of the
Court for filing the Appeal.
43. A harmonious reading of the provisions therefore requires
that, for the purpose of appellate remedy, a Victim, though a
Complainant in a given case, must proceed under Section
372 of the Code rather than invoking Section 378(4) of the
Code.
56. In the present case, in Section 372 of the Code, the said
Appeal has to be filed before the Sessions Court. The Apex
Court, in the said judgment, has also taken into
consideration that the acquittal would be challenged at the
stage of first appeal before the Sessions Court. The Appeal
would not lie to the High Court.
78. For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that where an
order of acquittal is rendered by a Magistrate, the statutory
remedy available to the Victim is to institute an appeal
before the Sessions Court in terms of the proviso to Section
372 of the Code, which mandates that such an appeal shall
lie to the court that would ordinarily entertain an appeal
against an order of conviction passed by that Court.
79. In view of the above, it transpires that the Complainant, in a
complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, being a Victim,
has a specific right to appeal under proviso of Section 372 of
the Code to the Court which is immediately superior in
hierarchy i.e., the Sessions Court.
80. In view of the above, the applications/appeals which are
pending before this Court can be disposed of with a direction
to transfer the said application/appeal to the concerned
Sessions Court. After it is transferred to the concerned
Sessions Court, it has to be treated as an Appeal under the
proviso under Section 372 of the Code and numbered
accordingly.”
4. Therefore, it has been held in the aforesaid judgment that the
Complainant, in a Complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act,
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R/CR.A/752/2024 ORDER DATED: 09/02/2026
being a Victim, has a specific right to appeal under proviso of
Section 372 of the Code (Section 413 of BNSS) to the Court which
is immediately superior in hierarchy i.e., the Sessions Court. The
applications for leave to appeal/appeals which are pending before
this Court can be disposed of with a direction to transfer the said
application/appeal to the concerned Sessions Court.
5. In the present case also, given the position of law as now settled
and since the Complainant in the present case is also a Victim, there
is no reason for this Court to take any view different from that taken
in Shivsinh Ganpatsinh (supra).
6. In view of the above, the Appeal is disposed of with a direction to
the Registry to transfer the appeal to the concerned Sessions Court.
After it is transferred to the concerned Sessions Court, it has to be
treated as an Appeal under the proviso under Section 372 of the
Code (Section 413 of BNSS) and numbered accordingly. The
Registry is directed to transfer the entire record of the case,
including the certified copies of the order impugned and Record and
Proceedings, if lying with this Court, to the concerned lower
Appellate Court, forthwith. It is open for the parties to agitate all the
grievances before the concerned Court afresh. It is clarified that this
Court has not gone into the merits of the matter at this stage.
(SANJEEV J.THAKER,J)
URIL RANA
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: RANA URIL K(HC01406), PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 09/02/2026 18:52:53
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