VAJESINH CHHATRASINH CHAUHANversusDEPUTY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER

     C/SCA/1229/2025                              ORDER DATED: 23/04/2026




           IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

             R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1229 of 2025
================================================================
                       VAJESINH CHHATRASINH CHAUHAN
                                   Versus
                         DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
================================================================
Appearance:
MR DIPAK R DAVE(1232) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR VAIBHAVKUMAR I BHOI(12030) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR PRADIP J PATEL(5896) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================
 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE

                              Date : 23/04/2026
                               ORAL ORDER

1.    By the present writ petition, the petitioner impugns the award
dated 30.03.2024 passed by the Labour Court, Godhra in Reference
(T) No.151 of 2011, whereby the learned Labour Court has partly
allowed the reference and granted a lump sum compensation of
Rs.70,000/- to the petitioner herein along with costs of Rs.5,000/-.

2.    Learned counsel Mr.Dipak Dave appearing for the petitioner
submits that the Labour Court has come to a categorical finding that
there is violation of Sections 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act” for short) in the present case. He
submits that in this background, the learned Labour Court ought to
have granted reinstatement with back-wages instead of lump sum
compensation. He submits that the petitioner has specifically stated
that he had worked for 7 years with the respondent as a Rojamdar
labourer and that the said statement has not been disproved by the
respondent through credible evidence. He submits that in view
thereof, the learned Labour Court has drawn adverse inference

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against the respondent and held that the petitioner had rendered
continuous service for 7 years with the respondent. He submits that
the learned Labour Court has also held that as per Section 25B of the
ID Act, the petitioner was working continuously with the
respondent.

3.    Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the lump sum
compensation granted by the learned Labour Court is based on
erroneous facts. He submits that the age of the petitioner on the date
of passing of the award was 56 years and therefore, he had four more
years of service left and that he had not crossed the age of
superannuation. He submits that in this background, the petitioner
ought to have been reinstated in service with full back-wages and
consequential benefits. In support of his contentions, he has relied
upon the order dated 24.06.2022 in Special Civil Application
No.4168 of 2022 and other connected matters passed by the
Coordinate Bench of this Court, wherein it has been held that the
compensation in lieu of reinstatement will be detrimental to the
petitioner, who has worked for a long period of time. He has also
relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench in Letters Patent
Appeal No.306 of 2008 dated 03.05.2018 and the order dated
19.03.2024 in Letters Patent Appeal No.190 of 2024 laying down a
similar proposition. He, therefore, submits that the impugned award
granting lump sum compensation be quashed and modified and the
petitioner be granted reinstatement with full back-wages and all
consequential benefits.

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4.    Per contra, learned counsel Mr.Pradip Patel appearing on
behalf of the respondent submits that in the present case the
petitioner has not produced any document to show that he was
working with the respondent. He submits that the petitioner has
nowhere stated his date of joining of service with the respondent. He
submits that the petitioner has only stated that he was working for 7
years before his alleged termination. He submits that even the date
of termination is also not stated and the claim vaguely mentions
date of oral termination as April, 1997. He submits that vague
averments are made in the claim petition and that the learned Labour
Court has partly allowed the reference only on the basis of adverse
inference drawn against the respondent herein. He submits that the
findings arrived at by the learned Labour Court are not based on any
evidence on record, but only on adverse inference. He submits that
even in his cross-examination, the petitioner has stated that he was
going for a work as and when called for by the respondent. It is also
admitted by the petitioner that he has not given any information as to
from what date to what date he has worked with the respondent and
for how many days in each month for the said period. He submits
that in the cross-examination, the petitioner has further stated that he
was going for work of the respondent as and when the main
contractor of the village used to take him for work.

5.    Learned counsel for the respondent submits that since the
petitioner was never appointed as a daily wage labourer with the


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respondent, no records were maintained and therefore, nothing could
be produced on record. He submits that even the adverse inference
drawn against the respondent cannot be sustained in law since the
workman had not proved his case at all. He, therefore, submits that
the petitioner is not at all entitled for any reinstatement with
continuity and full back-wages as he was never employed by the
respondent. He, therefore, submits that the present petition be
dismissed. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the order
dated 29.09.2025 in Special Civil Application No.488 of 2014 and
other connected matters passed by the Coordinate Bench of this
Court, wherein it has been held that the burden of proof first lies on
the workman to demonstrate that he had worked continuously for
240 days in the preceding year and it was incumbent upon the
workman to adduce cogent evidence in this regard apart from his
own deposition to substantiate his claim of employment with the
employer.

6.    Heard learned counsel for the parties. Perused the documents
on record and considered the submissions.

7.    The present case reveals very peculiar facts. Annexure-B to
the petition is the copy of the claim petition filed by the petitioner.
The said claim petition is in a standard typed format, wherein blanks
have been filled up in handwriting with respect to the number of
years of service, daily wages and date of termination. All the
averments in the claim petition are totally general in nature and


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vague. The claim petition does not state the date of joining of service
by the petitioner. Even in his deposition, the petitioner has admitted
that he does not remember his date of joining nor he remembers his
date of termination, yet it has been claimed that the petitioner was
working with the respondent since 7 years. In the reference
proceedings, both the parties have led only oral evidence. The
petitioner in his cross-examination has made a categorical statement
that it is true that he was going for work with the respondent as and
when the main contractor of the villager asked him to come and
work. He has also admitted that he used to do labour work wherever
the main contractor used to take him. He has admitted that he has not
given any date of joining of service with the respondent. He has also
admitted that from what date till which date he has worked with the
respondent and for how many days in each month he has worked. He
has admitted that he has not produced any evidence in this regard
before the Labour Court.

8.    A perusal of the oral evidence of the witness for the
respondent reveals that the petitioner was coming for work as a daily
labourer as and when he was called for. He was not appointed as a
Rojamdar daily wager by the department. It is also stated that since
he was not appointed by the respondent, no records were maintained
in respect of the petitioner.

9.    The learned Labour Court by the impugned award has held
that the petitioner was working as a daily wage labourer with the


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      C/SCA/1229/2025                                   ORDER DATED: 23/04/2026




respondent since last 7 years from the date of his oral termination.
The said finding has been recorded on the basis of adverse inference
drawn on the ground that the respondent has not produced any
evidence on record to controvert the statement made by the
petitioner in his claim petition. Further, on the basis of the
provisions of Section 25B of the ID Act, the learned Labour Court
has assumed that the petitioner has continuously worked for the said
period of 7 years despite no clearcut statement made by the
petitioner that he has worked for 240 days and more in the preceding
year as well as in the alleged last 7 years in service. The total onus
has been placed on the respondent-employer and it has been held
that since the respondent has not produced any muster roll or
attendance sheet in view of the provisions of Section 25B of the ID
Act, the service of the petitioner to be treated continuous.

10.    Further, the learned Labour Court has come to the conclusion
that since the petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation, he is
not entitled for any reinstatement in service and back-wages and
accordingly, has granted a lump sum compensation of Rs.70,000/- in
lieu of reinstatement with continuity in service and full back-wages.
It is also pertinent to mention here that the respondent has not
challenged the impugned order till date.

11.    In the case of Range Forest Officer vs. S.T. Hadimani,
reported in (2002) 3 SCC 25, the Apex Court has held thus:-
       “3. For the view we are taking, it is not necessary to go into the
       question as to whether the appellant is an "industry" or not, though


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      C/SCA/1229/2025                                      ORDER DATED: 23/04/2026




       reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v.
       Pratam Singh Narsinh Parmar, JT (2001) 3 SC 326. In our opinion the
       Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without
       first determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent
       had worked for more than 240 days in the year preceding his
       termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but
       this claim was denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to
       lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked for 240 days in the
       year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own
       statement in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient
       evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a
       workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of
       receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record of
       appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the
       workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside.
       However, Mr. Hegde appearing for the Department states that the
       State is really interested in getting the law settled and the respondent
       will be given an employment on compassionate grounds on the same
       terms as he was allegedly engaged prior to his termination, within two
       months from today.”


12.    In the case of Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bangalore
vs. S. Mani and Others, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 100, the Apex
Court has held thus:-
       “18. The concerned workmen in their evidence did not specifically
       state that they had worked for 240 days. They merely contended in
       their affidavit that they are reiterating their stand in the claim
       petition.
       19. Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an
       oath to state that they had worked for 240 days. No document in
       support of the said plea was produced. It is, therefore not correct to
       contend that the plea raised by the Respondents herein that they have
       worked continuously for 240 days was deemed to have been admitted
       by applying the doctrine of non-traverse. It any event the contention
       of the Respondents having been denied and disputed, it was
       obligatory on the part of the Respondents to add new evidence. The
       contents raised in the letters of the Union dated 30th May, 1988 and
       11th April, 1990 containing statements to the effect that the workmen
       had been working continuously for 240 days might not have been
       replied to, but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the
       allegations made therein cannot be said to have been proved
       particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof were not
       proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such
       letters, the contents thereof would not stand admitted. The Evidence


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       Act does not say so.”


13.    In the case of R.M. Yellatti vs. Asstt. Executive Engineer,
reported in (2006) 1 SCC 106, the Apex Court has held thus:-

       “17. Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the
       provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the
       proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However,
       applying general principles and on reading the aforestated
       judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that
       the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for
       240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the
       workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon
       the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary.
       In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will
       be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no
       receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman
       (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the
       court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of
       appointment or termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance
       register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend
       thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it
       clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the
       claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the
       burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked
       for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down
       that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of
       suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the
       tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management.
       Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that
       the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere
       with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court
       unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each
       case.”

14.    Despite the settled legal position, the learned Labour Court has
accepted the oral statement made by the petitioner without any
cogent evidence on record being produced in respect of joining of
service, date of oral termination and number of days worked in each
of the year of 7 years of service as claimed. The learned Labour
Court has awarded lump sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

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      C/SCA/1229/2025                                                    ORDER DATED: 23/04/2026




15.     For the aforesaid reasons and observations, no interference is
called for. The present petition is devoid of merits and is
accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.

                                                                                    Sd/-
                                                                  (ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)
ABHISHEK/70

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: ABHISHEK DASHRATHBHAI PRAJAPATI(HC01389), GOV, at High Court of Gujarat on 27/04/2026 14:44:54




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