High Court of Gujarat
KANAIYALAL NAGJIBHAI ROTversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Decided
- Disposal
- 58-RULE ISSUED & RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @FH
- Bench
- NIRZAR S DESAI
Holding
The termination order was a stigmatic termination and was quashed; the petitioner was reinstated without entitlement to back‑wages.
Summary
The petitioner, Kanaiyalal Nagjibhai Rot, a fixed‑term Assistant Depot Manager of Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation, was terminated on 6 March 2021 after an FIR was lodged against him under IPC sections 406, 409, 420, 120B, the Essential Commodities Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act. He challenged the termination as a stigmatic order that was passed without a full departmental inquiry or compliance with natural‑justice principles. The High Court examined a line of precedents establishing that termination based solely on criminal allegations, without a proper inquiry, is stigmatic and therefore illegal under Article 311. Relying on decisions such as Rakeshkumar Katara v. State of Gujarat and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Swati Priyadarshini, the Court held that the termination was unlawful. Consequently, the termination order was quashed, the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated to his original post for the balance of his contractual term, and no back‑wages were awarded. The petition was allowed in its entirety.
Issues considered
- The termination of a contractual employee on the basis of an FIR constitutes a stigmatic termination.
- Whether a full‑scale departmental inquiry is required before terminating a contractual employee.
- Whether the termination order violates the principles of natural justice and Article 311 of the Constitution.
- Entitlement to reinstatement and back‑wages after quashing a stigmatic termination.
Legislation cited
- Essential Commodities Act — s. 3, 7
- Indian Penal Code — s. 120B, 406, 409, 420
- Prevention of Corruption Act
Subjects
- stigmatic termination
- contractual employee
- due process
- departmental inquiry
- natural justice
- Article 311
- reinstatement
- back wages
- IPC
- Prevention of Corruption Act
- Essential Commodities Act
Judgment
C/SCA/8522/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/02/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8522 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI
=====================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
=====================================================
KANAIYALAL NAGJIBHAI ROT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
=====================================================
Appearance:
KARTIK H BHATT(9313) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR. BHARGAV V PANDYA(7103) for the Respondent(s) No.
2
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=====================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI
Date : 10/02/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Leave to join In-charge General Manager
(Personnel), Gujarat State Civil Supplies
Corporation, Gandhinagar as respondent No.3 as
per amendment tendered by learned advocate Mr.
Kartik H. Bhatt appearing for the petitioner
today. The same is taken on record and granted.
To be carried out forthwith.
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2. With the consent of parties, the matter is
taken up for final disposal today itself. Hence,
Rule. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.
Aditya Davda waives service of rule on behalf of
respondent Nos.1 and 2 and learned advocate Mr.
Bhargav Pandya waives service of rule on behalf
of respondent No.3.
3. By way of this petition, the petitioner has
challenged the order of termination dated
6.3.2021 passed by respondent No.3 and has
prayed for quashing and setting aside all
consequential and subsequent orders pursuant to
the order dated 6.3.2021 and has prayed for a
direction to the respondents to reinstate the
petitioner to the post of Assistant Depot
Manager with all consequential benefits
4. The facts stated by learned advocate Mr.
Kartik Bhatt are as under :-
4.1 That the present petitioner was appointed
as Assistant Depot Manager by the Gujarat State
Civil Supplies Corporation on 21.05.2016 and
joined service on 02.06.2016. The appointment
was on fixed pay for a period of five years.
Before the completion of the said period, an
inspection was carried out on 27.01.2021 by the
Deputy General Manager, Panchmahal of respondent
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No. 3 Corporation, and no irregularities were
found. It is stated by learned advocate Mr.
Kartik Bhatt that thereafter, in February 2021,
the Mamlatdar, Shahera conducted another
inspection and found certain irregularities in
the stock at the godown. Consequently, an FIR
dated 20.02.2021, being FIR No. 11207061210114
of 2021, was registered at Shahera Police
Station, District Panchmahal, under Sections
406, 409, 420, and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code, along with Sections 3 and 7 of the
Essential Commodities Act.
4.2 In view of the registration of the
aforesaid FIR, the petitioner’s services were
terminated vide the impugned order dated
06.03.2021 without following due procedure of
law. Since the petitioner’s contractual period
had not expired and the petitioner was on
probation, learned advocate Mr. Kartik Bhatt
submitted that, considering the language of the
order, the termination can be termed a stigmatic
order. Therefore, in view of the catena of
decisions of this Court, the impugned order,
being stigmatic and based on the criminal case
registered against the petitioner, is illegal
and is required to be quashed and set aside.
5. Mr. Kartik Bhatt, learned advocate
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appearing for the petitioner relied upon the
latest decision of this Court dated 04-
10.12.2024 in case of Rakeshkumar Bhursingbhai
Katara V/s. State of Gujarat in Special Civil
Application No. 22588 of 2022 and allied matters
and submitted that while allowing the petitions
of those petitioners, this Court has elaborately
considered the decision of this Court right from
the decision in the case of State of Guajrat
V/s. Chetan Jayantilal Rajgor dated 24.07.2020
passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1596 of 2019
and other decisions including the latest
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of
Swati Priyadarshini V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh
and others reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2139
and therefore, present case is squarely covered
by the above decision and therefore, the
petitioner’s termination order is bad in law and
the same is deserves to be quashed and set aside
and the petitioner is required to be reinstated
on his original post.
6. Mr. Aditya Davda, learned AGP appearing for
the respondent – State vehemently opposed the
petition and submitted that the petitioner was
found to have indulged into misconduct which
would dis-entitle him from serving any further.
He submitted that in view of registration of FIR
against the present petitioner for an offence
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under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the
present petitioner’s services are rightly
terminated. Learned AGP also submitted that
there are Special Leave Petition pending before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court whereby the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has vide interim order dated
17.09.2024 passed in case of State of Gujarat
V/s. Hiralben Navinchandra Dholakiya in Special
Leave Petition Civil (Diary) No. 37835 of 2024
has stayed the impugned order of this Court.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has vide
interim order dated 14.12.2023 passed in the
case of The State of Gujarat V/s. Ashishbhai
Chandrakantbhai Solanki in Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 23698 of 2022 has stayed
the impugned order of this Court whereby the
order of stigmatic termination was quashed by
this Court and she therefore, prayed for
dismissal of this petition.
6.1 He further submitted that the authority
has taken into consideration the Government
Resolution dated 16.02.2006 r/w Government
Resolution dated 20.10.2015 and Government
Resolution dated 28.03.2016 and by virtue of
powers flowing from the provisions of above
Government Resolutions, the order of termination
was passed and therefore, the same is absolutely
just, legal and proper.
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6.2 Additionally, it was submitted by
learned AGP that in view of specific provision
in the Government Resolution dated 28.3.2016 and
more particularly, Clause No.14 (A), the
authority has power to terminate the services of
the present petitioner and as the principles of
natural justice are complied with, such order
cannot be said to be stigmatic. It was also
submitted that in view of the fact that special
panel was constituted and the petitioner was
granted sufficient opportunity of personal
hearing, the same would amount to holding an
inquiry and, therefore, this Court may not
interfere with the impugned order of termination
and dismiss the petition.
7. In rejoinder, learned advocate Mr. Kartik
Bhatt submitted that the submission in respect
of pendency of Special Leave Petition before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has already been
considered by this Court in its judgment in case
of Rakeshkumar Bhursingbhai Katara (supra) and
as far as the submission about the powers to
terminate the services of the petitioner flowing
from Government Resolution dated 16.02.2006 r/w
Government Resolution dated 20.10.2015 and
Government Resolution dated 28.03.2016 are
concerned, the same would be absolutely
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insignificant in light of catena of decisions by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court holding that once the
termination order is found to be stigmatic then
in that case the termination order must go and
therefore, the petition is required to be
allowed.
8. I have heard the learned advocates for the
parties and perused the record. I have also
considered the order dated 13.04.2022 whereby
the petitioner’s services are terminated. On
perusal of above order, I found that there is a
reference about the FIR registered against the
present petitioner under the Prevention of
Corruption Act and as the entire order is based
on the above premises on registration of FIR
against the present petitioner, prima facie, the
impugned order can be said to be a stigmatic
order.
9. This Court had on occasion to consider the
similar set of facts in respect of stigmatic
termination and while dealing with this aspect,
this Court by considering series of decisions on
the subject and more particularly, in the case
of Rakeshkumar Bhursingbhai Katara (supra) by
taking into consideration the recent decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Swati
Priyadarshni (Supra) observed in paragraphs
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Nos.14 to 18 as under :-
"14. Further, very recently, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Swati
Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh
and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 2139
(Supra) has while allowing the appeal
preferred by the appellant, made the
following observations in paragraphs 29 to
36 as under :-
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION :
29. Having bestowed our anxious
consideration to the lis, we find that the
interference of the Division Bench with
the judgment dated 20.06.2017 of the
learned Single Judge, has to be
interdicted at our hands.
30. A bird’s eye views reveals thus. The
appellant topped the revised Merit List,
leading to her appointment as an APC.
While serving as such, complaint(s)
against her, in brief, were that she was
not performing her duties, primarily on
two counts – (i) not punctual in attending
to her duties, and; (ii) not correctly
reported with regard to the events in the
hostel. As against these, the appellant’s
response, via her replies to the SCNs, is
that she, inter alia, frankly admits to
being late on occasion, but to compensate
for her late-coming, she used to sit till
late evening in the office for completion
of work. On this count, the Respondents
cannot be faulted. It is no justification
for the appellant to contend that she was
late, but worked late/overtime such that
the work did not suffer. However, as borne
out from the record, with regard to the
hostel, charge was given to her for only
5/6 days. As such, in our view, it cannot
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be said that within such a short period,
the appellant, without fully understanding
the attendant issues, could have
straightaway given any opinion/report on
the hostel. Be that as it may, this case
turns on our findings infra.
31. Clause 4 of the RGPSM’s General
Service Conditions under the heading
“Resignation/Termination” provides as
below :-
“Persons working on contract can be
terminated with one month notice if found
inefficient. In case of persons found
indulged in undesirable activities
amounting to degradation of dignity of
Mission, Mission Director shall reserve
right to terminate him/her with immediate
effect.”
(emphasis supplied)
32. Perusal of Clause 4 makes it clear
that ordinarily, for inefficiency, one
month’s notice is sufficient. The Clause
also makes it clear that if someone is
found to have indulged in “undesirable
activities”, the Mission Director was
competent to terminate such person’s
services “with immediate effect”. We are
afraid that the Respondents have placed
themselves in a Catch-224 situation. If
the order dated 30.03.2013 falls within
the former part of Clause 4, as contended
by the respondent, on the premise that it
is a case of termination simpliciter and
non-stigmatic, then one month’s notice was
required to be issued to the appellant,
which admittedly was not done in the
instant matter. Arguendo, were the order
dated 30.03.2013 to be seen as falling
under the latter part of Clause 4, it
would be stigmatic, as made clear by the
use of the words “indulged in undesirable
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activities amounting to degradation of
dignity of Mission”.
33. In either of the above-noted
eventualities, the Impugned Judgment would
have to necessarily be set aside.
Nevertheless, let us examine the reasoning
of the Division Bench, which opined that
the order is non-stigmatic and simpliciter
non-renewal of contract. The order dated
30.03.2013 was, quite obviously, the
culmination of the process set into motion
by the two SCNs, which has been overlooked
by the Division Bench. The mere non-
mention of the background situation or the
SCNs in the order dated 30.03.2013 cannot,
by itself, be determinative of the nature
of the order. As held by this Court in
Samsher Singh v State of Punjab, (1974) 2
SCC 8315 and Anoop Jaiswal v Government of
India, (1984) 2 SCC6, the form of an order
is not its final determinant and the Court
can find out the real reason and true
character behind terminating/removing an
employee. Moreover, the Impugned Judgment
also does not deal with Clause 4.
Interestingly, this Clause also escaped
the attention of or/and was not brought to
the notice of the learned Single Judge
either.
34. It is profitable to refer to what five
learned Judges of this Court laid down in
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India,
1957 SCC OnLine SC 5:
“28. The position may, therefore, be
summed up as follows : Any and every
termination of service is not a dismissal,
removal or reduction in rank. A
termination of service brought about by
the exercise of a contractual right is not
per se dismissal or removal, as has been
held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand
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v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420:
(1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination
of service by compulsory retirement in
terms of a specific rule regulating the
conditions of service is not tantamount to
the infliction of a punishment and does
not attract Article 311(2), as has also
been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26].
In either of the two abovementioned cases
the termination of the service did not
carry with it the penal consequences of
loss of pay, or allowances under Rule 52
of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that
the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency
or other disqualification may be the
motive or the inducing factor which
influences the Government to take action
under the terms of the contract of
employment or the specific service rule,
nevertheless, if a right exists, under the
contract or the rules, to terminate the
service the motive operating on the mind
of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has
said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India
[LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455]
wholly irrelevant. In short, if the
termination of service is founded on the
right flowing from contract or the service
rules then, prima facie, the termination
is not a punishment and carries with it no
evil consequences and so Article 311 is
not attracted. But even if the Government
has, by contract or under the rules, the
right to terminate the employment without
going through the procedure prescribed for
inflicting the punishment of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank, the
Government may, nevertheless, choose to
punish the servant and if the termination
of service is sought to be founded on
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other disqualification, then it is a
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punishment and the requirements of Article
311 must be complied with. As already
stated if the servant has got a right to
continue in the post, then, unless the
contract of employment or the rules
provide to the contrary, his services
cannot be terminated otherwise than for
misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other good and sufficient cause. A
termination of the service of such a
servant on such grounds must be a
punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or
removal within Article 311, for it
operates as a forefeiture of his right and
he is visited with the evil consequences
of loss of pay and allowances. It puts an
indelible stigma on the officer affecting
his future career. A reduction in rank
likewise may be by way of punishment or it
may be an innocuous thing. If the
government servant has a right to a
particular rank, then the very reduction
from that rank will operate as a penalty,
for he will then lose the emoluments and
privileges of that rank. If, however, he
has no right to the particular rank, his
reduction from an officiating higher rank
to his substantive lower rank will not
ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere
fact that the servant has no title to the
post or the rank and the Government has,
by contract, express or implied, or under
the rules, the right to reduce him to a
lower post does not mean that an order of
reduction of a servant to a lower post or
rank cannot in any circumstances be a
punishment. The real test for determining
whether the reduction in such cases is or
is not by way of punishment is to find out
if the order for the reduction also visits
the servant with any penal consequences.
Thus if the order entails or provides for
the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or
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the loss of his seniority in his
substantive rank or the stoppage or
postponement of his future chances of
promotion, then that circumstance may
indicate that although in form the
Government had purported to exercise its
right to terminate the employment or to
reduce the servant to a lower rank under
the terms of the contract of employment or
under the rules, in truth and reality the
Government has terminated the employment
as and by way of penalty. The use of the
expression “terminate” or “discharge” is
not conclusive. In spite of the use of
such innocuous expressions, the Court has
to apply the two tests mentioned above,
namely, (1) whether the servant had a
right to the post or the rank, or (2)
whether he has been visited with evil
consequences of the kind hereinbefore
referred to? If the case satisfies either
of the two tests then it must be held that
the servant has been punished and the
termination of his service must be taken
as a dismissal or removal from service or
the reversion to his substantive rank must
be regarded as a reduction in rank and if
the requirements of the rules and Article
311, which give protection to government
servant have not been complied with, the
termination of the service or the
reduction in rank must be held to be
wrongful and in violation of the
constitutional right of the servant.”
(emphasis supplied)
35. We would only be adding to verbosity
by multiplying authorities. In view of the
above dictum, it is clear that the
Respondents did not comply with Clause 4 –
either the first part or the second part
thereof. The order dated 30.03.2013 does
visit the appellant with evil consequences
and would create hurdles for her re
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further employment.
36. In view of the discussions made herein
above, the Impugned Judgment is quashed
and set aside. The judgment of the learned
Single Judge dated 20.06.2017 stands
revived, however with a modification to
the extent that the appellant shall be
entitled to all consequential benefits
including notional continuation in service
at par with other similarly situated
employees, but with the back wages
restricted to 50%. Further, in view of the
long passage of time, we deny liberty to
the respondents to proceed afresh against
the appellant as was granted by the
learned Single Judge. However, this will
not preclude the respondents from taking
action against the appellant in accordance
with law in futuro apropos her official
duties on the post in question, if the
situation so arises. The exercise be
completed within three months from the
date of receipt of this judgment.
15. Considering the observations made in
the above two decisions, the order of
termination was held to be stigmatic, in
respect of allegations levelled against
the concerned employee in each of the
petitions, there was no full-fledged
inquiry held and yet by assigning reasons
which would cast stigma upon the
petitioners, the services of the
petitioners was terminated. In the instant
case also, some irregularities are alleged
in MGNREGA Scheme against each of the
petitioners and without holding
departmental inquiry, on the aforesaid
ground, the petitioners' services were
terminated. Therefore, I have no
hesitation in holding that the termination
of services of each of the petitioners are
stigmatic in nature and the same is passed
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without holding any full-fledged inquiry
and, therefore, the impugned orders
terminating the services of the
petitioners are quashed and set aside and
the petitions stand allowed. Rule is made
absolute to the aforesaid extent. No order
as to costs.
16. The respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioners on their
original posts which they were holding
prior to their termination upto the term
of their appointment, as if the order of
termination was never passed. The
reinstatement of the petitioners as
directed above shall be for the remaining
period of their contractual employment
upto making of total original period fixed
for their employment as per their order of
appointment. Further, it will be open for
the respondents, if they so deem fit, to
initiate a full-fledged inquiry against
each of the petitioners by complying with
the principles of natural justice and as a
result of quashment of the termination
orders in each of the petitions, if they
are entitled to any monetary benefits for
the interregnum period, the same shall be
considered notionally for taking into
consideration any benefits which may flow
on account of service conditions of the
petitioners.
17. As far as backwages is concerned,
learned AGP Ms. Nirali Sarda as well as
learned advocate Mr. Nisarg Jain appearing
for the respective respondents have
opposed the said prayer by stating that
the petitioners have not worked actually
in past since their termination. In
support of her contention, she relied upon
the decision of the Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Bhaveshkumar
Rameshkumar Kanara v. State fo Gujarat
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decided on 17.10.2023 in Letters Patent
Appeal No.659 of 2023 wherein while
denying the monetary benefits for the
interregnum to the appellant, the Division
Bench has observed in paragraph 5.1 to 5.4
as under :-
"5.1 The decision of this Court in
Kaminiben Thakorbhai Patel Vs. State of
Gujarat, which was Letters Patent Appeal
No.761 of 2021, decided on 24.12.2021,
arose in the similar and nearly identical
set of facts.
5.1.1 While not granting the backwages,
the court observed thus in para 8,
“As far as the aspect of grant of back
wages to the appellants is concerned,
while on behalf of the appellants, the
relief of back wages was pressed by
submitting that the back wages have to
follow automatically when the
reinstatement is directed upon holding the
termination illegal, certain conspicuous
aspects stare at the face of the
controversy in this case fir considering
the issue of back wages. Not only that
long time has elapsed since the appellants
are ordered to be reinstated by this order
and the principle of no work no pay would
apply. What becomes decisive in the matter
on this score is the factum that the
appellants were appointed for five years
initially and during such five years their
services came to be terminated by passing
the impugned order. They are reinstated as
per the above direction for the remainder
period providing further that all other
conditions in respect of nature of their
appointment would operate. In such
circumstances, the question of grant of
back wages does not arise. The appellants
will not be entitled to any back wages.”
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5.2 The petitioner herein was a fixed term
employee, he has been reinstated for the
remainder term of five years subject to
further orders which may be passed by the
authorities for extension, if any, in the
term of employment. When the initial
tenure of the petitioner was fixed, that
very aspect would render grant of
backwages not permissible.
5.3 It would be incongruent to grant
monetary benefits and the backwages while
reinstating a fixed term employee,
inasmuch as granting such benefit would
amount to giving salary beyond total term
of five years for which the appointment is
made."
18. Considering the above observations
made by the Division Bench of this Court,
it is held that none of the petitioners
are entitled to any backwages as in view
of the fact that the petitioners are
directed to be reinstated and State is
also directed to ensure that the
petitioners are allowed to perform their
duties for the remaining period of their
contractual appointment."
10. As far as the State's submission about the
powers to terminate a contractual employee in view of
Government Resolution dated 28.3.2006 is concerned,
the coordinate Bench of this Court in the decision in
the case of Hiteshkumar Dahyabhai Rathod v. State of
Gujarat delivered on 8.10.2020 in Special Civil
Application No.19460 of 2019 has observed in
paragraphs 17 and 18 as under :-
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"17. The Division Bench of this Court in
the case of State of Gujarat vs. Chetan
Jayantilal Rajgor (Supra), while
confirming the judgment of the learned
single Judge, dismissed the appeal. In the
case before the Division Bench, the
contention was raised on behalf of the
State Government that while discontinuing
service of an employee concerned, adequate
opportunities were extended and hence, the
action cannot be said to be in violation
of principles of natural justice. It was a
specific case of the State Government
before the Division Bench that the show
cause notice was issued requiring the
employee concerned to show cause as to why
his service should not be discontinued in
terms of the government resolution dated
4.6.2009 and it is only after considering
the detailed reply filed by the employees
concerned followed by a personal hearing
that the authorities took a decision of
putting an end to the contractual
employment. It was contended before the
Division Bench that such action cannot be
termed to be de hors principles of natural
justice. It was also the case of the State
Government that full- fledged departmental
enquiry are not to be conducted in a
contractual employment inasmuch as, the
contractual employment are governed by
resolutions issued by the State Government
from time to time. The Division Bench,
while not accepting the aforesaid
contentions raised by the State
Government, affirmed the view taken by the
learned single Judge, observing in paras
6, 7, 8, 9 and 11 as under :-
“6. In the cognate matter also, almost
similar observations are visible and as
such, we do not propose to over burden the
present order. These observations if to be
examined in the background of present fact
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situation, the same are found to be just
and proper. It appears here that the
original petitioners were dealt with by
issuance of show cause notice with respect
to serious charges levelled against them
and the notice was given stating as to why
in terms of their appointment, they may
not be dismissed from the services. Now,
this show cause notice appears to have
been replied at length by the original
petitioners and subsequently, by giving a
brief opportunity, without conducting
full-scale departmental inquiry, an order
of dismissal came to be passed. This
procedure which has been adopted by the
department against both the original
petitioners and undisputedly, no
departmental inquiry having been conducted
against them, the learned Single Judge, on
the basis of relevant proposition of law
laid down by the Apex Court, was justified
in his view that in the absence of full-
scale departmental inquiry, the services
of the writ petitioners cannot be
terminated in the manner in which it has
been put to an end. We see no infirmity in
the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, particularly having gone through
the relevant record made available to us.
7. This view which has been taken by the
learned Single Judge, to which we are also
in agreement, stands fortified by few
decisions by the Division Bench of this
Court which have already been relied upon
by the learned Single Judge.
8. The bone of contention of appellants –
State authorities is that since the
original petitioners are employed on a
contract basis and fixed pay, the
Department is not under an obligation to
conduct a detailed full-scale departmental
inquiry. Now, this contention has been the
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subject matter of scrutiny on earlier
occasion before a Coordinate Bench in
Letters Patent Appeal No.189 of 2018
between Vadodara Municipal Corporation v.
Manishbhai Nayanbhai Modh, decided on
20.2.2018. The relevant observations
contained in the said decision are
reflecting in Para.4.1 which are also
based upon the decision of the Apex Court
and in consonance with the provision of
the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said observations
have also been considered at length by the
learned Single Judge which are reflecting
in Para. 5.7 of the impugned order.
9. Yet in another decision again by the
Division Bench of this Court rendered in
Letters Patent Appeal No.841 of 2019
between Rahul Aydanbhai Vak v. State of
Gujarat, decided on 15.4.2019, in which
the same issue has been considered. The
relevant discussion of the Division Bench
in the said case is contained in Para.7, 8
and 9, in which in no uncertain terms,
almost in similar set of circumstance, the
Division Bench has clearly opined that
full-scale departmental inquiry will have
to be undertaken, if initiation of action
on the basis of unsatisfactory work, gross
negligence or indiscipline or any act
which may tantamount to be stigmatic and
as such, consistently this view has been
clearly opined by the Division Bench.
11. From the overall material on record
and in consideration of aforesaid
observations, we see no distinguishable
material to take a different view or
deviate from the same. Since almost in
similar issue, the proposition is to the
effect that whenever any charge is
levelled and action is found to be
stigmatic, a full-scale departmental
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C/SCA/8522/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/02/2026
inquiry deserves to be undertaken
irrespective of whether the delinquent was
a regular employee or contractual employee
on a fixed salary. As a result of this, we
are of the considered opinion that since
undisputedly by a brief procedure, an
action is initiated against the
respondents herein while dismissing their
services, said action itself is found to
be not on the touchstone of aforesaid
proposition of law. As a result of this,
no error is committed by the learned
Single Judge. Having perused these
material, we are not satisfied with the
submissions made by learned counsel for
the appellants in both these appeals.”
18. From the aforesaid enuncitation, it is
clear that whenever any charge is levelled
and action is found to be stigmatic, a
full-scale departmental enquiry deserves
to be undertaken irrespective of whether
the delinquent was a regular employee or
contractual employee on a fixed salary.
The principles enunciated by the
coordinate bench as well as by the
Division Bench of this Court apply on all
fours to the facts of the present case
inasmuch as, the allegation against the
petitioner is that by accepting the bribe,
he has committed an offence under
provisions of the Act of 1988 and thereby
has not maintained absolute integrity and
has acted in defiance of clause (i) of
sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the Conduct
Rules of 1971. The aforesaid propositions
of law have not been disputed by the
learned Assistant Government Pleader on
principle as well as on facts."
11. The aforesaid decision was carried in
appeal by the State by way of Letters Patent Appeal
No.423 of 2021 and the said appeal was also dismissed
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C/SCA/8522/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/02/2026
by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated
9.6.2021 wherein the Division Bench after considering
the above paragraphs 17 and 18 of the learned Single
Judge and other relevant paragraphs, observed in
paragraphs 7.2 and 8 as under :-
"7.2 Similar view has been taken by this
Court also while dismissing the Appeal
preceded by the State vide order dated
08.06.2021 passed in Letters Patent Appeal
No.99 of 2021 as well.
8. In all aforesaid judgments, the entire
case law has elaborately been discussed
and it is held that in absence of full
scale departmental inquiry, services of
the delinquent cannot be terminated if the
order of termination is found to be
stigmatic and hence we are unable to take
a different view as the same is based on
numerous judgments referred to in those
decisions."
12. In view of the fact that the contention
raised by the State Government about observance of
principles of natural justice has already been
considered by the coordinate Bench and the same has
not been accepted by the Division Bench of this
Court, I am bound by the view taken by the Division
Bench of this Court and, therefore, the aforesaid
submission that as the respondents have followed the
principles of natural justice before terminating the
petitioner or that such would amount to holding a
full-fledged departmental inquiry cannot be accepted.
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C/SCA/8522/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/02/2026
13. In view of above, as the present order of
termination is also found to be stigmatic order by
this Court, the facts of the present petition is also
squarely covered by the decision of this Court in
case of Rakeshkumar Bhursingbhai Katara (supra) and
accordingly, the impugned order of termination dated
13.04.2022 is required to be quashed and set aside
and the same is accordingly, quashed and set aside.
Resultantly, the petitioner is directed to be
reinstated. However, the reinstatement would be only
till remaining period of his appointment on his
original post which the petitioner held prior to his
termination, as if the order of termination is never
passed. Remaining period of his contractual
employment upto making of total original period fixed
for his employment as per his original order of
appointment.
14. Further if the respondents, if they so deem
fit, it will be open for them to initiate a full-
fledged inquiry against the petitioner by complying
with the principles of natural justice and as a
result of quashing the order of termination in
respect of present petitioner, if he is entitled to
any monetary benefits, the same shall be considered
notionally by the State Government. However, there
shall not be any entitlement of back-wages to the
petitioner.
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C/SCA/8522/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/02/2026
15. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the
petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the
aforesaid extent. No order as to costs.
16. The petitioner shall be reinstated in
remaining period and thereafter, it is left to the
discretion of the authority whether to continue the
petitioner upon completion of contractual period by
placing the petitioner in regular pay scale or not to
extend his services as the same depends upon the
satisfactory service rendered by the petitioner as
per the appointment order itself. Direct service is
permitted.
(NIRZAR S. DESAI,J)
Pallavi
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: PALLAVIBEN PRABHUDAS PANCHAL(HC01403), PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 11/02/2026 12:57:16
Page 24 of 24
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