SHIRINBI D/O AAMIRKHA SHAIKH THROUGH KHAN SHAKERABI SHABBIRversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/160/2026                           ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

       R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 160 of 2026

==========================================================
 SHIRINBI D/O AAMIRKHA SHAIKH THROUGH KHAN SHAKERABI
                        SHABBIR
                         Versus
                STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR KUNAL S SHAH(5282) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. ROHAN RAVAL, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

                          Date : 22/01/2026

                        ORAL ORDER
         (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI)


1.     The      detenue   herein   namely     Shirinbi       Aamirkha
Shaikh came to be preventively detained vide the detention
order dated 30.12.2025 passed by the Commissioner of
Police, Surat City, as a dangerous person as defined under
Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social
Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of
1985).


2.     By way of this petition through her Aunt Khan
Shakerabi Shabbir, the detenue has challenged the legality
and validity of the aforesaid order.



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      R/SCR.A/160/2026                                     ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




3.      This Court has heard learned advocate for the
petitioner        and    learned    APP       for    the     respondent-State
Authorities.


4.      Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public
order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.
Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order
of detention ought not have been passed.                            It is further
submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that the
impugned order is passed without application of mind and
prima facie the order is passed mechanically.


4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was executed upon the petitioner
and      presently       he   is   detained         in   the     Central        Jail,
Ahmedabad.


5.      On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual offender and
his activities affected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of
Surat and lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.

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     R/SCR.A/160/2026                       ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




6.     Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of
his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is
sustainable in law or not?


7.     We have carefully gone through the order passed by
the concerned authority.           It appears that the order
impugned was executed upon the detenue and presently he
is detained in Central Jail, Ahmedabad. In the grounds of
detention, reference of two criminal cases for the offences
punishable under Sections 118(1), 115(2), 296(b), 351(3)
and 54 of the BNS and under Section 135 of the Gujarat
Police Act registered with Limbayat Police Station
against the detenue from 05.07.2025 to 01.10.2025 is
made out.


7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities
of the detenue as a “dangerous person” affects adversely or
are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order
as explained under the provisions of the the Act of 1985.
Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged offences, the detenue
was granted bail by the concerned court.


8.     Considering the impugned order, it appears that the

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     R/SCR.A/160/2026                          ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1985 is referred by
the concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to
be reproduced. The same reads as under:


       “(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by
       himself or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period
       of three successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to
       commit or abets the commission of any of the offences
       punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter VIII or Chapter
       XVI (except section 354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376,
       376A, 376B, 3376C, 376D, or 377) or Chapter XVII or
       Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences
       punishable under chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959;”


9.     After consideration of the available material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of two cases, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction
that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be
acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order’. In our considered opinion, the said offences do not
have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.                     In
this regard, we would like to refer the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and
others reported in AIR 2025 SC 2868. In para-9 and para-
21 of the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:


       “9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive
       detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the
       State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of
       an individual in anticipation of the commission of further
       offence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary


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R/SCR.A/160/2026                             ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




  course of nature. The power of preventive detention finds
  recognition in the Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b).
  However, this Court has emphasized in Rekha v. State of
  Tamil Nadu3 that the power of preventive detention is an
  exception to Article 21 and, therefore, must be applied as
  such, as an exception to the main rule and only in rare
  cases.”

  …..

  “21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that
  the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu,
  instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention,
  which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena
  Begum v. State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :

          “59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
          proceedings where the detenu had been released on
          bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been
          moved by the State. In the light of the same, the
          provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary
          statute, should not have been resorted to when
          ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to
          address the apprehensions leading to the impugned
          detention order. There may have existed sufficient
          grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the
          circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of
          ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an
          extraordinary measure of the law of preventive
          detention.”

          60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay
          Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984
          SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the
          Chief Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-36,
          para 32)

          32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive
          detention is a hard law and therefore it should be
          strictly construed. Care should be taken that the
          liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case
          falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant
          law. The law of preventive detention should not be


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        R/SCR.A/160/2026                                                                      ORDER DATED: 22/01/2026




                       used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is
                       involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for
                       the purpose of keeping a man under detention when
                       under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
                       resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material
                       available is such as would satisfy the requirements of
                       the legal provisions authorising such detention. When
                       a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal
                       court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising
                       the validity of an order of preventive detention which is
                       based on the very same charge which is to be tried by
                       the criminal court.” (Emphasis supplied)”

10.        For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record are not sufficient for
holding that the alleged activities of the detenue have either
affected              adversely                 or        likely            to       affect            adversely                 the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.


11.        Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned dated 30.12.2025 passed by the respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.


                                                                                                   (ILESH J. VORA,J)


                                                                                               (R. T. VACHHANI, J)
Mehul Desai
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: MEHULKUMAR BHIMABHAI DESAI(HCD0075), ENGLISH STENOGRAPHER GRADE TWO CLASS TWO, at High Court of Gujarat on 22/01/2026 15:07:52




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