SMIT @SUMIT SATISHBHAI DARJI THRO RABARI KRISHNA KHODABHAIversusSTATE OF GUJARAT
- Disposal
- 38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH
Holding
The detention order is invalid and is quashed because the material does not satisfy the requirement of a threat to public order.
Summary
The petitioner, Smit@Sumit Satishbhai Darji, was preventively detained on 1 February 2026 under Section 2(g) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 as an "immoral traffic offender" and lodged a petition challenging the order. The petitioner argued that the detaining authority had no material showing any disturbance to public health, order or tranquility, and that the order was passed mechanically. The State contended that the detainee was a habitual offender whose activities threatened public order in Vadodara. The Court examined the detention order, noting that only two prior cases under the Immoral Trafficking (Prohibition) Act and IPC sections 54, 114 and 188 were cited, and that bail had been granted in those cases. Relying on Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the extraordinary nature of preventive detention and the need for concrete material linking the accused to a threat to public order, the Court held that the material was insufficient. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the detention order was quashed, and the detainee was directed to be released.
Issues considered
- Whether the detention order under Section 2(g) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 is valid in the absence of material showing a threat to public order.
- Whether preventive detention is an appropriate remedy when ordinary criminal proceedings and bail are available.
Legislation cited
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(g), s. 3
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 114, s. 188, s. 54
Subjects
Judgment
R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 1966 of 2026
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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SMIT @SUMIT SATISHBHAI DARJI THRO RABARI KRISHNA KHODABHAI
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
==========================================================
Appearance:
O I PATHAN(7684) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS MONALI BHATT, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
Date : 02/03/2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS)
1. The detenue herein namely Smit@Sumit Satishbhai
Darji came to be preventively detained vide the detention
order dated 01/02/2026 passed by the Police
Commissioner, Vadodara, as a immoral tra ic o ender
de ned under Section 2(g) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of
1985).
2. By way of this petition through his friend, the detenue
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R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
3. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties.
4. Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public
order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.
Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order of
detention ought not have been passed. It is further submitted
by learned advocate for the petitioner that the impugned
order is passed without application of mind and prima facie
the order is passed mechanically.
4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was executed upon the detenue and
presently he is detained in the Rajkot Central Jail.
5. On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual o ender and
his activities a ected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order with
a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of
Vadodara and lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.
6. Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
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R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of his
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable
in law or not?
7. We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the order impugned was
executed upon the detenue and presently he is in Rajkot
Central Jail. In the grounds of detention, reference of two
cases for the o#ences punishable under Sections 3, 4 and
5 of the Immoral Tra#ick (Prohibition) Act and Sections
54, 114 and 188 of the IPC registered with various
police stations against the detenue from 19/10/2023 to
17/12/2025 is made out.
7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue as a “immoral tra ic o ender” a ects adversely
or are likely to a ect adversely the maintenance of public
order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985.
Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged o ences, the petitioner
was granted regular bail by the concerned court.
8. Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(g) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the
concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:
“2(g) "immoral tra ic o ender "means a person who
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R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
habitually commits or abets the commission of any
o ence under the Suppression of Immoral Tra ic in
Women and Girls Act, 1956;”
9. After consideration of the available material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of two cases, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction
that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be acting
in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’.
In our considered opinion, the said o ences do not have any
bearing on the maintenance of public order. In this regard,
we would like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others reported
in AIR 2025 SC 2868. In para-9 and para-21 of the said
decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive
detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the
State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty
of an individual in anticipation of the commission of
further o ence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the
ordinary course of nature. The power of preventive
detention ,nds recognition in the Constitution itself,
under Article 22(3)(b). However, this Court has
emphasized in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu3 that the
power of preventive detention is an exception to Article
21 and, therefore, must be applied as such, as an
exception to the main rule and only in rare cases.”
…..
“21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed
that the State should move for cancellation of bail of the
detenu, instead of placing him under the law of
preventive detention, which is not the appropriate
remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v. State of
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R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
Telengana9 , this Court observed :
“59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three
criminal proceedings where the detenu had been
released on bail, no applications for cancellation of
bail had been moved by the State. In the light of
the same, the provisions of the Act, which is an
extraordinary statute, should not have been
resorted to when ordinary criminal law provided
su icient means to address the apprehensions
leading to the impugned detention order. There
may have existed su icient grounds to appeal
against the bail orders, but the circumstances did
not warrant the circumvention of ordinary criminal
procedure to resort to an extraordinary measure of
the law of preventive detention.”
60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay
Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 :
1984 SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah,
J. (as the Chief Justice then was) observed : (SCC
pp. 35-36, para 32)
32. … It is well settled that the law of
preventive detention is a hard law and therefore it
should be strictly construed. Care should be taken
that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised
unless his case falls squarely within the four
corners of the relevant law. The law of preventive
detention should not be used merely to clip the
wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal
prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention when under
ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the
material available is such as would satisfy the
requirements of the legal provisions authorising
such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail
by a competent criminal court, great caution
should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of
an order of preventive detention which is based on
the very same charge which is to be tried by the
criminal court.” (Emphasis supplied)”
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R/SCR.A/1966/2026 JUDGMENT DATED: 02/03/2026
10. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material available on record are not
su icient for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue
have either a ected adversely or likely to a ect adversely the
maintenance of public order and therefore, the subjective
satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be
said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned dated 01/02/2026 passed by the respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(N.S.SANJAY GOWDA,J)
(D. M. VYAS, J)
ILA
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: ILA PRAFULKUMAR PATEL(HC00194), Principal Pvt Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 03/03/2026 11:28:44
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