VIKRAMBHAI @ VIKKO BHUPATBHAI CHAUHAN THROUGH GOPABHAI RAJABHAI MAKWANAversusSTATE OF GUJARAT

     R/SCR.A/289/2026                                  ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

       R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 289 of 2026

==========================================================
     VIKRAMBHAI @ VIKKO BHUPATBHAI CHAUHAN THROUGH
               GOPABHAI RAJABHAI MAKWANA
                          Versus
                 STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR GAURANG K CHAUHAN(9858) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. BHARGAV K. CHAUHAN(19374) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. RONAK RAVAL, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================

 CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
       and
       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI

                            Date : 29/01/2026

                         ORAL ORDER
          (PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)


1.     This      petition   is   filed    by     the   petitioner       namely
Vikrambhai @ Vikko Bhupatbhai Chauhan through his
father-in-law Gopabhai Rajabhai Makwana under Article
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the
detention order detention order dated 22.12.2025 passed
by the District Magistrate, Bhavnagar under Sub-Section
2 of Section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social
Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of
1985’).


2.     By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged
the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.


                                   Page 1 of 6
     R/SCR.A/289/2026                      ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




3.     This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.


4.     Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention
authority to indicate as to how the public health or public
order or public tranquility was disturbed in any manner.
Thus, in absence of any such material on record, the order
of detention ought not have been passed.            It is further
submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that the
impugned order is passed without application of mind and
prima facie the order is passed mechanically.


4.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted
that the impugned order was execution upon the detenue
and presently he is detained in the Central Jail, Vadodara.

5.     On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual offender and
his activities affected at the society at large. Hence, the
Detaining Authority, considering the antecedents and past
activities of the detenue, has passed the impugned order
with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the area of
Bhavnagar and lastly prayed to dismiss the present
petition.

6.     Having considered the facts as well as the submissions


                            Page 2 of 6
     R/SCR.A/289/2026                       ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue arises as to whether the order of
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of
his powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is
sustainable in law or not?

7.     We have carefully gone through the order passed by
the concerned authority.           It appears that the order
impugned was executed upon the petitioner and presently
he is in Central Jail, Vadodara. In the grounds of
detention, reference of one criminal case for the offences
punishable under Sections 65(A)(E), 116(b), 81, 83, 68
and 98(2) of the Prohibition Act and Sections 345(3),
347(1), 348 and 349 of BNS registered with Vartej Police
Station against the petitioner on 11.10.2025 is made out.

7.1. In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities
of the detenue as a “bootlegger” affects adversely or are
likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order as
explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985. Undisputedly,
in the aforesaid alleged offences, the petitioner was granted
regular bail by the concerned court.

8.     Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act of 1985 is referred by
the concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to
be reproduced. The same reads as under:



                             Page 3 of 6
     R/SCR.A/289/2026                            ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




       “2(b) "bootlegger"    means      a    person    who     distills,
       manufactures, stores, transports, imports, exports, sells or
       distributes any liquor, intoxicating drug or other intoxicant in
       contravention of any provision of the Bombay Prohibition
       Act, 1949 and the rules and orders made thereunder, or of
       any other law for the time being in force or who knowingly
       expends or applies any money or supplies any animal,
       vehicle, vessel or other conveyance or any receptacle or any
       other material whatsoever in furtherance or support of the
       doing of any of the things described above by or through any
       other person, or who abets in any other manner the doing of
       any such thing;”


9.     After consideration of the available material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of one case, the
authority has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction
that the activities of the detenue could be termed to be
acting in a manner ‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order’. In our considered opinion, the said offences do not
have any bearing on the maintenance of public order.                       In
this regard, we would like to refer the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and
others reported in AIR 2025 SC 2868. In para-9 and para-
21 of the said decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed as under:


       “9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive
       detention is an extraordinary power in the hands of the
       State that must be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of
       an individual in anticipation of the commission of further
       offence(s), and therefore, must not be used in the ordinary
       course of nature. The power of preventive detention finds
       recognition in the Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b).
       However, this Court has emphasized in Rekha v. State of


                                Page 4 of 6
R/SCR.A/289/2026                              ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




  Tamil Nadu3 that the power of preventive detention is an
  exception to Article 21 and, therefore, must be applied as
  such, as an exception to the main rule and only in rare
  cases.”

  …..

  “21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that
  the State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu,
  instead of placing him under the law of preventive detention,
  which is not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena
  Begum v. State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :

          “59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
          proceedings where the detenu had been released on
          bail, no applications for cancellation of bail had been
          moved by the State. In the light of the same, the
          provisions of the Act, which is an extraordinary
          statute, should not have been resorted to when
          ordinary criminal law provided sufficient means to
          address the apprehensions leading to the impugned
          detention order. There may have existed sufficient
          grounds to appeal against the bail orders, but the
          circumstances did not warrant the circumvention of
          ordinary criminal procedure to resort to an
          extraordinary measure of the law of preventive
          detention.”

          60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay
          Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984
          SCC (Cri) 361] , Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the
          Chief Justice then was) observed : (SCC pp. 35-36,
          para 32)

          32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive
          detention is a hard law and therefore it should be
          strictly construed. Care should be taken that the
          liberty of a person is not jeopardised unless his case
          falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant
          law. The law of preventive detention should not be
          used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is
          involved in a criminal prosecution. It is not intended for
          the purpose of keeping a man under detention when


                             Page 5 of 6
          R/SCR.A/289/2026                                                                      ORDER DATED: 29/01/2026




                        under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to
                        resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material
                        available is such as would satisfy the requirements of
                        the legal provisions authorising such detention. When
                        a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal
                        court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising
                        the validity of an order of preventive detention which is
                        based on the very same charge which is to be tried by
                        the criminal court.” (Emphasis supplied)”

 10.         For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered
 opinion that, the material available on record are not
 sufficient for holding that the alleged activities of the
 detenue have either affected adversely or likely to affect
 adversely the maintenance of public order and therefore, the
 subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority
 cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law.

 11.         Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
 impugned dated 22.12.2025 passed by the respondent
 authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set
 at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any other case.
 Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.


                                                                                                     (ILESH J. VORA,J)


                                                                                                 (R. T. VACHHANI, J)
 Mehul Desai
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: MEHULKUMAR BHIMABHAI DESAI(HCD0075), ENGLISH STENOGRAPHER GRADE TWO CLASS TWO, at High Court of Gujarat on 29/01/2026 14:48:15




                                                              Page 6 of 6