RABARI VIPUL @VALAN RAGHUBHAI BIJALBHAI THRO MANUBHAI RAGHUBHAI DESAIversusDISTRICT MAGISTRATE
- Disposal
- 38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH
- Bench
- GITA GOPIL S PIRZADA
Holding
The detention order is illegal and is quashed because the alleged offences do not affect public order.
Summary
The petitioner was preventively detained as a "dangerous person" under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 by a District Magistrate on 14 May 2026. He challenged the detention, arguing that the offences for which he was booked – under various sections of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita – pertained only to law and order and not to public order as required by the Act. The State contended that the petitioner was a habitual offender whose activities threatened public order in Surat. The Court examined the distinction between "public order" and "law and order", relying on Supreme Court precedents such as Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal, and Commissioner of Police v. C. Anita. It held that the cited offences did not affect public order and the detaining authority’s satisfaction was therefore invalid. Consequently, the detention order was quashed and the petitioner was ordered to be released.
Issues considered
- Whether the detention order under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985 is valid when the alleged offences affect only law and order and not public order
- Whether the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction meets the statutory requirement of "prejudicial to public order"
Legislation cited
- Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhitas. 115(2), s. 135, s. 308(4), s. 351, s. 351(2), s. 351(3), s. 352, s. 54, s. 61(2)
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(c), s. 3
Subjects
Judgment
R/SCR.A/7223/2026 ORDER DATED: 19/06/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 7223 of 2026
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RABARI VIPUL @VALAN RAGHUBHAI BIJALBHAI THRO
MANUBHAI RAGHUBHAI DESAI
Versus
DISTRICT MAGISTRATE & ORS.
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Appearance:
GAURAV VYAS(9855) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. MEET THAKKAR APP for the Respondent(s) No. 2
RULE NOT RECD BACK for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
Date : 19/06/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE GITA GOPI)
1. The petitioner herein came to be preventively detained
vide the detention order dated 14.05.2026 passed by
the District Magistrate, Mehsana, as a “dangerous
person” as defined under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat
Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (herein
after referred as ‘the Act of 1985).
2. By way of this petition, the petitioner has challenged
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the legality and validity of the aforesaid order.
3. This Court has heard learned advocate Mr. Gaurav
Vyas and Mr. Meet Thakkar, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor for the respective parties.
4. Learned advocate for the detenue submits that the
grounds of detention has no nexus to the “public
order”, but is a purely a matter of law and order, as
registration of the offence cannot be said to have either
affected adversely or likely to affect adverse the
maintenance of public order as contemplated under
the explanation sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act,
1985 and therefore, where the offences alleged to have
been committed by the detunue have no bearing on the
question of maintenance of public order and his
activities could be said to be a prejudicial only to the
maintenance of law and order and not prejudicial to
the maintenance of public order.
5. On the other hand, learned APP opposing the
application contended that, the detenue is habitual
offender and his activities affected the society at large.
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In such set of circumstances, the Detaining Authority,
considering the antecedents and past activities of the
detenue, has passed the impugned order with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order in the area of
Surat.
6. Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the respective parties, the issue arise as to
whether the order of detention passed by the Detaining
Authority in exercise of his powers under the
provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law?
7. The order impugned was executed upon the petitioner
and presently he is in Jail. In the grounds of detention,
a reference of three criminal cases i.e. (i) for the offence
under Sections 308(4), 351 and 61(2) with Mehsana
Police Station, (ii) for the offence under Sections
115(2), 352, 351(3), 54 and 135 with Mehsana Police
Station, (iii) for the offence under Sections 351(2) and
54 with Mehsana Police Station registered against the
petitioner under the of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, was
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made and further it is alleged that, the activities of the
detenue as a “dangerous person” affects adversely or
are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public
order as explained under Section 3 of the Act of 1985.
8. After careful consideration of the material, we are of
the considered view that on the basis of three criminal
cases, the authority has wrongly arrived at the
subjective satisfaction that the activities of the detenue
could be termed to be acting in a manner ‘prejudicial
to the maintenance of public order’. In our opinion, the
said offences do not have any bearing on the
maintenance of public order.
9. The distinction between "public order" and "law and
order" has been carefully defined in a Constitution
Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and
Others, (1966) 1 SCR 709. In this judgment, His
Lordship Hidayatullah, J. by giving various
illustrations clearly defined the "public order" and "law
and order". Relevant portion of the judgment reads
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thus:
"....Does the expression "public order" take
in every kind of disorder or only some? The
answer to this serves to distinguish "public order"
from "law and order" because the latter
undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if
disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every
breach of the peace does not lead to public
disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight
there is disorder but not public disorder. They can
be dealt with under the powers to maintain law
and order but cannot be detained on the ground
that they were disturbing public order. Suppose
that the two fighters were of rival communities
and one of them tried to raise communal
passions. The problem is still one of law and
order but it raises the apprehension of public
disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The
contravention of law always affects order but
before it can be said to affect public order, it must
affect the community or the public at large. A
mere disturbance of law and order leading to
disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for
action under the Defence of India Act but
disturbances which subvert the public order are.
A District Magistrate is entitled to take action
under Rule 30(l)(b) to prevent subversion of public
order but not in aid of maintenance of law and
order under ordinary circumstances.
It will thus appear that just as "public
order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited)
was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity
than those affecting "security of State", "law and
order" also comprehends disorders of less
gravity than those affecting "public order". One
has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and
order represents the largest circle within which is
the next circle representing public order and the
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smallest circle represents security of State. It is
then easy to see that an act may affect law and
order but not public order just as an act may
affect public order but not security of the
State...."
9.1 The concept of `public order' and `law and order' has
been dealt with in the case of Pushkar Mukherjee &
Others v. The State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC
852. In this case, the Supreme Court had relied on the
important work of Dr. Allen on `Legal Duties' and
spelled out the distinction between `public' and
`private' crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In
considering the material elements of crime, the historic
tests which each community applies are intrinsic
wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two
most important factors which have led to the
designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen
has distinguished `public' and `private' crimes in the
sense that some offences primarily injure specific
persons and only secondarily the public interest, while
others directly injure the public interest and affect
individuals only remotely. There is a broad distinction
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along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the
application of any such test.
9.2 The Supreme Court in the case of Babul Mitra alias
Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal & Others,
(1973) 1 SCC 393 had an occasion to deal with the
question of "public order" and "law and order". The
Supreme Court observed that the true distinction
between the areas of "law and order" and "public
Order" is one of degree and extent of the reach of the
act in question upon society. The court pointed out
that the act by itself is not determinant of its own
gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its
potentiality it may be very different.
9.3 In Commissioner of Police & Others, v. C. Anita
(Smt.), (2004) 7 SCC 467, the Supreme Court again
examined the issue of "public order" and "law and
order" and observed thus:
"7. ....The crucial issue is whether the activities of
the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While
the expression "law and order" is wider in scope
inasmuch as contravention of law always affects
order, "public order" has a narrower ambit, and
public order could be affected by only such
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contravention which affects the community or the
public at large. Public order is the even tempo of
life of the community taking the country as a
whole or even a specified locality. The distinction
between the areas of "law and order" and "public
order" is one of the degree and extent of the reach
of the act in question on society. It is the
potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of
life of the community which makes it prejudicial
to the maintenance of the public order. If a
contravention in its effect is confined only to a few
individuals directly involved as distinct from a
wide spectrum of the public, it could raise
problem of law and order only. It is the length,
magnitude and intensity of the terror wave
unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder
that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting
"public order" from that concerning "law and
order". The question to ask is:
"Does it lead to disturbance of the
current life of the community so as to
amount to a disturbance of the public
order or does it affect merely an
individual leaving the tranquility of
the society undisturbed?"
This question has to be faced in
every case on its facts."
10. For the reasons recorded, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record are not sufficient
for holding that the alleged activities of the detenue
have either affected adversely or likely to affect
adversely the maintenance of public order and
therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the
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detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid
and in accordance with law.
11. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The order
impugned dated 14.05.2026 passed by the respondent
authority is hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to
be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not required in any
other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. Direct
service permitted.
(GITA GOPI,J)
(L. S. PIRZADA, J)
DIKSHA
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: DIKSHA HARISH GUSAIN(HC02363), ENGLISH STENO GRADE-II\, at High Court of Gujarat on 19/06/2026 16:20:27
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