Ravijyot Finance and Leasing Private LimitedversusUnity Small Finance Bank Limited

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                                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                           ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                                             WRIT PETITION NO. 3842 OF 2026

                      M/s. Ravijyot Finance and Leasing Pvt. Ltd.                 …Petitioner
                            Versus
                      Unity Small Finance Bank Limited                            …Respondent

                                                      ******
                      Mr. Debesh Panda a/w. Mr. Ashish Venugopal, Mr. Shubhra Swami, Mr.
                      Akshay Naik, for the Petitioner
                      Mr. Nitin Thakker, Senior Advocate a/w. Ms. Saloni Kapadia, Ms.
                      Daksha Kasekar, Ms. Shailaja Beria i/b. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas,
                      for Respondent No. 1 Bank.
                                                      ******
VISHAL                                         CORAM : MANISH PITALE AND
SUBHASH
PAREKAR                                                   SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, JJ.
Digitally signed by
VISHAL SUBHASH
PAREKAR
Date: 2026.08.17
18:54:43 +0530
                                                    DATE       : 17th AUGUST, 2026

                      P.C. :

                      1.          Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner. The Respondent-

                      Bank is also represented by learned counsel.


                      2.          This Petition is filed and circulated urgently today on the

                      ground that its sale notice dated 22 nd July, 2026 fixes sale of the

                      subject property for today. Considering the urgency of the matter,

                      circulation was granted for today and the Petition is taken up for

                      consideration.


                      3.          The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that in the face


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of admitted position on facts and the manner in which the

proceedings initiated by the Respondent- Bank have taken shape

before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) under the

provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), on a

proper reading of the relevant provisions of IBC, this Court ought to

to interdict the Respondent Bank from going ahead with the sale of

the subject property.


4.          In that context, learned counsel for the Petitioner referred to

various provisions of the IBC, including Sections 96, 100, 101, as also

121 and 122 thereof.


5.          It was submitted that the Respondent Bank, as a creditor itself,

initiated the proceedings under Section 95 of the IBC, which have now

reached the stage of Section 100 thereof. Even though the moratorium

period of 180 days is over and there is no extension granted by the

NCLT, until and unless the process reaches its logical conclusion in the

form of application of mind and thereupon an order being passed by

the NCLT, resulting in a situation where recourse can be had to

Sections 121 and 122 of the IBC, the Respondent Bank cannot be

permitted to proceed further with the intended sale of the subject

property.

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6.          On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for

the Respondent Bank raises objection with regard to the very

maintainability of this petition. Amongst other arguments, it is

submitted that the Petitioner has the alternative, efficacious statutory

remedy of approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the

provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets

and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (Securitisation Act), if

at all it has any objection with the subject sale notice dated 22 nd July,

2026.


7.          It is further brought to our notice that the petitioner, admittedly,

has earlier filed a Securitisation Application before the DRT

challenging the first sale notice issued by the Respondent Bank, and

the said proceeding is still pending.


8.          It is further brought to our notice that the petitioner is a

mortgagor and cannot couch its arguments as if it is a creditor. This

clearly demonstrates that the question of law sought to be raised on

behalf of the Petitioner ought not to be considered by this Court. In

this backdrop, attention of this Court is also invited to proceedings in

Commercial Suit (L) No. 9866 of 2026. It is submitted that the

Petitioner, despite being the mortgagor, has challenged the very

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mortgage itself in the said suit, claiming that the subject documents

are forged and fabricated. In the said pending suit also, an attempt

was made by the Petitioner by filing Interim Application (L) No. 9874

of 2026 for seeking urgent interim relief in order to stall the sale

proceedings by way of auction. By an order dated 24 th March, 2026,

the learned Single Judge of this Court rejected the prayer for urgent

ad-interim relief, inter alia, observing that the Petitioner indeed has

the remedy of approaching the Debt Recovery Tribunal.


9.          Having considered the elaborate submissions made on behalf of

the Petitioner in the context of the aforementioned provisions of the

IBC, we are not impressed, firstly for the reason that the petitioner is a

mortgagor of the subject property. An impression was sought to be

created that the petitioner was a creditor and that the respondent

Bank was a creditor that was breaking ranks from other creditors,

which ought not to be permitted under the scheme of the IBC. On a

pointed query put to the learned Counsel for the petitioner as to the

details of the other creditors, there was no answer forthcoming, and it

was submitted that if time is granted, the details could be placed

before this Court.


10.         Considering the tenor of submissions made on behalf of the

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Petitioner, we are of the opinion that this is another attempt of a

mortgagor to somehow wriggle out of the situation and not taking

recourse to the statutory remedy available under the provisions of the

Securitisation Act. In the face of such an alternative, efficacious

statutory remedy available to the Petitioner, we are not inclined to

entertain the present Writ Petition.


11.         The Supreme Court on a number of occasions has indicated,

including in the cases of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon 1

and Celir LLP vs. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. 2, that in

the face of availability of such a statutory remedy, the High Courts

exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India ought not to show any indulgence. As a matter of fact, in the

case of Celir LLP (supra) the Supreme Court was constrained to

observe as follows:

                      101] More than a decade back, this Court had expressed
                      serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in
                      regard to the High Courts ignoring the a availability of
                      statutory remedies under the RDBFI Act and the
                      SARFAESI Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article
                      226 of the Constitution. Even after, the decision of this
                      Court in Satyawati Tondon, it appears that the High
                      Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction
                      under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under
                      the RDBFI Act and the SARFAESI Act.

1 (2010) 8 SCC 110.
2 (2024) 2 SCC 1.

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12.         It is an admitted position that, the Petitioner has admittedly already

taken recourse to the said statutory remedy while challenging the first

sale notice, and that the proceeding is still pending. As noted here-in-

above, the learned Single Judge of this Court in Commercial Suit (L)

No. 9866 of 2026 also declined urgent interim relief, inter alia,

referring to availability of remedy of approaching the DRT.


13.         We also find that the question of law sought to be raised, by

referring to the aforementioned provisions of the IBC, is nothing but

another desperate attempt on the part of the Petitioner to somehow

avoid steps being taken by the Respondent Bank, which is a secured

creditor, in terms of the provisions of the Securitisation Act.


14.         The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent Bank

referred to judgment of this Court in the case of Nanda Takwane and

Others vs. The State of Maharashtra3 and judgment and order dated

28th July 2023 passed in Writ Petition (L) No. 9116 of 2023 (Mr. Latif

Yusuf Manikkoth and Anr. vs. The Board of Directors, Bank of Baroda).

Reliance was placed on the said judgments to contend that

moratorium would not apply or impact to the subject property, which

exclusively belongs to the Petitioner as a mortgagor. It was

3 2026 SCC OnLine 5212.

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emphasized that the property does not belong to the borrower, and

therefore, the submissions made on behalf of the Petitioner with

regard to the alleged question of law that arises in this Petition in the

context of the provisions of the IBC ought not to be considered. We

are of the opinion that the said aspect need not be gone into, as we

are inclined to dismiss this Petition on the ground of the availability of

efficacious alternative remedy itself.


15.         We also find substance in the contention raised on behalf of the

Respondent Bank that the present Writ Petition is not maintainable as

the Respondent is a private bank and as per settled law, a Writ Petition

against private bank is not maintainable. It is to be noted that

Respondent- private Bank is the sole Respondent in this Petition and

therefore on this ground also, the Writ Petition deserves to be

dismissed.


16.         The Petitioner also did not disclose the fact that the moratorium

was not extended by the NCLT. It was only when the learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the Respondent Bank tendered a copy of an

order dated 1st July, 2026 passed by the NCLT that the aforesaid fact

came to light. This is another reason why the Petitioner does not

deserve any indulgence from the writ Court. It is a settled position of

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law that when a party approaches the writ Court, it has to come with

clean hands. The Supreme Court in the case of Udyami Evam Khadi

Gramodyog Welfare Sanstha and Another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

and Others4, in this context, has observed as follows:

                     16] A writ remedy is an equitable one. A person
                     approaching a superior court must come with a pair of clean
                     hands. It not only should not suppress any material fact, but
                     also should not take recourse to the legal proceedings over
                     and over again which amounts to abuse of the process of
                     law. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair
                     Industries³ this Court was of the opinion that such a
                     repeated filing of writ petitions amounts to criminal
                     contempt.



17.         In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. Pending

applications, if any, also stand disposed of.




                 (SHREERAM V. SHIRSAT, J.)                  (MANISH PITALE, J.)




4 (2008) 1 SCC 560.

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