Created by Fuzzy Cloud

Bombay High Court

MUKESH POPATLAL GADAversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS

Decided
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The Court held that a prima facie case of forgery and fraud exists and the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 cannot be exercised, thereby dismissing the application to quash the FIR.

Summary

The State filed FIR No.3029/2016 under Section 82 of the Registration Act alleging that a Power of Attorney dated 23 September 1980, which was not registered, was used to execute sale deeds in 2010 for property belonging to Anupama Co‑operative Housing Society. The Power of Attorney was purportedly executed by two Jaisinghani brothers, one of whom had died in 1989, and it referenced survey numbers that were only allotted in 2004, raising a prima facie case of forgery and fraud. The applicant, Mukesh Popatlal Gada, sought quash of the FIR under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., arguing lack of requisite permission under Section 83 of the Registration Act, absence of a false statement, and undue delay. The Court held that Section 83’s permission requirement is permissive, not mandatory, and that the documents show clear misuse, establishing a prima facie case under Sections 82, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. Consequently, the Court found no ground to exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR and dismissed the application.

Issues considered

  • Whether prior permission under Section 83 of the Registration Act is mandatory for prosecution under Section 82.
  • Whether the FIR under Section 82 discloses the requisite false statement or false document to constitute an offence.
  • Whether a prima facie case of forgery, fraud and related IPC offences exists against the applicant.
  • Whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the FIR.
  • Whether the delay in lodging the FIR defeats the prosecution.

Legislation cited

Subjects

  • Registration Act
  • Section 82
  • Section 83
  • Section 482
  • Power of Attorney
  • Forgery
  • Fraud
  • Criminal Procedure
  • Quash FIR
  • Delay

Judgment

SKN                                                  903-APL-413.2016.doc

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 413 OF 2016


Mukesh Popatlal Gada,
aged 41 years, Indian Inahbitant,
permanently residing at Flat No.406.
H-Wing, Dhanraj Society, CTS No.1224,
Apte Road, Shivaji Nagar,
Pune- 411 004.

      V/s.

1. State of Maharashtra
   (through Kondhwa police station)
   Pune- C.R.No.3029/16)

2. Chandrakant Ramrao More,
   aged 52 years, Occ: Service,
   residing at 401, Astonia Royal,
   R-Wing, Ambegaon, Budruk,
   Haveli, Dist. Pune.

3. Mrs.Rekha A. Jayrath,
   aged 62 years, Occ: Service,
   retired government service,
   Bldg A-2, flat No.13,
   Raksha lekha society, Koregaon
   Park, Dist. Pune- 411 001.

                   _______________________________

Mr.Subhash Jha with Mr.Siddharth Jha, Mr.Sumeet Upadhyay, Mr.Chetan
Gogawale and Ms.Prachi Kabra i/b. Law Global for the Applicant.
Ms.Sharmila Kaushik, APP for the Respondent-State.
Mr.Mandar Limaye with Mr.Vedant Bende for the Intervener.
                  _______________________________




                                                                 1/20
SKN                                                      903-APL-413.2016.doc



              CORAM :         RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE , J.
              DATED     :     31st JULY 2026.


JUDGMENT :-

1.        Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Taken up for hearing by

consent of parties.

2.        By the present Application filed under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Applicant seeks to quash and set aside FIR

No.3029/2016 dated 23rd March 2016 registered with Kondhwa Police

Station, Pune for the offence punishable under section 82 of the

Registration Act, 1908 (for short “Registration Act”). On 08 th December

2018, sections 420, 467, 468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code (for short

“IPC”) have been subsequently added.

3.        The facts of the prosecution case, in brief, are as under:

3.1       The FIR No.3029/2016 came to be registered with the Kondhwa

Police Station, District- Pune on the basis of the complaint filed by one Mr.

Chandrakant Ramrao More, Respondent No.2 herein who was working as

Sub-Registrar, Haveli-12, Kondhwa, Pune against the Applicant and others

for the offence punishable under section 82 of the Registration Act.          The

complaint, dated 23rd March 2016 is filed pursuant to the complaint

lodged by one Mr. Vijay Kumbhar, President of Anupama Co-operative

Housing Society, Pune (Intervener in the present Application).

                                                                       2/20
SKN                                                    903-APL-413.2016.doc

3.2       That, the allegation in the complaint is in respect of documents

concerning property bearing City Survey No.2, Hissa Nos.4 and 5. That,

one Mr.Arun Sripati Ranvade signed on behalf of (1) Mr.Nandakumar

Thakurdas Jaisinghani and (2) Mr.Balram Thakurdas Jaisinghani as their

Constituted Attorney. That, the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September

1980, which was annexed to the said documents, was neither notarized

nor registered.

3.3       It is alleged that, the documents were registered with the office

of the Sub-Registrar, Haveli No.12 bearing Registration Nos.1939/2010,

dated 5th March 2010 in respect of property bearing Survey No.2, Hissa

Nos.4 and 5 and 2/4 + 5 + 6/1, 1A/1B/2 and Survey No. 2/4E, Plot

No.14 admeasuring 6.25 R and the document bearing Registration

No.2283/2010 dated 17th March 2010 village Aundh, Survey No.2, Hissa

Nos.4 and 5 and 2/4 + 5 + 6/1, 1A/1B/2, Survey No.2/4D, Plot No.13 for

an area admeasuring 4.29 R out of land admeasuring 8.58 R-8 have been

registered by Arun Shripati Ranvade, who had signed the documents as

Power of Attorney holder/Constituted Attorney of (i) Mr.Nandkumar

Thakurdas Jaisinghani and (ii) Mr.Balaram Thakurdas Jaisinghani. That,

the said Power of Attorney dated 23rd September 1980 was used in the said

transaction.




                                                                   3/20
SKN                                                     903-APL-413.2016.doc

4.        It is alleged that, the Power of Attorney was not registered, as

per Circular dated 29th January 2007.    That, it is not stated whether the

person who gave the Power of Attorney was dead or alive. Based on these

allegations, the FIR was filed.

5.        Heard Mr. Subhash Jha, learned counsel for the Applicant,

learned APP for the Respondent-State, and Mr. Mandar Limaye for the

Intervener.

6.        Mr.Jha, learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submitted

that,

6.1       No case is made out against the Applicant under section 82 of

the Registration Act in as much as the allegations do not make out the

ingredients as required under section 82 of the Registration Act. Perusal of

the FIR would indicate that, there is no mention as to which is the false

statement made in the Sale-deed 5th March 2010 and 17th March 2010.

That, section 82 of the Registration Act does not contemplate or provide

for punishment, in case the Power of Attorney is not registered.

6.2       Sections 82 and section 83 of the Registration Act are to be read

in conjunction. Section 83 of the Registration Act provides that, the

registering officer may commence prosecution with the permission of the

Inspector General or Registrar or Sub-Registrar. That, there is no document

evidencing that, the permission as required under section 83 of the


                                                                    4/20
SKN                                                       903-APL-413.2016.doc

Registration Act has been taken.     Apart from the statement made in the

FIR that the Authority had the permission, there is no material on record

evidencing the same. That, even though time was granted to produce the

permission, the learned APP has not been able to produce the permission

which is referred to in the FIR. That, no inquiry was held nor was any

notice issued under section 83 of the Registration Act.

6.3       It would be necessary that, the affected party is heard before

initiating any action in complaints under section 82 of the Registration

Act. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

in the case of Union of India v. Shiv Raj and others, reported in (2014) 6

SCC 564 and Automotive Tyre Manufacturers Association v. Designated

Authority and others, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 258 to submit that unless

and until the Statue expressly excludes an opportunity of hearing, the

hearing ought to be given.

6.4       It is not the requirement of law that the Power of Attorney is to

be registered.   It was only after 1 st April 2013, by the Maharashtra

amendment, it become compulsory to register the Power of Attorney.

6.5       The Ranvade family owned a plot of land admeasuring 10 acres

which was given for the purposes of development to four developers, two

of whom were Mr.Nandakumar Thakurdas Jaisinghani and Mr.Balram

Thakurdas Jaisinghani.       That, the transaction is based on the Release


                                                                      5/20
SKN                                                     903-APL-413.2016.doc

Deed and not on the basis of the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September

1980.   That, the Power of Attorney was only annexed to the Sale-deeds

dated 5th March 2010 and 17th March 2010.

6.6       That,    Mr.Nandakumar Thakurdas Jaisinghani and Mr.Balram

Thakurdas Jaisinghani on 23rd September 1980 executed the Power of

Attorney in favour of Mr.Arun Ranvade.          That, the Sale-deeds were

executed in favour of M/s. G and Associates (of which the Applicant is a

partner) in respect of plot No.13 and plot No.14. That, the complaint has

only been filed on 23rd February 2016 alleging that the Power of Attorney

dated 23rd September 1980 is not registered. The alleged permission is

granted by the Collector of Stamps for lodging the FIR, only on 23 rd March

2016.   That, the FIR being lodged on 23 rd March 2016, the Applicant was

made accused only on later stage.     That, there is a delay in lodging the

FIR. Therefore, interference under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is warranted.

That, the FIR is motivated and mala fide exercise which targets the

Applicant. That, the delay in initiation the criminal prosecution has been

unexplained.      Reliance was placed upon the the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Chanchalpati Das v. State of Bengal and

another., reported in (2023) 20 SCC 120.

6.7       That, the FIR was initially lodged under section 82 of the

Registration Act which is a special statute.   That, under section 83 of the


                                                                    6/20
SKN                                                      903-APL-413.2016.doc

Registration Act, a criminal prosecution could be commenced by or with

the permission of the Inspector General, the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar

in which territory, district or sub-district, as the case may be, the offence

has been committed. Referring to section 82 of the Registration Act, it was

submitted that, the necessary ingredients of section 82 have not been

complied with. While referring to the reply dated 5 th January 2026 to RTI

application filed by the Applicant, it was submitted that, prima facie it

would indicate that the permission which is required under section 82 of

the Registration Act is not available.

6.8         Relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of     Gudru Samba Shiva Rao        v. State of Madhya Pradesh and

another, dated 19th August 2025 in SLP (Cri) No.485 of 2025, while

referring to paragraph-12 thereof, it was submitted that the Applicant

being the purchaser of the said property cannot be said to have offered any

fraudulent inducement to the Complainant nor can it be said that the

Applicant made the Complainant to part with the property for a valuable

security.    Considering that, the documents in question are registered

documents, executed for a valid consideration, it would be the Applicant

who ought to have taken a criminal prosecution against the sellers.

Referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

Mohammed Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, reported in (2009) 8 SCC 751,


                                                                     7/20
SKN                                                    903-APL-413.2016.doc

paragraphs-20 to 22, it was submitted that, no fraudulent or dishonest

inducement was made out against the Applicant.

7.        Mr.Mandar Limaye, learned Advocate appearing for the

Intervener submitted that,

7.1       The complaint has been filed on behalf of the Society in respect

of Sale-deeds executed between Arun Ranvade and the Applicant.

7.2       The Power of Attorney dated 23rd September 1980, on the basis

of which the execution is done, is false and bogus document.     That, the

property, which has been sold to the Applicants, belongs to Anupama

Housing Society. That, though initially the FIR was registered under

section 82 of the Registration Act, sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 have

been added in December 2017.

7.3       The transaction is in respect of property which Mr.Jaisinghani

sold to the Society.   That, the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September

1980 has been used and acted upon and it is not the case as contended

that it was only annexed to the Sale-deeds. That, Mr. Balram Jaisinghani

expired in the year 1989, and, therefore the Power of Attorney, even if in

existence, came to an end. That the said Power of Attorney dated 23 rd

September 1980 was used by Arun Ranvade in the year 2010, when

Mr.Balram Jaisinghani had already expired in 1989.    That, the offence is

clearly made out.


                                                                   8/20
SKN                                                     903-APL-413.2016.doc

7.4        The mutation entries bearing Nos.4256 and 4257 pertaining to

the Sale-deeds were challenged by the Government of Maharashtra in

Appeal under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The said mutation

entries have been set aside.   That, the Applicants were party-respondents

in the said Appeal and were heard. The order dated 17 th January 2007

passed in the Appeal has not been challenged by the Applicants.

7.5        It is not compulsory/ mandatory to take permission under

section 83 of the Registration Act.   Reliance was placed on the judgment

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dharmadeo Rai                  v.

Ramnagina Rai, reported in AIR 1972 SC 928, paragraph-5 and 6 thereof,

to submit that, the provisions of section 83 of the Registration Act are not

mandatory and are, in fact, directory in nature.       That, in any event,

sanction in the present case has been taken.    That, any challenge to the

sanction or any question of the existence of the sanction can be considered

at the stage of the trial.

7.6        The other fact which clearly demonstrates that the Power of

Attorney dated 23rd September 1980 is false and fabricated document is

that, the Power of Attorney purported to be of the year 1980 makes a

reference to plot numbers, which plot numbers have been allotted by the

Authorities only in the year 2004,       after the implementation of the

consolidation scheme. In the year 1980, when the Power of Attorney is


                                                                    9/20
SKN                                                      903-APL-413.2016.doc

alleged to have been executed, the reference could only be made to the

then existing survey numbers and not the plot numbers.

7.7       The Power of Attorney has been used in respect of lands which

are not even referred to in the Power of Attorney. That, the fraud, forgery

and conspiracy are clearly made out.

8.        The learned APP appearing for the Respondent-State while

referring to the affidavit-in-reply and, particularly paragraphs-9, 10 and 16

thereof, submitted that, the case against the Applicants is clearly made

out. Referring to paragraph-22 of the affidavit-in-reply, he submitted that,

the Power of Attorney dated 23rd September 1980, used in the year 2010,

is in respect of a person who had expired in the year 1989 and is used for

completely different and distinct properties which are not even referred in

the Power of Attorney.      While referring to the affidavit-in-reply and

particularly paragraph-22 thereof, learned APP stressed on involvement of

the Applicant Mukesh Popatlal Gada in the said crime.

9.        Mr.Jha, learned counsel for the Petitioner, in rejoinder, submitted

that, this is a vexatious prosecution which has been launched at the

instance of some dishonest elements of the society. That, the Intervener is

not the Chairman of the Society. That, while executing the document, the

Applicant, who is a businessman, generally do not look into such minute

details of the land which are purchased. That, the scope of the FIR cannot


                                                                    10/20
SKN                                                        903-APL-413.2016.doc

be extended and a new case cannot be made out by supplementary

statements.

10.       Perused the entire record.     First aspect which is required to be

considered is whether it is necessary for the Authorities to have the prior

permission under section 83 of the Registration Act to initiate a criminal

proceeding under the Registration Act. A useful reference can be made to

the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dharmadeo Rai

v. Ramnagina Rai (supra), while specifically referring to section 83 of the

Registration Act has observed that:

        3. In this Court, the only point argued on behalf of the
        appellant was that the complaint was incompetent as it was
        filed by a person without obtaining the necessary permission
        under Section 83 of the Act and, therefore, the conviction was
        bad and must be set aside. Section 83 of the Act provides:
              “83. (1) A prosecution for any offence under this Act
              coming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his
              official capacity may be commenced by or with the
              permission of the Inspector General, the Registrar or the
              Sub-Registrar, in whose territories, district or sub-district,
              as the case may be, the offence has been committed.
              (2) Offences punishable under this Act shall be triable by
              any Court or officer exercising powers not less than those
              of a Magistrate of the second class.”

        4. On a reading of the section, it would be clear that it deals
        only with prosecution for an offence under the Act coming to
        the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official
        capacity. It, in effect, provides that where an offence comes to
        the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official
        capacity, a prosecution may be commenced by or with the


                                                                       11/20
SKN                                                    903-APL-413.2016.doc

      permission of any of the officers mentioned in the section. The
      section can possibly have no application to cases in which
      offences are committed under the Act, but the offences do not
      come to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official
      capacity. If the Registering Officer does not know in his official
      capacity that the document produced before him is a false
      document or that the person appearing before him is
      personating some other person, the section has no application.
      The section is not prohibitory in that it does not preclude a
      private person from commencing a prosecution. Even in a case
      where the commission of an offence comes to the knowledge
      of the Registering Officer in his official capacity, the section
      does not prohibit a private person from commencing a
      prosecution as the section is clearly permissive in its language
      and intent. In other words, the section is an enabling one. It
      enables the persons mentioned therein to commence a
      prosecution in cases where the commission of the offence
      under the Act comes to the knowledge of the Registering
      Officer in his official capacity. The section enables the officers
      named to use their official position for the purpose of
      prosecution without personal risk.

      5. In Gopinath v. Kuldip Singh [ILR 11 Cal 566] the question
      whether the section prohibits a private person from
      commencing a prosecution without the permission as
      provided in the section, came up for consideration and a Full
      Bench of the Calcutta High Court answered the question by
      saying that the section is not prohibitory in character and that
      it does not preclude a private person from commencing a
      prosecution for an offence under the Act without the
      permission as envisaged in the section. This case has been
      followed by the Madras High Court in Re Piranu Nadathi [ILR
      40 Mad 880] There also the Court has taken the view that the
      section is an enabling one in that it only authorises the
      authorities mentioned therein to commence a prosecution,
      and does not prohibit a private person from commencing a
      prosecution without the permission as required by the section.

                                                                   12/20
SKN                                                   903-APL-413.2016.doc

      In Emperor v. Yesa Nana Didwagh [AIR 1937 Bom 191]
      Beaumont, C.J., speaking for the Court, said that the section is
      intended to provide only for cases where the knowledge of an
      offence under the Act comes to a Registering Officer in his
      official capacity and that it has no application when he has no
      such knowledge, and that even in cases where he has
      knowledge of the commission of the offence in his official
      capacity, the section is only enabling and does not preclude a
      private person from launching a prosecution for the offence.
      The same view was taken by a Bench of the Patna High Court
      in Ganga Dibya v. Emperor [AIR 1943 Pat 227] and also by
      the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Habib
      Shah v. Mehda Shah. [AIR 1960 J&K 18] In Nga Pan
      Gaing v. King-Emperor [AIR 1927 Rang 61] the Rangoon High
      Court held that the word “may” in Section 83 of the Act
      should be read as equivalent to “must be” and that a
      prosecution for an offence under the Act coming to the
      knowledge of a Registering Officer in his official capacity
      cannot be commenced by a private person without the
      permission mentioned in the section. A Full Bench of the
      Allahabad High Court, in Emperor v. Mohd. Mehdi [AIR 1934
      All 963] took the view that Section 83 lays down a special
      procedure for prosecution of the offences created by the Act
      and, therefore, that procedure should be followed, that
      although the word “may” occurring in the section cannot be
      read as “must”, it has to be read in the context as having a
      mandatory character. The Court said that the offences
      contemplated by Sections 81 and 82 of the Act are offences
      committed against registering authority, that only indirectly
      that private persons would be affected and, therefore, the
      provisions of the section are prohibitory in character. In our
      view, this reading of the section is inadmissible for the obvious
      reason that the section, as we have said, provides only for one
      type of cases, namely, cases in which the commission of an
      offence under the Act comes to the knowledge of the
      Registering Officer in his official capacity and even there, the
      language of the section is permissive and not mandatory.

                                                                  13/20
SKN                                                  903-APL-413.2016.doc

      Section 81 of the Act makes the endorsing, copying,
      translating or registering of a document by a Registering
      Officer charged with those duties in a manner which he
      knows or believes to be incorrect, intending thereby to cause
      injury as defined in the Penal Code to any person, an offence
      punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven
      years or with fine or with both. Section 82 deals with four
      classes of offences classified under clauses (a), (b), (c) and
      (d) of the section. Clause (a) deals with intentionally making
      false statements before officers acting under the Act, clause
      (b) with intentionally delivering to a Registering Officer a
      false copy of a map or plan; and (c) with false personation
      and presentation of a document or the making of an
      admission or a statement in the assumed character in any
      proceeding or enquiry under the Act. Clause (d) deals with
      the abetment of the above offences.

      6. If the authorities mentioned in Section 83 of the Act were
      to collude with the person guilty of an offence under Section
      82 of the Act, or if they fail to launch a prosecution against
      the Registering Officer for an offence under Section 81 of the
      Act, there would be a total bar to prosecution by a private
      person in case we accept the reasoning of the Rangoon and
      Allahabad High Courts. We do not think that a construction
      which would lead to that result is warranted by the plain
      language of the section.

      7. One would have expected a more apt phraseology if the
      purpose of the Legislature was to prohibit the prosecution of
      an offence under the Act by a private individual. Seeing that a
      private person will be more seriously injured by the action of
      an offender who not only forges a document but endeavours
      to give it a higher efficacy by registering it, we can perceive
      no reason why the private person should be denied the liberty
      to prosecute the offender. We also see no reason why a
      Registering Officer guilty of an offence under Section 81 of
      the Act should get immunity from prosecution by a private

                                                                14/20
SKN                                                      903-APL-413.2016.doc

         individual injured thereby. Counsel for the appellant referred
         to the decision of this Court in K.M. Kanavi v. State of
         Mysore [AIR 1968 SC 1339 : (1968) 3 SCR 821 : (1969) 1
         SCJ 168 : 1968 Cri LJ 1510] and contended that Section 83
         of the Act is prohibitory in character. There is no merit in this
         contention as the language of the provision there considered
         was totally different.”

11.       Sections 82 and 83 of the Registration Act provide that in case

an offence is committed under the Registration Act and if it comes to the

knowledge of the registering officer in his official capacity, the prosecution

can be initiated. Section 83 of the Registration Act uses the word “may”.

The language used in section 83 of the Registration Act is permissive and

not mandatory. Perusal of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

the case of Dharmadeo Rai v. Ramnagina Rai (supra) would make it clear

that the language of section 83 is permissive and not mandatory. The

word “may” has been used in the said section with the aforesaid intention

and objective. In that view of the matter, I find that the prior permission

as contended as required under section 83 of the Registration Act is not

mandatory. It is also open for a private individual to file a complaint.

12.       Perusal of the documents i.e. both the Sale-deeds and Power of

Attorney would make it clear that the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd

September 1980 has been misused long after the death of            Mr.Balram

Jaisinghani.    Further, on considering the documents, it prima facie

appears that, false and fabricated documents have been used before the

                                                                     15/20
SKN                                                     903-APL-413.2016.doc

registering authority. When both the Sale-deeds and the purported Power

of Attorney dated 23rd September 1980 are read together, it is apparent

that the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September 1980 has been used in

respect of land bearing different survey numbers and not the survey

numbers referred to in the Power of Attorney. In that view of the matter,

a prima facie case under section 82 of the Registration Act and section 420

and other sections of IPC is clearly made out. It is not disputed that, the

said Mr.Balram Jaisinghani had expired in the year 1989. In my opinion, a

prima facie case of the offence of forgery is also made out.

13.         As regards the argument of the Applicants that, a notice ought

to have been issued to the Applicants before registering the FIR under

section 82 of the Registration Act, I am of the view that the said notice is

neither contemplated under the Act nor necessary.      It cannot be that in

each and every matter/ offence under the Registration Act, a notice is

required to be given.

14.       As regards the question of delay, I am of the opinion that

considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be

that the criminal complaint can be thrown only on the ground of delay.

Prima facie, it appears that, the documents have been misused and

signatures have been made on behalf of the person who was no longer

alive. A bare perusal of the document bearing No.1939/2010 would


                                                                   16/20
SKN                                                   903-APL-413.2016.doc

indicate that, the said document has been signed by Arun Ranvade on

behalf of Mr.Nandakumar Jaisinghani and Mr.Balram Jaisinghani as Power

of Attorney Holder.      Perusal of the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd

September 1980 would indicate that the reference therein is to lands

bearing Survey Nos.2/4E/Plot Nos.13, 14 for an area of 6.25 R and

4.29 R.   Though, the Power of Attorney is in respect of Survey No.2/4E,

the same has been used to register a Sale-deed dated 17 th March 2010

bearing Registration No.2283/2010       in respect of Survey No.2/4D.

Further, the said Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September 1980 is used in

document bearing Registration No.2283/2010, by Mr.Arun Ranvade as a

Power of Attorney holder of Mr.Balram Jaisinghani who had already

expired in the year 1989. Similarly, the said Mr.Arun Ranvade had again

used the said Power of Attorney dated 23 rd September 1980 to register the

Sale-deed dated 5th March 2010 bearing Registration No.1939/2010 on

behalf of Mr.Balram Jaisinghani.

15.       I have perused the Affidavit dated 16 th December 2025 filed by

the Assistant Police Inspector attached to the Kondawa Police Station.

Perusal of the Affidavit would indicate that, the Power of Attorney dated

23rd September 1980 which was used for registration of the Sale-deed

dated 5th March 2010 bearing registration No.1939/2010 and 17 th March

2010 bearing registration No.2283/2010 mentions/describes the property


                                                                 17/20
SKN                                                     903-APL-413.2016.doc

by giving survey numbers. The Investigating Officer has stated that, from

the information received from the office of the Tahsildar, Pune City the

new Survey Numbers       which are mentioned in the Power of Attorney

dated 23rd September 1980 were only allotted and given in the year 2004

when the Government had replaced the old type of property records and

implemented the new system. That, the survey numbers mentioned in the

Power of Attorney are survey numbers allotted to the internal roads of the

Anupama Co-operative Society. That, the same were allotted in the year

2004 and therefore mention of same survey numbers in the Power of

Attorney purported to be executed in the year 1980 is a clear fact which

establishes the forgery. The record indicates that, the said Mr.Balram

Jaisinghani expired in the year 1989 and the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd

September 1980 has been used while executing the Sale-deeds in the year

2010. In my opinion, a clear prima facie case of fraud is made out.

16.       A perusal of the Sale-deed dated 5th March 2010 bearing

registration No.1939 of 2010 would indicate that, by the said Sale-deed

the said Arun Shripati Ranvade has signed on behalf of Nandakumar

Thakurdas Jaisinghani and Balram T. Jaisinghani as a Power of Attorney

Holder. The said Balram Jaisinghani expired in the year 1989 and the

Sale-deed is executed in the year 2010. Prima facie, this is indicative of a

fraudulent transaction as the fact is that the Power of Attorney dated 23 rd


                                                                   18/20
SKN                                                       903-APL-413.2016.doc

September 1980 had ceased to exist and, therefore the Power of Attorney

holder could not have executed the said Sale-deeds.

17.        Perusal of the Power of Attorney dated 23rd September 1980

would indicate that the same has been given by Balram Jaisinghani and

Nandakumar Jaisinghani to Arun Ranvade in respect of Survey Nos.

2/4E/Plot Nos. 13 and 14 whereas the Sale-deed dated 17 th March 2010

bearing registration No.2283 of 2010 which has been executed by Arun

Shripati Ranvade on behalf of Balram Jaisinghani on the basis of the said

Power of Attorney has been executed in respect Survey No.2/4D/Plot

No.13. Prima facie, a clear case of fraud is made out as the Power of

Attorney is in respect of survey No.2/4E and a Sale-deed is executed in

respect of Survey No. 2/4D.

18.        Further, perusal of the order dated 17 th January 2017, it would

be pertinent to note that the mutation entries bearing Nos.4256 and 4257

have been set aside. Mutation Entry No.4256 was in respect of Sale-deed

dated 5th March 2010 and Mutation Entry No.4257 is in respect of Sale-

deed dated 17th March 2010.        The Applicants were parties to the said

proceeding.    Though the Applicants were parties to the proceeding, they

have not challenged the order dated 17 th January 2010 till date.          The

allegation of the Intervener is that the said property, in fact, belongs to the

Society.


                                                                      19/20
SKN                                                   903-APL-413.2016.doc

19.       In my opinion, prima facie case is made out against the

Applicants. Considering the facts and circumstances, no case is made out

to exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C..   In view

thereof, Application is dismissed.




                               (RANJITSINHA RAJA BHONSALE, J.)




                                                                  20/20


Continue reading with your account

Sign in to read the full judgment. It’s free.

Sign in to read

Checking your session…

For a signed copy suitable for filing, refer to the court's website.