RAMESH ALIDAS BAJAJversusASHOK KISHINCHAND CHAWLA

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                      AGK
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

                                ARBITRATION APPLICATION NO. 94 OF 2026
                                                     WITH
                                  INTERIM APPLICATION NO.4351 OF 2026

                      Ramesh Aildas Bajaj & Another               … Applicants
                                 V/s.
ATUL
GANESH                Ashok Kishinchand Chawla, deleted
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
                      since deceased 1a) Geeta Ashok Chawla
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI              & Others                                    … Respondents
Date: 2026.09.21
11:37:22 +0530




                      Mr. Anoshak Davar with Mr. Dhaval Shethia, Ms. Deepa
                      Pojuja and Ms. Asfiya Cutchi i/by J Law Associates for
                      the Applicant.
                      Ms. Bharati Ahuja, Respondent No.4, in-person.


                                           CORAM                : AMIT BORKAR, J.

                                           RESERVED ON          : SEPTEMBER 18, 2026

                                           PRONOUNCED ON : SEPTEMBER 21, 2026
                      JUDGMENT:

                      1.    The Applicant has filed present Application under Section 11
                      of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment
                      of Arbitrator arising between the parties pursuant to Clause 14 of
                      the Agreement to transfer dated 25 August 2004.

                      2.    According to the Applicants, facts giving rise to the filing of
                      the present Application are as under. On 28 August 2004,
                      Agreement to Transfer was executed between the Applicants and



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the Respondents in respect of property being Plot No. 99/B,
bearing CTS No. 386/7, admeasuring about 197.6 sq. Meters with
the dwelling house, standing thereon situated at Village Wadhavli,
Collectors Colony, Chembur, Mumbai 400 074 (said property). At
the time of execution of the said agreement, the following persons
were in possession of the said property: (i) Mr. Ashok Chawla; (ii)
Mr. Sanju Joshi; (iii) Mr. Paul; (iv) Mr. Anil Rajput; (v) Applicants.
Under the said Agreement the Respondents were under following
obligations: to get the premises in possession of Mr. Sanju Joshi,
Mr. Paul, Mr. Anil Rajput vacated (as per clause 3 of the said
agreement); to get their names mutated on the property card (as
per clause 4 of the said agreement); to hand over the possession of
the said rooms to the Applicants herein (as per clause 5 of the said
agreement).

3.    On the other hand, upon completion of the Respondents'
obligation, the Applicants were under obligation to pay the
balance consideration as agreed under the said agreement.
Between 10 to 13 September 2004, the Respondents partially
performed agreement by handing over the possession of premises
in possession of Mr. Paul and Mr. Doshi to Applicants. But the
Respondents could not settle claim of Mr. Anil Rajput and thus
kept the execution of conveyance deed in respect of the said
property in abeyance till the year 2012. In the year 2012, the
Respondents expressed their inability to settle the third tenant Mr.
Anil Rajput and thus requested the Applicants to settle same.

4.    The Applicants paid total amount of Rs. 13,10,000/-(which
includes Rs.6,10,000/- paid to Owners and Rs. 7,00,000/- paid to



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tenants on behalf of the owners). It was further agreed under the
Agreement to transfer that the amount paid to tenants on behalf of
the owners shall be adjusted from the total consideration.
Subsequently, since the Respondents did not comply with the terms
of agreement, Suit No. 2311 of 2012 was filed for specific
performance. During pendency of the said suit, the Respondents
inducted one Mr. Julie in one of the rooms over the said property
in the year 2019. The Applicants had no option but to settle the
tenancy claim of the said Ms. Julie.

5.    During the pendency the Respondents approached the
Applicants showing their willingness to comply with the said
agreement. The Respondents in fact never had any intention to
adhere by the terms of the said agreement. During the pendency of
the said suit, under the guise of settlement the Respondents again
took Rs. 1,61,741 from the Applicants. The Applicants from the
year 2004 till the year 2024 has paid total sum of Rs.40,05,741/-
(which includes Rs.7,71,741/- paid to Owners and Rs.32,34,000/-
to tenants), which is way more than Rs. 24,51,000/- which was
agreed under the said agreement. The Applicants has further paid
the property tax of the said property which was pending form the
year 2010.

6.    On 25 April 2024, the aforesaid suit was withdrawn by the
Applicant since there was an arbitration clause as pointed out the
Respondents. Notice dated 21 June 2024 for invocation of the
Arbitration was issued by the Applicants. The Respondents replied
to the said notice on 31 July 2024 refusing the invocation of the
arbitration and appointment of the Arbitrator as proposed under



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the said Agreement.

7.    Mr. Davar, learned Advocate for the Applicants, submits that
under Section 11(6) read with Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, the role of the Court at the stage of
referring the parties to arbitration is limited. According to him, so
far as limitation is concerned, this Court is required to examine
only whether the present Application under Section 11 has been
filed within the prescribed period. He submits that the period has
to be considered from the date of service or receipt of the Notice
invoking arbitration under Section 21, dated 6 November 2025,
and the reply thereto dated 5 December 2025.

8.    According to Mr. Davar, the question whether the actual
claims of the Applicants are barred by limitation is a different issue
from the question whether the present Application under Section
11 has been filed within time. He submits that the limitation
applicable to the underlying claims depends upon several facts
which require examination. These include the alleged continuous
part-payments made from time to time, totaling Rs.40,05,741/-
between the years 2004 and 2024, including Rs.1,61,741/-
accepted between 28 November 2022 and 7 September 2024; the
steps taken for settling the claims of the tenants, namely Mr.
Sanjay Doshi, Mr. Paul and Mr. Anil Rajput in the year 2012 and
Ms. Julie under the Registered Deed of Transfer dated 18 March
2021; payment of municipal property tax for the period from 2010
to 2024 amounting to Rs.2,06,882/-; and the earlier proceedings
filed bona fide in Suit No.2311 of 2012 before the City Civil Court
at Bombay. According to him, these matters involve both questions



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of fact and questions of law and therefore cannot be decided at the
stage of considering an Application under Section 11.

9.    Mr. Davar further submits that once this Court is satisfied
that the present Application under Section 11 has been filed within
the prescribed period, after the Notice invoking arbitration under
Section 21 dated 6 November 2025 and the Reply dated 5
December 2025, the question of limitation of the substantive
claims should be left to the Arbitral Tribunal. According to him, the
various factual issues relating to limitation require evidence and
proper consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal. This would include
the Applicants’ contention regarding exclusion of the period during
which Suit No.2311 of 2012 was prosecuted in good faith before
the City Civil Court, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
until the Suit was withdrawn on 25 April 2024. It is therefore
submitted that these issues should remain open for determination
by the Arbitral Tribunal after considering the evidence led by the
parties.

10.   Mr. Davar submits that the Applicants have made several
payments from time to time in connection with the transaction
covered by the Agreement to Transfer dated 28 August 2004.
According to him, payments totaling Rs.7,71,741/- were made
directly to the owners and their legal heirs between the years 2004
and 2024. He particularly relies upon the aggregate amount of
Rs.1,61,741/- paid by the Applicants and accepted by the
Respondents between 28 November 2022 and 7 September 2024.
He submits that Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for
a fresh period of limitation where payment towards a debt or



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interest is made before expiry of the prescribed period by the
person liable to make such payment. According to him, the
payments made from time to time, including the payment made up
to 7 September 2024, therefore require consideration while
deciding whether the claims are barred by limitation.

11.   Mr. Davar further submits that the period during which the
Applicants prosecuted Suit No.2311 of 2012 before the City Civil
Court from 2012 until 2024 is liable to be excluded under Section
14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. He submits that Section 14 permits
exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting another civil proceeding
with due diligence and in good faith, where the proceeding
concerns the same matter and was prosecuted before a Court
which was unable to entertain it because of a defect of jurisdiction
or some other cause of a similar nature. According to him, whether
the Applicants satisfy the requirements of Section 14 is a matter
requiring examination of the facts and circumstances in which the
earlier Suit was filed and prosecuted. He therefore submits that
this issue should be left for consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal.

12.   Ms. Ahuja, Respondent No.4 appearing in person, on the
other hand, submits that the claim which the Applicants seek to
refer to arbitration is ex facie a dead claim. According to her, even
if the present Application under Section 11 has been filed within
the period applicable to such an Application after refusal to
appoint an Arbitrator, that fact does not remove the separate bar of
limitation applicable to the substantive claim. She submits that the
substantive claim arising from the Agreement had become time-
barred much before the Applicants issued their first notice



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invoking arbitration under Section 21 on 21 June 2024. She points
out that the Agreement to Transfer is dated 28 August 2004.
According to her, the transaction was required to be completed in
the year 2004 and the balance consideration was payable by 31
December 2004. Despite this, arbitration was invoked for the first
time only on 21 June 2024.

13.   Ms. Ahuja further submits that the Applicants' own earlier
proceedings show that the claim had become time-barred when
Suit No.2311 of 2012 was filed. She relies upon the order dated 25
September 2012 passed by the City Civil Court, which, according
to her, records that the balance consideration was payable by 31
December 2004. The said order records that proceedings for
specific performance had not been instituted within the prescribed
period and that no explanation for the delay had been given.
According to Ms. Ahuja, the Applicants cannot revive a remedy
which had become barred merely by withdrawing the Suit in the
year 2024 and invoking arbitration on 21 June 2024.

14.   Ms. Ahuja places reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. M/s B.B.M. Enterprises ,
Civil Appeal No.4320 of 2026, 2026 INSC 358, decided on 9 April
2026. According to her, in that case the Supreme Court set aside
an appointment of an Arbitrator under Section 11 where the
admitted facts and chronology showed that the claim was ex facie
a dead claim and no detailed examination of evidence was
necessary. She submits that the Supreme Court has made a
distinction between the limitation applicable to the Application
under Section 11 and the limitation applicable to the substantive



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claim. According to her, a subsequent notice invoking arbitration
under Section 21 cannot bring back a claim which had become
barred by limitation.

REASONS AND FINDINGS:

15.   I have considered the submissions of Mr. Davar, learned
Advocate for the Applicants, and Ms. Ahuja, Respondent No.4, who
has appeared in person. I have considered the Agreement to
Transfer which is on record. From the Agreement, it appears that
the   total   consideration   fixed   between     the      parties      was
Rs.24,51,000/-. Out of this amount, Rs.1,60,000/- was paid as
earnest money. The balance amount was to be paid before 31
December 2004. The Agreement required the Vendors to get the
premises vacated from the tenants, to get the property transferred
in their names in the concerned records and to hand over vacant
possession to the Purchasers. At this stage, the question before the
Court is not whether the Applicants will succeed in their claim
under the Agreement. The question is whether the present
Application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 can be refused only on the ground that, according to the
Respondents, the main claim is barred by limitation. These are two
different questions. The limitation for filing an Application under
Section 11 and the limitation applicable to the main claim under
the Agreement cannot be treated as being the same.

16.   There is no dispute regarding the arbitration clause in the
Agreement. Clause 14 provides that any dispute or difference
between the parties relating to the Agreement is to be referred to




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arbitration. It provides the manner in which the Arbitrator or
Arbitrators are to be appointed if the parties are not able to agree.
The clause further provides that the arbitration will be governed
by the Arbitration Act which is in force. Therefore, the existence of
an arbitration agreement between the parties is not really in
dispute.

17.   The main case of the Respondent is that the claim of the
Applicants is an ex facie dead claim. The Agreement was entered
into in the year 2004. Under Clause 2, the balance consideration
was to be paid before 31 December 2004. Clause 4 required the
Vendors to get the property transferred in their names in the
concerned    records   before   30    November     2004.       Clause       5
contemplated that vacant possession would be handed over, and
the necessary conveyance documents would be executed. On a
plain reading of these clauses, it can be seen that the parties
expected the transaction to be completed around the year 2004.
However, this fact cannot decide the present Application. The
Applicants have placed a different factual position before the
Court. According to them, the Respondents did not complete their
obligations under the Agreement. They state that possession of
some portions was handed over, but disputes with the tenants
continued. They further state that the Respondents could not settle
the claim of Mr. Anil Rajput and, in the year 2012, requested the
Applicants themselves to settle the said claim. The Applicants rely
upon payments made from time to time in relation to the same
transaction. This includes, according to them, an amount of
Rs.1,61,741/- which was accepted between 28 November 2022



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and 7 September 2024.

18.   Whether these payments were made, for what purpose they
were made, who received them and whether they can be treated as
part-payment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are
matters which require consideration of the facts and documents.
The Applicants rely upon payments made to the tenants and the
subsequent settlement of the claim of Ms. Julie. These matters
cannot be decided merely by looking at the date of the original
Agreement.

19.   Mr. Davar has relied upon Suit No.2311 of 2012. According
to him, the Applicants had filed that Suit before the City Civil
Court for enforcing the same transaction. The Applicants state that
they prosecuted the Suit from 2012 until 2024 in good faith and
with due care, believing that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to
decide the dispute. When the Respondents took the stand that the
dispute was required to be referred to arbitration, the Applicants
sought withdrawal of the Suit with liberty to take appropriate
steps for arbitration. The Applicants have relied upon the order
dated 25 April 2024 by which the Suit was permitted to be
withdrawn, and the subsequent Review Order dated 31 August
2024. According to the Applicants, paragraph 4 of the earlier order
contained adverse observations and those observations were later
deleted in review. The operative portion relied upon by the
Applicants is:

      "Suit is allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to the
      Plaintiffs/Applicants to exhaust appropriate legal remedies
      and initiate arbitration proceedings in accordance with law.



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      Paragraph 4 of the Order dated 25.04.2024 stands deleted,
      and all adverse observations contained therein stand
      expunged, leaving all rights, contentions, and remedies of
      the parties open to be agitated before the Arbitral Tribunal."

20.   The effect of this order cannot be considered separately from
the issue of limitation. The Applicants are not relying only upon
the fact that the earlier Suit was filed. They are relying upon the
manner in which the Suit was prosecuted, the objection raised by
the Respondents regarding arbitration, the order permitting
withdrawal and the Review Order by which paragraph 4 was
deleted. Whether the period spent in the earlier Suit can be
excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act is a separate
question. However, at the stage of considering the Application
under Section 11, it cannot be assumed that the earlier Suit has no
legal relevance.

21.   The Applicants rely upon Section 14 of the Limitation Act for
excluding the time spent in the earlier proceeding. Their case is
that the earlier Suit was prosecuted with due diligence and in good
faith and that it related to the same dispute. Therefore, the
Applicants have given a specific reason as to why the period from
2012 to 2024 should not be counted for the purpose of limitation.
Whether all the requirements of Section 14 are satisfied will
depend upon the pleadings and record of the earlier Suit and the
circumstances in which the Suit was prosecuted and withdrawn.
This cannot be decided only by looking at the date of the
Agreement of 2004.




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22.   The Respondent is correct to the extent that the limitation of
the substantive claim and the limitation of the Section 11
Application are two different matters. This position has been
settled by the Supreme Court. In Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v.
ASAP Fluids (P) Ltd., (2025) 1 SCC 502, the Supreme Court
considered the earlier judgments and referred to the clarification
made in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12
SCC 1. The relevant part of paragraph 136 was:

      “136. Thus, we clarify that while determining the issue of
      limitation in exercise of the powers under Section 11(6) of
      the 1996 Act, the referral Court should limit its enquiry to
      examining whether Section 11(6) application has been filed
      within the period of limitation of three years or not. ... the
      referral Courts, at the stage of deciding an application for
      appointment of arbitrator, must not conduct an intricate
      evidentiary enquiry into the question whether the claims
      raised by the applicant are time-barred and should leave that
      question for determination by the arbitrator.”
23.   This principle makes it clear that, at the stage of Section 11,
this Court is not required to conduct a detailed examination of
every fact relating to the limitation of the main claim. It is true
that the Supreme Court has recognised a limited situation where
the Court can refuse a reference if the claim is clearly dead and
there is no real dispute requiring consideration by an Arbitral
Tribunal. In the passage relied upon by the Applicants from Vidya
Drolia, the Supreme Court observed:

      “The court at the referral stage can interfere only when it is
      manifest that the claims are ex facie time-barred and dead,
      or there is no subsisting dispute. All other cases should be




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      referred to the Arbitral Tribunal for decision on merits.”
24.   The expression "manifest" is important. It means that the
claim should be clearly and plainly dead from the material before
the Court. If deciding the issue requires consideration of disputed
facts, different documents or the legal effect of events which
happened later, ordinarily such question should not be decided at
the Section 11 stage.

25.   The Respondent has relied upon State of West Bengal and
Others v. B.B.M. Enterprises, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 980. That
judgment, on the facts placed before this Court, does not require a
different conclusion. In that case, the work had been completed on
30 July 2000 and the notice invoking arbitration was issued only
on 2 June 2022. The Supreme Court found that after the
communication dated 4 January 2001, the appellant had taken no
steps for about 21 years. The Supreme Court observed:

      “After Annexure P9 of 04.01.2001, whether it be the interim
      determination of dues or not, the appellant slept over its
      claim for 21 years before the notice seeking arbitration was
      issued on 02.06.2022; an ex-facie dead claim.”
26.   The important feature of that case was that there was no
material showing any real event during the long period of 21 years
which required further examination. There was no final bill, no
request for determination of the amount payable and no notice
invoking arbitration during that entire period. On those admitted
facts, the Supreme Court held that the claim was ex facie dead.

27.   The position placed before this Court is different at this
stage. The Applicants have referred to several events which



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occurred after the Agreement was entered into. They rely upon
part performance, payments made to the owners and tenants,
settlement of tenancy claims, payment of property taxes, filing and
prosecution of Suit No.2311 of 2012, withdrawal of that Suit with
liberty to commence arbitration, the Review Order dated 31
August 2024 and the notice invoking arbitration. I am not holding
at this stage that each of these events is proved or that every such
event extends the period of limitation. I am only considering that
these events have been relied upon by the Applicants and their
effect requires consideration.

28.   In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is no
dispute at all regarding limitation. There are questions as to when
the cause of action arose, whether there were subsequent acts
amounting to part performance or acknowledgment, whether the
payments relied upon have any legal effect under Section 19 of the
Limitation Act, whether the period spent in the earlier Suit can be
excluded under Section 14 and what is the effect of the
withdrawal order and the subsequent Review Order.

29.   Ms. Ahuja has relied upon the order dated 25 September
2012 passed by the City Civil Court. According to her, even at that
time the Court had noticed that the balance consideration was
payable by 31 December 2004 and that no proceedings for specific
performance had been filed within the prescribed period. This
submission is relevant and cannot be ignored. If that order was the
only material before the Court and there were no subsequent
events requiring consideration, the submission that the claim had
become old and barred would have considerable force. However,



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the Applicants have pointed out that the earlier withdrawal order
was subsequently reviewed and paragraph 4 was deleted.
According to the operative portion reproduced above, “all adverse
observations contained therein stand expunged” and the rights and
contentions of the parties were kept open before the Arbitral
Tribunal. Therefore, at this stage, the earlier observations cannot
be treated as final findings deciding every question of limitation
between the parties. This is particularly so because the Applicants
rely upon the subsequent Review Order. The exact legal effect of
the orders passed by the City Civil Court can properly be
considered by the Arbitral Tribunal after the complete record of
the earlier Suit is before it. At the same time, I do not accept the
submission that merely issuing a notice invoking arbitration in
2024 can revive a claim which had become barred. Such a
proposition would not be correct. A later notice cannot create a
fresh cause of action. This position has been made clear in Vishram
Varu and Company v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 588 and in
B.B.M. Enterprises. The Applicants therefore have to show some
reason for continuing the claim, excluding the earlier period or
calculating limitation in some other permissible manner.

30.   This is the difficulty in accepting the Respondent's
submission at the present stage. The Applicants rely upon
provisions which, if proved and found applicable, may have an
effect on limitation. They rely upon Section 19 on the basis that
payments were made during the continuing transaction. They rely
upon Section 14 on the basis that the earlier Suit was prosecuted
in good faith and with due diligence before a Court which,



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according to them, could not decide the matter because of the
arbitration clause. I am not holding that these provisions
necessarily apply in favour of the Applicants. The finding at this
stage is only that these are issues which can be argued and require
adjudication.

31.   The present matter therefore cannot be treated in the same
manner as a case where the admitted facts show that a party did
absolutely nothing for many years and there was no intervening
event at all. Here, the Applicants have placed a series of events
before the Court and have relied upon documents and orders
whose legal effect is disputed. The issue is therefore not merely to
count the years from 2004. It is necessary to consider what
happened between the parties after 2004 and what legal effect
may follow from those events. I am unable to accept the
submission that merely because the earlier Suit was filed in 2012,
it necessarily means that the Applicants' claim had completely
ended in every manner. The filing and conduct of the earlier Suit
may have relevance while considering the conduct of the parties
and their rights under the Agreement. More importantly, the
Applicants say that the earlier Suit was filed for the same rights
which they now seek to enforce through arbitration. If the
requirements of Section 14 are found to be satisfied, the period
spent in that Suit may have to be considered while calculating
limitation. Whether the Applicants will satisfy the requirements of
Section 14 is a matter for the Arbitral Tribunal.

32.   The judgment in Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh is therefore
relevant to the present case. The Supreme Court has made it clear



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that when deciding whether the substantive claim is time-barred
requires an “intricate evidentiary inquiry”, such enquiry should not
be undertaken at the Section 11 stage. The same position is found
in paragraph 136 of Krish Spg. The purpose of proceedings under
Section 11 is not to conduct a full trial regarding the substantive
claim before the Arbitrator is even appointed. This does not mean
that the Respondent has no remedy. If, after considering the
Agreement, pleadings, payment records, the earlier Suit, the orders
of the City Civil Court and other material, the Arbitral Tribunal
finds that the claim is barred by limitation, the Tribunal can reject
the claim on that ground in accordance with law. The question of
limitation can be considered by the Tribunal as a preliminary issue
or along with the merits, depending upon the facts and
circumstances of the case.

33.   So far as limitation of the present Section 11 Application is
concerned, the position of the Applicants is different. The
Applicants state that the notice invoking arbitration was issued on
21 June 2024 and was again served on 6 November 2025. They
rely upon the refusal of the Respondents and state that the present
Application was filed. Even on the dates relied upon by the
Respondents, there is no material before me to show that the
present Section 11 Application was filed after three years from the
failure or refusal to act upon the request for appointment of an
Arbitrator. The Respondent has not placed any material from
which it can be held that the present Section 11 Application is
barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, these
two questions have to be kept separate. One question is whether



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the Applicants have approached this Court under Section 11 within
the prescribed period. The other question is whether the main
claims under the Agreement are within limitation. The first
question can be decided from the material presently available. The
second question depends upon the effect of the events relied upon
by the Applicants and cannot be decided without making an
enquiry which, according to the law, has to be left to the Arbitral
Tribunal.

34.   I, therefore, hold that the present case does not fall within
that limited category where the claim is so plainly dead that the
Court must refuse to refer the dispute to arbitration. The
arbitration agreement is found in Clause 14 of the Agreement. The
present Section 11 Application is within limitation. The objection
regarding limitation of the substantive claim involves questions
concerning subsequent payments, the earlier Suit, Sections 14 and
19 of the Limitation Act and the effect of the orders passed by the
City Civil Court. These questions will have to be decided by the
Arbitral Tribunal.Thus, the submission of Mr. Davar is accepted
only to the limited extent that this Court should not conduct a
detailed enquiry into the limitation of the substantive claim. At the
same time, the submission of Ms. Ahuja that the Agreement of
2004 makes the claim a dead claim cannot be accepted at this
stage. This does not mean that I have held that the substantive
claim is within limitation. It only means that, on the present
material, the question of limitation is not so clear and beyond
doubt as to refuse appointment of an Arbitrator.




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35.   On considering the Agreement, the arbitration clause, the
submissions made by both sides and the principles explained in
Vidya Drolia, BSNL v. Nortel Networks India (P) Ltd., Arif Azim,
Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh, SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Krish Spg. and State of West Bengal v. B.B.M. Enterprises , I am
satisfied that the dispute is required to be referred to arbitration.
The Arbitral Tribunal shall remain free to consider all objections
regarding limitation, including the applicability of Sections 14 and
19 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the effect of the proceedings in Suit
No.2311 of 2012, the effect of the orders dated 25 April 2024 and
31 August 2024 and the legal effect of the payments and other
events relied upon by the Applicants. The observations made in
this judgment shall not be treated as final findings on these
substantive issues.

36.         In the aforesaid circumstances, the present Application
under Section 11 of the Act, is deserved to be disposed of in terms
of the following order:

      A)    Mr. Ashish Venugopal, Advocate of this Court is hereby
      appointed as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the
      disputes and differences arising between the Applicants and
      the Respondents in relation to the Agreement to Transfer
      dated 25 August/28 August 2004, including the claims and
      counterclaims arising therefrom;

      Office Address:- Chambers of Nikhil Sakhardande, Sr. Adv.,
      1101, 1 Infinity, Cawasji Patel Street, Fort, Mumbai –
      400001.




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Email:[email protected]

B)   A copy of this Order will be communicated to the
Learned Sole Arbitrator by the Advocates for the Applicant
within a period of one week from today. The Applicant shall
provide the contact and communication particulars of the
parties to the Arbitral Tribunal along with a copy of this
Order;

C)   The Learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the
statutory Statement of Disclosure under Section 11(8) read
with Section 12(1) of the Act to the Advocates for the
Applicant so as to enable them to file the same in the
Registry of this Court. The Registry of this Court shall retain
the said Statement on the file of this Applicant and a copy of
the same shall be furnished by the Advocates for the
Applicant to the Advocates for the Respondent;

D)   The Learned Sole Arbitrator is requested to forward the
statutory Statement of Disclosure under Section 11(8) read
with Section 12(1) of the Act to the parties within a period
of two weeks from receipt of a copy of this Order;

E)   The parties shall appear before the Learned Sole
Arbitrator on such date and at such place as indicated, to
obtain appropriate directions with regard to conduct of the
arbitration including fixing a schedule for pleadings,
examination of witnesses, if any, schedule of hearings etc. At
such meeting, the parties shall provide a valid and functional
email address along with mobile and landline numbers of the



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      respective Advocates of the parties to the Arbitral Tribunal.
      Communications to such email addresses shall constitute
      valid service of correspondence in connection with the
      arbitration;

      F)    All arbitral costs and fees of the Arbitral Tribunal shall
      be borne by the parties equally in the first instance, and shall
      be subject to any final Award that may be passed by the
      Tribunal in relation to costs.

37.   All issues on merits are expressly kept open to be agitated
before the arbitral tribunal appointed hereby.

38.   All actions required to be taken pursuant to this order shall
be taken upon receipt of a downloaded copy as available on this
Court’s website.

39.   In view of disposal of the Arbitration Application, all pending
interlocutory applications stand disposed off.


                                              (AMIT BORKAR, J.)




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