UNION OF INDIA THROUGH CHIEF COMMERCIAL MANAGER CENTRAL RAILWAY MUMBAIversusINSPIRISYS SOLUTIONS LIMITED

                                                                      -ARBP642-2025.DOC

                                                                                Santosh

                            IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION


                                ARBITRATION PETITION NO. 642 OF 2025
                                               WITH
                              INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO. 18580 OF 2024

                      Union of India                                     ...Petitioner/
                                                                             Applicant
                                         Versus
                      Inspirisys Solutions Ltd.                         …Respondent



                      Mr. N. R. Bubna, a/w Mr. Vinit Jain, Mr. Gaurav Mhatre, and
                           Mr. Aryanraj A. for the Petitioner/Applicant.
                      Mr. Bimal Rajasekhar, a/w Ms. Vanshika Jain, for the
SANTOSH                    Respondent.
SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.10.06                               CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
22:14:14 +0530
                                          RESERVED ON: 16th SEPTEMBER, 2026
                                        PRONOUNCED ON: 6th OCTOBER, 2026
                      ORDER:-

                      1.   This is a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

                      Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Arbitration Act, 1996”) to set aside

                      the award dated 22nd    February, 2023 passed by the arbitral

                      tribunal in an arbitral proceeding in connection with the post

                      warranty maintenance of 175 numbers of Smart Card based

                      ATVM Kiosk, reader and Management Terminals.

                      2.   By the said award, a three-member arbitral tribunal has

                      directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 2,45,97,550/- to the

                      respondent-claimant, within 60 days thereof, and in the event of

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default, to pay simple interest at the rate of 7% p.a. on the

award amount from the date of the award till payment.

3.   In the wake of disputes between the petitioner and the

respondent-claimant over annual maintenance contract for

servicing and maintaining Automated Ticket Vending Machines

(‘ATVM’) and related system machines, pursuant to an order

dated 7th July, 2022, the parties were referred to arbitration

before a three-member arbitral tribunal. Eventually, on 22 nd

February, 2023, the arbitral tribunal passed the aforesaid

award sought to be impugned in this petition, which has been

filed on 5th September 2023.

4.   In the affidavit-in-reply to the interim application, being

IA(L)/18580/2024, the respondent-claimant has raised the

ground that petition does not deserve to be entertained as it has

been filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 34(3) of

the Arbitration Act, 1996 plus the extendable period of 30 days

under the proviso thereto.

5.   The petitioner has made an endeavour to meet the

challenge of the bar of limitation by filing an affidavit in

rejoinder. It is, inter alia, asserted that the impugned award

declared that it shall be published immediately on receipt of the

arbitration fees and expenses from the parties. And since the

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arbitration fees were paid on 12th May, 2023 and 17th May, 2023

and, thereafter, the signed copy of the award was dispatched

and received in the office of the DGM, Central Railway, on 11 th

July, 2023, the period of limitation commenced from the date of

receipt of the duly published original award. Thus, the petition

filed on 5th September, 2023 was within the period of limitation.

6.   I have heard Mr. Bubna, the learned Counsel for the

petitioner, and Mr. Rajasekhar, the learned Counsel for the

respondent, on the point of the bar of limitation. The learned

Counsel took the Court through the pleadings and the material

on record.

7.   Mr. Rajasekhar, the learned Counsel for the respondent,

submitted that the petitioner is attempting to take an undue

advantage of its act of withholding the arbitration fees. It was

submitted that the issue as to the quantum of fees to be paid to

the arbitral tribunal was resolved by the High Court by an order

dated 20th March, 2023, whereby the High Court directed that

the fees payable to the arbitrators should be governed by the

instructions issued on the subject by the Railway Board.

Accordingly, on 23rd March, 2023, the arbitral tribunal reduced

the fees to Rs.1,75,500/-. On the very day, the petitioner

received the scanned copy of the award by WhatsApp on the

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WhatsApp group created for the arbitral proceedings. In

addition, on 24th March, 2023, the petitioner duly received a

colour photocopy of the award by courier service. The covering

letter was digitally signed by one of the members of the arbitral

tribunal (Mr. A.K. Mittal).

8.    Although the petitioner has acknowledged the receipt of

the copy of the arbitration award from the presiding Arbitrator

on WhatsApp group on 23rd March, 2023 and colour photostat

copy through courier service on 24th March, 2023, no steps were

taken to file the petition within the prescribed period. On 27 th

June, 2023, a communication was addressed to the arbitral

tribunal seeking a copy of the arbitral award to artificially create

a basis for filing the arbitration petition. Thus, the claim of the

petitioner that, since the original award was received on 11 th

July, 2023 the filing of the petition on 5th September, 2023 was

within the prescribed period of limitation was a subterfuge.

9.    Mr. Rajasekhar further submitted that, it is not the

requirement of the law that the original physical copy of the

award be furnished to the party. Where the correspondence,

during the pendency of the arbitral proceedings, has been

exchanged through emails, the delivery of the copy of the

arbitral award through email constitutes sufficient compliance

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of the provisions contained in Section 31(5) of the Arbitration

Act, 1996. Mr. Rajasekhar submitted that the WhatsApp group

was the primary mode of communication between the parties,

including the arbitrators, during the course of the arbitral

proceedings.

10.   To lend support to the aforesaid submissions that where

the   parties    had   agreed     upon   a    preferred     mode    of

communication, the service of an arbitral award through such

mode would be a sufficient service, Mr. Rajasekhar placed

reliance on an order passed by the learned Single Judge in

Application     (L)/30946/2023    Mars   Envirotech       Limited   vs.

Amanecer Green Private Ltd., dated 21st February, 2024, and

the Division Bench judgment arising out of the same case in

Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 7341/2024, dated 4 th September,

2024. Reliance was also placed on the judgments of the Delhi

High Court in the cases of Continental Telepower Industries

Limited vs. Union of India and others1, Ministry of Youth Affairs

and Sports Dept. of Ports, Govt. of India vs. ERNST and Young

Pvt. Ltd. (Now known as ERNST and Young LLP) and anr. 2, Chief

Engineer Employees State Insurance Corporation vs. ENARCH



1     2009 SCC OnLine Del 1859.
2     OMP (COMM) 377/2018, dated 23.8.2023.
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Consultants Pvt. Ltd.3, and Container Corporation of India

Limited vs. Roadwings International Pvt. Limited4.

11.   In opposition to this, Mr. Bubna, the learned Counsel for

the petitioner, stoutly submitted that the challenge to the

tenability of the petition on the ground of bar of limitation is

completely misconceived and is mounted with a view to delay

the disposal of the interim application seeking stay to the

execution and operation of the impugned award.           Mr. Bubna

laid emphasis on the fact that the impugned award itself makes

it explicitly clear that, though the award had been made and

signed on 22nd February, 2023, yet, it would be published only

upon receipt of the “arbitral fees and expenses” from the parties.

Thus, there was no publication of the award till the parties paid

the fees. It is in that context, Mr. Bubna would urge, the

petitioner has asserted that the fees were paid on 12 th        May,

2023 and 17th May, 2023, and only thereafter the original signed

copy of the arbitral award was received on 11 th July, 2023.

Therefore, the period of limitation for filing a petition under

Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 could only commence

from 12th July, 2023.

12.   Without disputing the fact that, in the letter dated 27 th

3     OMP (Comm) No.529/2024, dated 7.7.2026.
4     OMP (Comm) No. 449 of 2022, dated 5.4.2024.
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June, 2023 addressed to the learned members of the arbitral

tribunal, it was mentioned that a copy of the arbitral award was

uploaded on the WhatsApp group on 23rd March, 2023 and a

colour photostat copy of the award was sent to the DGM’s

Office, Central Railway, through courier on 24 th March, 2023,

Mr. Bubna submitted that the receipt of the copies of the

arbitral award in the aforesaid fashion did not constitute due

delivery of the award under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act,

1996.

13.     Mr. Bubna further submitted that, the publication of the

award was deferred till the payment of the “arbitral fees and

expenses”, and, thus, it cannot be said to have been published

before the fees were paid. And only thereafter, could the

petitioner obtain the original award from the arbitral tribunal on

11th July, 2023. Mr. Bubna further submitted that the delivery

of the signed copy of the award is of immense significance. Time

for filing objections to the award can only be reckoned from the

day on which the signed copy of the award was made available

to the parties. To buttress this submission Mr. Bubna placed

reliance on the decision in the case of Dakshin Haryana Bijli

Vitran Nigam Limited vs. Navigant Technologies Private Limited5.


5       (2021) 7 SCC 657.
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14.   Under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, an

application for setting aside an arbitral award may not be made

after three months has elapsed from the date on which the

party making that application has received the arbitral award.

Under the proviso to sub-section (3), the Court may entertain

the application within the further period of 30 days, but not

thereafter, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by a

sufficient cause from making the application within the

prescribed period of three months.

15.   It would be contextually relevant to note that, under

Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, after the arbitral

award is made, the arbitral tribunal is enjoined to deliver a

signed copy of the arbitral award to each party. A conjoint

reading of sub-section (5) of Section 31 with Section 34(3) of the

Arbitration Act, 1996, would make it clear that the limitation

prescribed for filing a petition to set aside the award under

Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would commence from

the date a signed copy of the arbitral award is delivered to the

party that makes an application for setting aside the same.

16.   In the light of the aforesaid statutory prescription, two

dates assume critical salience. First, the date on which the

signed copy of the arbitral award is delivered to the party, who

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files a petition to set aside the said award. Second, the date on

which such petition is filed before the Court.          The first date

assumes importance from the perspective of the commencement

of the period of limitation. The second date is also of immense

significance to ascertain whether the petition is, in fact, filed

within the prescribed period of three months (from the date of

the commencement of the period of limitation) and the

extendable 30 days period (albeit only upon the satisfaction of

the Court), as the Court is denuded of the power to condone the

delay beyond the prescribed period of three months plus 30

days.

17.     In the light of aforesaid statutory regime, readverting to

the controversy at hand, it is necessary to extract clause 15.3 of

the impugned award. It reads as under:

        “15.3     The award has been made and signed on 22-2-2023
        at Mumbai. The award shall be published immediately on
        receipt of ‘Arbitral Fee and Expenses’ from the parties.”


18.     Two aspects become abundantly clear.          The award was

made and signed on 22nd February, 2023. The publication of the

award was purportedly to follow the receipt of the arbitral fees

and expenses from the parties. There is not much dispute over

the fact that the clarification with regard to the quantum of fees

was issued by this Court in Review Petition No. 38940/2022 in

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Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 222/2022. Thereupon, vide

Minutes of Order dated 23rd March, 2023, the arbitral tribunal

reduced the fees. It is not in dispute that on 23 rd March, 2023

itself, the petitioner received the scanned copy of the award via

WhatsApp. Again incontrovertibly, as is evident from the

communication dated 27th June, 2023, a colour photostat copy

of the award was received by the office of DGM, Central Railway,

through courier service.

19.   In the face of the aforesaid material, can the publication of

the award be said to be deferred till the receipt of the, “arbitral

fees and expenses’ thereby postponing the date from which the

time prescribed for filing a petition under Section 34 would

commence to run?

20.   The thrust of the submission on behalf of the petitioner

was that the original signed copy of the award was received by

the petitioner on 11th July, 2023 only.      Thus, the period of

limitation would commence from that day.

21.   It would be contextually relevant to note that, the fact that

the photostat copy of the award was received by the petitioner

from the arbitrator by courier service on 24 th    March 2023 is

indubitable. By that token, the communication dated 27 th June,

2023 addressed to the arbitral tribunal seeking a copy of the

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award was thus beyond the prescribed period of three months.

22.   I find it rather difficult to accede to the submissions of Mr.

Bubna that since the arbitral fees were paid on 17th May, 2023,

the award can be said to have been published only upon the

payment of fees, i.e. 17th May, 2023. That would introduce an

element of uncertainty as to when the award was, in fact, made

and published. It is more so for the reason that on 20 th March,

2023 itself, this Court had clarified that the arbitral fees shall

be payable in accordance with the instructions issued by the

Railway Board from time to time. The question that would thus

come to the fore is, whether a party to the arbitral proceedings

can be permitted to delay the payment of arbitral fees for a

considerable period and thereafter contend that since the award

cannot be said to have been published for want of payment of

fees, the prescribed period did not begin to run.                To

countenance such a plea would amount to putting a premium

on unjustified inaction and default on the part of such party.

23.   This takes me to the pivotal submission on behalf of the

petitioner that, what was required to be delivered was the

original signed copy of the award and not a scanned copy or a

photostat copy of the award. The question that warrants

consideration is, what is the import of the term “signed copy”

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used in sub-section (5) of Section 31 of the Arbitration              Act,

1996. The relevant part of Section 31 reads as under:

      “31.   Form and contents of arbitral award -

      (1)    An arbitral award shall be made in writing and shall be signed

      by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal.

      ……..

      (5)    After the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be

      delivered to each party.”


24.   On a plain reading, sub-section (5) of Section 31 casts an

obligation on the arbitral tribunal to deliver a signed copy of the

arbitral award to each party. The mode in which the “signed

copy” is to be delivered is not indicated by the text of sub-

section (5) of Section 31. Any mode of delivery which in itself

ensures the identity and authenticity of the arbitral award that

is delivered to each of the parties would be sufficient. The term

“signed copy”, in the considered view of this Court, does not

necessarily imply that only the original award made in duplicate

or triplicate, as the case may warrant, shall be delivered. Clause

56 of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, indicates what

“to sign” signifies, as under:

      “3(56)    “sign”, with its grammatical variations and cognate
      expressions, shall, with reference to a person who is unable to write
      his name, include “mark”, with its grammatical variations and
      cognate expressions.”

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25.   A copy which bears the signature(s) of the arbitrator(s),

and not necessarily, in original, may amount to a signed copy.

Any other interpretation would put unjustified restrictions in

the matter of delivery of the copy of the award to a party. The

Courts cannot be oblivious to the march of technology. It cannot

be arrested.    If an interpretation is adopted that, only the

original award bearing the signature of the arbitrator(s) in ink

would amount to a signed copy of the arbitral award, the very

purpose and object of the Arbitration Act, 1996 of ensuring an

expeditious resolution of the dispute by a forum chosen by the

party by putting in place strict timelines for the challenge to the

arbitral award, would be defeated.

26.   Keeping in view the aforesaid overarching objective of

Arbitration Act, 1996, the Courts have taken a view which keeps

pace with the march of technology. The Courts have looked at

the substance of the matter from the perspective as to whether

the aggrieved party has, in fact, received a signed copy of the

award and not the form of the service of the original award

bearing the signature of the Arbitrator(s) in ink.

27.   In the case of Mars Envirotech Limited (supra), a learned

Single Judge of this Court held that, when the applicant therein

had received the award on its registered email ID by the

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arbitrator, the period for filing the arbitration petition was

required to be computed from that date. A Division Bench of

this Court in Mars Envirotech Limited in Arbitration Appeal (L)

No. 7341/2024 (supra) affirmed the said view. It was, inter alia,

observed that since the appellant did not dispute the fact that

the award dated 19th October, 2022 was sent on the email

address of the appellant and earlier email sent on the very same

address had been replied to, the signed copy of the award can

be said to have been received by the appellant therein.

28.    In the case of Ministry of Youth Affairs (supra) a learned

Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, after analysis of a number

of decisions, held that when a scanned signed copy of the award

was received by the petitioner, the same constituted valid

delivery in terms of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act. It was

observed, the law has to keep pace in tandem with the

developing technology. When service by email is an accepted

mode of service then sending scanned signed copy of the

award/order of the arbitral tribunal to the parties would be a

valid delivery as envisaged under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration

Act.

29.    In the said case, a reference was made to a Division Bench

judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Delhi Urban

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Shelter Improvement Board vs. Lakhwinder Singh6, wherein it

was enunciated that the expression “signed copy” in Section

31(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 clearly indicates the legislative

intent that a copy authenticated by an arbitrator is served on

each party.

30.   Likewise, in the case of Chief Engineer Employees' State

Insurance Corporation (supra) another learned Single Judge of

the Delhi High Court observed as under:

      “15. Section 31(5) requires delivery of a signed copy of the
      Arbitral Award. It does not prescribe the mode through which
      such delivery must necessarily be effected. The provision does
      not mandate that delivery can only be by physical dispatch or
      by a certified hard copy. Once the learned Arbitrator himself
      transmitted a scanned signed copy of the Arbitral Award to
      the parties through the very mode adopted during the arbitral
      proceedings, and the authenticity of such communication
      remains unquestioned, the statutory requirement under
      Section 31(5) stood duly complied with.”



31.   The decision in the case of Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran

Nigam Limited (supra) on which reliance was placed by Mr.

Bubna, does not seem to advance the cause of the submission

on behalf of the petitioner. As is evident from the facts

encapsulated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 45 of the said

judgment, in the said case, even though the award was

pronounced on 27th April, 2018, the signed copy of the award

was provided to the parties only on 19th May, 2018. The
6     2017 SCC OnLine Delhi 9810.
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procedural order therein revealed that on 27 th April, 2018, only a

copy of the award was provided to the parties to point out any

computation,    clerical or typographical errors which could be

corrected in the award. It was further recorded that the third

Arbitrator had dissented, and would deliver his separate

dissenting opinion. On 12th May, 2018, the third arbitrator

pronounced     his dissenting opinion. Again the matter was

posted to 19th May, 2020 to enable the parties to point out any

error which could be corrected. Eventually, on 19 th May, 2018,

the signed copy of the award and the dissenting opinion were

handed over to the parties. In that factual backdrop, the

Supreme Court observed that the period of limitation for filing

objections would have to be reckoned from the date on which

the signed copy of the award was made available to the party.

32.   The facts of the case at hand are materially distinct. As

noted above, the award explicitly records that it was made and

signed on 22nd February, 2023. The arbitral tribunal, after the

High Court clarified the aspect of arbitral fees, passed a

procedural order on 23rd March, 2023 and forwarded a scanned

copy of the arbitral award to the petitioner on 23 rd March, 2023

itself and a colour photostat copy of the award alongwith a

covering letter was indisputably received by the petitioner on


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24th March, 2023. It was nowhere the case of the petitioner that

either the scanned or the colour photostat copy of the award did

not bear the signatures of the members of the arbitral tribunal.

On the contrary, after the expiry of the three-months period, if

computed from 24th March, 2023, a communication was

addressed on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the

arbitral fees and expenses were paid on 17th May, 2023, and,

yet, the petitioner had not received original arbitral award.

33.   In the aforesaid backdrop, if the submissions on behalf of

the petitioner that the award was not declared on account of

non-payment of the arbitration fees, despite the order dated 23 rd

March, 2023 passed by the arbitral tribunal, is countenanced, it

would amount to permitting the petitioner to take an unfair

advantage of the delay on its own part and, thus, artificially

extend the prescribed period for filing the petition under Section

34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, though the signed copy of the

award was duly and unquestionably received by the petitioner

on 24th March, 2023. The mandate of the provisions contained

in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would thus be

circumvented in an indirect and convoluted manner.

34.   The conspectus of the aforesaid consideration is that, on

the own showing of the petitioner, a signed copy of the arbitral

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award was received by the petitioner, at any rate, on 24 th March,

2023 and, thus, the filing of the petition on 5 th September, 2023

was well beyond the prescribed period of three months plus the

extendable period of 30 days. Resultantly, the challenge to the

tenability of the petition on the ground of bar of limitation

deserves to be sustained.

35.     Hence, the following order:

                            :ORDER:

(i)     It is declared that the petition is barred by the period of

        limitation provided under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration

        Act, 1996.

(ii)    The petition, thus, stands dismissed.


(iii)   In view of the dismissal of the petition, the interim

        application also stands disposed.

                                            [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

        At this stage, Mr. Bubna, the learned Counsel for the

Petitioner seeks continuation of the ad-interim relief granted in

the Petition upon deposit of the award amount.

        Mr. Rajashekhar, the learned Counsel for the Respondent

concurs that the Petitioner has deposited the award amount.



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However, he opposes the prayer for continuation of the ad-

interim relief.

      In the light of the view taken by this Court in this order,

the ad-interim relief granted by this Court shall continue to

operate for a period of four weeks from today.




                                         [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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