Bombay High Court
JATIN @SONU MUKESH MEWATIversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- Decided
- Disposal
- Disposed Off
Holding
The Court allowed the bail application, granting bail subject to strict conditions.
Summary
The applicant, Jatin @ Sonu Mukesh Mewati, was arrested in 2018 for serious offences under the IPC, Arms Act and other statutes and has been in custody for over four years without trial. He filed a bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, arguing that the prolonged pre‑trial detention violates his right to liberty and presumption of innocence. The Court examined the constitutional mandate of Article 21, the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and considered the applicant’s young age, length of incarceration, and lack of any trial progress. Relying on precedents such as Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State, the Court held that the applicant is unlikely to flee or tamper with evidence. Consequently, the Court granted bail with a personal bond of Rs 25,000 and several reporting and non‑interference conditions. The order expressly limited its observations to bail and did not address the merits of the underlying criminal case.
Issues considered
- Whether bail should be granted under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 despite the seriousness of the offences and the applicant’s prolonged pre‑trial detention
- Whether the applicant’s age, length of incarceration and lack of trial progress justify the grant of bail
- Whether the risk of flight, witness tampering or repeat offence warrants denial of bail
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959 — s. 27
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — s. 483
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — s. 496, 497, 498
- Constitution of India — s. Article 21
- Indian Penal Code — s. 120B, 201, 302, 34, 504, 506
- Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999
Subjects
- bail
- presumption of innocence
- right to liberty
- undertrial detention
- young offender
- Section 483 BNSS
- IPC offences
- trial delay
- Article 21
Judgment
20.BA.3752.2026.doc
Harshada H. Sawant
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION NO.3752 OF 2026
Jatin @ Sonu Mukesh Mewati .. Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra .. Respondent
....................
Mr. Aniket Nikam a/w. Ms. Abhilasha Pawar and Mr. Shivraj
Dubele, Advocates for Applicant.
Mr. Sukanta A. Karmakar, APP for Respondent.
...................
CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.
DATE : OCTOBER 05, 2026
P.C.:
1. Heard Mr. Nikam, learned Advocate for Applicant and Mr.
Karmakar, learned APP for Respondent.
2. This is an Application under Section 483 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking Bail in connection with C.R.
No.224 of 2018 registered with Paud Police Station, Pune for offences
punishable under Sections 302, 201, 120B, 504 and 506 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 27 of the Arms
Act, 1959.
3. The date of the incident is of 2018. Applicant was initially
arrested on 21.07.2018 and thereafter released on COVID bail. He
thereafter was also granted bail in a different offence for which he was
indicted under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999.
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On 31.07.2023, Applicant immediately surrendered in the present
offence and showed his bonafides, notwithstanding the bail which was
granted to him earlier. Thereafter, Applicant has been in custody.
Applicant is incarcerated for the past more than 4 years 2 months. This
in itself is a long period of incarceration, considering the fact that the
trial has not begun, prosecution has not examined a single witness as
yet. Applicant is a young offender of 24 years.
4. It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application
has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain
whether the accused is likely to appear before the court for trial. There
are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of
accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would
influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents
which are required to be considered in such cases.
5. In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson1, the Allahabad
High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting
bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It
held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session
discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls
all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must
be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that
accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to
1 AIR 1931 ALL 356
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defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is
the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut
Conspiracy case.
5.1. Justice Mukerji writing for the Bench held as under:-
“9. Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an
attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the
High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason
for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek.
The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it
goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of
justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the
defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time
cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an
attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes
a bail may be granted but not in other classes.
This being my reading of the law, I proceed to see whether
this is a case in which the applicants ought to be let out on bail.
On general principles, and on the principles on which sections
496 and 497 (as amended in 1923) are framed, the grant of bail
should be the rule and refusal of bail should be the exception. In
the case of a bailable offence, the law expressly says that if the
accused person applies for bail he shall be released (section
496). Section 497 applies to cases of non-bailable offence and
there it is said that the accused person shall be released on bail
except where there appears to be a reasonable ground for
believing that he has been guilty of a very heinous offence,
namely one which may be punished by either death or by
transportation for life : section 497(1). Again it is laid down
that where, at any stage of the investigation or trial, there are
not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person
has committed a non-bailable offence, but there are sufficient
grounds for further inquiry into his guilt, the accused shall be
released on bail : section 497(2).
The principle to be deduced from sections 496 and 497 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, therefore, is that grant of bail is the
rule and refusal is the exception. (emphasis underlined) That
this must be so is not at all difficult to see. An accused person is
presumed under the law to be innocent till his guilt is proved.
As a presumably innocent person he is entitled to freedom and
every opportunity to look after his own case. It goes without
saying that an accused person, if he enjoys freedom, will be in a
much better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. One of the complaints
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made by the applicants in this case is that their letters sent from
the custody have been opened and inspected and censored, and,
therefore, they were not in a position to conduct their defence
with the aid of such friends as may he outside the prison. As I
have said, it is obvious that a presumably innocent person
should have his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
This being the rule, there may, of course, be exceptions. I will
not attempt to lay down any cases of exceptions, because these
cases before us are not exceptions and I do not want to say
anything which will be only in the nature of an obiter dictum.”
5.2. Justice Boys writing a concurrent view held as under:-
“As to the object of keeping an accused person in detention during the
trial, it has been stated that the object is not punishment; that to keep
an accused person under arrest with the object of punishing him on the
assumption that he is guilty, even if eventually he is acquitted, is
improper. This is most manifest. The only legitimate purposes to be
served by keeping a person under trial in detention are to prevent
repetition of the offence with which he is charged, where there is
apparently danger of such repetition, and to secure his attendance at
the trial. The first of these purposes clearly to some extent involves an
assumption of the accused's guilt, but the very trial itself is based on a
prima facie assumption of the accused's guilt and it is impossible to
hold that in some circumstances it is not a proper ground to be
considered. The main purpose, however, is manifestly to secure the
attendance of the accused.”
6. In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation2, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered
the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail,
principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well
recognised principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail
jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the judgment reads as under:-
“Prevailing situation
6. Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The
statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd
2 (2022) 10 SCC 51
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of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of
this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to
be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being
charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They
are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women.
Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of
them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the
mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the
investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a
draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus
to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an
impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually
opposite to each other.
Definition of trial
7. The word “trial” is not explained and defined under the
Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the
purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of
investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would
obviously be different between these two stages. In the former
stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted
for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters
substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a
trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence
to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards
enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among
other factors.
8. Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as
a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on
suspension of sentence.
Definition of bail
9. The term “bail” has not been defined in the Code, though
is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a
personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an
accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police
or by the investigating agency.
10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect
while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it
is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the
suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and
the trial. The word “bail” has been defined in Black's Law
Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:
“A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required
by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in
court at a future time.”
11. Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines “bail” as:
“to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on
security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a
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place certain, which security is called bail, because the
party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of
those who bind themselves or become bail for his due
appearance when required, in order that he may be safely
protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his
escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him.”
Bail is the rule
12. The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception
has been well recognised through the repetitive
pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh
Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v.
Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] ,
held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24)
“19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab
[Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC
565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is
set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88,
paras 27-30)
‘27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which
deal with the right to ordinary bail because that
right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right
to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that
as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High
Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In
re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC
OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 479-
80 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance
of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be
applied in the solution of the question whether bail
should be granted or refused is whether it is
probable that the party will appear to take his trial
and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be
withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which,
significantly, are the “Meerut Conspiracy cases”
observations are to be found regarding the right to
bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N.
Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor,
1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was
observed, while dealing with Section 498 which
corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code,
that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the
High Court wide powers to grant bail which were
not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding
Section 497 which corresponds to the present
Section 437. It was observed by the court that there
was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle
governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by
Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be
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exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson
[Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All
14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that
it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down
any particular rules which will bind the High Court,
having regard to the fact that the legislature itself
left the discretion of the court unfettered. According
to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise
from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases
and to say that in particular classes a bail may be
granted but not in other classes. It was observed that
the principle to be deduced from the various
sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that
grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception.
An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much
better position to look after his case and to properly
defend himself than if he were in custody. As a
presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled
to freedom and every opportunity to look after his
own case. A presumably innocent person must have
his freedom to enable him to establish his
innocence.
28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by
Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115]
that : (SCC p. 242, para 1)
“1. … the issue [of bail] is one of liberty,
justice, public safety and burden of the public
treasury, all of which insist that a developed
jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially
sensitised judicial process. … After all, personal
liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental,
suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of
“procedure established by law”. The last four
words of Article 21 are the life of that human
right.”
29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.)
[Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1
SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by
Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p.
129, para 29)
“29. … There cannot be an inexorable formula
in the matter of granting bail. The facts and
circumstances of each case will govern the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting or
cancelling bail.”
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30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8,
p. 806, para 39), it is stated:
“Where the granting of bail lies within the
discretion of the court, the granting or denial
is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and
circumstances of each particular case. Since
the object of the detention or imprisonment of
the accused is to secure his appearance and
submission to the jurisdiction and the
judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is
whether a recognizance or bond would effect
that end.”
It is thus clear that the question whether to
grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a
variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect
of which must enter into the judicial verdict.
Any one single circumstance cannot be treated
as of universal validity or as necessarily
justifying the grant or refusal of bail.’
* * *
24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the
Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is
concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the
rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India
and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental
Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be
suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the
Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a
vast number of substantive and procedural rights post
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] .”
13. Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay
Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 :
(2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras
21-23)
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down
from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure
the appearance of the accused person at his trial by
reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither
punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be
considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure
that an accused person will stand his trial when called
upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the
principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that
every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and
duly found guilty.
22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that
detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a
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cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity
demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in
custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial
but in such cases, “necessity” is the operative test. In this
country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of
personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any
person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon
which, he has not been convicted or that in any
circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon
only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left
at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.
23. Apart from the question of prevention being the
object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact
that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial
punitive content and it would be improper for any court to
refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct
whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to
refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of
giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.”
Presumption of innocence
14. Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed
through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to
prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to
satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and
enlargement on bail is to be denied.
15. Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged
throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge
the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law,
until the individual is proven guilty.”
7. Considering Applicant’s age, if he is enlarged on bail Court is
hopeful that his family will undoubtedly do their duty to make every
effort and attempt to reform and aid Applicant in leading a reformed
life while on bail rather than keep him in prison and expose him to
criminal outlook and life in prison. However on the flip side, if a
chance is given to the Applicant because of his young age by enlarging
him on bail, there is a possibility that he will be remorseful and repent
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in retrospect. This is a chance required to be taken by the Court
because punishment has to be believed to be inflicted for a reformative
result rather than being punitive in nature.
8. Undoubtedly the trial will determine the complicity of
Applicant in the offence. While considering Bail Application in such
facts, Court feels that reform and rehabilitation of the under trial
accused needs to be considered especially when age of the accused
person is young so that he gets an opportunity/or is given an
opportunity to reform, rehabilitate and earn his livelihood honorably
from the perspective of social integration. This is a chance which the
Court must take considering the young age of accused person. The age
of the Applicant is very young. If the Applicant is incarcerated in prison
further, there is every possibility that he might lose faith in the
institution and society at large and may tread the path of criminality or
would waste his life. Incarceration in prison exposes many youth to
abuse as is shown statistically.
9. In the case of Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Anr.3, the Supreme Court while granting bail to
accused incarcerated for 4 years in paragraph Nos.16 and 17 held as
under:-
"16. Criminals are not born but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond
redemption. This humanist fundamental is often missed when
3 (2024) 9 SCC 813
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dealing with delinquents, juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint
has a past and every sinner a future. When a crime is
committed, a variety of factors is responsible for making the
offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and
economic, may be, the result of value erosion or parental
neglect; may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the
manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted
with indigence or other privations.
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court
concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the
fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or
any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for
bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article
21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.
10. In the case of Balwinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.4,
in a case under Sections 302 and 307 of IPC the Supreme Court
granted bail to the accused who was behind bars for 4 years citing
unlikelihood of completion of trial in the near future as also on parity
with the co-accused.
11. In the case of Roland Victor Monterio Vs. State of
Maharashtra5, this Court (Coram: N.J. Jamadar, J.) in a case under
Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of the IPC granted bail to the accused
on account of his long incarceration of 4 years.
12. There are several harms of incarceration which are inflicted
disproportionately on the youth. This is the reason why Court feels that
any / every semblance of a chance towards a reformative approach in
punishment should be adopted, especially in the case of young
offenders. Hence every opportunity or to that extent risk should be
4 SLP (Crl.) No.8523 of 2024
5 Bail Application No.1981 of 2023 decided on 11.01.2024.
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constructively taken by the Court in the case of young offenders –
accused before committing such accused to further custody and give
such accused an opportunity to become a good citizen in the Society.
These observations are only in the view of the young age of the
Applicant before me and it is only a means to explore an alternative to
incarceration so that the Applicant can become a good citizen.
13. Applicant is incarcerated for 4 years and 2 months. Hence, in
view of my aforesaid prima facie observations and judicial
pronouncements, Bail Application is allowed subject to the following
conditions:-
(i) Applicant – Jatin @ Sonu Mukesh Mewati is directed to
be immediately released from prison in connection with
CR. No.224 of 2018;
(ii) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on
furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs.25,000/- (Rs. Twenty Five
Thousand only) with one or two sureties in the like
amount;
(iii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer at
Paud Police Station, once every month, on the first
Sunday of the month between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
until commencement of trial and thereafter shall attend
all dates of hearing before the Trial Court;
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(iv) Applicant shall cooperate with the conduct of the trial
and remain present before the Trial Court on all dates,
unless specifically exempted. Applicant shall not seek
unnecessary adjournments. Any such conduct shall
entitle the prosecution to apply for cancellation of bail;
(v) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra
without prior permission of the Trial Court;
(vi) Applicant shall not influence any of the witnesses or
tamper with the evidence in any manner;
(vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed
of his current residential address and mobile telephone
number and shall forthwith inform the Investigating
Officer of any change in his residential address or
mobile telephone number, as and when such change
occurs; and
(viii)Any breach or infraction of any of the aforesaid
conditions shall entail cancellation of the bail granted to
the Applicant.
14. It is clarified that the observations made in this order are
limited for the purpose of granting bail only and I have not made any
observations on merits of the case. The trial shall be adjudicated on
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the strength of the evidence led and strictly on its own merits being
uninfluenced with any of the prima facie observations made
hereinabove in this order.
15. Bail Application is allowed and disposed in the above terms.
[ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ]
H H Sawant
Digitally signed
HARSHADA by HARSHADA
HANUMANT
HANUMANT SAWANT
SAWANT Date: 2026.10.05
15:05:18 +0530
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