PANJAB PRAKASHRAO PATIL AND ANOTHERversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

2026:BHC-AUG:9908-DB

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                                              {1}

                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   BENCH AT AURANGABAD
                           PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.30 OF 2017
                                             WITH
                       CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1034 OF 2018 IN PIL/30/2017
              1. Shri Panjab S/o. Prakashrao Patil,
                 Age: 29 years, Occu.: Agriculture,
                 R/o. Sant Namdeo Nagar,Balsond,
                 Hingoli, Tq. and District Hingoli.

              2. Shri Santosh S/o. Shriram Bhise,
                 Age: 37 Years, Occu.: Agriculture,
                 R/o. Gawalipura, Hingoli,
                 Tq. and Dist. Hingoli.                      … Petitioners

                          Versus

              1. The State of Maharashtra,
                 Through its Principal Secretary,
                 Urban Development Department,
                 Mantralaya, Mumbai -32.

              2. The Under Secretary,
                 Under Secretary,
                 Urban Development Department,
                 Mantralaya, Mumbai -32.

              3. The Collector,
                 Hingoli, District Hingoli.

              4. The Chief Officer,
                 Hingoli Municipal Council,
                 Hingoli, District Hingoli

              5. M/s. Nidhi Mercantile Limited
                 B-306-209, Dynasty Business Park,
                 J.B. Nagar, A.K. Road, Andheri (E),
                 Mumbai – 400 059
                 Through its Proprietor
                 Shri Jugalkishor S/o. Chaganlal Tapadiya,
                 R/o. Nirala Bazar,Samarth Nagar,
                 Aurangabad, District Aurangabad.            … Respondents
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                                   ......
Mr. D.S. Bagul, Advocate h/f Mr. P.D. Bachate, Advocate for Petitioners
Mr. S.B. Narwade, AGP for Respondents No.1 to 3
Mr. Vivek Bhavthankar, Advocate for Respondent No.4
Mr. Anil S. Bajaj, Advocate for Respondent No.5
                                   ......

                         CORAM     :   SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI AND
                                        HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR, JJ.
                RESERVED ON        : 18 FEBRUARY, 2026
               PRONOUNCED ON : 09 MARCH, 2026

JUDGMENT [Per Hiten S. Venegavkar, J.] :-

1.     This Public Interest Litigation is instituted in the year 2017

seeking issuance of writ of certiorari and allied directions to quash and

set aside the communication dated 21.09.2015 issued from the Urban

Development Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai, whereby it was

communicated to the Chief Officer, Municipal Council, Hingoli that

certain reservations affecting the subject lands have lapsed in terms of

Section 127 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966

(for short “the MRTP Act”). The petitioner also prays for directions to

Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to maintain the reservation of the disputed

property for public amenities such as stadium, high school, primary

school, health centre, library, gymnasium, garden/open space etc. In the

alternative, it is prayed that the petitioner’s representation dated 9

September 2016 be decided by Respondent Nos. 1 to 4.
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2.     The factual canvas, in so far as is necessary for adjudication, is

that the subject property comprises lands bearing Survey Nos. 143, 144

(part), 146/2, 154 and 155 (and allied sub-divisions, as pleaded),

originally owned by Usmanshahi Mills, later stated to be National

Textile Corporation. It is pleaded that in the year 1996, the then owner

sought non-agricultural permission and the Assistant Director, Town

Planning, Aurangabad by order dated 19.11.1996 granted such

permission and sanctioned a layout wherein open spaces, primary

school and playground were earmarked and internal roads of varying

widths were shown. It is further pleaded that MSRTC acquired Plot Nos.

19 to 23 from the sanctioned map and succeeded in establishing its

ownership in those plots.


3.     The petitioner asserts that the Revised Development Plan of

Municipal Council, Hingoli was sanctioned by notification dated

28.04.1994 and came into force from 01.07.1994, and under such plan

the subject lands were affected by multiple reservations for public

amenities including stadium, high school, primary school, health centre,

library, gymnasium, garden and open space. The petitioner then traces

a sale deed executed by National Textile Corporation in favour of

Respondent No. 5 – M/s Nidhi Mercantile Limited, referring to the

property by survey numbers and PR card numbers. The petitioner’s
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grievance, in essence, is that land reserved for public purposes has been

sought to be “de-reserved” through the impugned communication and

thereafter Respondent No. 5 has attempted to create third-party

interests by carving out and selling plots even from areas which were

earlier earmarked for public amenities/open spaces.


4.      It is further pleaded that Respondent No. 5 had filed Writ

Petition No. 2083 of 2014 before this Court challenging rejection orders

dated 22.03.2011 and 19.10.2013 in relation to building permission

and also sought a declaration that reservation had lapsed. The

municipal council opposed that writ petition contending that it had not

received the alleged purchase notice dated 04.02.2008 and that the said

notice was forged. The writ petition came to be withdrawn by

Respondent No. 5 with liberty to pursue alternate remedies. Thereafter,

Respondent No. 5 moved the State machinery; the Under Secretary

issued communication dated 21.09.2015 stating that reservation has

lapsed and if the municipal council still requires the land it may acquire

it by following acquisition law.


5.      We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned

counsel appearing for Respondent No. 5, learned AGP for the State, and

learned counsel/representative for the municipal council and planning

authorities. With their assistance we have perused the pleadings and the
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material referred to during hearing including the municipal council

resolutions, correspondence placed on record and affidavits filed by the

concerned authorities including subsequent affidavits indicating the

status of the second revised development plan.


6.      Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned

communication is ex facie illegal and constitutes colourable and mala

fide exercise of power. It is submitted that the essential pre-condition

for lapse under Section 127 of the MRTP Act is valid service of a

purchase notice upon the planning authority/appropriate authority, and

as the municipal council’s consistent stand was that no such notice

dated 04.02.2008 was served, the statutory clock never commenced. It

is urged that the State Government could not have declared lapse

without first adjudicating the foundational fact of service, particularly

when the municipal council had branded the notice as forged. It is also

submitted that land reserved for public amenities cannot be allowed to

be converted into private layout by administrative fiat. It is finally urged

that, in any case, public interest demands protection of the very same

land which is reserved in the development plan, and shifting of

reservations to other lands cannot answer the grievance because the

public amenities were planned with reference to this very locality and

this very parcel.
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7.     Per contra, learned counsel for Respondent No. 5 submitted that

the petition is meritless and proceeds on suppression and selective

reading. It is submitted that Respondent No. 5 had issued purchase

notice dated 04.02.2008 under Section 127 of MRTP Act, followed by

reminder dated 03.06.2009, and when municipal council failed to

respond, Respondent No. 5 approached the State Government by

representation dated 22.12.2010 enclosing the purchase notice and

reminder; the State Government forwarded the same to the municipal

council and called for report; the municipal council placed the matter

before the general body and in the meeting dated 07.03.2012 recorded

inability to acquire due to huge cost and resolved to seek grants;

however, no acquisition proposal was ever moved within the statutory

period. It is further submitted that after the communication dated

21.09.2015, the general body again deliberated and by resolution dated

09.12.2015 recorded that reservations (except one) had lapsed and the

land was not required for acquisition. Counsel contended that municipal

council’s subsequent actions, sanctioning layout, demanding and

receiving development/betterment charges, and acting upon the post-

lapse regime are consistent only with the position that the notice was

within the knowledge of the council and the lapse had occurred by

operation of statute. Heavy reliance is placed on the principle that lapse

under Section 127 of the MRTP Act is automatic once the statutory
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conditions are met and does not require any further “order of

dereservation”, the impugned communication being at best an

intimation of a statutory consequence. For this proposition, reliance is

placed on Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 7 SCC 555.


8.     Learned    AGP    for   the   State   supported   the   impugned

communication. It is submitted that the State machinery acted upon

representation, called for reports, and on the basis of the report of the

town planning authority and the municipal council’s own record of

inaction and inability, communicated that reservation has lapsed.

Learned AGP submitted that Section 127 of the MRTP Act does not

contemplate a roving adjudication akin to a trial; once the notice is

shown to have been received/acted upon and no steps towards

acquisition are initiated within the stipulated time, the statutory

consequence follows. Reliance is also placed on Supreme Court

decisions in Girnar Traders (surpa) explaining that “steps” means steps

leading to acquisition not mere correspondence, and that the provision

is intended to prevent indefinite sterilization of private land. Reference

is made to Shrirampur Municipal Council, Shrirampur v. Satyabhamabai

Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5 SCC 627 : AIR 2013 SC 3757) and

Chhabildas v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 2 SCC 784.
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9.     The municipal council’s position, as it emerges from the record

and affidavits, is not uniform across time. The earlier stand disputes

receipt of the notice; however, later material placed on record records

that the State Government’s forwarding letter with copy of notice was

received and placed before the general body; the general body

considered the acquisition cost and expressed inability to acquire; and

thereafter, in the meeting dated 09.12.2015, the council resolved that

the land is not required to be acquired. In a later affidavit, the

municipal council also states that after receipt of the State

communication dated 21.09.2015, the general body resolved that the

property is not required on various grounds, and it was informed

accordingly to the State. The town planning authority’s affidavit further

indicates that while certain reservations had lapsed, due care was taken

to provide reservations in the second revised development plan and that

the second revised plan (as accepted) came into force with effect from

10.02.2019.


10.    On the above pleadings and submissions, the determinative

issues which arise are: (i) whether the petitioner can maintain a PIL to

compel continuance of reservation only on the subject lands

notwithstanding the statutory regime of lapse under Section 127 of the

MRTP Act and subsequent planning measures; (ii) whether, on facts, the
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purchase notice requirement under Section 127 of the MRTP Act can be

treated as satisfied in the present case; (iii) whether steps towards

acquisition were commenced within the statutory period; (iv) what is

the impact of the municipal council’s resolutions, statements and

subsequent conduct; and (v) whether the subsequent second revised

development plan safeguarding public amenities elsewhere renders the

reliefs infructuous or inequitable.


11.     Before we deal with those issues, it is necessary to clear the

conceptual misunderstanding that runs through a substantial part of the

petitioner’s argument. Section 127 of the MRTP Act does not speak of

“de-reservation by order”. It provides a deeming consequence: upon

failure of the planning/appropriate authority to acquire within the

specified timeline after service of notice, the reservation “shall be

deemed to have lapsed” and the land “shall be deemed to be released”

and becomes available to the owner for development as permissible in

the case of adjacent land. In Girnar Traders (supra), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has explained the scheme of Sections 126 and 127 of

the MRTP Act and the legislative intent to avoid leaving the landowner

at the mercy of inaction. The impugned communication dated

21.09.2015, when read in that light, is not an independent exercise of

“power to de-reserve” but an administrative intimation recording the

statutory position on the basis of the file noting and reports.
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12.    We now address the petitioner’s first plank that notice was never

served upon the municipal council, and therefore the period for lapse

never commenced. The law is settled that a valid notice under Section

127 of the MRTP Act is a condition precedent for lapse. However, the

present record does not permit the controversy to be decided by

isolating the municipal council’s initial denial and ignoring subsequent

admissions and conduct. The material referred to during arguments,

particularly the State’s forwarding of the notice annexed to the

representation and the municipal council placing the same before the

general body, materially alters the complexion. Once the purchase

notice and the attendant demand for acquisition are brought within the

knowledge of the principal officer/competent authority of the planning

authority and is acted upon institutionally, the planning authority

cannot be heard to contend that the notice is a nullity on the hyper-

technical ground of initial mode of service. In Perfect Machine Tools

Company Limited v. State of Maharashtra , (2017) 16 SCC, 482, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

       “4. In the above facts, we are not inclined to go into the argument
       made on behalf of the Corporation that the notice being addressed to
       the Chief Engineer (Development Plan), Municipal Corporation of
       Greater Mumbai, and not to the Commissioner is not a valid notice
       and, therefore, the operation of the time period specified under
       Section 127 of the MRTP Act had not commenced. The records in
       original placed before the Court indicate that the notice along with
       the note of the Deputy Chief Engineer had been placed before the
       Municipal Commissioner, who, therefore, had adequate notice of the
       purchase notice issued under Section 127 of the MRTP Act. Even if it
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       is to be held that the period of six months would run not from the
       date of the notice i.e. 29-9-2004 but from the date it was placed
       before the Commissioner i.e. a date between 16-10-2004 and 18-10-
       2004, what transpires is that the notice/declaration under Section 6 of
       the Land Acquisition Act having been issued on 28-6-2005 is still
       beyond the period of six months as required under Section 127 of the
       MRTP Act.

       5. In this regard we may also put on record that the initial
       Notification reserving the land is dated 6-11-1991 and a period of ten
       years had expired much prior to the issuance of the purchase notice
       dated 29-9-2004. No steps for acquisition of the land had been taken
       during the long period i.e. over a decade, that had elapsed and also
       within the additional time of six months contemplated under Section
       127 of the MRTP Act.”

        The Supreme Court refused to entertain a technical objection

about the notice being addressed to an officer other than the

Commissioner when the record showed the notice had been placed

before the Municipal Commissioner who had “adequate notice”, and

even observed that the period could be reckoned from the date it was

placed before the Commissioner.


13.     We are conscious that Perfect Machine Tools (supra) concerned

service within the municipal corporation and the Commissioner being

the principal officer. Yet, the principle that emerges is that the statute’s

purpose is to trigger acquisition decision-making; where the competent

authority has demonstrable knowledge of the notice and the notice is

acted upon at the institutional level, the planning authority cannot

defeat Section 127 of the MRTP Act by taking a stand of “no service” in

the teeth of its own records. In the present matter, the municipal
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council’s general body deliberations on acquisition cost and its

resolution seeking grants presuppose that the demand for acquisition

was before it. The petitioner’s own narration records that the State

forwarded the notice and that the general body met on 07.03.2012 and

considered acquisition cost, and later on 09.12.2015 recorded lapse and

unwillingness to acquire. Once these facts exist on record, the

contention that the statutory period “never began” becomes legally

untenable.


14.    The    petitioner   urged    that   service   “through   the   State

Government” is not service “on the municipal council”. We do not

accept the submission in the manner it is canvassed. Section 127 of the

MRTP Act requires service on the “Planning Authority, Development

Authority or Appropriate Authority”. It does not prescribe a single rigid

mode of service; what is insisted upon is that the notice be directly

served upon the relevant authority. When the notice is admittedly

received in the governmental channel, forwarded to the planning

authority for report/action, placed before the general body and acted

upon, the requirement of service is satisfied in substance. Any other

view would allow the planning authority to nullify Section 127 by

simply denying receipt while simultaneously considering and acting on

the forwarded notice, which would subvert the statutory object

recognized in Girnar Traders (supra) and Chhabildas (supra).
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15.    We also find that the petitioner’s reliance on the municipal

council’s earlier pleading (in Writ Petition No. 2083 of 2014) disputing

notice cannot be treated as conclusive when later events and materials

show that the notice was in fact before the general body and the council

chose not to acquire. This is not a case where the municipal council

consistently maintained denial and no internal record existed. Here, the

subsequent resolutions and statements point to knowledge and

acceptance of the statutory position.


16.    The next aspect is whether “steps” towards acquisition were

commenced within the statutory period. The jurisprudence is settled

that “steps” means real steps towards acquisition as contemplated under

Section 126 of the MRTP Act leading to the statutory declaration under

the acquisition law; mere resolutions or correspondence are not

enough. Shrirampur Municipal Council (supra) authoritatively reiterates

that “steps” commence when the State takes active steps leading to

publication of the relevant declaration; otherwise the landowner is left

at the mercy of indeterminate delay. The record before us, including the

municipal council’s own resolutions, shows inability due to lack of

funds, and no acquisition proposal being carried to its logical statutory

culmination within time. The petitioner, while urging that the council

was “willing” to acquire, does not demonstrate any statutory step taken

within time that would satisfy Section 127 of the MRTP Act. Even the
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stance that grants were required is, in law, an explanation of inability; it

is not a “step” within the meaning of Section 127 of the MRTP Act.


17.     We therefore conclude that once the notice requirement is

treated as satisfied on the above reasoning, the consequence under

Section 127 of the MRTP Act necessarily follows due to absence of

statutory acquisition steps within the prescribed period. The lapse is

automatic by operation of law.


18.     We now deal with the submission based on municipal council’s

conduct and whether it binds the municipal council and impacts the

petitioner’s entitlement in PIL jurisdiction. The record indicates that in

the general body meeting dated 09.12.2015, the Chief Officer’s

statement that reservations have lapsed was recorded, and the council

resolved that the land is not required for acquisition. Whatever may

have been the earlier dispute about receipt of the notice, the municipal

council’s subsequent institutional conduct, treating the reservation as

lapsed, declining acquisition, and thereafter acting consistently with the

post-lapse situation, precludes it from re-agitating the foundational plea

of “no notice”. Public bodies, no doubt, must act in accordance with law

and there is no estoppel against statute; however, here the statute itself

produces lapse upon conditions being met, and the municipal council’s

conduct is relevant not to override the statute but to assess the
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credibility of the “no service” contention and to determine whether this

Court should exercise PIL jurisdiction to unsettle the statutory

consequence years later.


19.    On the petitioner’s argument that Respondent No. 5 withdrew

Writ Petition No. 2083 of 2014, and therefore cannot seek relief which

he has already given up, we find the premise to be inaccurate. The

earlier writ petition was withdrawn with liberty to pursue alternate

remedies; it was not decided on merits, granting any finding that

reservation had not lapsed. Once the legal regime under Section 127 of

the MRTP Act is triggered by notice and inaction, the statutory

consequence follows irrespective of whether a litigant succeeded or

withdrew    earlier   proceedings.   Further,    the   State’s   impugned

communication does not create rights by adjudication; it records a

statutory consequence after receiving reports.


20.    The petitioner’s central public interest argument is that the

reservation for public amenities must be maintained on the very same

parcel and cannot be shifted. We find that this submission overlooks the

statutory planning framework. Development plans are not immutable;

the MRTP Act contains provisions for revision and modification. The

affidavits on record indicate that the second revised development plan

came into force with effect from 10.02.2019 and, even assuming some
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earlier reservations lapsed, the planning authority took due care to

provide reservations for public amenities by including such reservations

in the second revised plan and/or imposing them on other identified

lands. Once the competent planning authority, following the statutory

process,    revises   the   plan   and   safeguards    the   public    purpose

reservations, the petitioner cannot insist, as a matter of right, that the

public purpose must remain pegged only to the subject lands and no

other land. Urban planning is not an exercise in freezing one private

parcel forever; it is an evolving arrangement balancing public needs

with legal limitations on sterilization of land, the latter being precisely

the mischief Section 127 of the MRTP Act addresses. Chhabildas (supra)

reiterates that once reservation lapses, the land becomes available for

development “as otherwise permissible in the case of adjacent land

under the relevant plan”; it does not mean that public purpose

disappears from the town, but that the burden on that specific land

cannot be continued indefinitely without acquisition.


21.     Even on the broader principle of judicial review in planning

matters, it is well established that courts do not substitute their view for

that   of   planning    authorities    unless   a   clear statutory     breach,

arbitrariness, mala fides or perversity is shown. Bombay Dyeing &

Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group (2006)

3 SCC 434 is one among decisions which recognize that planning
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decisions under the MRTP framework involve policy considerations and

technical evaluation; judicial interference is limited to legality and not

merits of planning choice. In the present case, once it is found that the

statutory lapse under Section 127 of the MRTP Act is legally sustainable

and the subsequent plan safeguards reservations elsewhere. Petitioner’s

insistence upon reservation only on the subject land becomes an

impermissible attempt to micro-manage town planning schemes

through PIL.


22.    The petitioner also urged mala fides and colourable exercise of

power. These allegations are serious and must be pleaded with

particulars and supported by cogent material. Beyond rhetorical

assertions, the record shows that the State sought reports, municipal

council deliberated, cited financial incapacity, and ultimately the

communication was issued. We do not find material to return a finding

of mala fides. On the contrary, what emerges is a long period of inaction

in acquisition, which is the precise circumstance Section 127 of the

MRTP Act addresses.


23.    The petitioner’s alternative prayer for directing Respondent Nos.

1 to 4 to decide the representation dated 9 September 2016 also does

not survive as a standalone mandamus in the present facts. The

substance of the representation is the same grievance of maintaining
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reservation on the subject land and challenging lapse. Once we hold

that the statutory lapse was sustainable and that subsequent revised

planning has protected public amenities through the second revised

development plan, a direction to “decide” the representation would be

an empty formality and would not alter the legal position. PIL

jurisdiction is not invoked to secure academic directions.


24.    We also cannot be oblivious to the subsequent developments

recorded before us; Respondent No. 5 has obtained layout sanction and

created third-party rights by sale of multiple plots. While creation of

third-party rights cannot sanctify an illegality, in the present case we

have not found the lapse or the communication to be illegal.

Interference at this distance of time would unsettle transactions and

lead to inequitable consequences without a sound legal foundation,

particularly when the public interest facet is stated to be addressed

through the second revised development plan.


25.    In conclusion, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to a

writ for quashing the communication dated 21.09.2015. We hold that,

on the facts placed on record, the requirement of notice under Section

127 of the MRTP Act stood satisfied in substance as the purchase notice

was brought to the knowledge of the municipal council through the

governmental channel, placed before the general body and acted upon,
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and thereafter no statutory steps towards acquisition were taken within

the stipulated period, resulting in lapse by operation of law. Our

conclusion is fortified by the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Girnar Traders v. State of Maharashtra, (supra),

Shrirampur Municipal Council, Shrirampur v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji

Dawkher, (supra), Perfect Machine Tools Company Limited v. State of

Maharashtra (supra), and Chhabildas v. State of Maharashtra, (supra).

We further hold that, in view of the second revised development plan

coming into force with effect from 10.02.2019 and the affidavits

indicating that reservations for public amenities have been protected by

planning measures, the petitioner cannot insist that the reservation

must continue only on the subject land and on no other land, and the

reliefs in PIL jurisdiction do not warrant interference.


26.     The Public Interest Litigation is accordingly dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.


27.     The amount of Rs.25,000/- out of the amount of Rs.50,000/-,

which was deposited by the petitioners, is directed to be refunded to

them. The amount of Rs.25,000/- be credited to the High Court Legal

Services Authority.
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28.        In view of disposal of the P. I. L., this civil application No.1034 of

2018 does not survive and stands disposed of.




[ HITEN S. VENEGAVKAR ]                        [ SMT. VIBHA KANKANWADI ]
            JUDGE                                         JUDGE


S P Rane