Bombay High Court
Arun Punjaji KaduversusKanhur Pathar Multi State Co- op. Ltd., Thru. Representative Pradeep Prabhakar Dhakane and Ors.
- Disposal
- DISPOSED OFF
Holding
The High Court held that the fresh arbitration was valid and the appeal challenging the award was dismissed.
Summary
The appellant, Arun Punjaji Kadu, had taken a loan of Rs.2,00,000 from Kanhur Pathar Multi State Co‑op. Soc. Ltd. (a cooperative society under the MSCS Act). The first arbitration under Section 84 of the MSCS Act resulted in an award dated 31‑03‑2013, which was set aside by the Principal District Judge on procedural grounds, with liberty to the respondent to make a fresh reference. A second arbitration was then instituted, leading to an award on 26‑07‑2019 directing the appellant and other respondents to pay Rs.11,63,883 with interest. The appellant challenged this award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, but the district judge dismissed the challenge and allowed a fresh arbitration. On appeal, the High Court examined whether the district judge had jurisdiction to remand the matter, whether the person initiating the fresh arbitration was authorized, and whether an arbitration agreement was required. Relying on the principle that a fresh arbitration is permissible when the earlier award is set aside on technical grounds, and on the Steel Authority of India Ltd. decision, the Court held that the fresh arbitration was valid and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the Principal District Judge had jurisdiction to remand the matter and grant leave for a fresh arbitration after setting aside the first award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether the individual who initiated the fresh arbitration on behalf of the cooperative society was duly authorized.
- Whether an arbitration agreement is a prerequisite for initiating arbitration when the proceeding is statutory under Section 84 of the Multi State Co‑operative Societies Act, 1984.
- Whether a fresh arbitration is maintainable when the earlier award was set aside on procedural/technical grounds.
Legislation cited
Subjects
- Arbitration
- Section 34
- Section 84
- Statutory arbitration
- Remand jurisdiction
- Arbitration agreement
- Multi State Co-operative Societies Act
- Fresh arbitration
- Procedural infirmities
Judgment
2026:BHC-AUG:45372
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
19 ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 19 OF 2025
ARUN PUNJAJI KADU
VERSUS
KANHUR PATHAR MULTI STATE CO-OP. SOC. LTD., THRU. REPRESENTATIVE
PRADEEP PRABHAKAR DHAKANE AND OTHERS
...
Mr. V.D. Salunke, Advocate for appellant
Mr. S.V. Suryawanshi, Advocate for respondent Nos.1, 2c and 3
...
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 4600 OF 2025 IN ARBA/19/2025
...
CORAM : ROHIT W. JOSHI, J.
DATE : 28th SEPTEMBER, 2026
ORDER :
. Present appeal takes exception to Judgment and order dated
04.03.2025 passed by learned Principal District Judge, Ahmednagar
dismissing Arbitration Application No.11/2019 filed by present appellant
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in order to
challenge arbitral award dated 26.07.2019 passed by Mr. B.B. Shelke as sole
Arbitrator in Arbitration Reference No.1/2018 by which the present appellant
2 19_ARBA_19_2025
and respondent Nos.2 and 3 to pay an amount of Rs.11,63,883/- with
interest @ 18% per annum from 25.03.2018 to the present respondent No.1.
Respondent No.1 is a Multi State Co-operative Society registered under the
Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as
“MSCS Act” for short). It had advanced a loan of Rs.2,00,000/- to present
appellant.
2 Since the loan amount was not repaid, initially arbitration
proceeding bearing Case No.ARB/KPMSCCS/ANR/60/2012 was initiated
under Section 84 of the M.S.C.S. Act. In the said arbitration proceeding an
Award was passed on 31.03.2013. The arbitral award was challenged by
filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
which came to be registered as Arbitration Application No.2/2013. The said
application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was
allowed vide judgment and order dated 15.01.2018. The arbitral award
dated 31.01.2013 was quashed and set aside with liberty to respondent No.1
to make fresh reference to the Arbitrator on the same cause of action.
3 Accordingly, fresh reference vide Arbitration Reference
No.1/2018 was made by present respondent No.1. Learned Arbitrator has
passed award dated 26.07.2019, inter alia directed the present appellant and
respondent Nos.2a to 2e and 3 to jointly and severally pay amount of
3 19_ARBA_19_2025
Rs.11,63,883/- with interest @ 18% per annum from 25.03.2018. The said
arbitral award dated 26.07.2019 came to be challenged by present appellant
by filing present application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act being Arbitration Application No.11/2019, which came to be
dismissed by learned Principal District Judge, Ahmednagar vide Judgment
and order dated 04.03.2025.
4 The contention of Mr. V.D. Salunke, learned Advocate for
appellant is that the present arbitration proceeding has commenced as per
leave granted by learned Principal District Judge, Ahmednagar in the first
round of litigation. It is contended that in the first round of litigation, after
having set aside arbitral award it was not open for the learned Principal
District Judge to remand the matter for fresh consideration and/or to grant
leave to initiate fresh proceeding for arbitration, more so, when the
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was filed
by the present appellant. The contention of the learned Advocate is that
clause 3 and 4 of the operative order in the Judgment and order dated
15.01.2018 is nullity since the learned Principal District Judge does not have
jurisdiction to pass an order of remand under Section 34 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act. Apart from this, it is contended that the person who
has filed the second arbitration proceeding on behalf of respondent No.1 was
4 19_ARBA_19_2025
not authorized to do so and as such arbitration proceeding at his behest
should not have been entertained. Lastly, it is argued that in the absence of
any arbitration agreement between the parties the Arbitrator did not have
any jurisdiction and as such the award passed is without authority of law.
5 Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. S.V. Suryawanshi argued that in
the first round of litigation learned Principal District Judge has set aside the
arbitral award, not on merits but on procedural infirmities. Learned
Advocate contends that since adjudication on merits was not done, it was
necessary that the claim was required to be decided on merits. Learned
Advocate contends that even in the absence of clause 3 and 4 of the operative
order in the Judgment dated 15.01.2018 fresh arbitration proceeding could
always be by respondent No.1. In support of the said contention learned
Advocate has placed reliance on Judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of
Steel Authority of India Limited vs. Indian Council of Arbitration and another
[2015 SCC OnLine Del 13394]. As regards the contention with respect to
authorization, it is argued that the same person was authorized to file
arbitration proceeding. It is argued that in the first round of litigation the
said person has initiated the arbitration proceeding and no objection was
raised with respect to his authority to conduct the arbitration. As regards the
contention with respect to initiation of arbitration in the absence of
5 19_ARBA_19_2025
agreement for arbitration, the argument is that the arbitration in the present
case is a statutory arbitration.
6 As regards the first contention that the initial order dated
15.01.2018 passed by learned Principal District Judge in Arbitration
Application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act being a
nullity and consequently second arbitration proceeding is non est, the said
contention cannot be accepted. Perusal of earlier Judgment would indicate
that the dispute was not be decided on merits. It is only on account of some
procedural defects that the arbitral award was set aside. In such situation,
having regard to the legal principle that it is not open to remand the matter
to Arbitrator the learned Principal District Judge has dismissed the
application and has granted leave to make fresh reference on same cause of
action.
7 Perusal of the Judgment in the case of Steel Authority of India
Limited (supra), on which reliance was placed by respondent No.1, will
indicate that a fresh arbitration in a case where arbitration award was set
aside on technical ground is maintainable. Therefore, the contention that the
arbitration which is commenced after adjudication of the first arbitration
proceeding by the Principal District Judge is a nullity cannot be accepted.
6 19_ARBA_19_2025
8 The second contention by the learned Advocate is that the
person who has initiated the arbitration proceeding on behalf of respondent
No.1 was not duly authorized. The said contention is rejected on two
grounds; firstly, because in the earlier arbitration proceeding the same person
had initiated the arbitration proceeding and the arbitration proceeding is for
the same cause and as such fresh authorization was not required and
secondly, also because this contention is not raised under Section 34
proceeding before learned Principal District Judge.
9 The contention of Mr. V.D. Salunke that an arbitration agreement
is a necessary prerequisite for initiating arbitration proceeding, as a general
provision of law is acceptable, however, in the present case the arbitration
has commenced in view of Section 84 of the MSCS Act and as such the last
contention also cannot be accepted.
10 The contention of learned Advocate Mr. V.D. Salunke that in the
subsequent arbitration proceeding the learned Arbitrator has proceeded as if
the matter was remanded by the learned Principal District Judge and has
decided the case accordingly. It does appear from the reading of the award
that the learned Arbitrator was under such influence. Even if it is assumed
that the learned Arbitrator has decided the case as if the order passed by the
learned Principal District Judge is a remand order that by itself has not
7 19_ARBA_19_2025
affected the merits of the matter. For the reasons stated above, in the
considered opinion of this Court, no case for interference is made out.
Arbitration appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. Pending
Civil Application also stands disposed of.
( ROHIT W. JOSHI, J. )
agd
Checking your session…