Bombay High Court
MR. VIPUL GOPALDAS ASHAR AND ANR.versusCHANDRAKANTA NARENDRA KHANDELWAL
- Decided
- Disposal
- Rejected
- Bench
- N JAMADAR
Holding
The revision applications are rejected; the civil court had jurisdiction and the suit is not barred by limitation.
Summary
The co‑owners of a building in Malad, Mumbai (the respondents) sued the defendants for possession of flats, alleging the defendants were trespassers who occupied the flats as licencees without a valid leave‑and‑licence agreement. The defendants contended that a sale agreement dated 15 February 2013, later alleged to be forged, transferred ownership and that the suit should be dismissed on the ground that it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and was barred by limitation. The City Civil Court rejected the defendants' notices of motion, holding that no licence agreement existed and the suit was within the ordinary civil court’s jurisdiction and within the limitation period. On revision, the High Court affirmed that the civil court retained jurisdiction despite the disputed licence‑tenancy character and that the limitation period had not expired, thus rejecting the revision applications. Consequently, the plaintiffs' suit for possession proceeds.
Issues considered
- The suit for recovery of possession falls within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil court despite the parties' claim of a licence relationship under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.
- Whether the suit is barred by the limitation period on the basis of alleged knowledge of the forged sale document.
- Whether the existence of a disputed licence/tenancy relationship ousts the civil court’s jurisdiction.
Legislation cited
- Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 — s. 24, 40
Subjects
- licence agreement
- lease
- Maharashtra Rent Control Act
- jurisdiction
- limitation period
- civil revision
- trespass
- forged document
- possession suit
Judgment
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 124 OF 2026
Vipul Gopaldas Ashar & anr. ..Applicants
Versus
Virendra Girdharilal Khandelwal …Respondent
WITH
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 143 OF 2026
Vipul Gopaldas Ashar & anr. ..Applicants
Versus
Chandrakanta Virendra Khandelwal …Respondent
Mr. Dhruva Gandhi, a/w Mr. Mihir Kakade, & Mr. Himagn
Malik i/b Jayakar & Partners, for the Applicants.
Mr. S A Abhyankar a/w Ms. Anjali Helekar & Ms. Apurva
Mhatre, for the Respondent.
CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.
DATE : 24th MARCH 2026
ORDER :
1. These Civil Revision Applications are directed against
orders dated 21st November, 2025, passed by the learned Judge,
City Civil Court, in the Notices of Motion taken out by the
applicants/defendants, for the rejection of the plaints in SC Suit
Nos. 43/2018 and 44/2018, instituted by the respondents in the
respective applications, whereby the said Notices of Motion were
rejected.
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2. The respondent in each of the applications/plaintiffs are
the co-owners of the premises situated at CTS No. 371, Malad,
Mumbai. The Respondents had developed the said premises and
constructed residential and commercial premises therein.
2.1 The plaintiff in SC Suit No. 43/2018 claimed that, Flat No.
102 and 401 in the said building came to be allotted to the
plaintiff. Flat No. 102 had been given on leave and licence. The
defendants/applicants desired to occupy the said flat as
licencee, for a term of 11 months commencing from February,
2013 to January, 2014. An aggregate amount of Rs. 11,00,000/-
towards the licence fee at the rate of Rs. 1,00,000/- per month
was paid by the defendants. However, the defendants did not
execute the leave and licence agreement.
2.2 Instead, the defendants in connivance with the Advocate to
whom the parties had approached to draft the leave and licence
agreement, prepared a false and forged document, purportedly
executed on 15th February, 2013 to the effect that the plaintiff
had agreed to sell Flat No. 102 and her undivided right, title and
interest in the subject property. Thus, the plaintiff instituted the
suit asserting that, the defendants were the trespassers and for
the necessary declaratory and consequential reliefs.
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2.3 In SC Suit No. 44/2018, the respondent/plaintiff has
made identical averments, with the change that the defendants
had agreed to occupy Flat No. 601 on leave and licence basis.
2.4 It would be contextually relevant to note, the
applicants/defendants contend that the plaintiffs had agreed to
sell the suit flats and the other properties by executing a writing
dated 15th February, 2013; which incorporated the terms of the
contract between the parties to sell the subject flats. Under the
said contract for sale, the plaintiffs accepted part consideration
and put the defendants in possession of the subject flats and,
therefore, the defendants were constrained to institute the suits
against the plaintiffs herein seeking specific performance of the
said contract. To give a counter blast, the plaintiffs herein have
instituted the instant suits raising false contentions.
2.5 In the instant suit, the applicants/defendants took out the
Notices of Motion seeking rejection of the plaint on multifold
grounds including that, the suit for eviction of licencee was
barred by the provisions contained in the Maharashtra Rent
Control Act, 1999 (‘the Act, 1999’), and, even otherwise, the suit
was ex facie barred by law of limitation, as it was instituted
beyond three years of the purported knowledge of the plaintiff
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that, the writing dated 15th February, 2013 was forged and the
defendants had allegedly practiced fraud on the plaintiffs.
2.6 By the impugned order, the learned Judge, City Civil Court
rejected the Notices of Motion observing inter alia that, there
was no leave and licence agreement in writing and, therefore,
the bar to the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, cannot be
countenanced. It was further observed that, on the basis of the
averments in the plaint, it appeared that the suit was instituted
within the prescribed period of limitation from the date of
knowledge of the offending transactions.
2.7 Being aggrieved, the applicants/defendants have invoked
the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
3. I have heard Mr. Dhruva Gandhi, the learned Counsel for
the applicants, and Mr. S A Abhyankar, the learned Counsel for
the respondents. The learned Counsel for the parties took the
Court through the averments in the plaint and the material on
record.
4. Mr. Gandhi canvassed a two-pronged submission. First,
on the own showing of the plaintiff, the applicants were
inducted in the subject flat as licencee. If that is the case, the
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City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain, try and
determine the suit for recovery of possession of the licenced
premises from an erstwhile licencee and only the Competent
Authority appointed under Section 40 of the Act, 1999, has the
exclusive jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Act, 1999.
5. Secondly, even if the case of the plaintiff is taken at par,
the suit is ex facie barred by limitation. In the plaint, the
plaintiffs averred that they became aware of the alleged
fraudulent document dated 15th February, 2013 and the fraud
practiced on the plaintiffs, only upon being served with the
papers and proceedings in the suits instituted by the
defendants.
6. Attention of the Court was invited to the interim order
dated 10th May, 2013 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil
Court in the Notices of Motion taken out by the defendants in
the said suit. It was submitted that, the institution of the suit in
the year 2018, after the service of the papers and proceedings in
those suits in the year, 2013 itself, was clearly barred by
limitation.
7. In contrast to this, Mr. Abhyankar, the learned Counsel for
the respondents/plaintiffs, resisted the submissions on behalf
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of the applicants. Emphasis was laid on the fact that, the very
document dated 15th February 2013 which is pressed into
service on behalf of the defendants, dismantles the case of the
defendants. The defendants have even not paid the deficit stamp
duty on the said fraudulent document which was impounded by
the trial Court for adjudication of the stamp duty. Mr.
Abhyankar further urged that, the conduct of the defendants
also deserves to be taken into account as they have not
deposited the balance consideration, as directed by the Court,
and, thus, the interim reliefs in their suits stood vacated. The
defendants who are in the unauthorized occupation of the
subject flats have filed these applications to further delay the
disposal of the suits, urged Mr. Abhyankar.
8. From the perusal of the averments in the plaint and the
material on record, it prima facie appears that the essential
contest between the parties revolves around the nature of the
jural relationship. On the one hand, the plaintiffs assert that,
the defendants came in possessions of the subject flats as
licencee thereof, and under the pretext of execution of leave and
licence agreement, a fraudulent document showing that the
plaintiff had sold the subject flats was brought into force. On
the other hand, the defendants claimed that, the transaction
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between the parties was that of sale of the subject flats and
there was never any relationship of licensor or licencee between
the plaintiffs and the defendants.
9. Keeping in view the aforesaid broad nature of the
controversy between the parties, the averments in the plaint and
the document annexed with it, are required to be appraised so
as to decide whether plaints deserve to be rejected, as being
barred by any law. From the perusal of the averments in the
plaint, it becomes evident that, the plaintiffs have asserted that,
the defendants entered into the possession of the subject flat as
licencee. The entire licence fees was paid upfront. However, the
defendants did not execute the leave and licence agreement.
Thus, the defendants are the trespassers.
10. In the backdrop of the aforesaid assertions in the plaint,
Mr. Gandhi would urge that, the fact that the leave and licence
agreement is not forthcoming, does not make any significant
difference in the matter of jurisdiction of the Competent
Authority to consider the prayer for eviction of the persons who
are stated to be the licencees.
11. To lend support to this submission, Mr. Gandhi placed
reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of Mukesh
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Dharsibhai Thakkar Vs. Rajnikant Ramanlal Gunderia & ors. 1,
and another Division Bench judgment in the case of Nagin
Mansukhlal Dogli Vs. Haribhai Manibhai Patel 2, which was
affirmed in the Mahadev P. Kambekar (Dead) through LR’s Vs.
Shree Krishna Woolen Mills Pvt. Ltd3.
12. Evidently, there is no agreement in writing to evidence the
relationship of licensor or licencee between the parties. The
Explanation to Sub-section (3) of Section 24 of the Act, 1999
inter alia provides that an agreement of licence in writing shall
be conclusive evidence of facts stated therein. In the case of
Mukesh Thakkar Vs. Rajnikant Gunderia (supra), on which
reliance was placed by Mr. Gandhi, this Court enunciated that
in the face of an agreement of licence in writing, it will not be
open for a party to lead evidence to show that, the transaction
was not of leave and licence but that of tenancy.
Notwithstanding the absence of the agreement of licence in
writing, Mr. Gandhi would urge, the competent authority only
would have the jurisdiction.
1 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 731
2 AIR 1980 Bom 123
3 (2020) 14 SCC 505
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13. The aforesaid submissions deserve consideration in the
context of the averments in the plaint and the tenor of the
plaintiffs claim. In substance, the plaintiffs are contesting the
jural relationship between the parties. It is trite, a party can
question the character of the document. There is a difference
between challenge to the content of the documents and the
challenge to its character. A party is entitled to demonstrate
that, the document in question does not represent the bargain
which the parties intended to arrive at.
14. In the case at hand, the Court finds that, it is the stated
case of the defendants that, they were put in possession of the
subject flats under the terms of the purported agreement for
sale dated 15th February, 2013. The defendants have not at all
referred to, much less admitted, the antecedent relationship
between the parties. In such a situation, where there is material
to indicate that, a party has disputed the character of its
occupation, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not
instantaneously ousted. The question of jurisdiction would then
merit adjudication.
15. A useful reference in this context can be made to a three-
Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
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Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. Vs. Navrang Studios & anr. 4, wherein the
legal position expounded as under :-
“18. Thus exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Court of
Small Causes and jurisdiction is denied to other Courts
(1) to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a
landlord and a tenant relating to recovery of rent or
possession of any premises, (2) to try any suit or
proceeding between a licensor and a licensee relating to
the recovery of licence fee or charge, (3) to decide any
application made under the Act and, (4) to deal with any
claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its
provisions. Exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and try
certain suits, to decide certain applications or to deal
with certain claims or questions does not necessarily
mean exclusive jurisdiction to decide jurisdictional facts
also. Jurisdictional facts have necessarily to be decided
by the Court where the jurisdictional question falls to be
decided, and the question may fall for decision before the
Court of exclusive jurisdiction or before the Court of
ordinary jurisdiction. A person claiming to be a landlord
may sue his alleged tenant for possession of a building on
grounds specified in the Rent Act. Such a suit will have to
be brought in the Court of Small Causes, which has been
made the Court of exclusive jurisdiction. In such a suit,
the defendant may deny the tenancy but the denial by
the defendant will not oust the jurisdiction of Court of
Small Causes. If ultimately the Court finds that the
defendant is not a tenant the suit will fail for that reason.
If the suit is instituted in the ordinary Civil Court instead
of the Court of Small Causes the plaint will have to be
4 (1981) 1 SCC 523
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returned irrespective of the plea of the defendant.
Conversely a person claiming to be the owner of a
building and alleging the defendant to be a trespasser will
have to institute the suit, on the plaint allegations, in the
ordinary Civil Court only. In such a suit the defendant
may raise the plea that he is a tenant and not a
trespasser. The defendant's plea will not straightaway
oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court but if
ultimately the plea of the defendant is accepted the suit
must fail on that ground. So the question whether there
is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties
or such other jurisdictional questions may have to be
determined by the Court where it falls for determination-
be it the Court of Small Causes or the ordinary Civil
Court. If the jurisdictional question is decided in favour of
the Court of exclusive jurisdiction the suit or proceeding
before the ordinary Civil Court must cease to the extent
its jurisdiction is ousted.”
16. If a party has set up a jural relationship, which is not
governed by the special enactments, then the plaintiff is entitled
to institute the suit in the ordinary Civil Court considering the
defendant to be a trespasser. A useful reference in this context
can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Abdulla Bin Ali & ors. Vs. Calappa & ors 5., wherein it was
enunciated that, when the Defendants therein denied the title of
the Plaintiffs and the tenancy, the Plaintiffs filed a suit treating
5 (1985) 2 SCC 54
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them to be trespassers and the suit was not on the basis of
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and on
the denial of the tenancy and the title of the Plaintiffs –
Appellants, the latter filed a suit treating the Defendants therein
to be trespassers and the suit against the trespassers would lie
only in the Civil Court and not in the revenue Court. Thus, in
the light of the denial of the tenancy by the Defendants, the suit
was cognizable by the Civil Court.
17. The plaintiffs have instituted the suit with a clear
assertion that, the applicant/defendants are the trespassers.
Thus, submission on behalf of the defendants/applicants
premised on the bar of jurisdiction contained in the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, does not merit acceptance.
18. On the aspect of the bar of limitation, it may be apposite
to note that, the fact that the plaintiffs are the co-owners of the
suit property is rather incontrovertible. The plaintiffs claimed
that, the defendants are the trespassers and, thus, seek
recovery of possession of the subject flats. The reliefs in the
plaint are thus in assertion of the proprietory title of the
plaintiffs over the subject flats. As the claim of the plaintiff for
recovery of possession of the subject flats rests in ownership
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thereof, the claim of the plaintiffs cannot be confined to the
declaration sought by the plaintiffs that purported writing
between the parties dated 15th February, 2013 is illegal, bad in
law, void and not binding upon the plaintiffs.
19. In the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that,
the relief of the recovery of possession of the subject flats
inexorably flows from the declaration of the character of the
writing dated 15th February, 2013 only. Rather, the suit appears
to have been instituted on the basis of title of the plaintiffs over
the suit subject properties. Resultantly, even if one part of the
cause of action survives, the suit must proceed to trial. There
can be no rejection of the plaint in part.
20. From the aforesaid standpoint, the question as to whether
the suits are barred by law of limitation, thus assumes the
character of a mixed question of facts and law and, therefore,
the learned Judge, City Civil Court was justified in declining to
reject the plaint on the ground that, the reliefs are ex facie
barred by limitation.
21. For the foregoing reasons, the Revision Applications
deserve to be rejected.
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22. Hence, the following order :-
::ORDER::
i) The Civil Revision Applications stand
rejected.
ii) No costs.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
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