BHAGABAI GANPATI SHINDE (SINCE DECEASED THR. LRS. YASHODA PRAKASH BUDHGAONKAR)versusRANGRAO RAMCHANDRA JAGTAP (SINCE DECEASED THR. LRS.) AND ORS.

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           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                    CIRCUIT BENCH AT KOLHAPUR

                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.166 OF 2018

Bhagabai Ganpati Shinde
(since deceased through legal heir)
Yashoda Prakash Budhgaonkar
Age: 51 years, Occ: Household
R/o Khanbhag, Shevale Galli,
Dist. Sangli                                    …    Applicant

            Versus

1. Rangrao Ramchandra Jagtap
   (since deceased through legal heir)
1.A. Shanta Rangao Jagtap
     Age: 50, Occ: Household,
     R/o Khanbhag, Shevale Galli,
     Dist. Sangli.

1B. Vinayak Rangrao Jagtap
    Age: 30 years, Occ: Business
    R/o Khanbhag, Shevale Galli,
    Dist. Sangli

1C. Gouri Prashant Shinde
    Age:--- Occ:--
    R/o Chitre Galli Khanbhag, Dist. Sangli

1D. Ujawala Rangrao Jagtap
    Age:32, Occ: Housewife
    R/o Khanbhag, Shevale Galli, Dist. Sangli

2.   Vishwas Ramchandra Jagtap
     (since deceased through legal heir)

2.A. Sharda Vishwas Jagtap
    Age: 50, Occ: Agriculture


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2B. Dayanand Vishwas Jagtap
    Age: 25, Occ: Agriculture

2C. Devki Vishwas Jagtap
    Age: 28, Occ: Household

2D. Durga Vishwas Jagtap
    Age: 23, Occ: Household
    Respondents 2A-2D R/o
    Jakhapur, Near Grampanchayat,
    Tal. Kavathe Mahankal, Dist. Sangli

3. Prasad Anandrao Jagtap
   Age: 30 Occ: Service

4. Smt. Kamal Anandrao Jagtap
   Age: 50 Occ: Household

5. Chandrakant Anandrao Jagtap
   Age:30, Occ: Education

6. Archana Anandrao Jagtap
   Age: 30 Occ: Household
   Respondents 3-6 R/o Khabhag,
   Shevale Galli, Dist. Sangli                       ...Respondents

                                 ***
Mr. Umesh R. Mankapure a/w Ms. Rati S. Sinhasane, for Applicant.

Mr. Akshay A. Kulkarni, for Respondents.
                                    ***

                                   CORAM       :   M. M. SATHAYE, J.
                                   DATE        :   6th February 2026.

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1.        This Civil Revision Application, filed under Section 115 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short ‘CPC’) challenges the Judgment and decree
dated 14.06.2017 passed by the learned Ad-hoc District Judge-2, Sangli in


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Regular Civil Appeal No. 274 of 2010, whereby the appeal preferred by the
Revision Applicant – Bhagabai Ganpati Shinde is dismissed, thereby
confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 31.08.2010 passed by the learned
2nd Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sangli in Regular Civil Suit No. 333 of
2000, by which the suit filed by the Respondents-Landlords for eviction of the
Revision Applicant-Tenant was decreed.


2.        The dispute is arising out of a landlord-tenant dispute under provisions
of Maharshtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (‘MRC’ Act for short). One room
admeasuring 10 ft x 10 ft with vacant area around it out of C.S. No. 246A/2
at Uttar-khan of Sangli city is the suit premises.


3.        The Respondents/Landlords instituted the said suit for recovery of
possession of the suit premises against the Revision Applicant/Tenant
contending inter alia that after the conclusion of earlier litigation between the
parties, there was a change in circumstances and that the suit premises were
required bona fide by the Plaintiffs. In the original plaint, the requirement of
Plaintiff No. 2 – Vishwanath Ramchandra Jagtap was pleaded on the ground
that he is doing business of milk collection and was residing with his family
and three children at Village Jakhapur. It was pleaded that Vishwanath and
his children frequently visited Sangli, but due to lack of space, they were
unable to stay there, and the suit premises are bona-fide required. The
requirement of other the Plaintiffs was also pleaded.


4.        In the year 2008, the Respondents amended the plaint by adding
paragraph 5-A contending that the subject matter property (in which suit-
premises are situated) has been partitioned amongst the Plaintiffs and suit
premises has fallen to the share of Plaintiff No. 2 Vishwanath (a.k.a.


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Vishwas). It is contended that Plaintiff-Vishwanath has three children and
that his son Dayanand aged 19 years, was pursuing education and also
assisting his uncle (Plaintiff No. 1) in carpentry work and he is of
marriageable age. It was contended that Vishwanath had closed his business
and intended to shift to Sangli with his family, but was unable to do so for
want of accommodation. It was further pleaded that Vishwanath’s financial
condition is dire as he has no land or source of income and that his land at
Jakhapur was acquired for a wind-mill project by Suzlon Company.


5.        The Revision Applicant/Original Defendant filed her written statement
denying the inter alia bona-fide requirement. She resisted the suit on the
ground of res-judicata contending that an earlier suit (R.C.S. No. 132 of
1990) between the same parties for the same suit-premises was decreed only
on the ground of default, which was set aside in appeal. She contended that
the accommodation available with the three brothers are sufficient and that
Plaintiff No. 1 has sold a property at Vijaynagar, Sangli, indicating absence of
bona-fide requirement. She further contended that her financial condition is
weak and that she was dependent on her daughter’s income and would suffer
greater hardship if evicted. An additional written statement was filed
opposing the amended plaint, denying the theory of oral partition, asserting
that Vishwanath permanently resides at Jakhapur and owned residential
properties bearing Gram Panchayat number, denying closure of business and
acquisition of land.
6.        Issues were framed. Parties led evidence and learned Trial Judge
decreed the said suit granting eviction. The Trial Court held that the
requirement and greater hardship are proved in favour of the landlord. The
Trial Court also held that the suit is not hit by principles of res judicata.
The Trial Court also directed inquiry into mesne profits.


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7.        The Revision Applicant/Tenant filed the said appeal challenging the
decree of eviction. During pendency of the appeal, both Original Defendant-
Bhagabai Ganpati Shinde and Plaintiff No. 1- Rangrao and Plaintifff No. 2-
Vishwanath (a.k.a. Vishwas) expired and their legal heirs are brought on
record.


8.        The Appellate Court dismissed the said appeal under the impugned
Judgment and Decree concurring with the findings of the Trial Court that
bona-fide requirement and hardship is proved in favour of landlords and suit
is not hit by res-judicata.


                                   SUBMISSIONS

9.        Learned Counsel Mr. Mankapure, appearing for the Revision-
Applicant / Tenant submitted as under.

9.1.      That pleadings in the earlier suit as well as in the present suit and the
case made out by the landlords in both the suits are same and therefore the
suit is clearly hit by principles of res judicata.

9.2.      That when the earlier suit was decreed only on the ground of default, it
is only the tenant who pressed the appeal and the landlord did not press the
appeal on the ground of requirement. That the earlier appeal was dismissed
in February-2000 and immediately within a span of four months, the present
suit is filed claiming same requirement in June-2000 and therefore, thee is no
change in requirement and case is not bona fide.

9.3.      That case of oral partition between the three brothers pleaded by way
of amendment is nothing but an attempt to create an artificial requirement
and is a ruse to pretend bona-fide requirement.




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9.4.      That in the given set of facts, when three brothers are having the
property and two brothers take individual shares having usable rooms or
buildable area, no prudent man would accept the portion in possession of the
tenant in an equitable partition, especially when Plaintiff No.2 has a land and
house at Village Jakhapur. That therefore the case of partition could not be
believed for bona-fide requirement.That one of the plaintiffs has sold a
property at Sangli and therefore need is not bona-fide.

9.5.      Mr. Mankapure has taken the Court through various statements made
in the oral evidence and cross-examination in support of his contention. He
submitted that the landlord’s witness has admitted that details of alleged
partition such as date etc. is not known, clearly indicating that partition is not
genuine.

9.6.      He relied upon the judgment of Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr. Mahesh
Chand Gupta, [(1999) 6 SCC 222] in support of his submission that
requirement cannot be a mere desire and there has to be something more
than that.


10.            On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondent Mr.
Kulkarni supported the impugned judgment and decree and submitted as
under.

10.1.          That if the pleadings in the plaint of the earlier suit and the
present suit are carefully seen then it is clear that in the earlier suit,
requirement was pleaded for brothers Rangrao and Anandrao alongwith the
Vishwanath and in the present suit, the requirement is specifically pleaded for
brother ishwanath (Plaintiff No.2 herein).

10.2.          That the requirement is pleaded for children of Vishwanath for
the purpose of their education as well as for performing marriage of son.


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10.3            That the Defendant/Tenant in the written statement has clearly
accepted that the three brothers have divided the property in the municipal
record and has also admitted that landlord of the suit premises in her
possession is Plaintiff No.2-Vishwanath and other Plaintiffs (Rangrao and
Anandrao) have no concern with the same.

10.4.           That it has come on record in the earlier suit that certain amount
was lent as loan by the tenant on the basis of which the ground of default
was held as ‘not proved’ by the Appellate Court and even in the present suit,
the witness for the tenant has expressed wish to purchase the suit premises
herself. This indicates that financial position of the tenant is sound.

10.5.           That both the son and daughter of the Plaintiff-Vishwanath have
been examined who have asserted their requirement and there is no reason to
disbelieve them.

10.6.           That the landed property at Jakhapur is admittedly acquired and
the sale of property at Vijaynagar, Sangli by other brother is not relevant for
the purpose of considering requirement of Vishwanath. He relied upon the
judgment Shridhar Dattatraya Karadkar vs. Narayan Laxman Soparkar, [2017
(4) Mh. L. J. 712] in support of his case.

                            REASONS AND CONCLUSION

11.       I have   considered the rival submissions carefully and perused the
record. I have also gone through the judgments of Trial Court and Appellate
Court, both in the earlier round of litigation and present one.


12.       At the outset, it is necessary to note that revisional jurisdiction of this
Court under section 115 of the CPC is limited to considering whether there is
any jurisdictional error or perversity or whether the impugned order is based



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on appreciation and misreading of pleadings/ evidence, so much so that if
allowed to stand, would amount to miscarriage of justice, as laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule Vs.
Maruti Hari Jadhav [1965 SCC OnLine SC 83] and paragraph 43 of
HPCL Vs. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78]. Unless such situation exists, re-
appreciation of evidence is not permitted under Section 115 of CPC.


13.       So far as the aspect of res judicata is concerned, the Appellate Court
has considered the pleadings of the earlier suit as well as present suit and has
concluded that the cause for which earlier suit was instituted ceases to exist
and the cause for the new suit is that Plaintiff-Vishwanth has closed his
business and wants to settle at Sangli and bonafide requirement is claimed.


14.       In this respect, for the objective satisfaction of the Court, I have gone
through the pleadings of the earlier plaint and present plaint. In the earlier
plaint in paragraph No. 4, the requirement of other brothers i.e. Anandrao
and Rangrao is specifically pleaded as stating that they are occupying only
one room each staying with their families with school going children. The
only statement about Plaintiff-Vishwanath is that he stays at Village Jakhapur
and he does not have premises to stay. The requirement about the children
and their education and marriage was not specific about the Plaintiff-
Vishwanath. However, in the present suit in the original plaint, the
requirement of Plaintiff-Vishwanath is pleaded specifically and the plaint is
amended in 2008, i.e. after a span of about eight years from decision in the
earlier litigation. By amendment, it is specifically pleaded that Plaintiffs have
orally partitioned the property among themselves and in the partition, the
suit premises (tenanted property) has fallen to the share of the Plaintiff-
Vishwanath. That he has closed his business. That he has three children.


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That his son Dayanand is 19 years of age who is taking education as well as
working with his uncle that he is of marriageable age. That for want of space
Plaintiff-Vishwanath and his family members cannot start residing at Sangli.
That financial condition of Plaintiff Vishwanth is dire since he has no land
because the same acquired by Suzlon Company.


15.       With such specific pleadings in the present suit for requirement of
Plaintiff-Vishwanath and with the case of partition eight years after the
decision in earlier litigation, in my view, the conclusion of Courts below that
present suit is not hit by res-judicata, is legal and proper. It cannot be said
that the issues directly and substantially involved in the earlier suit is
involved in the present suit.


16.       So far as the argument about the case of partition being an attempt to
create artificial requirement is concerned, it is material to note that the
Revision-Applicant / Tenant, in amended written statement paragraph No.
5A, has admitted that the Plaintiff - Rangrao has applied to the local
authority and has got divided the suit property into three parts. She has also
admitted in the written statement that a new property card is opened and
amendment is carried out in the map and area. The tenant has not examined
herself by entering witness box she however has examined her daughter
(Sau. Yashoda Prakash Budhgaonkar). This witness has admitted in cross
examination that other plaintiffs (brother Rangrao and heirs of Anandrao)
have no concern with the suit premises, and as per record the landlord of the
suit premises is Plaintiff No. 2 Vishwanath.


17.       The argument is that the landlord’s witness could not answer the
question about the partition such as date etc. and therefore it must be held


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that there is no real partition. However, in the teeth of stand taken by the
Tenant herself in the written statement, as well as admission given by her
witness, the theory of partition is apparently accepted by the Tenant herself
and therefore the said argument has no merit.


18.       Landlord is the best judge of his requirement and it is not for the
tenant or Court to dictate terms to the Landlord as to how he should use his
own premises, as held in S. R. Babu vs. T. K. Vasudevan & Ors. [2001 (4) ALL.
MR. 536], Prativa Devi (Smt) vs. T. V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC 353] and
Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs.) vs. Traders & Agencies & Another [(1996) 5
SCC 344]. Requirement is something more than mere desire/wish but less
than compelling and dire necessity, as held in Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead)
By Lrs. vs. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co. [2000 Bom. R.C. 143]. This is settled
position of law.

19.       Landlord Plaintiff Vishwanath himself and his son (Dayanand) as well
as daughter (Durgamata), all have entered witness box and have supported
the case of requirement for stay at Sangli for residence. They have asserted
that they wish to shift to Sangli but has no residence of their own. Landlord’s
daughter has led evidence to the effect that she requires the suit premises
because she is required to stay elsewhere for taking her education.
Considering the requirement to shift to Sangli with family and for the
purpose of residence to support education of children and son being of
marriageable age, availability of house at Village Jakhapur is of no
consequence. Also if any property is sold by brother of Vishwanath,
considering that they have partitioned amongst themselves, such sale will not
affect Vishwanath’s requirement. Nothing is brought to the notice of the
Court to show that Vishwanath had other property at Sangli which he sold.


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20.       Considering the evidence, as appreciated by the Trial Court and the
Appeal Court, the concurrent finding of fact about bonafide requirement,
appears most probable and it does not require any interference.


21.       So far as the aspect of comparative hardship is concerned, the witness
for the tenant has expressed wish to purchase the suit premises herself. This
itself is sufficient to show that the financial capacity of the tenant is sound.
There is nothing on record to show that the tenant has made any effort and
despite due diligence other premises could not be found. In that view of the
matter, even the concurrent finding on the ground of comparative hardship
appears most probable and does not require any interference.


22.       Lastly, so far as the Judgment of Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) relief upon
by the Petitioner is concerned, there is no dispute about the proposition of
law that the requirement has to be more than mere desire. However, in the
facts and circumstances narrated above, when the landlord’s children
including son of marriageable age as well as education-taking daughter have
entered witness box and asserted requirement, it cannot be said that the
requirement is mere desire. This is certainly a case which falls just short of
dire necessity.


23.       In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no jurisdictional error
and concurrent findings do not require any interference. The Civil Revision
Application is accordingly dismissed.


24.       At this stage, learned Counsel for the Revision Applicant prays for
continuation of stay to the eviction decree. The request is opposed by learned
Counsel for the landlord.


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                      25.       Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, subject to the
                      Revision Applicant filing an undertaking-affidavit in this Court, within a
                      period of three weeks from today, stating that she will not create third party
                      interest and she will not induct third person and that she will vacate the suit
                      premises within eight weeks from today, eight weeks time to vacate is
                      granted.


                      26.       All concerned to act on duly authenticated or digitally signed copy of
                      this order.

                                                                          [ M. M. SATHAYE, J. ]
TALLE
SHUBHAM
ASHOKRAO
Digitally signed by
TALLE SHUBHAM
ASHOKRAO
Date: 2026.02.09
14:30:11 +0530




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