L AND T FINANCE LTD.versusSANJAY ISHAWARLAL THAKKAR AND ORS

                                                                    -CRA345-2026.DOC

                                                                              Santosh

                           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                             CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 345 OF 2026

                      L & T Finance Ltd. (earlier known as L&T
                      Housing Finance Ltd.)
                      Having its Head Office at Mumbai and also
                      an Branch Office in Nashik, located at West
                      Wing, First Floor, Devis College Road,           ...Applicant
                      Opposite Big Bazaar, Nashik – 422 005          (Ori.Def.No.7)
                                        Versus
                      1. Sanjay Ishwarlal Thakkar
                         Age-57 years, Occupation Business
                         R/o Flat No.19 and 26, Kalavishva
                         Housing Society, Bhabha Nagar, Mumbai
                         Naka, Nashik.                              ...Ori. Plaintiff
                      2. Gautam Bhausaheb Wadekar
                         Age 37 years, Occupation Business
                      3. Sonam Gautam Wadekar
                         Age 35 years, Occupation Housework
                         Both Defendant Nos.2 and 3
                         R/o Flat No.9, Sairaj Apartment,
                         Opposite Hotel Celebration Paqrthardi
                         Fata, Mumbai-Agra Highway, Nashik,
SANTOSH
SUBHASH                  Taluka and District Nashik.
KULKARNI              4. Sandeep Motiram Khandbhale
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH SUBHASH
                         Age 34, Occupation – Agricultural and
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.09.23         Business, R/o. At Post Mahirawani, Tq.
17:31:56 +0530
                         & Dist. Nashik.
                      5. The Branch Manager,
                         State Bank of India, Mumbai Naka
                         Branch, located at Mumbai Naka Area,
                         Agra Road, Nashik
                      6. Santosh Bhikaji Bhor
                         Age 35 years, Occupation Business
                         R/o Pathardi Fata, Nashik
                      7. Nitin Asaram Shirsat
                         Age 30 years, Occupation – Business
                         R/o. Nashik, Location at House No.26,
                         Amarapali Chowk, Pabuddh Nagar, MIDC

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   Satpur, Nashik, Taluka & Distrcit Nashik
8. Business Co-operative Bank Ltd.
   Meher Branch Nashik, located at Kailas            …Respondents
   Bhavan, Near Meher Signal, Old Mumbai            (Ori.Resp.Nos.3
   Agra Road, Nashik                                       to 6 & 8.

Mr. Anand Poojari, a/w Reet and Rahila Menon, i/b S. I. Joshi
     & Co., for the Applicant.
Mr. Nitin Thakker, a/w Vivek Punjabi and Priyansh Jain, for
     Respondent No.1.

                        CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                   RESERVED ON: 29th JULY, 2026
                 PRONOUNCED ON: 22nd SEPTEMBER, 2026

JUDGMENT:-

1.    This revision application is directed against an order dated

22nd June, 2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Nashik, on

an application for rejection of the plaint under the provisions of

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the

Code”), whereby the said application (Exhibit-32) preferred by

the Applicant-Defendant No. 7 in Special Civil Suit No. 91 of

2023, came to be rejected.


2.    Shorn of superfluities, the background facts leading to

this revision application can be stated as under:


2.1   Respondent No.1 - Plaintiff was the owner of the flats,

being Flat Nos. 19 and 26 in Shri Kalavishva Co-operative

Housing Society Limited, situated at Survey No. 570/1-2, Plot

No. 5, within the limits of Nashik Municipal Corporation (“the

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suit flats”). On 12th March, 2020, the Plaintiff had purportedly

executed a Sale Deed styled as Transfer Deed in favour of

Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for a consideration of Rs. 49,51,000/-.

Defendant No. 7 is a Housing Finance Company.               Defendant

Nos.1 and 2 had availed loan from Defendant No. 7 to finance

the acquisition of the subject flats. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2

committed default in repayment of the loan amount. Defendant

No. 7 was thus constrained to initiate action against Defendant

Nos. 1 and 2 and the suit flats in which Defendant Nos. 1 and 2

had   created   a   security    interest.   Eventually,   the   learned

Magistrate   passed    an      order   under    Section   14    of   the

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI Act,

2002”) for possession of the subject flats.


2.2   In the meanwhile, the Plaintiff – Respondent No.1

instituted the suit on 9th February, 2023, seeking a declaration

that the Transfer Deed dated 13th March, 2020, having been

obtained by practicing fraud on the Plaintiff, was null and void

and the ownership of the Plaintiff over the suit flats was not

thereby divested and that Defendant No. 7 and the other co-

Defendants had no concern with the suit land and for the

consequential relief of injunction.

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2.3   In the said suit, by an order dated 22nd June, 2024, the

learned Civil Judge granted an interim injunction restraining

the Defendants from causing obstruction to, or interference

with, the Plaintiff's possession over the suit flats.


2.4   Defendant No. 7 took out an application for rejection of the

plaint under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, on

the ground that the suit was barred by the provisions contained

in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.


2.5   The application was resisted by the Plaintiff.


2.6   After appraisal of the averments in the plaint, and the

submissions canvassed on behalf of the parties, the learned

Civil Judge was persuaded to reject the application for the

rejection of the plaint observing that, the Civil Court had

jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the question as to

whether the Sale Deed was obtained by practicing fraud on the

Plaintiff, and there were adequate averments in the plaint to

merit the trial of the suit. Conversely, the DRT was not

competent to adjudicate the issues raised by the Plaintiff and

grant the prayers sought by the Plaintiff.


3.    Being aggrieved, Defendant No. 7 has come in revision.




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4.   I have heard Mr. Anand Poojari, the learned Counsel for

the Applicant, and Mr. Nitin Thakker, the learned Senior

Advocate for Respondent No. 1-Plaintiff, at some length. The

learned Counsel took the Court through the averments in the

plaint and the documents annexed thereto.


5.   Mr. Poojari, the learned Counsel for the Applicant,

submitted that the learned Civil Judge misconstrued the nature

of the suit. The fact that the suit was instituted after Defendant

No. 7, the secured creditor, initiated measures under Section 13

of the SARFAESI Act to realise the security was completely lost

sight of by the trial Court. The alleged fraud was discovered in

the month of March 2020 itself and, yet, the suit came to be

instituted after the possession notice was affixed on the suit

flats in the year 2023. This motive behind the litigation did not

enter the verdict of the learned Civil Judge, submitted Mr.

Poojari.


6.   Mr. Poojari further submitted that, the learned Judge

wrongly assumed jurisdiction on the premise that the Plaintiff

had pleaded fraud. Mere use of the words "fraud" or "fraudulent"

in the plaint is of no significance. The person seeking to avoid a

transaction evidenced by a registered instrument is enjoined to

plead the material particulars in relation to, and the manner in

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which, the fraud was allegedly played.   The averments in the

plaint, Mr. Poojari would urge, singularly lack the requisite

particulars. Such bald allegations of fraud are of no avail. To

bolster up this submission, Mr. Poojari placed reliance on the

judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Charu Kishor

Mehta vs. Prakash Patel and others1, and Electrosteel Castings

Limited vs. UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and

Others2.

7.   Mr. Poojari strenuously urged that, the bar to the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to a matter which is

governed by the provisions of the Recovery of Debts and

Bankruptcy Act, 1993, (“the RDB Act”) and the SARFAESI Act is,

in a sense, absolute. Any person aggrieved by the measures

initiated by the secured creditor qua the secured assets has to

work out his remedies before the Tribunal constituted under the

RDB Act. The statutory bar cannot be circumvented by resorting

to clever drafting. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Poojari

banked upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of

Jagdish Singh vs. Heeralal and others3, Sree Anandhakumar

Mills Limited vs. Indian Overseas Bank and others 4, Punjab and

1    2022 SCC OnLine SC 1962.
2    (2022) 2 SCC 573.
3    (2014) 1 SCC 479.
4    (2019) 14 SCC 788.
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Sind Bank vs. Frontline Corporation Limited5, and Central Bank

of India and Another vs. Prabha Jain and Others6.

8.    In opposition to this, Mr. Nitin Thakker, the learned Senior

Advocate for Respondent No. 1, submitted that the learned Civil

Judge has correctly exercised the jurisdiction not to reject the

plaint at the threshold. Neither there is any jurisdictional error

nor material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction by the trial

Court. Therefore, in exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction,

this Court may not interfere with the impugned order.


9.    Mr. Thakker joined the issue on the absence of pleadings

to make out a case of fraud. Taking the Court through the

averments in the plaint and the documents annexed thereto, Mr.

Thakker would urge, the Plaintiff has specifically averred about

the manner in which the fraud was practiced upon him. The

Plaintiff has furnished all the necessary particulars in regard to

the acts and conduct of the co-defendants which were

fraudulent in nature. The manner in which Defendant No. 7

professed to sanction the purported loan to Defendant Nos. 1

and 2 also betrays an element of knowledge about the

fraudulent acts on the part of the co-Defendants. Mr. Thakker



5     (2023) 16 SCC 301.
6     (2025) 4 SCC 38.
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would further urge, in any event, it is now well settled by a

catena of judgments that, the determination of fraud and the

consequential reliefs of declaration and injunction are beyond

the remit of the statutory powers of DRT, a Tribunal with limited

jurisdiction.


10.   Mr. Thakker laid emphasis on the fact that the issues

raised by the Plaintiff and the prayers sought by the Plaintiff are

such that the DRT can neither examine those issues nor grant

the reliefs. Only the Civil Court having plenary jurisdiction can

grant the reliefs of the nature claimed by the Plaintiff. To lend

support to the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Thakker pressed into

service a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of

Bank of Baroda vs. Gopal Shriram Panda and another 7, wherein

this Court elaborately considered the interplay between the

jurisdiction of the DRT and the Civil Court where infringement

of civil rights is alleged.


11.   At any rate, Mr. Thakker would submit, the issue of fraud

raised by the Plaintiff merits trial and the Plaintiff cannot be

non-suited at the threshold.


12.   I have given careful consideration to the submissions

canvassed across the bar.

7     2021 SCC Online Bom 466.
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13.   Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 empowers any

secured creditor to enforce the security interest without the

intervention of the Court or Tribunal, in accordance with the

provisions of the said Act, notwithstanding anything contained

in Section 69 or 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP

Act, 1882”).


14.   Under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, any person

including the borrower, aggrieved by any of the measures

referred to in Sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured

creditor may make an application to the Tribunal assailing the

legality, propriety and correctness of the measures initiated by

the secured creditor.


15.   The measures which can be taken by the secured creditor

have been enumerated in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, bars the jurisdiction of

the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of

any matter which the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is

empowered by or under the said Act to determine and

proscribes grant of injunction by any Court or Authority in

respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any

power conferred by or under the said Act or under the RDB Act,

1993. Section 35 provides that the provisions of the SARFAESI

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Act, 2002 shall have overriding effect, notwithstanding anything

inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time

being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any

such law.


16.   The fulcrum of the submissions on behalf of the applicant

was that the instant suit is clearly barred by the provisions of

Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.               Section 34 reads as

under:

      “Section 34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction.-
             No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any
      suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts
      Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or
      under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted
      by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken
      or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under
      this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
      Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).”

17.   Whether the aforesaid provision excludes the jurisdiction

of the Civil Court to entertain, try and decide the suit of the

present nature, is at the heart of the matter.


18.   To begin with, it is necessary to note that the jurisdiction

of the Civil Court to decide the suits of a civil nature is of wide

amplitude.    It is considered to be plenary. The normal rule is

that the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all suits of civil

nature except those of which cognizance by the Civil Court is

either expressly or impliedly barred. An inference of exclusion


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of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not to be readily drawn.

On the contrary, there is a presumption in favour of the

existence rather than the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the

Civil Court. Where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is stated to

be barred by the adjudicatory machinery created by the special

statute, then investigation as to the issues like, whether the

statute gives finality to the orders of the Tribunal or Authority

created therein and whether such Tribunal or Authority is

empowered to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a

suit, warrant consideration. Even in such cases, the jurisdiction

of the Civil Court cannot be completely barred.         If it can be

demonstrated that the provisions of the particular statute have

not been complied with or the Tribunal or Authority constituted

thereunder has not acted in conformity with the fundamental

principles of judicial procedure, the Civil Court can still

adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the parties.


19.   On the aforesaid premise of the nature of the jurisdiction

of the Civil Court, if the provisions of Section 34 of the

SARFAESI Act, 2002 are considered, it becomes abundantly

clear that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred “in respect

of” any matter which the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal is

empowered under the said Act to determine and the second part

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of Section 34 proscribes the grant of injunction also “in respect

of” any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power

conferred under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 or the RDB Act, 1993.

Though the expression, “in respect of” appears to be of wide

connotation,   yet,   the   said   expression   is   required   to   be

appreciated in the light of the expression which follows, “ any

matter which a DRT or Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or

under this Act to determine”.       On a proper construction, the

latter expression governs the former expression, “in respect of”.

On a plain reading, it thus becomes evident that the interdict

contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to a suit or

proceeding is in respect of any matter which the DRT is

empowered by or under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 to determine.

The necessary corollary is that the prohibition is in respect of

the matters which properly fall within the ambit of the measures

envisaged by Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.


20.   Likewise, the bar under Section 18 of the RDB Act, 1993 is

in relation to the matters specified in Section 17 of the said Act,

which, in turn, empowers the Tribunal to                exercise the

jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide

applications from the Banks and Financial Institutions for

recovery of debts due to such Banks and Financial Institutions.

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21.   The aforesaid statutory regime, therefore, necessitates an

enquiry into the matters which can be legitimately determined

by the Tribunal or the province of authority of the Tribunal

under    the   SARFAESI       Act,   2002   and    RDB     Act,   1993.

Incontrovertibly, the Tribunal constituted under the RDB Act,

1993 is a creature of statute.        The Tribunal cannot exercise

authority or assume jurisdiction over the matters which have

not     been   specifically    entrusted    to    the    Tribunal    for

determination. Of necessity, the Tribunal has to act within the

parameters of the jurisdiction conferred upon it.


22.   Keeping the aforesaid principle in view, the controversy at

hand is required to be appreciated. The foundational premise of

the case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant No. 3, with whom

the Plaintiff had financial transactions, had in collusion with

the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and the other co-defendants,

defrauded the Plaintiff by making him to execute the Sale Deed

by making false representations and thereafter surreptitiously

transferred the consideration from the account of the Plaintiff

maintained with State Bank of India to the Business Co-

operative Bank Ltd. account, and, eventually, the moneys were

distributed amongst the Plaintiff, Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 on

23rd March, 2020.

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23.    In view of the provisions contained in Order VI Rule 4 of

the Code, in all cases in which the party pleading reliance on

any misrepresentation, fraud and other vitiating elements,

particulars with dates and items, if necessary, shall be stated in

the pleading. The learned Civil Judge was of the view that there

were clear and sufficient averments in the plaint which prima

facie suggest as to how the fraud has been committed and,

thus, the case warranted a trial.


24.   Mr. Poojari, the learned Counsel for the Applicant,

submitted that mere assertion of fraud is of no avail. The

Plaintiff has failed to furnish the requisite particulars of fraud.

An endeavour was also made by Mr. Poojari to drive home the

point that even when a fraud is alleged unless such fraud is

attributable to the secured creditor, the Civil Court would not

have the jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.


25.   This submission was premised on the observations of the

Supreme Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and others

vs. Union of India and others8. Attention of the Court was

invited to the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph

51 of the judgment in the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra),

which read as under:


8     (2004) 4 Supreme Court Cases 311.
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      “51.    However, to a very limited extent jurisdiction of the civil court
      can also be invoked, where for example, the action of the secured
      creditor is alleged to be fraudulent or their claim may be so absurd
      and untenable which may not require any probe, whatsoever or to say
      precisely to the extent the scope is permissible to bring an action in
      the civil court in the cases of English mortgages. We find such a scope
      having been recognized in the two decisions of the Madras High Court
      which have been relied upon heavily by the learned Attorney General
      as well appearing for the Union of India, namely V. Narasimhachariar
      v. Egmore Benefit Society (Air 1955 Mad 135) AIR at pp.141 and 144, a
      judgment of the learned single Judge where it is observed as follows in
      para 22: (AIR p.143)

             "22. The remedies of a mortgagor against the
             mortgagee who is acting in violation of the rights, duties
             and obligations are twofold in character. The mortgagor
             can come to the Court before sale with an injunction for
             staying the sale if there are materials to show that the
             power of sale is being exercised in a fraudulent or
             improper manner contrary to the terms of the mortgage.
             But the pleadings in an action for restraining a sale by
             mortgagee must clearly disclose a fraud or irregularity
             on the basis of which relief is sought: 'Adams v. Scott,
             (1859) 7 WR (Eng.) 213 (Z49). I need not point out that
             this restraint on the exercise of the power of sale will be
             exercised    by    Courts    only   under    the    limited
             circumstances mentioned above because otherwise to
             grant such an injunction would be to cancel one of the
             clauses of the deed to which both the parties had agreed
             and annul one of the chief securities on which persons
             advancing moneys on mortgages rely. (See Ghose,
             Rashbehary: Law of Mortgages, Vol.II, 4th Edn., p 784).”



26.   Support was also sought to be drawn from the following

observations in the case of Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (supra):

       “7.1 It is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant herein that in
       the plaint there are allegations of “fraud” with respect to the
       assignment agreement dated 30-6-2018 and it is the case on behalf
       of the plaintiff – appellant herein that assignment agreement is
       “fraudulent” inasmuch as after the full payment as per the approved
       resolution plan under IBC and the original corporate debtor is
       discharged, there shall not be any debt by the plaintiff-appellant
       herein as is discharged, there shall not be any debt by the plaintiff-
       appellant herein as a guarantor and therefore assignment deed is
       fraudulent. Therefore, it is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-
       appellant herein that the suit in which there are allegations of
       “fraud” with respect to the assignment deed shall be maintainable
       and the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act shall not be
       applicable.

       7.2   However, it is required to be noted that except the words used
       “fraud”/”fraudulent” there are no specific particulars pleaded with
       respect to the “fraud”. It appears that by a clever drafting and using

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      the words “fraud”/”fraudulent” without any specific particulars with
      respect to the “fraud”, the plaintiff-appellant herein intends to get out
      of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and wants the suit
      to be maintainable. As per the settled proposition of law mere
      mentioning and using the word “fraud”/”fraudulent” is not sufficient
      to satisfy the test of “fraud”. As per the settled proposition of law
      such a pleading/using the word “fraud”/”fraudulent” without any
      material particulars would not tantamount to pleading of “fraud”.

      ……

      9.    Having considered the pleadings and averments in the suit
      more particularly the use of word “fraud” even considering the case
      on behalf of the plaintiff, we find that the allegations of “fraud” are
      made without any particulars and only with a view to get out of the
      bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and by such a clever
      drafting the plaintiff intends to bring the suit maintainable despite
      the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which is not
      permissible at all and which cannot be approved. Even otherwise it is
      required to be noted that it is the case on behalf of the plaintiff-
      appellant herein that in view of the approved resolution plan under
      IBC and thereafter the original corporate debtor being discharged
      there shall not be any debt so far as the plaintiff-appellant herein is
      concerned and therefore the assignment deed can be said to be
      “fraudulent”.
                                                    (emphasis supplied)



27.   Mr. Poojari would further urge that the fact that the

Plaintiff was not a borrower or guarantor was not of material

significance. The expression, “any person” used in Section 17 is

of wide import to cover in its fold any other person who may be

affected by any action taken under Section 13 of the SARFAESI

Act, 2002. A strong reliance was placed by Mr. Poojari on the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Singh

(supra), wherein the following observations were made:

      “19. The expression ‘any person’ used in Section 17 is of wide
      import and takes within its fold not only the borrower but also the
      guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken
      under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. Reference may be made
      to the Judgment of this Court in Satyavati Tondon’s case (supra).

      20. Therefore, the expression ‘any person’ referred to in Section 17
      would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well. Therefore, irrespective

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         of the question whether the civil suit is maintainable or not, under
         the Securitisation Act itself, a remedy is provided to such persons so
         that they can invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation
         Act, in case the bank (secured creditor) adopt any measure including
         the sale of the secured assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest.

         …...

         24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured
         creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor
         proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of
         Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower’s debt.
         One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of
         secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by
         way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person
         aggrieved by any of the “measures” referred to in sub-section (4) of
         Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under
         Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no
         civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding
         “in respect of any matter” which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is
         empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The
         expression ‘in respect of any matter’ referred to in Section 34 would
         take in the “measures” provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13
         of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any aggrieved person has
         got any grievance against any “measures” taken by the borrower
         under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to
         approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court.
         Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain
         any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under
         sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those
         matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate
         Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides
         other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act,
         which takes in Section 9 CPC as well.”



28.   The aforesaid submissions of Mr. Poojari are required to be

appreciated keeping in view the well recognized principle that a

judgment cannot be read like a statute. The words used in the

judgment cannot be construed with the same strictness as the

words and expressions employed by the legislature. The ratio of

the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mardia

Chemicals (supra) is that if it could be demonstrated that the

action     of   the    secured      creditor     is   based      on    fraudulent


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transactions, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not be

completely ousted.     A proposition that the fraud must be

attributable to the actions of the secured creditor and then only

the Civil Court would have jurisdiction may not be deducible

from a correct and meaningful reading of the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals (supra).


29.   As the process of creating security interest in a property

involves, at times, multiple parties and passes through various

stages, it would be difficult to accede to the submission that

only when it could be demonstrated that, the fraud is clearly

attributable to the secured creditor, the affected party could

invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It is quite conceivable

that the underlying transaction may be tainted with fraud, as

alleged in the instant case, and, subsequently, the security

interest is created in respect of the said property.    In such a

situation, the allegations of fraud and the consequences that

emanate therefrom cannot be legitimately enquired into by the

Tribunal which is a creature of statute with limited jurisdiction.


30.   A useful reference, in this context, can be made to a

Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Bank of

Baroda (supra), wherein the Division Bench, on a reference,

considered the following question:

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      "Whether the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to decide all the
      matters of civil nature, excluding those to be tried by the
      Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the
      Securitisation Act, in relation to enforcement of security
      interest of a secured creditor, is barred by Section 34 of the
      Securitisation Act ?



31.   After an elaborate analysis, the Division Bench answered

the above question as under:

      “Answer :
      The answer, looking to the nature of the question, in our view, is
      in parts :-
      (A) Jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to decide all
      matters relating to Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, is
      exclusive.
      (B) In all cases, where the title to the property, in respect of
      which a 'security interest', has been created in favour of the
      Bank or Financial Institution, stands in the name of the
      borrower and/or guarantor, and the borrower has availed the
      financial assistance, it would be only the DRT which would have
      exclusive jurisdiction to try such matters, to the total exclusion
      of the Civil Court. Any pleas as raised by the borrowers or
      guarantors, vis-a-vis the security interest, will have to be
      determined by the DRT.
      (C) The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the matters
      of civil nature, excluding those to be tried by the Debts
      Recovery Tribunal under Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI
      Act, in relation to enforcement of security interest of a secured
      creditor, is not barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act.
      (D) Where civil rights of persons other than the borrower(s) or
      guarantor (s) are involved, the Civil Court would have
      jurisdiction, that too, when it is prima facie apparent from the
      face of record that the relief claimed, is incapable of being
      decided by the DRT, under Section 17 of the DRT Act, 1993 read
      with Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act.
      (E) Even in cases where the enforcement of a security interest
      involves issues as indicated in Mardia Chemicals (supra) of
      fraud as established within the parameters laid down in A.
      Ayyasamy (supra); a claim of discharge by a guarantor under
      Sections 133 and 135 of the Contract Act [Mardia Chemicals
      (supra)]; a claim of discharge by a guarantor under Sections
      139, 142 and 143 of the Contract Act; Marshaling under Section
      56 of the Transfer of property Act [J.P. Builders (supra)]; the
      Civil Court shall have jurisdiction.

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      (F) Examples as indicated in para 22.3, are illustrative of the
      Civil Court's jurisdiction.
      (G) The principles laid down in para 33 (i) to (ix) of Sagar
      Pramod Deshmukh (supra) are in accordance with what we
      have discussed and held above.”
                                             (emphasis supplied)



32.   The Division Bench has held in clear and explicit terms

that, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide all the maters

of Civil nature, excluding those to be tried by the Tribunal

under Sections 13 and 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, in relation

to enforcement of security interest of a secured creditor, is not

barred by Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Where civil

rights of persons other than the borrowers or guarantors are

involved, the Civil Court would have jurisdiction, that too when

it is prima facie apparent from the face of the record that the

relief claimed is incapable of being granted by the Tribunal

under Section 17 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act,

1993 (“the RDB Act”) read with Sections 13 and 17 of the

SARFAESI Act, 2002. Likewise, the Civil Court would have

jurisdiction to decide the issue of fraud as indicated in Mardia

Chemicals (supra).




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33.    In the case of Central Bank of India and Anr Vs Prabha

Jain and Ors9, the Plaintiff had, inter alia, sought the following

reliefs :

       “(1) declaration that the sale deed executed by the brother-
       in-law of the Plaintiff in favour of the borrower was illegal;
       (2)  declaration that the mortgage deed executed by the
       borrower in favour of the bank was illegal;
       (3)    delivery of possession of the subject property”



34.     It is in that context, the Supreme Court held that, so far

as the first and second reliefs were concerned, they were not in

relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under

Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Rather, those reliefs

were in relation to action taken prior to the secured creditor

stepped into the picture and well prior to the creditor invoking

the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. Therefore, the Tribunal

would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI

Act, 2002 to grant declarations sought in the first and second

reliefs.


35.    To retain emphasis, reverting to the facts of the case, it

may be apposite to note that, the Plaintiffs in the instant case, is

seeking the following reliefs :

       “(1)   The plaintiff prays that the present suit be granted
       along with costs.

9      (2025) 4 SCC 38.
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      (2)    Considering the reason mentioned in the suit, the sale
      deed dated 13/03/2020, which was executed with the
      assistance of Defendant No. 3 by Defendants No. I and 2 and
      registered with- the Sub-Registrar, Nashik-1 under Registered
      Document No. 2183/2020, may be declared null and void
      and cancelled and also on the basis of said sale deed. It is
      further declared that the plaintiff's ownership of the suit
      property remains unaffected. And Notice of this declaration
      should be given to the Sub-Registrar, Nashik-1.

      (3)    It should be declared that Defendant No. 7, as well as
      other defendants, have no rights, interests, or claims
      concerning the suit property.

      (4)    It should be declared that defendants or any others
      person on behalf of defendants should be restrained from
      obstructing    or   interfering   with   the   plaintiff's   lawful
      possession of the suit property, either directly or through
      third party. They should not remove the plaintiffs possession,
      create any rights or interests related to the suit property, or
      engage in any dealings with others regarding the suit
      property and for that purpose permanent injunction be
      granted against the defendants.

      5.     Any other just and equitable reliefs should be passed
      in favour of the plaintiff.”




36.   If the principles adverted to above, are applied to the facts

of the case at hand, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction

under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, much less, under

Section 17 of the RDB Act, to grant declarations sought in

prayer clause (2), extracted above, which is the principal prayer



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on the grant or refusal of which the fate of the entire suit

hinges.


37.   While explaining the ratio in the case of Jagdish Singh

(supra), the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India

and Anr vs. Prabha Jain and Ors (supra), observed, inter alia, in

relation to the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the

case of Bank of Baroda (supra), as under :

      “29. In para 24 (of Jagdish Singh) this Court held that DRT
      has jurisdiction with respect to “measures” taken by the
      secured creditor under Section 13(4) and that in respect of
      such matters, the civil court’s jurisdiction is ousted. However,
      thereafter, there is no further discussion on the nature of the
      suit and without recording any finding that DRT has the
      power to decide partition suits, this Court straightaway
      affirmed the rejection of the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11.
      While doing so, this Court missed to consider that under
      Section 17, DRT has no power to partition properties and
      hence, civil court’s jurisdiction to grant a decree of partition
      cannot be said to be ousted. When there is no finding in the
      judgment that the DRT has the jurisdiction to grant the relief
      of partition, the judgment cannot be said to be a precedent
      on that point.
      30.   The aforesaid was looked into by a Division Bench of
      the Bombay High Court in Bank of Baroda (supra), and the
      reasonings       assigned   in    our   view    are    very
      commendable………..”
                                         (emphasis supplied)



38.   In view of the aforesaid clarification of law, in the context

of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 17 of the

SARFAESI Act, 2002, reliance placed by Mr. Poojari on the

decisions in the cases of Jagdish Singh (supra) and Sree

Anandhakumar Mills Ltd (supra), which followed Jagdish Singh

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(supra), does not advance the cause of the submission on behalf

of the Applicant.


39.    If the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the

case at hand, prima facie, the following position emerges. There

are clear and categorical allegations of fraud qua the Defendant

Nos. 1 to 3, especially the manner in which the Defendant No. 3

allegedly exploited the precarious financial position of the

Plaintiff and indulged in purported fraudulent acts. From the

averments in the plaint, it also becomes evident that, no sooner,

the purported fraud was unearthed, the Plaintiff had lodged a

criminal complaint against the Defendant No. 1 being Criminal

Case   No.   5338/2020,    and   also   reported   the   matter   to

Sarkarwada Police Station on 24th July, 2021. The manner in

which the purported consideration amount was shared between

Defendant    No.    1   (Rs.15,00,000/-),   Defendant      No.    3,

(Rs.6,00,000/-), and Defendant No. 4, (Rs. 25,00,000/-), when

the Defendant No. 1 was, in fact, the purchaser who was to pay

the consideration, also lends prima facie support to the claim

of the Plaintiff. The assertion in paragraph No. 5 of the plaint

that, Defendant No. 1 had drawn a cheque in the sum of

Rs.46,12,500/- payable on 20th March, 2020, after the fraud

was allegedly unearthed and, upon presentment, the said

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cheque was returned for insufficiency of funds also renders the

prima facie finding of the learned Civil Judge that, there are

adequate averments in the plaint to demonstrate the manner in

which the fraud was allegedly practiced to merit a trial.


40.   Resultantly, in exercise of limited revisional jurisdiction,

this Court does not find any jurisdictional error or material

irregularity in exercise of the jurisdiction by the learned Civil

Judge. The Civil Revision Application, thus, deserves to be

dismissed.

41.   Hence, the following order:

                          :ORDER:

      The Civil Revision Application stands dismissed.




                                          [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




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