MR. LAKSHMIKANT DIGAMBAR JOSHIversusRUTURAJ CO-OP. HO.SOC.THR.ITS CHAIRMAN-KANTILAL S. MUNOT AND SECRETARY R. P. SHAH

                                                                    901-CRA353-2026+.DOC

                                                                                 Santosh

                             IN THE HIGH Court OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                                CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 353 OF 2026

                      Lakshmikant Digambar Joshi                           ...Applicant
                                       Versus
                      Ruturaj Co-op. Housing Society Through its
                      Chairman and Ors.                                 …Respondents
                                                 WITH
                                  INTERIM APPLICATION NO.3471 OF 2026

                      Mr. S. C. Wakankar, for the Applicant.
                      Mr. Jaydeep Deo, for Respondents
SANTOSH
SUBHASH
KULKARNI                                            CORAM:     N. J. JAMADAR, J.
Digitally signed by
SANTOSH
                                                    DATED:     1st SEPTEMBER, 2026
SUBHASH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.09.05
17:47:56 +0530
                      Order:-

                      1.    This revision application is directed against an order dated

                      4th March, 2026, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Pune,

                      whereby an application preferred by the Applicant – Original

                      Defendant No. 1 for the return of the plaint for the presentation

                      to the proper Court under the provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of

                      the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“the Code’), came to be

                      rejected.


                      2.    The Respondent No. 1 – Plaintiff is a Housing Co-operative

                      Society, registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-

                      operative Societies Act, 1960 ("the Act, 1960"). The Respondent


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No. 1 instituted the suit with the assertions that the Applicant –

Defendant No. 1 is its member. The Society was formed with the

object to provide plots to its members for the construction of

bunglows/residential premises for their own use. As per the

approved by-laws of the Society and its resolutions, the plots

can only be used for the private residence of the members and

their respective families, and no multi-storied ownership scheme

is allowed to be implemented on the plots allotted by the Society.


3.   Defendant No.1 and Defendant Nos. 2 to 4, who are the

family members of the Defendant No.1, started development on

the subject plot of land. It transpired that the Defendant Nos.1

to 4 had surreptitiously entered into a registered Development

Agreement with Defendant No. 5, a registered partnership firm

of which Defendant Nos. 5A and 5B are the partners, to

construct a multi-storied building over the subject plot.

Irrevocable Power of Attorney has also been executed in favour

of Defendant No. 5, and thereby, cumulatively, transferring the

development rights in favour of Defendant No. 5, which, inter

alia, empowered the Defendant No. 5 to sell/transfer units in

the multi-storied structure to be erected on the subject plot.


4.   The Plaintiff further asserted, Defendant Nos. 6 and 7; the

Planning Authorities, have sanctioned the building plan without

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examining the permissibility of such development. Hence, the

suit seeking declaration that the Development Agreement and

the Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 11 th March, 2022, and

the Correction Deeds dated 1st April, 2022, in respect of the suit

property executed by and between the Defendant Nos. 1 to 4

and Defendant No. 5 are null and void, and not binding upon

the plaintiff Society and its members, the building plan

sanctioned by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 is illegal, and the

consequential reliefs of injunction.


5.   The Applicant – Defendant No. 1 appeared in the suit and

filed application for the return of the plaint, contending, inter

alia, that the pivotal issue in the suit revolved around the

disputes between the plaintiff Society and Defendant No. 1

member on account of the alleged breach of the by-laws of the

Plaintiff Society. Therefore, the Co-operative Court had exclusive

jurisdiction to try and decide such disputes.     Conversely, the

Civil Court’s jurisdiction was barred by the provisions contained

in Section 163 of the Act, 1960.


6.   By the impugned order, the learned Civil Judge was

persuaded to reject the application observing, inter alia, that

the dispute was not covered by the provisions contained in

Section 91 of the Act, 1960, and having regard to the prayers in

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the suit, only the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain,

try and decide the suit.


7.   Mr. Wakankar, the learned Counsel for the Applicant,

submitted that, at the heart of the controversy is the

construction of a multi-storied building, which the plaintiff

asserts is impermissible as per the by-laws of the Society.

Resultantly, the essential dispute is in regard to the business of

the Society and since that dispute has arisen between the

Society, and one of its members, only the Co-operative Court

has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, try and decide the

dispute of the present nature in view of the provisions contained

in Section 91(1) of the Act, 1960.


8.   Mr. Wakankar, took the Court through the averments in

paragraphs 3, 4 and 11 of the plaint, to bolster up the

submission that, the essential dispute was in relation to the

alleged violation of the by-laws and resolutions passed by the

Society, and the declarations sought by the Plaintiff in regard to

the instruments executed by the Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in favour

of Defendant No. 5 were in the nature of subsidiary reliefs. To

lend support to this submission, Mr. Wakankar placed reliance

on a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the

case of N. Jethani v. Shri Shivaji Co-operative Housing Society

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Ltd. Pune and others1.

9.    Per contra, Mr. Deo, the learned counsel for Respondent

No. 1 – Plaintiff, submitted that the dispute was not only

between the parties enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-

section (1) of Section 91 of the Act, 1960. Nor the subject matter

of the dispute fell within the specified categories. The reliefs of

declaration and injunction sought by the Plaintiff were beyond

the remit of the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. Thus,

only the Civil Court has the jurisdiction. To lend support to this

submission, Mr. Deo placed reliance on the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Margaret Almeida and Others vs.

Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society Limited and

Others2.

10.   The legal position as to the interplay between the

jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Co-operative Court under

the Act, 1960 is well settled by a catena of decisions. The

jurisdiction of the Civil Court is plenary and omnipresent.

Conversely, the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court is

circumscribed by the provisions contained in the Act, 1960; in

the context of the controversy at hand, Section 91 under the

caption “disputes”. To attract the provisions contained in
1     2015(2) Mh.L.J. 589.
2     (2012) 5 SCC 642.
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Section 91, the twin test of the “type” of the dispute and the

“identity” of the parties must be satisfied. In other words, the

dispute must be of the “type” described in Sub-section (1) of

Section 91, and such dispute must have arisen between the

parties who belong to any of the categories specified in Clauses

(a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) of that section.


11.   In the case of Margaret Almeida (supra), the Supreme

Court, after an analysis of the provisions contained in Section

91, Section 163 and related provisions of the Act, 1960,

enunciated in clear and explicit terms that, the disputes which

are mandatorily required to be referred to the Co-operative

Court should be of the category which are referred to in Section

91(1), and such disputes must have arisen between the parties

to dispute who should belong to one or the other categories

specified under clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 91,

referred to therein as, “enumerated persons”. The Supreme

Court exposited that, both the subject matter as well as the

parties to the dispute must be those specified under that

section. In other words, the Supreme Court clarified, if either of

the aforementioned requirement is not satisfied then the dispute

cannot be adjudicated by the Co-operative Court. If one of the

parties to the dispute is not an enumerated person, the

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question, whether the subject-matter of the dispute is one which

falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court

need not be examined. Similarly, if it is found in a given case

that the subject-matter of the dispute is not covered by Section

91, an inquiry into the question whether the parties to the

dispute fall under any of the categories enumerated under

Section 91 would become irrelevant.


12.   Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the case at

hand, especially in the light of the nature of the instruments

executed by Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in favour of Defendant No. 5,

which broadly indicate that, in lieu of the transfer of

development rights, Defendant No. 1 is to get two flats and

monetary consideration of Rs.1 Crore only, and the Defendant

No. 5 is entitled to sell, transfer and monetize rest of the land

and constructed units that may become available, it becomes

abundantly clear that, the twin test is not satisfied. Neither the

dispute is confined to the type of the disputes covered by sub-

section (1) of Section 91, nor the parties to the suit belong to the

categories of persons enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-

section (1) of Section 91. Moreover, the Co-operative Court has

no jurisdiction to grant the declarations in regard to the legality

and validity of the instruments executed by Defendant Nos. 1 to

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4 in favour of Defendant No. 5, much less in regard to the

development permission granted by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7.


13.   The submission of Mr. Wakankar that, the dispute

ultimately boils down to the binding character of the bye-laws

and resolutions of the Society restricting the development over

the plots does not carry the matter any further, as even if some

part of the dispute may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Co-operative Court, yet, the entirety of the dispute is

completely beyond the remit of its jurisdiction, and only the

Civil Court having plenary jurisdiction can entertain, try and

decide the controversy and grant the reliefs of the nature

claimed in the suit.


14.   Resultantly, the learned Civil Judge committed no error in

rejecting the application for return of the plaint. Thus, there is

neither any jurisdictional error nor material irregularity in

exercise of the jurisdiction by the trial Court, so as to warrant

exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court.


15.   The application thus stands dismissed.


16.   In   view   of   dismissal    of   the    revision   application,

IA/3471/2026 also stands disposed.


                                               [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

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